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My thesis is a description of the structure of rationality and
morality.It does not argue for one conception of rationality against
others,but argues that all conceptions of rationality are the result
of participation in a basic sort of activity - theoretical activity
- which I understand as the fundamental exercise of reason.It is in
terms of this,deeper,activity of reason that all individual
conceptions of rationality can be explained,even though rational
behaviour is explained not in terms of it,but by the particular
conception of rationality of the agent.Consequently,I oppose only
conceptions of rationality which are 'absolutistwhich imply that
rational behaviour can only be behaviour justified by their
principles,and never behaviour justified by the principles of
conceptions of rationality arrived at through different exercises of
theoretical activity.
Since rationality is participation in forms of theoretical activity
concerning principles by those whose principles they are,the basis
of rationality is the shared life in which principles are learned
and the kinds of intellectual activity in which they are confirmed
and/or revised: community and communication.These features are also
the basis of morality which is communication concerning concrete
situations within particular communities. Morality differs from
rationality because the sort of communication it involves is not a
means to establishing principles,but the end of this.Morality has a
goal.then.and it has two aspects:an understanding
component, ethics, and an experiential component,love.
Chapter 1 analyses Aristotle's Final Good and concept of dialectic.I
explain how rational behaviour can be both based on First Principles
directed to a determinate end,and pursued through involvement with
community,political, norms.The determinate good is dependent upon
contingently structured,shared norms. Chapter^2 analyses Aquinas's
Natural Law and the structure of practical reason and of the
Summa.This indicates how the precepts of Natural Law are compatible
with,and require participation in,intellectual enquiries in which
current orthodoxy is constantly questioned.
These non-absolutist readings of Aristotle and Aquinas are balanced
in Chapter 3 by the deficiencies of the absolutist Natural Law of
William Blackstone and John Finnis.The criticism of rational
absolutism is continued in Chapter 4 with an account of the defects
of Kant's practical rationality,and in Chapter 5 which surveys
utilitarianism and other contemporary moral philosophy.This leads to
my own account of morality as social practice,and its relation to
ethics in terms of understanding and experience.
Chapter 6 defends my view of rationality against contemporary
functionalist and agent-centred alternatives.Chapter 7 defines the
terms in which communication and community have been
explained,explains the relation of morality to rationality,and
describes the structure of practical reasoning.
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'...hence new customs can arise having the force of law.For such
exterior actions, frequently repeated., effectively declare the
interior movement of the will and the concept of reason. '
St.Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologiae.1-2.97■3■c.
Introduction.
This thesis is an account of rationality.It claims that an account
oi rationality must rest squarely upon two concepts,communication
and community.Given the history of the philosophical treatment of
rationality,it is by examining theories of practical rationality
that I will be able to argue far the centrality of communication and
community.lt is in such theories,and not in more formal or technical
treatises of 'theoretical' rationality,that these two concepts are
discussed,and as I will argue that these concepts are necessary to
an understanding of rationality,it is by detailed examination of
theories of practical rationality that I will construct my account
of rationality.
My thesis is that every theory of rationality concerns facts and
presuppositions of particular cultures and social contexts,but that
it is possible to give an account of what rationality Is. which is
not an account based upon cultural and contextual norms,but an
account which is universal for human beings,and which is based upon
the concepts of communication and community.This account explains
theories of rationality by showing that they are themselves
paradigmatic instances of rationality:rationality,explained in
terms of communication and community,is a form of activity,what I
call theoretical activity,which produces such things as theories of
rationality;these theories of rationality will reflect the
prevailing norms of the communities within which the theoretical
activity is being pursued.Thus,although it is not possible to judge
individual theories of rationality except with reference to
internal,ultimately social,criteria of relevance and adequacy,it is.
possible to judge whether or not they are theories of rationality
with respect to the account, which I shall give, of what rationality
is.
As I am here not only presenting this idea but arguing for it,my
study will inevitably possess elements oi an analytic theory of
rationality,namely that relevant to my own upbringing and
education,and elements of historical/critical interpretations of
other concepts of rationality,those I choose to consider.My
argument,then,will proceed by methods derived from the conception of
rationality by which I and those around me explain our behaviour,and
by critical interpretations of alternative conceptions of
rationality.Given what my thesis is and the fact that I want to
argue for it,I can see no alternative methodology to this. Any
tension between my inevitable and parochial concentration on the
conception I find around me and those others I choose to discuss on
the one hand and my suggested account that what rationality is. is
something universal for all human communities on the other should be
clarified by the one particular historical theory of rationality I
take as privileged above all others,not in respect of its own
principles,but because oi its acknowledgement of the need for a
deeper understanding of what rationality is than that provided by
theories of rationality,including itself.
By distinguishing the particular theory of rationality of Thomas
Aquinas from what I claim to be his more fundamental understanding
of what rationality is - an understanding based on the concepts of
communication and community - I have a model for my own project of
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giving an account of rationality and not just one more theory of
rationality.And in his method of reflection on one's 'own* theory
and historical/critical interpretation of the best alternatives to
it,I find not just a method for constructing a twentieth century
theory of rationality,but a model for an account of what rationality
is.It will emerge that the parochial methodology is not only the
inevitable means of presenting my account,but also very much the
substance of my account of rationality.
I believe that this centrality of communication and community is not
centrality within our understanding of one particular sphere or
attribute of human life:it is centrality to understanding of human
life in total. If these concepts are required for full understanding
of human beings, rationality, which depends on them,cannot be simply
one more human attribute or capacity:it is rather the ultimate
intelligibility or form of human life.
This is a very traditional sounding conclusion,yet ray view of
rationality does not accord with traditional foundationalist-realist
theories but with what Rorty has called theories of solidarity
(R.Rorty,'Objectivity or Solidarity?' in eds. J.Rachmann and
C.Vest,Post-Analytic Philosophy)■That is,it is influenced by the
thought of Wittgenstein, Kuhn,Feyerabend, Habermas, Rorty and the
climate of anti-foundationalism.These names, however,do not appear in
my thesis.My concern is to construct a philosophy within this mode
but which finds its roots within the Aristotelian and Thomist
traditions;to suggest,as Maclntyre has done,that parts of this
tradition are useful in the anti-foundationalist cause, in particular
the vision of rationality as the basic human condition,though not of
any theory of rationality as foundationally or metaphysically
privileged;and to advance an account of morality which is both
acceptable to the anti-foundationalist yet preserves what I believe
to be a vital insight of the traditional view: the belief that there
is a persistent level of value beyond particular moralities,and that
there is moral truth (even if there is no other objective
truth),defined as correspondence of moralities with this level.I
call this level ethics.
My conclusion is traditional sounding because of its intentional
historical basis,and because it preserves the traditional views of
rationality as definitive of humanity and morality as giving access
to certain value.It is not acceptable to a
traditionalist,however, because it holds rationality is a form of
activity and that the rational first principles,the particular
theories of rationality,this activity creates may all be completely
revised or rejected by further activity;and because it holds that
moralities may fail to express the basic,certain values - may be
false - though there is no access to ethical value except through
the morality within which I happen to find myself.
The way in which our western philosophical tradition - the tradition
which is post-Homeric,post-Platonic,post-Augustinian and post-
Kantian - has unfolded means that the concepts of communication and
community should be easiest illustrated through the intersection of
historical theory of reason and theory of morality:practical
rationality.These two vital elements of a human life have been too
often bracketed off as mere capacities or aspects of life by
philosophical writers rather than treated as the forms of human
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life.To recover the true picture of human life as
rationality,and, secondarily, morality,we must first choose a definite
critical strategy for recovering the concepts of communication and
community from historical theory of practical rationality.This will
isolate these concepts in a foundational role,allowing me to start
upon an account of rationality based upon their structure.
My method will be to explain in the context of the Aristotelian
background and against the alternatives of Kantian and utilitarian
rationalities the relation between the theory of practical
reason,the doctrine of Natural Law,of Thomas Aquinas and his own
more fundamental understanding of what rationality is.This
exposition will show how it is possible both to have a theory of
rationality the first principles of which are determined by the
factors of one's time, circumstances, cultural factors and so on,and.
to have a belief in a more fundamental rationality consisting in the
primary, and the highest,activity of a human being:to communicate and
doing so,to construct,as well as to exercise,conceptions of
rationality.Having exposed communication and community in this way, I
will go on to construct the account of rationality as theoretical
activity.Rationality is a form of activity because it consists in
communication;and it is theoretical,in a sense which I will derive
from Aquinas,because it is communication by means of the intelligent
application of learned norms.These two characteristics of activity
and the theoretical are the materials for the content of my account
of rationality.
As a form of activity rationality is intimately related to morality
(the historical philosophers were not wrong when they explained
morality as practical reason).Morality is related to rationality not
as one,or the highest,application of it,but because finite rational
beings have needs and these needs stand in logical relations to
goods which constitute the prerequisites of any system of
morality.As theoretical activity rationality is necessarily a
constant recreation of the community norms it applies.I provide
explanations of activity and theory which explain the
'revolutionary' nature of any piece of rational behaviour.If
behaviour is rational.it cannot consist merely in application of
rules:it must stretch in the very application of them,at least
towards a justification of them; at most towards their replacement.
In this introduction I provide an overview of the study, but it may
be useful first to summarise the two ways in which it may be read.In
both of these the position I take on Aquinas is the most important
factar.First.it can be explained as a two-section work.In the first
section the centrality of the notion of dialectic in theory of
rationality and theory of morality within a certain stream of
thought (Aristotle/Aquinas/Natural Law tradition) is examined and
defended against alternative non-dialectical theories within our
philosophical tradition; in the second section this centrality is
explicitly assigned to the notions of communication and community
which the historical conception of dialectic clarifies,and these
notions are analysed.
Secondly,the study can be explained in three parts:part one attempts
to deflect the reading of Aristotle and Aquinas as 'non-
perspectivist' or foundationalist thinkers by emphasising the
dialectical nature of their thought at the expense of their status
as theorists of rationality and morality from first principles;part
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two considers two forms of philosophical thought which do suggest we
can construct theories of rationality and morality from first
principles,and criticises both these theories and this conception of
theory;part three a/ suggests a way of understanding morality which
involves taking seriously the nature of love,interpreting this as
communication,and interpreting community as striving at the level of
everyday affairs (morality) to achieve communication of individuals
as individuals (ethics:an aspect of love),and b/ suggests that
though we cannot produce a universally valid theory of
rationality,we can produce a detailed account of the sort of
activity rationality is (theoretical activity) and the sort of risks
it involves for finite creatures (needs),and thereby a foundation
for practical reasoning.
In both of these explanations Aquinas is central.lt is the
particular way in which he harmonises his own theory of rationality
(God,objects of natural inclinations and first principles of
practical reason) with dialectical enquiry into others which
suggests to me the notion of a pre-theoretical account of
rationality and the method for establishing community and
communication as the basis of this account.And it is this
harmonisation which suggests to me the possibility of a middle-
position between universal first principles of rationality and
relativist rationality of cultural norms;a middle-position which
acknowledges the specificity and independence of particular theories
of rationality,but sees them all as expressions of a deeper
rationality which all human beings share:the ability to communicate
intelligently,to exercise and to recreate standards of
rationality,and so to function as part of a community.This middle-
position seems to me to characterise Aristotle's ethics, Aquinas's
theory of human nature,and the best of Natural Law tradition.
The reason for beginning with Aristotle is not only the obvious
background importance of his ethics for Aquinas's theory of
practical reason,but my belief that in his ethics we have the
example of an account of what rationality is,in terms of elements
similar to those of Aquinas;a particular and coherent theory of
practical rationality;and that we see these related in a
particularly brilliant way.My explanation of this relation should
explain how Aristotle avoids the poles of moral absolutism and moral
relativism. This middle position, I claim, is the same position as that
of Aquinas.
Absolutism is the greatest error in conceptions of rationality,and
in all normative conceptions,for the purposes of this
thesis.Absolutism I understand as anti-perspectivism. If
perspectivism is the thesis that no normative claims may be valid
because of conditions which make no reference to the particular
context or the contingent circumstances of the claimant, anti-
perspectivism is the thesis that the validity of normative claims
may rest in conditions which make no reference to the context or
contingent circumstances of the claimant.This is what I understand
as absolutism.lt is a view which has been,and sometimes
is,held,particularly by the Catholic Church,concerning the ethics of
Aristotle and the moral philosophy of Thomas Aquinas.Part of the
work of my thesis is to show that these are not absolutist
theories.Further work would be to show that this conclusion should
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not dismay admirers of the theories of practical rationality of
Aristotle and Aquinas.
I summarise and discuss the argument of Michomachean Ethics
concerning eudaimonia and the ergon,the division of the soul,the
deduction of practical wisdom and the concept of the phronimos. I
give an account of the theory of deliberation,and the role in this
of a concept of the Final End.I approach the problem of the
structure of the End through the concept of dialectic.Dialectic is
vaiuable as a means to the First Principles of the various
sciences,and it is valuable in itself because it is. a means to
something so important, Similarly, moral virtue is valuable as a
means,in various different ways,to theoria,and it is valuable in
itself because it is a means to something so important.This leads to
a dynamic concept of eudaimonia:practical activity conditions
theoretical contemplation,and both have equal value. Eudaimonia does
not entail absolutism because the Final End is not a determinate
state of set ol activities,but a lifetime of participation in those
practical/moral activities which,to different degrees and in
different ways,facilitate theoretical activities,and of
participation in theoretical activities.This concept of eudaimonia
does provide the ultimacy and self-suiiiciency necessary to give
point to deliberation,and so Aristotle does possess a coherent
account of reasoning as central part oi a non-absolutist theory of
rationality.
In the second part of my first chapter I turn to dialectic,claiming
that we cannot understand the relation of moral activity and theoria
unless we address Aristotle's conception of enquiry,particularly
ethical enquiry.Ethics is not only enquiry into First Principles of
morality,but enquiry into the social practices and beliefs which are
the presuppositions of all First Principles.It seems this limits the
power of ethics to teach,or convert,and to explain the moral
principles outside of particular social contexts.I introduce the
importance of the concept of community here (where Maclntyre
emphasises tradition),believing that it can reconcile Aristotle's
dialectical approach to rationality with the concept of an end which
is truly final,which gives point to deliberation.In fact,I argue,in
the text of N.E. the question of a reconciliation of eudaimonia with
dialectical explanation of First Principles of morality and all
rational enquiries does not arise because in its purpose,its form
and certain of its precepts the text is. the theory that the Final
Good is determined by,and is exercised by,the prevalent forms of
explanation due to the exercise of dialectical enquiry in
determining First Principles.
Aristotle's achievement is not the creation of the practical
concepts utilised by Aristotelian moral philosophers, but the
conception of the relation of these to the theoretical enquiries
into rational action of a particular community,ethics;the relation
of ethics to moral training;and the dialectical understanding of
ethics.This leads to discussions of Aristotle's conception of
ethics,of the text of H. E.,of the theory of virtue,of early moral
training and moral education,and of theory of dialectic.These
discussions explain the relation of dialectical activity concerning
the community's norms to the intuitive apprehension of First
Principles, mjus.( and the relation of moral/practical activity to
theoretical contemplation.It appears that the life of
moral/practical virtue consists in immersal in the community
mores:these are not merely the source of First Principles but the
actual form of life of a community;hence,the value of such a life in
itself and not merely as a means to First Principles.
I determine that the life of moral/practical activity has the
property of ultimacy because the endoxa are ultimate,and the
property of self-sufficiency because theoretical activity is not
other than,not higher than,it,but a form of reasoning from the
endoxa when these are grasped by nous.Theoretical contemplation and
moral/practical activity are,in fact.inseparable in Aristotle's
theory of practical rationality:their common source in the endoxa
means that in a human life they will both be constituents of
eudaimonia,and constituents of equal value.We can prove this
inseparability because we know that dialectical activity is the
necessary condition of apprehension of the First Principles,and we
know that moral/practical activity concerns the endoxa of
dialectical activity and that theoretical activity proceeds from the
First Principles we apprehend by nous.A lifetime of activity in
accord with highest virtue,then,is a lifetime of theoretical
activity and of those moral/practical activities whose dialectical
nature leads to our apprehension of First Principles of theoretical
activities.
Aristotle's concept of rationality forms the basis for an
understanding of rationality which may co-exist with our own
particular theory or conception of rationality whatever that happens
to be. Rationality is a community cnTnmnTn.cating in a pre-theoretical
yet theoretically basic way.This account of 'pre-theoretical yet
theoretically basic' communication within communities can be further
explained by a study of Thomas Aquinas who combines Aristotle's
relation of dialectic and ethics with the Eternal Law to give us the
Natural Law through the principles of which we discover the identity
of reason with dialectic within the human community.
I introduce the context and purpose of Aquinas's work,and the
central concepts of his theory of practical rationality:the dual
operations of reason,the First Principle of practical reason,the
precepts of Natural Law,and the natural inclinations.The main
relations to be discussed are those between human nature and the
Final Good,and natural inclinations and practical reason.I discuss
why Aquinas's Final End,unlike Aristotle's,must lie outside the
human community,the structure of the End of Beatitude and the
relation of the Natural Law to it,and the ordering of the natural
inclinations.They do not amount to a determinate account of the
content of right conduct,but they do have a necessity due to the
Eternal Law.To understand how they can have necessity though their
content must be spelled out in accordance with contingent factors I
turn to stoic thought which relates natural inclinations to law,and
to neo-platonism which explains the connection of natural
inclinations to the scale of being and the diffusion of God through
the scale,thus explaining the connection of natural inclinations to
the Final Good.
To understand how practical reason operates through the natural
inclinations as the agent pursues his good I have to explain the
basic principles of practical reason,their relation to the formal
First Principle,and the concepts of self-evidence and synderesis.In
particular,I have to discuss the derivation of secondary practical
principles irom the basic ones through consideration of human law
and convention.Most oi our practical reasoning actually depends upon
such secondary principles and so morality depends upon social norms
and conventions.The Natural Law then is both participation in
Eternal Law and articulation of contingently determined norms:in
other words,it is human participation in Eternal Law.It
is,therefore,not an absolutist rational theory because it is
constantly open to extension and revision.To understand this Aquinas
has to be further examined.
There are three reasons why the theory of Natural Law is not
absolutist:Natural Law is not autonomous;its basic principles hold
because human beings are as they are,and not because reason is as it
is;and the First Principle of practical reason is not just the basic
principle of action,but the principle of activity which makes clear
to us that activity is primarily theoretical,and which helps us to
see that it is (theoretical) activity which is. rationality.This last
claim takes up the remainder of my chapter on Aquinas.I try to show
that theoretical enquiry is activity;that activity is the basic
human experience of reason;that scientific enquiry is the most
perfect theoretical activity;and that theoretical activity underlies
all human action.I do this by a discussion of the context,purpose
and method oi the Suaaa intended to show that it is not theory
anything,but theory become activity:an uncompletable process of
theorising continually extended.
I claim that the First Principle of practical reason is Aquinas's
explanation of our participation in activity,and the cause of this
participation (it is principle of intentionality).Activity is a more
basic concept than either thought or action for Aquinas;it is an
involvement of reason at a level prior to logic or
ethics:fundamental human involvement in dialectical creation and
exercise of norms,involvement under the modality of the First
Principle.As such,a participation in a particular activity is,in
itself.no more 'rational' than a participation in any
other:activity-participation is what rationality consists
in:1udgements of rationality require particular conceptions of
rationality and can only be made once participation in theoretical
activity has created particular social norms and contexts of
conformity.
A particularly important example of rational activity will be one
which can both explain present normative standards and principles
and the dynamism of theoretical activity (which can explain a
particular theory of rationality and disclose what rationality
is.). This is what we have in the SiiMB.-The relation of the First
Principle,the principle of activity,to the structure of the Summa
Theologiae - theory-become-activity, as I have interpreted it - means
that the virtues of the Snmma are those of rationality itself.I
summarise the relevance of Aquinas's theory for my thesis as
follows: he extends the endoxa to a non-political community under
authority from a canonical text;he shows First Principles can be
challenged at the theoretical level and not just at the level of the
endoxa;he shows proof is activity,and incompletable activity;he
shows theorising is paradigmatic rational activity. I hope to have
shown that Aquinas does not have an absolutist theory,and to have
explained what I mean by 'the account' of rationality,'what
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rationality is.' : theoretical activity, more basic than particular
theories of rationality,and responsible for them.
My interpretation of Aquinas's Natural Law concepts is far from that
of the tradition,and in need of defence. My defence consists in an
examination of two modern English juristic theorists of natural
law. I criticise William Blackstone on the nature of law and
obedience to law,human freedom,the nature of Good and Evil and the
'immutable relations of justice',and the concept of happiness.I
balance this with Aquinas's conception of Natural Law as rational
participation in Eternal Law, and include in this Aquinas's concepts
of freedom,Good and Evil and happiness,which play a coherent role
within his theory of rationality.In contrast,Blackstone simply has a
motley selection of elements of Natural Law theory without either a
theory of practical reasoning or a theory of human nature which
makes intelligible the theoretical employment of these elements.In
so far as he is typical of modern natural law tradition,my account
of Aquinas's theory of Natural Law has nothing to fear from that
tradition.
John Finnis,like Blackstone,presents a synthesis of Natural Law
concepts with contemporary concepts and problems in law,morality and
politics.However,like Blackstone,he simply takes these Aristotelian
and Thomist concepts from their historical and textual contexts and
uses them in contemporary contexts without any hint of a dialectical
establishment of their relation to the contemporary context.I set
out his theories of value and practical reasoning,and discuss
problems with his notion of value,self-evidence,obligation and
reasoning.All of the philosophical difficulties I outline for his
theory arise because he lacks a concept of human nature.He does not
want to adopt a Thomist view of it,and he has no alternative of his
own. My interpretation of Natural Law,and the conception of human
nature as rationality,theoretical activity,which I have
developed,again have nothing to fear from this representative of
contemporary Natural Law tradition.
The greatest threat to my theory is the historical rise of the
concept of the individual self as autono^mous rational and moral
chooser.The major theories based upon this concept,Kant and
Kantianism and utilitarianism,are examined.I discuss how Kant's
theory of practical rationality is incompatible with my notion of a
deeper account of rationality determining particular theories of
rationality.I then give an exposition of Kant's critical project,and
of the relevant sections of Critique of Practical Reason and
Groundwork.I explain that my main targets are Kant's concept of
interest and his theory of freedom.My argument is that pure
practical reason,as Kant is aware,requires a concept of interest,and
that the concept he provides is inadequate.The inadequacy might have
been,but is not,compensated for by his concept of free will.I claim
that Kant could solve the difficulty by taking into account elements
of his own Doctrine of Virtue.However.since he will not accept
theory of Natural Law,he will not do this.An alternative would be to
accept a normative assumption concerning human nature which would
perform the work of showing how we can take an interest in non-
empirical determination by the moral law,an assumption in content
similar to the second formulation of the categorical
imperative.This, however, is not a Kantian argument.
I
In the course of this argument I discuss the concept of interests as
bases of motives. Kant could explain non-empirical motivation if this
could be based, upon a concept of interest formed from a conception
of the Good.He has the materials for this conception of the Good in
D.V..but rejects it for his own theory of freedom:our freedom from
the conditioned world means that we can take an interest in non-
empirical determination of will.I try to show why Kant does not,in
fact,possess what is a theory of freedom at all,and I present an
alternative account,based upon Augustine as well as Aquinas,showing
what Kant's theory omits.I finally consider an attempt by Nagel to
give an account of practical reason within the Kantian tradition
based on a non-norinat.i ve assumption of human nature, and an attempt
by O'Neill to show Kant's substantive conclusions do follow from /
his own premises. I reject both these accounts,and subsequently
Kantian theory of rationality.
My treatment of utilitarianism consists in criticism of its main
features,then of particular accounts,and then of certain anti-
utilitarian contemporary moral theories.I discuss pleasure,pain and
suffering, maximisation and happiness,and provide my own analyses of
these.I criticise the utilitarian theories of Mill,
Bentham,Sidgwick,Sprigge,Hare and Harsanyi.I also criticise
contractarian and rights conceptions of morality and moral
theory.The model of utilitarian morality,and any model based upon
the premise of an invariant human psychology of calculation or self-
interest, is not a sufficient foundation for a theory of
rationality.I propose instead my own version of morality,which is a
linguistic one,Morality is the received forms of communication
within concrete,particular situations inside a particular human
community.As such,moralities,together with conceptions of
rationality,are one of the two individuating characteristics of
particular human communities.Moral theory is realist because
morality has a goal:the communication of individuals &£.
individuals.I explain that this communication has an experiential
aspect which I call love, and an aspect of understanding which I call
ethics. Ethics concerns those goods which must obtain if there is to
be communication of individuals as individuals at all.A true
morality is one which the standard of ethics evaluates as efficient
in producing experiences of love,manifested in respect for and
enjoyment of the goods;a false morality is false because it is
unethical.
The conception of morality as those contingently determined norms of
communication concerning,and within,concrete,particular situations
is related to what I describe as ethics by an account of love as the
most direct, unmediated, form of communication between individuals,and
an account of moral knowledge,understanding of the goods necessary
if this communication is to be achieved - the 'goods of ethics'.I
try to explain the relation of the experiential component in love to
the understanding component,and to relate the individualistic
character of love and ethics to the community interaction which is
morality.Love and ethical understanding are not found separately but
are,respectively,the experience and intelligibility of the
communication of individuals as individuals and not as role-
structured; a true morality is a system of practices and institutions
which constitute norms by which individuals can communicate as
individuals in the concrete,particular situations of everyday social
life. I also explain how even from within a false morality we can
have moral knowledge because the knowledge comes not from what we
try to communicate,but from the necessity of communication as
individuals and the requirements for this: from ethics.
Philosophy of mind provides a major challenge to my conception of
rationality in its account of small-scale breakdowns of rationality
and unreasonablenesses,and its treatment of large-scale breakdowns
and insanity.A functionalist analysis of these indicates a
functionalist analysis of rationality,and the spectre of absolutism
arises in a new way.I take Davidson's as the most important
functionalist analysis of temporary irrationality,and criticise him
on three fronts:his vocabulary for describing irrationality;his
principle of inconsistency;and his conception of basic principles
and norms of rationality.These paints are typical of functionalist
analyses,and I think my answers deal suitably with the challenges
they pose to my thesis.
Insanity is a more serious problem as accounts of it do strongly
suggest at least a minimum content of rationality.I take a recent
theory by J.Radden in order to expose conceptual weaknesses in the
relations of agency,reasoning and moral responsibility she
describes.She claims these relations suggest failures of agency are
(always) irrationality.I give my own account of agency and moral
responsibility through means of the notion of a moral community,and
claim failures of agency never by themselves entail irrationality.If
insanity is irrationality,this cannot be shown by appeal to defects
in the forms of reasoning and judgement required for moral
responsibility.I then suggest that even with gross abnormality
insanity depends not upon structural defects but upon the peculiar
content of behaviour.This may suggest there is a basic 'list',as
B.Gert thinks,of goods by which we can always judge certain forms of
behaviour as irrational,and,in certain conditions,insane.
However,using Gert,I try to show that the 'objective list'
conception is not of goods basic to any conception of
rationality,but only of goods basic to one particular conception of
rationality.I believe I have shown the phenomenon of insanity,and
judgements of insanity,do not threaten my conception of rationality.
My concluding chapter begins with a conceptual analysis of the
concepts of activity,theoretical activity and community, upon which I
have relied with little discussion.I explain why I believe
theoretical activity is rationality,and that there are requirements
to be satisfied if a human being is to engage in such activity
directed towards knowledge of those things belief in which
distinguishes him as a member of this community.These requirements
are satisfied at the individual leveljthey are needs.I give an
analysis of needs and needing in contrast to desiring.I derive a
conception of primary, as opposed to instrumental, needing: that we
are,by natural constitution or choice,a certain way entails that we
have certain needs;and explain the necessity within needing.Qf those
activities for which we have primary needs requiring satisfaction
rationality,theoretical activity,is peculiar in that we cannot
choose to follow it in just whatever way we like:we must follow the
common presuppositions of the community. Because of this, uniquely,we
can specify the full extent of primary rationality needs - not only
those which must be satisfied if we are to realise our capacity for
rationality in terms of the conception of rationality we share,but
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those which must be sa/isfied if we are to realise our capacity for
rationality at all.By reflecting on the nature of theoretical
activity and the place of the individual within the community we can
derive the full list of primary needs whose objects must be
satisfied if there is to be rationality at all.
The relation between these primary rationality-needs and the
'ethical goods' provides us with a very precise tool for describing
the relation of rationality to morality,especially given certain
overlaps in content between the two. Among the conceptual
connections,for example,there is an ethical requirement that we
satisfy all primary needs.A true morality will do this,including
satisfying all rationality-needs,even if the present conception of
rationality is not one logically connected to,or favoured by,the
morality.
The fact that these needs are basic,whatever the conception of
rationality of our community,means that they ground certain
methodological requirements upon reasoning which any conception of
rationality will respect.Otherwise it will not survive.These allow
us to give a set of conditions for practical reasoning,a foundation
for it.It is not possible to give a theory of practical reasoning
except with respect to one particular conception of rationality,and
I do not want here to do this.However we can say that all practical
reasoning depends upon principles,that these are based upon need
satisfaction - not once-and-for-all but as a constant process of
attentiveness to primary needs throughout reasoners' lives,and that
practical reasoning is a reflective restructuring of perception in
the light of needs which occurs as a consequence of certain
engagements of the practical intelligence.I discuss these
engagements,and the role of perception and judgement in a patterned
generalising and particularising coordination of the intelligence in
which form of reasoning we take a reflective stance towards our
situation in everyday life and so solve its problems in accordance
with our needs.In this restructuring we do not satisfy one primary
need,turning to it from others;rather we alter the pattern of our
needing such that one comes to reflective prominence and others are
permitted to share the structuring of our perception in ways that we
are more peripheral.
I explain that in practical reasoning it is actually various
informal principles of reasoning which we are usually aware of and
aware of operating,and not the needs and principles which form our
perception of,and solution to,practical problems.Further questions
concerning the instrumental reasoning by which we put the solutions
into practice are not my concern in this thesis.
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Chapter One.
I am going to discuss Aristotle's theory of rational action.An
Aristotelian account of rationality would also have to include the
theory of reasoning as developed,for example, in the Analytics.I am
not going to include this in my discussion as the formal study of
rational inferences as Aristotle understood it would be logic and
not part of the broader questions of rationality treated here. To
ask non-formal questions about the rationality of thought is either
to ask practical questions or to ask questions concerning
practice.In either case these will be contained within the eventual
argument of this thesis.Another reason for not discussing
theoretical reasoning is that whereas it concerns one half of the
distinction between action and thought,we, at least since the
eighteenth century ideal of the whole science of the human
being, have tended to apply rationality to a different referent from
thought and action:to conduct,and specifically to things which must
or must not be done.Ve have a much more holistic picture of the
human being,arising from attempts to unify the emotional and
personal character of individuals with their shared moral and
social make-up, and resulting in twentieth century philosophy of the
individual and of the person.When we discuss rationality we tend to
mean the degree of success with which individuals integrate
socially and in their understanding of the world while maintaining
intact their personal and emotional lives.It,therefore,coheres best
with our practice to reserve discussion of matters of purely
theoretical rationality for the discipline of logic except for
those non-formal questions of the rationality of thought,practical
questions,which directly concern human behaviour.
The most extended account of rational action in Aristotle is that
of flic^omachean Ethics (all references to Aristotle from The Vprks
of Aristotle.11 volumes,ed.¥.D.Ross,Oxford;1928).Despite its vital
discussions of voluntariness,friendship and the virtues.Eudemian
Ethics lacks the comprehensive integration of the other.Ve discover
that the structure of rational action consists of the elements of
theory of reasoning and theory of virtue.My account of this will
aim to explain the two components,and to do this without prejudice
for or against a reading of Aristotle as an 'absolutist' thinker;to
describe the difficult relation of moral virtue to intellectual
virtue;and to draw attention to what has been seen in the text as
the tension between an absolutist account of first principles and a
context-dependent account of the virtues.I will go on to explain
that the theory of rationality of N.E. must be read along with the
account of education into,and practice of,the virtues and the
theory of dialectic,and that this whole can then be seen as an
attempt by Aristotle to make compatible first principles of the
sciences with the recognition that any community's norms are truly
political:socially determined and contingent.This reading suggests
ways of understanding the uncomfortable relation of apparently
basic goods to social-context goods in the text,and the strange
opting for the contemplative ideal in Book 10.
The first sentence of H.E. states that 'Every art and every
enquiry,and similarly every action and pursuit,is thought to aim at
some good' (1094al).Every theory must begin somewhere, and so far as
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this opening opinion is judged correctly by Aristotle,the theory of
rational action begins by acknowledging that every action is
directed towards the achievement of some good,and that not every
good is chosen for the sake of something else,otherwise our desires
would be 'empty and vain' (1094a21).Of these goods there is at
least one,then,which is chosen for its own sake and not for the
sake of achieving some other good.It seems in fact that there can
only be one such final good,because only one good could be the
highest and the best.This sounds weak,but the point will emerge
later that unless there were one unequivocably final end,
deliberation would not provide the point of practical reasoning
which it is its role to do.This highest good is the object of
politics:it is eudaimonia,happiness.
The nature of this good,which underlines the meaning of all
rational action,is crucial,for upon this will turn the question of
the absolutism or non-absolutism of the standards of human
conduct.Aristotle notes certain features of eudaimonia in Book
1.First,we pursue a plurality of different ends in our different
activities,so not all of these can be final ends,that is,have the
character of the highest good.Then,what is in itself worthy of
pursuit (1097a31-2) is more final than what is worthy of pursuit
for the sake of something else.Happiness,we know,is in general
pursued for nothing other than itself,whereas other things are
pursued not only for themselves but also for happiness.Whatever
happiness is discovered to be will possess,then,the feature of
ultimacy which the final good must have.The final good is also
self-sufficient,'that which when isolated makes life desirable and
lacking in nothing' (1097bl4-15).Again,we know this is a feature of
happiness.Happiness is what is always chosen for itself,and it is
that which,alone,is sufficient for a full and desirable life.
If this were the modern concept of happiness,Aristotle's theory
would sound scandalous.Eudaimonia,however,is far from the notion of
personal contentment through material goods or success.I
think,however,it is nevertheless sensible to speak of eudaimonia as
happiness and not as flourishing or fulfilment.Obviausly.it is a
concept quite different from our concept of happiness,but its
content is sufficiently connected to this to make eudaimoniac
happiness a more familiar notion than 'full flourishing'.
Aristotle's attempt to give content to happiness begins with the
notion of a function.A good artist is one who performs the function
of an artist well;he is truly an artist.Man too must have a
function,something he does well in so far as he is truly a man.His
function,Aristotle thinks,is that which he does and no other thing
does.In man alone we find (1098a3) 'an active life of the element
that has a rational principle':man is active in accordance with
rationality.This then is his function.
One part of the element that has the rational principle has it in
that that part is obedient to the other part;and this second part
has it in that it leads,and exercises thought.Whichever part we
consider,we are dealing with activity implying a rational
principle.Such activity is common to all men and possessed by man
alone.It is therefore man's function,and the good man,the man who
is truly a man (' 'a so-and-so' and 'a good so-and-so1 have a
function which is the same in kind.' 1098a8-9),like the good
artist,is one who performs this characteristic activity well.We can
consider here the rational principle qua planning and guiding as
representing the function proper of man,and the rational principle
qua doing-as-guided and doing it well as representing the good of
man.low,as acting well for Aristotle is acting in accord with the
excellence of the activity in question,and the excellence of
activity in accord with the rational principle is virtue,then the
good man will be the man in whose life activity of soul is in
accord with virtue and with 'the best and most complete' virtue
(1098aI8). Happiness, then, is a life,'a complete life' (1098al9),of
activity in accordance with the highest virtue.
As 'The Function Argument' this has been held in
disrepute.However.it seems to me to carry us in the simplest
possible way from the conception of the human act as teleological
to the conception of the soul as layered and as fundamentally
rational.Part of the modern difficulty in accepting this argument
is that it deals with the soul only at the formal level,or species
level,and not with the soul as bearer of a unique identity.lt is as
the essence or form of a human being that the 'function argument'
explains the soul;the question of the individuation of souls would
only arise if we consider the appetitive impulses of particular
souls which set the rational ends to be followed and motivate the
individual.
This is basically the grounds of the defence of this argument by
T.H.Irwin ('The Metaphysical and Psychological Basis of Aristotle's
Ethics',Essays on Aristotle's
Ethics.ed.A.Q.Rortv.California:1980)■He argues that function has
reference only to essences or forms.If we accept Aristotle's
argument of De Anima 412al7-23 that the soul is the essence of the
man,and that the soul of man differs from the soul of an animal in
that,lacking reason,animals can have no conception of what is good
for them asgood for them whereas the human soul experiences
boulesis.rational wish,wish for what is good,then it becomes
reasonable to say that this peculiar property of the human essence
does define man in a useful and relevant way.It gives him his place
in the scheme of things:he is aware of his good,and so is a
rational chooser,one who aims for something because he perceives it
as. good.Certainly function tells us nothing about the character or
propensities of individuals,but at the species level 'rational
activity' (unlike 'carnivorous biped') succeeds both in describing
what human beings are,and,because of what they are,in specifying
what they are to do:they alone experience rational wish;they cannot
be defined,then,without the definition picking them out as beings
who are aware themselves that what they strive for is good,and this
awareness entails intelligent action.The Function Argument does
succeed at the level of the soul,the formal level,in demonstrating
something about the good man,the man truly a man:he is. the rational
man.Of course,Aristotle's account of rational activity requires
that the Function Argument be supplemented by an account of the
individual as bearer of particular and personal desires and subject
of unique experiences and perceptions which provide the goals and
motivations for his own rational actions. Once this is realised, the
Function Argument does not seem implausible,for it now not only
explains a species truth about human beings,but acknowledges
that,unlike other species,they cannot perform their function except
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in ways dependent upon features peculiar and unique to the
individual.
The final chapter of Book One of the Ethics discusses the division
of the human soul into the elements following the rational
principle,and the irrational element.This is important in
understanding the relation between the different types of
virtue.The irrational element is subdivided into the nutritive and
appetitive parts.The latter shares in the rational principle in
that it 'listens to and obeys it' (1102b31).It is,however, distinct
from the rational principle as we see in the cases of the continent
and incontinent where it is opposed to rationality,and in the
giving of reproof and advice.So two elements partake of the
rational principle,one (the element which 'has' the rational
principle) properly,and the other (the irrational element) by
'having a tendency to obey as one does one's father' (1103a3).The
obedience of this second element must be distinguished from that of
the part of the rational element which has the rational principle
in that it obeys the part which plans and guides.This 'passive'
obedience within the rational element appears to be the very model
of virtue.Indeed.corresponding to the difference between the
planning part of the rational element and the obeying part is the
difference between the two forms of virtue:virtue of the intellect
and virtue of character.Aristotle's quest to discover the nature of
eudaimonia becomes the search for which of the virtues activity of
the soul must be in accord with if the life in which it is found is
to be eudaimonic. Ve must consider further the relation between the
parts of the soul and the nature of virtue,but doing so involves
first making a definite choice.
One of Aristotle's major themes is the unity of all the
virtues.This is explicit in his official definition of
virtue:'Virtue,then,is a state of character concerned with
choice,lying in a mean, i.e. the mean relative to us,this being
determined by a rational principle,and by that principle by which
the man of practical wisdom would determine it' (1107a2ff).Only
with reference to practical wisdom, one of the virtues of the
intellect,can one possess any virtue.Similarly,at 1139a31 we are
told that without virtue of character we cannot exercise reason in
search of 'truth in agreement with right desire',the object of
practical reasoning.This object requires reasoning in order to
locate where our good lies, as well as moral virtue which is
required because action requires boulesis,rational wish for the
good to be achieved,and such desire for the good requires good
character.However,the moral and intellectual virtues are discussed
separately,the moral in Books 2 and 3-5,and the intellectual
beginning in Book 6.A full analysis of the text would treat
both,but my purpose is to discuss the structure of the text with
the intention of showing it does not present an absolutist virtue
theory of rationality. As I will be aiming to show it does not do
this by discussing its views on practice of and education into the
virtues,and on the role of dialectic rather than by attempting to
show its particular catalogue of virtues has relevance only for
Aristotle's own society.it will be reasonable to concentrate on the
intellectual virtues,and in particular on those which refer to
practical reasoning.For these virtues have application to the
virtuous activities even of a society with a completely different
code of moral virtues,whereas the moral virtues of Aristotle even
if they could 'carry' give no explanation of the structure of
virtuous activity.
In Book 6 (1139a6) Aristotle introduces a further distinction
within the element which 'grasps a rational principle'.One of its
parts is scientific,concerning the eternal things;the other is
calculative,concerning the variable.The calculative part is then
identified with the deliberative part (1139al3).We have now three
sorts of division concerning the rational principle.The soul is
divided into a rational element which has the principle and an
Irrational element which does not;the rational element has it
either 'actively' or 'passively';the appetitive aspect of the
irrational element, at least in the continent and incontinent
(1102bl4ff>,may also share the rational principle ('even this seems
to have a share in a rational principle';and,in the temperate
man,'it speaks,on all matters,with the same voice as the rational
principle');and the rational element both considers scientifically
the invariable and deliberates concerning the variable.
The work of both the scientific and the calculative (deliberative)
parts concerns truth:truth and falsity are the 'good' and the 'bad'
of the scientific part;while 'truth in agreement with right desire'
is the good of the calculative part.The states in which the
scientific part arrives at truth and the calculative at truth in
accordance with right desire are the virtues of the two parts.There
are five such states listed:art,scientific knowledge,practical
wisdom,philosophical wisdom,intuitive reason.I am particularly
concerned with practical wisdom because it is the virtue which
concerns actions good and bad in respect of the agent rather than
in respect of what the actions produce.Practical wisdom is 'a true
and reasoned state of capacity to act with regard to the things
that are good or bad for man' (1140b5);'to that which observes well
the various matters concerning itself...one ascribes practical
wisdom' (1141a25).Also,since it is practical,practical wisdom is
concerned with particulars.lt is,then,concerned with how one's life
goes,with particulars,with things we deliberate about (1141b9),and
with action (1141b21).
When we consider the definition of eudaimonia ('activity of soul in
accordance with virtue'),and recall that this activity was of the
element of the soul having the rational principle and that we now
know there are five forms of intellectual virtue which the part of
the soul which has the rational principle may possess.it seems that
practical wisdom is at least a necessary condition for that
activity which constitutes eudaimonia.This is so because practical
wisdom is required for there to be (a) deliberation concerning (b)
particulars over (c) a whole continuing life.And (a) if there is no
deliberation,there can be no activity of soul followlnga rational
principle (1098a7-8),for deliberation is of the means to the end
which is established non-deliberatively through possession of the
rational principle;(b) if no particulars are considered,eudaimonia
cannot be 'a certain kind of life' (1098al2>,for a life is a
particular life;and (c) if there is no foresight with regard to
one's own life (1141a28>,part of eudaimonia cannot be that it is
found 'in a complete life' (1098al8).
Ve can claim so far then that the virtue in question in 'activity
of the soul in accordance with virtue' either is or includes the
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intellectual virtue of practical wisdom.This is, of
course,Aristotle's own position. From his description of the
practically wise subject as one who 'observes well the various
matters concerning itself' we can understand practical wisdom both
as one of the catalogue of the virtues and as that virtue which has
in its exercise the task of coordinating and organising the other
virtues.He also asserts clearly this central role of practical
wisdom in those places where he tells us that the possession of any
of the moral virtues implies practical wisdom <1107a2;1144b20>;or
that the possession of practical wisdom implies the possession of
all the moral virtues <1144b31;1145al-2).Practical wisdom may be
regarded then either as a vital constituent of eudaimonia, or as the
form of,and dynamism behind,eudaimonia.In order to approach the
question of the status of first principles within Aristotle's
theory of rational action we must ask whether his account of the
practically wise man,the phronimos,does represent a conception of
eudaimonia which is coherent,and whether the life of the phronimos
is supposed to represent a fixed and universal goal of rational
activity.
To ask this we must consider the notion which seems to be central
to Aristotle's account of the phronimos.The phronimos is one
capable of reasoning and acting well with regard to the things
which are good and bad for himself.He is one who knows his good,and
who can by reasoning act so as to achieve it.The virtue of
practical wisdom is exercised by one the calculative part of whose
soul grasps the rational principle well.To calculate includes being
able to deliberate,and it is to Aristotle's account of deliberation
and its place within the structure of 'grasping the rational
principle' that we must turn to understand practical wisdom.
Deliberation may be pursued by anyone,by fools and madmen
(1112a21),but to study it we must consider the deliberation of one
who deliberates well.Deliberation is working out how to achieve
what one has set oneself to achieve. The key to understanding it is
that we do not deliberate aboutends.The process is described in 3,3
as like the investigation and analysis of a geometrician.As he
works backwards from the postulated construction discovering by
what means it is produced,the subject reasoning practically works
from his end to the means of behaving so that what presently exists
at the level of imagination will exist in actuality.Deliberation is
comparing alternatives and analysing methods.To deliberate well is
to investigate means of bringing about eudaimonia,to reason
concerning the Final Good what it is best for me,here and now,to
do. Fools and madmen may deli berate,but they fail to consider all
the alternatives and methods for achieving euidaimonia. Instead they
simply try to establisheudalmonia. directly, through their
deliberation,or they deliberate with respect to the merely apparent
good.For Aristotle,to exercise the reasoning powers in this
way,either to get eudaimonia or to consider means to some non-
eudaimonic good, is not to be rational in the way the practically
rational man is.He does not use his deliberative skill to produce
eudaimonia ~ he does not deliberate about ends ~ or to consider
means to the merely apparent good.Rather,in deliberation he
considers efficient means to ultimate achievement of his good
through,and in,performance of virtuous activities;and the good
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about which ultimately he deliberates is the good he learns through
his possession and exercise oi the moral virtues - eudaimonia.
So the task oi deliberation,the heart of the intellectual activity
oi practical reasoning,is to consider alternatives and analyse
methods ior realising eudaimonia;and the unity of the virtues
guarantees that the man oi practical wisdom will know the good in
advance oi his deliberation.His deliberation is neither a means to
knowing the good,or to achieving here and now the good through
intellectual calculation.However,although the phronimos does not
deliberate about ends,he may constantly discover ends he may now
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adopt as the ends to be pursued in his future actions through his
deliberation concerning means to be adopted towards the realisation
oi his present ends.Simply,at tl 1 deliberate about the means to
end e and accept means ml; I might simply immediately perform ml as
an action,or 1 might, at t2,take ml as my end e-1 (one step
further ..from eudaimonia if considered as arche. and one step closer
it considered as telos) towards which I must next deliberate to
discover the best means, in my situation,oi realising e-1.Also,in
accepting ml" as means to e I may discard nl and pi but accept nl as
a possible means to a postponed end,e2 - which ml perhaps revives
within me - which will then have to be deliberated;and accept pi
not as a means lo anything at all but as a newly discovered end-
for-the-sake-oi-eudaimonia, arising not from any process of
deliberation,but irom my deliberative activity.As Aristotle
says,this expanding series ol ends will only ever give a reason for
action if there is a Final End,be it state or process,which can
give to all the subsidiary ends the phronimos adopts the status of
means,either to be immediately adopted,or to be once again
transformed through deliberation into subordinate ends to which
practically realisable means must be sought.The Final End provides
intelligibility by transforming ends into means and means into
ends;practical wisdom provides knowledge concerning which means to
adopt and which ends to pursue.It is because the Final Good is not
the immediate object of deliberation,that it can open up to us
whole patterns of ends through its own teleology;and because it is
known by the phronimos in advance of his deliberation,that good
deliberation will not concern the merely apparent good.
Deliberation is the centre-piece of the practical reasoning of the
wise, but it is not the full picture of the rational life of the
phronimos.Possession of practical wisdom,the excellence of the
calculative part,also requires that the phronimos hold a conception
of the Final Good,arrived at in the proper way (whatever that may
turn out to be);that he be able to derive from this the idea of his
good in particular circumstances,which ability comes only with
experience;and that having deliberated,he is then capable of
performing those functions within his control necessary for the
performance of the virtuous action.This last is the province of the
practical syllogism,upon which much of the attention in studies of
practical reasoning is misleadingly concentrated.
Upon the conclusion of deliberation,an agent may perform the chosen
action.Then there is either attributable to him or actually
rehearsed by him (it does not seem to matter much which) a
syllogism to the effect that 'doing this (the conclusion of the
deliberation) requires doing that';'doing that is best done here in
this way';and the doing of it.The construction of these practical
syllogisms is the means by which we make our decisions active in
our lives.They represent the connection of deliberated means with
action directly,that is,without the necessity of seeing these means
as themselves yet another subordinate end to to which same further
means of actualisation must be sought.Syllogisms,then,form the
limitation upon thought in practical matters by ensuring that at
this point it does eventually become action.
Although Deliberation is far from being the whole of Aristotelian
rationality (to claim this would be to fail to acknowledge the
entire conception of the virtues),an action into which deliberation
does not enter is not a rational action.This is the reason why the
virtue of practical wisdom whose work is deliberation has a unique
structuring role in action,although it is only one of a plurality
of virtues.We may believe we can act rationally without
deliberation:filled with elation,I run and do not pause to consider
running at all;without deliberation,I do what I have done a
thousand times before,and unlock the door in order to enter my
house.In our modern vocabulary we would say these are not actions
done for no reason;they are intentional - they are not
involuntary,and on suddenly focussing attention on my doing them I
would not be surprised at my behaviour;therefore they are
rational.According to Aristotle's theory,however,routine actions
done automatically are,in fact,preceded by deliberation,and
spontaneous actions,though they may be an expression of some good
which may even involve our Final Good,because they are not aimedat
the good,cannot be rational.
He nowhere says that deliberation of means which precedes action
must immediately precede action.Deliberation issues not in action
but in choice,1 deliberate desire of things in our own power'
(1113a'12). The conclusion of deliberation is a desire to adopt
certain available means to the realisation of an end.We are not
required in drawing the conclusion to i mmprii at.el y adopt the
means.We are required to adopt the means when the circumstances are
appropriate.In this respect the conclusion of deliberation differs
sharply from the conclusion of a practical syllogism which
Aristotle repeatedly holds (see,for example,De Motu
Animal 1 iim701 a 1 2-15) is an action.The conclusion in deliberation
concerning the means to be adopted is separable from the action in
which it is enacted.Unlocking the door at 5.30 can only be done
'unthinkingly' because at some earlier time I have deliberated how
to go about reaching home;reasoned that unlocking the door forms
some small part of my deliberate desire to move indoors;and have
repeatedly and successfully unlocked doors as ways of moving
indoors.Such 'automatic' actions are,then,rational provided the
goal in question forms part of my good on this occasion.That it
does so is a function of whether this intended goal is itself an
efficient means in these circumstances to the achievement of my
higher-order good,the good which is in turn a direct means to, or an
aspect of,eudaimonia.
My example of running purely from elation is not,however,rational
by Aristotle's standard.He would describe this as action caused by
the appetitive part of the soul,and this is part of the irrational
element.The appetitive part is typically opposed by Aristotle to
the demands of the part which has the rational principle - for
example,in the discussion of akrasia at 1147a25-35 - though in the
continent it may obey the rational part,and in the virtuous it is
so much in harmony with the rational part that it in effect shares
the rational principle itself.That,in the less than virtuous,the
appetitive part opposes the rational part,indicates that appetite
can cause us to set ourselves ends,just as deliberation in the
light of the Final Good does.Once reached,however,the ends of
appetite are not deliberated over.That they cannot be the object of
sound deliberation is clear because the ends of appetite motivate
because oi the effect of their objects on appetite and not because
of the role of their objects as goods subordinate to the Final
Good;that they are not the object of deliberation at all is
7 apparent because we do not determine means to them but have our
practical reason compelled by them (at D. M. A. 701a30-36 in practical
syllogisms with ends oi appetite expressed in major premises the
mind oversteps the minor premise, and at M.E.1147a33-36 appetite is
described as being able to move us in the face of a major or
universal premise to the contrary).
Far from conforming to the geometrician's task of analysis of
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3,3,the only reasoning present in one who acts from ends of
appetite is the simple factual representation to himself that,for
example,everything sweet is pleasant and this here is sweet.So
powerful is the influence of the appetite that this is sufficient
to lead us to eat,even in the presence of a universal premise to
the contrary.lhe ends of appetite can cause us to form practical
syllogisms even in the face of the deliberated ends of reason.It is
obvious,then,that the mere presence of a practical syllogism is not
enough to entail rationality of action;it entails merely action.The
missing component of rationality in cases of action directed to the
achievement of an end of appetite is sound deliberation preceding
syllogising,for this would discover whether the action is here the
best way of realising my good,and if not,reject it.
In the case of running purely from elation we do not have a
rational action because we have undeliberated fallowing of
appetite.Even if the appetitive goal happened to coincide with my
good as it is to be realised here and now,this would not be
sufficient because human beings have not only to achieve their good
by activity,but to achieve it because they perceive it to be their
good. Thus,in the function argument it is this perception,rational
wish, which forms the real difference between human and other
beings. The human good is explained not by reference to some
external human function,but by the perception of human beings of
their own good,the intelligent activity of that function.
The phronimos,then, is centrally but not merely a good
deliberator.He must conceive of his own highest good,understand the
consequences of this conception in his changing
circumstances,deliberate well,and oppose the yearnings of appetite
to form ends in order to form practical syllogisms that are
efficient and will conclude with virtuous actions.All of this is
implied by the virtue of practical wisdom.However.it is the
presence of sound deliberation in his practical reasoning which is
rightly seen as the hallmark of his rationality because it is in
deliberation that we see how the virtue of practical wisdom alone
of the virtues,intellectual and moral,has the vital administrative
as well as executive role.Deliberation discovers how,here and
now,to follow the good,and it also has the ability to convert these
means themselves into subordinate ends we may accept,and to then
search for means of fulfiling these.It is this activity which makes
practical wisdom,unlike art or intuitive wisdom,concerned with
action not because of what it may lead to outside the sphere of
action (material goods; pleasure;knowledge),but concerned with
action simply as the structured transformation of human bahaviour
into pursuit of human good;concerned with action simply as action.
It is crucial to the Aristotelian theory that deliberation maintain
its purely formal role of calculating means, converting them into
ends for our acceptance and calculating basic means to subordinate
ends.If it once becomes concerned with the acceptance of or
realisation of ends,it then supplants practical wisdom as the
virtue which allows us to coordinate and pattern actions in the
light of the good;it ceases to function so as to transform
behaviour into focussed and directed action,but instead tries to
operate so as to bring about immediate understanding and possession
of eudaimonia. For Aristotle,however, practical wisdom and not sound
deliberation is what determines in our particular circumstances our
true ends;these ends are not realised piecemeal and immediately by
deliberation but discovered gradually through aspects of a life
lived in accordance with the virtues.
The account of deliberation may seem to suggest that deliberation
of the less than practically wise can fail either with respect to
their reasoning,on with respect to the objects of their
deliberation.The failure,that is,may be one of calculation,or one
of acceptance of the ends in the light of which we
deliberate.However,as one's good ultimately is a matter of virtuous
activity,and as we know from the definition of virtue (110Val-2)
that virtue in any particular case is determined by reference to
the 'mean' state of character which the phronimos determines,then
the ability to know one's good and to judge concerning it on
particular occasions cannot be separate abilities.An individual can
only come to the knowledge of his good by the acquisition of the
ability to make practically wise choices,choices of virtue,on
particular occasions;and he can only make these choices if he
already has within himself 'the rational principle'
(1107al>,knowledge of his good,by which to determine them. There is
no circularity here as the acquisition of the ability to act
virtuously is accounted for by Aristotle's programme of moral
education - in general,the study of such works as the Ethics
itself,and in particular the caution (1143bll-14) to attend to the
advice of the elders who have practical wisdom. Moral education and
habituation in the virtues cause the phronimos to choose correctly
in the light of his conception of the good,and to modify his
conception of the good in the light of his choices.One who is less
than practically wise, therefore,cannot truly be described as
deficient with respect either to his conception of the good onto
his ability to deliberate concerning it on particular occasions,for
the one ability cannot be possessed without the other.
There is no purely intellectual failure within practical
rationality.There is not even a purely perceptual failure within
it.An agent cannot be said to fail in that he lacks the ability to
perceive what here he ought to do although he knows what his good
is,tor although practical wisdom does involve perception (1142a27-
30),it is not the simple perception coming from sense
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experience.Practical wisdom demands not only the ability to see,but
to see what to do here and now given the knowledge oi something
universal (.see 114ibi4-i5). The sort oi perception relevant to
practical wisdom is not simple perception,then,but perception in
the iight oi one's good. So perceptual iailure, within practical
rationality is not possible without iailure oi some sort with
respect to one's good, a tailing in virtue (.see R.Sorabji 'Aristotle
on the Role oi intellect in Virtue' P.A.S.vol.74,1973-74).
An understanding oi the concept oi the phronimos,the one who
deliberates well,requires an understanding oi the moral virtues as
well as the intellectual,or at least an understanding oi the role
and operation oi the moral virtues since their actual nature is
subject to greater variation than the more formal intellectual
virtues.Deliberation is a process oi moving irom the conception of
our good in particular circumstances, as derived from our Final
Good,to the means by which we might now realise this good.Such a
conception must be that of a substantive end ii we are to regard
the means to it as themselves ends giving us reason to do what will
achieve that which we have reason to achieve.The questions of the
nature of the Final End which explains substantive ends and the
manner in which it is conceived are questions of the character of
rational human beings;they do not concern characteristically human
activity.which is directed tothese things,but aspects of the nature
of human beings.The answer to both these questions is the theory of
moral virtue.It is because of the moral virtues that we can
conceive of the End in the possession and pursuit of which our
intellectual virtues are also involved;and it is the role within
the Final End oi the moral virtues that accounts for the capacity
of eudaimonic human beings to enjoy variety of activity and emotion
within physical human life as. pursuit of eudaimonia.
Ve know (1098al8) that eudaimonia is activity in accordance with
'the best and most complete' virtue.Virtues are either intellectual
or moral,of character. At 1177al2 we are told the highest virtue is
'of the best thing in us';and at 1177al8 we are told,or
reminded, that the activity in question is contemplative.The
suggestion in the Ethics - remembering the practicality of ethics
for Aristotle and its concern with the particular - that the Final
End consists of a life of theoretical contemplation is
fascinating,but to many has seemed troubling.Genuine perplexity
emerges not with the claim that the point of action is non-
practical activity,but with the remembrance that action structured
in accordance with practical wisdom and in pursuit of the moral
virtues has previously been discussed as itself either involved
in,or constituting,its own Final End.'For while making has an end
other than itself,action cannot;for good action itself is its
end'(1140b6-7).The conception of practical activity being good not
merely because it may lead to eudaimonia, but because eudaimonia
is,at least in one aspect,the life of good action is rarely absent
from the discussion of the virtues.
Emphasis on this conception leads to the view that there must be
scattered throughout the text mention of various goods which are
the goals of those forms of practical activity which have a place
in eudaimonia. John Finnis (.Fundamentals oi Fthi cs. Oxford : 1 Qft.3, p 1Q >
holds such a view.He rounds on phrases like 'each man wishes
himself what is good, while no one chooses to possess the whole
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world if he has first to become someone else'(1166al9-21) and 'no
one would choose the whole world on condition of being
alone'(1169bl8).He detects the real structure of Aristotle's
thought in these remarks,pointing to a life consisting in
possession of a plurality of goods all members of which are equally
basic.This life of activity (for,1177al,'a virtuous life requires
exertion,and does not consist in amusement') aimed at the
reasonable production (made possible by practical reason:for
Finnis, itself one of the basic goods) of basic goods is held to be
eudaimania.
Others preserve the view of rationality as self-rewarding practical
activity without the construction of an alternative theory of the
good. Martha Nussbaum, (Fragility of Goodness. Cambridge: 1986. Appendix
to Part Three),for example,speaks positively of what for most is
the drawback of a conception of eudaimonia which is
plural,indeterminate and complex,and therefore the source of
vulnerability and ultimately conflict.Our rationality is not a
protection from danger,but a means of contending with danger by
laying ourselves open to the possibility of it in activities which
simply would not be worth taking part in if they did not expose us
to the risk of reversal and disaster.These activities possess a
value all of their own, of a sort not available to those who have
divine and Platonic self-sufficiency.They can only be found within
the life of a being which has need,lack and limitation (see
1178bl0-16).This value is ours.and it is this which makes it worth
pursuing;which makes these activities rational human
activities.Understanding the goodness of,or rather the rationality
pertaining to,a particular value is inseparable from understanding
whose value it is.Once we understand the being,we understand the
value.
Such Aristotelian theories do not do justice to Aristotle in
failing to take the discussion of theoria as a central part of the
argument for eudaimonia. It must be shown that both activity in
accord with moral virtue and theoretical activity are found within
the eudaimonic life,and that this is compatible with the definition
of eudaimonia as activity in accordance with the 'best and most
complete of the virtues'.To omit theoria from eudaimonia is
inconceivable.'But we must not follow those who advise us,being
men,to think of human things,and being mortal,of mortal things,but
must,so far as we can,make ourselves immortal, and strain every
nerve to live in accordance with the best thing in us'(1177b31ff).A
man content with Nussbaum's fragile humanity would not lead
Aristotle's life of happiness.We do not have self-sufficiency,but
we have theoria and we have nous.and by these we can transcend our
vulnerability (De Anima408bl8ff).
Ackrill ('Aristotle on Eudaimonia' Proceedings of British Academy
60,1974) suggests that 'the best and most complete virtue' refers
to the 'inclusive' and not the 'dominant' conception of the Final
End,and that it is quite different considerations which suggest
that theoria is a higher form of activity than practical/moral
activity.While believing himself that the two cannot ultimately be
reconciled,he is clear that Aristotle does not believe
reconciliation in an inclusive concept of eudaimonia involves
acknowledging that sophia is higher than the moral
virtues.However,it remains the case that in Book 10 these
'different considerations' for the dominance of theoria are
recalled by Aristotle, and that once introduced,they do justify the
view that activity in accordance with the highest virtue is the
activity of theoria - a position no one can call un-Aristotelian
(see S.Clark.Aristotle's Man.Oxford:1975.p.159-63)■That nous, is the
best part of us is clear because a/it is self-sufficient (1177bl-
4);b/our exercise of it is continuous,and it is the most
pleasant,purest and most enduring virtuous activity (1177a22-
28);and c/it can be exercised with only the necessaries of life
(a30),in independence of other human beings.Activity of
nous.then.is well-fitted to the formal definition of eudaimonia as
activity in accord with highest virtue.
Also,we cannot in this context pretend to be unacquainted with the
passages in Dp Airi ma in which the structure of the thinking and
knowing soul is described (Book 3,chapters 4,5);the descriptions
elsewhere dealing with the privileges of the theoretical intellect
(for example.De Generatione Anima 1i iun736b27-9):or the passages in
the Ethics itself in which philosophical wisdom is given the
dominant role VIt would be thought strange if practical
reason,being inferior to philosophic wisdom,is to be put in
authority .over if 1143b33-35; ' Wisdom must be intuitive reason
combined with scientific knowledge - scientific knowledge of the
highest objects...For it would be strange to think that the art of
politics,or practical wisdom,is the best knowledge,since man is not
the best thing in the world' 1141al8-22).Such passages make the
suggestion of excluding theoria from eudaimonia wild.The question
is whether eudaimonia, as defined at Book 1,7,can consist in both
moral/practical activity and in theoretical activity while the
latter is acknowledged to be activity in accordance with the
highest virtue.
It must be borne in mind that what we are seeking is not some
blessed state which the virtuous will reach,but a complete sort
of life,and a life of activity. Eudaimonia is a life of those
activities which are engaged in for no reason other than that they
are the activities they are;those for the sake of which all other
activities are undertaken.The simplest view,then,would be to take
these activities as including those in accord with the moral
virtues and those in accord with philosophic wisdom, the highest of
the intellectual virtues.The (greater) variety of moral activities
together with theoretical activity would exhaust those things done
for their own sake and judged worthy by men of practical
wisdom.This simple account,however,does not explain why
contemplation is the highest of virtuous activities.And even if
this were simply stated as an assumption of psychology,this would
leave the deliberating agent in a state of uncertainty.Unless his
perception were such that he became aware of the moral and
contemplative components of eudaimonia only individually and as
particular means of pursuing either were discovered by him.it could
always be passible that different ways of pursuing different
aspects of his good should become apparent to him
simultaneously.This possibility is the possibility of conflict,for
unlike clash between the claims of different goods within the moral
(or theoretical) sphere,this clash would be a clash between two
parts of the soul (scientific and calculative) different in kind
(1139a9-ll),and would therefore be irresoluble without appeal to
the higher status of one part or to some external principle.There
Is. no additional rational principle to appeal to here for
Aristotle,and we are then left with the need to justify appeal to
the scientific part when the calculative is equally part of
eudaimonia.
John Cooper (Reason and the Human Good in
Aristotle.Harvard;1975,ch.2) identifies a 'bi-partite'conception of
the good in E.E. .Here the values of social and,in particular,family
life do have a place alongside the development of philosophic
wisdom,but the dimension of moral and social activity is
limited. There are moral requirements which we must fulf il and
then,having done this,we may pursue contemplative activity without
restriction. Eudaimonia is 'the activity of a complete life in
accordance with complete virtue' (E.E.1219a39).The rational man is
one who will adopt as principles of action those means he believes
likely to get or promote such goods as friends,health and honour
and who will never sacrifice these goods for the sake of any other
value,but who,once moral reqirements are met,or where they do not
apply,will act so as to promote theoretical contemplation (Cooper
p. 142).
This is in many ways a satisfying account.lt seems not to exclude
any behaviour we would consider morally desirable.lt does not
attempt to harmonise or systematise the moral goods overmuch,but
recognises their heterogeneity and so allows for the possibility of
a certain autonomy in the ordering of them. It succeeds in showing
eudaimonia including moral and theoretical activity while still
demonstrating that it is theoretical activity which is activity in
accordance with the highest virtue.Cooper's theory appeals to a
unified conception of the human being as a compound of physical and
emotional needs with needs also for intellectual activity.This is a
definite improvement on the crude dichotomy which sees us as either
fundamentally moral and social embodied beings with a tendency for
intellectual activity,or near-divine reasoners who require the
satisfaction of certain physical and social needs if we are to be
enabled to contemplate. Cooper claims that his unified conception is
indeed the view of human nature of E.E. .and that it was surrendered
by Aristotle in M.E.10 only because of the late psychology of
Anima.
The higher intellectual faculties are independent of the rest of
the human being in D.A..They do not together with the other
psychological faculties which have dependence on the body form a
single soul, but (see 413b25> are 'a widely different kind of
soul1.Aristotle identifies the human being with the intellectual
soul (see N. E. 1166al7: 1178a8/9) because of the connection between
it and divinity. Because of this, in It. E. 10 it is intellectual
activity which is said to constitute eudaimonia and
not,as,according to Cooper,he has argued all along,moral/social
together with intellectual activity.
Despite the plausibility of this,I cannot see how Cooper can handle
those remarks in M.E.I which,as he himself notes,point to the
intellectualist conception,and also the remarks of Book 6,1141al2-
23.What is valuable about his study is that it does not abandon the
theory that contemplation is in accord with highest virtue,but does
abandon hierarchical talk of superiority of one sort of activity
over another.If,as may be passible (see Ackrill op cit.;Nussbaum
IS
p.373ff),no absolutely consistent concept of eudaimania is to be
found by treating N.E. as a unified whole,the most reasonable
course might indeed be a compromise of both forms of activity such
as E.E. suggests,avoiding the terminology of hierarchy of
activities.
However,the problem remains that replacing hierarchical talk with
talk of priority of satisfying demands still does not explain how
moral/social activity is an equal part of eudaimonia for it still
does not satisfy the criteria of self-sufficiency and ultimacy.It
cannot be sufficient,for intellectual activity would always offer
the prospect of a higher life of virtue;and it cannot be ultimate
because though never chosen for the sake of something else,there is
always something else that is also never chosen for the sake of
something else.That it has a prior claim to be participated in
—demonstrates neither the ultimacy nor the self-sufficiency of
practical activity.
Cooper's attempt to give an account of reasoning including
—conditions under which we may pursue each component of eudaimonia -
—we must first satisfy moral requirements,and there will come a
point at which we will be free to turn to theoretical matters -
also" does not succeed because it involves a notion of obligation
which is alien to Aristotle.For Aristotle,the requirements which
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must be met if I am to fully participate in the moral and social
activities of a rational life are not such as can be met and then
placed to one side while I turn to the pleasures of the
intellect,content that I have satisfied moral requirements.The
goods of health,friendship, capacity for reasoning,self-
knowledge, wealth and so on are not the sort of things which can be
achieved to a sufficient point and then turned from to be sustained
by some external principle. Achievement of these is actually not
achievement as such,but a process of continually attending to
circumstances as possible opportunities of,and threats to,these
goods.Aristotelian goods do not impose upon us a set of
obligations,but provide us with a set of values which must
not,ever,be betrayed in virtuous lives.We cannot reach the stage of
having adequately satisfied moral requirements so as to be able to
turn to intellectual ones for the values in question are not
obligations but the structure of complex,educated and
virtuous,perception for Aristotle,and he has no mechanism for
explaining temporary cessation of virtuous perception.
We must interpret moral and intellectual activity as possessing
equal rational weight.To this extent,we must somehow accommodate
Cooper's insight concerning them:they cannot be conceived of
hierarchically.However, although standing side by side,intellectual
activity alone must be activity in accordance with the highest
virtue.Let us consider in this context the relation of dialectic to
science for Aristotle.In simple anticipation of later discussion we
can say dialectic is a progression from the opinions of the
many,and that these are both cause of,and then reflection of,the
principles of all the sciences,including ethics.Dialectic is that
form of intellectual enquiry which provides us with the first
principles of science.As such,we can say that the value of
dialectic has two logical aspects:it is good first in that it is
the means to first principles;and secondly,it is good 'in
itself':something which is the means to something as important as
first principles has importance in its own right.The difference is
not slight.It is a/ valuable as. a means;and b/ derives independent
value as an activity because of its role as means to something
important.As the means it is valuable in respect of the first
principles it grounds;as an activity it is valuable because of the
service it provides of being a means.
I want to take a similar view of Aristotle's relation of moral to
intellectual activity.We know from Politics.7 that moral and
political activity exists for the sake of contemplative
activity. However, we feel sure from the structure of If. E. that moral
activity is also part of eudaimonia though not the highest
part.Within eudaimonia, then, there must be qualitative variety.We
need not only to deliberate so as to achieve the life of
contemplation, but also so as to achieve the life of moral
activity.This latter life is the Final Good in two senses,first in
that it is the means to contemplative activity (through morally
virtuous and social activity and education in the moral virtues we
are fitted for contemplation;moral requirements can be fulfilled
even when we turn from moral to intellectual activity);and
secondly,in that so far as it provides the means to contemplative
activity.it has independent value in itself.Moral/practical
activity can be considered as equally part of eudaimonia together
with intellectual activity in so far as it is conceived of as
valuable in itself because it is provider of means to intellectual
activity,but it can also be considered as activity in accordance
with a lower virtue in so far as it is conceived of merely as. the
means to intellectual activity.
The advantage of this conception of eudaimonia is that the Final
Good can now be explained as dynamic.There is no longer any
question of conceiving it in absolutist terms as a state of
possessing the rational goods.Rather it is more like a process:a
lifetime,of practical-activity-feeding-potential-for-theoretical-
activity (in ways to be explained) in which the practical activity
has value in itself,a value it draws from its role as means to
theoretical activity,and theoretical activity has value in itself,a
value it draws from its own nature as activity of the highest and
most divine part of us.The dynamism within this process.it should
be noted,is not limited by anything other than the requirement that
it provide means to contemplative activity.
There is no reason,if this is correct,to view Aristotle's ethics as
a structure based upon basic non-contextual goods,Rather it is
based on contingent and contextual social/moral virtues which may
be different and will show progress in different societies
(provided they continue to supply the means of theoretical
activity) while managing nonetheless to provide stable standards of
rationality a/ because the intellectual virtues are much less
subject to change,and b/ because the conception of the Final Good
will always contain at its highest the activity of theory.no matter
what the oblectof theorising is from society to society) .
The view of human life at its best,rational life,as a process of
developing and practising moral and social virtues so as to prepare
for theoretical activity requires a conception of human enquiry as
learning and exercising basic practical standards and standards of
social intercourse and doing this because it is valuable in
itself,while always remembering that this value derives from the
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status of this practical knowledge as eventual means to theoretical
knowledge.This conception is not just one which would have to be
developed if my suggestions about Aristotle are correct,but one
which must be defended if my thesis is correct,for it is the
historical source of my reading of Aquinas's theory of practical
reason,and my account of rationality.I have so far only suggested a
way of looking at eudaimonia.The second part of this chapter will
argue for the importance of understanding Aristotle's theory of
dialectic in understanding the Ethics.This will show that activity
grounded in the education and standards of one's society has both
the value of a means to theory,and value in itself because it is a
means to theory.However,I must first show in this part that the
conception of eudaimonia suggested will allow for a workable notion
of deliberation,so that Aristotle's whole theory of rationality can
be considered as a coherent example of a non-absolutist structure.
Deliberation searches for means to ends,and as part of this process
can convert means into subordinate ends either to be immediately
adopted in action via practical syllogisms, or to await the next
operation of deliberation in seeking means to fulfilling these.In
his deliberations the practically wise man has the conception of
his end as a lifetime of theoretical activity together with a
lifetime ol moral/practical activity.The latter he considers as a
means to the former,and,possibly,as a source of some of the
particular contents of his individual theoretical contemplation.He
also has a conception of his particular good in his
situation,farmed by perception and experience,and reflection upon
his Final Good (rarely,his particular good will appear to him as
theoretical contemplation or moral activity itself rather than
particular objects of individual activities).Having a conception of
his good (which,through his possession of the moral
virtues,coincides with the Final Good),he desires its
achievement,and deliberation is the process of considering
alternatives and analysing methods to this,and - in virtue of the
ultimate relation of these means to the Final End - of converting
them into subordinate ends.
Ve required a substantive concept of eudaimonia so that the
deliberative process of adducing means to ends and converting them
into new ends might not continue indefinitely as an empty exercise
of reason,but might terminate in the agent's being caused to form a
practical syllogism,and so that we might understand the objects of
our practical reasoning to possess sufficient desirability to
explain the rationality of our actions.A lifetime of theoria and
moral/practical activity represents termination in a life of
activity which is quite self-sufficient due to the sufficiency of
the latter to provide for the former,and,since philosophic wisdom
is the highest virtue, ultimate. It,therefore, can lend point and
desirability to our adopting those means deliberation discloses
towards it in our practical syllogisms, and it does provide a
terminus at which deliberation will stop and we will act.
The life of theoria cannot be attained without experience,and
education into,and exercise of,the moral virtues in forms of
practical activity,and possession of certain external goods -
companions,pleasure,health - which these activities realise.The
moral virtues and external goods are not achieved once-and-for-
all.but throughout a lifetime of practical activity.And such a life
is valued not merely as a means to a life of theoretical
activity,but for itself:as a form of life which is good in itself
because it does provide,in all sorts of ways,means to the highest
life.From the point of view of the theoretical life the practical
life is subordinate,but it is,unlike other subordinates,a
structural part of its superior,and so of eudaimonia.The
indispensability of a life of practical activity means that it,in
virtue of its relation to the lifetime of theoretical
activity.shares the properties of ultimacy and self-sufficiency.It
can,then,function as a substantive good within deliberation.
Finally,I should describe the operation of the practical syllogism
within reasoning.lt is not often a piece of our reasoning itself;we
are very rarely conscious of its steps at all,and even when we
are,rarely in step form.It is Aristotle's explanation of what
happens when having as a result of deliberation chosen to do
something we find ourselves in the appropriate circumstances with
no factors intervening.The syllogism is the explanation of what
doing is,not of what leads to doing.The immediacy of the syllogism
appears to us as a form of perception:we know something is to be
done;we see now it is right to do it;and we do it.However unhappy
the terminology of ' syllogism', its 'conclusion' is definitely
action,and not decision.This account follows Cooper's.Whether we
are to understand it as a piece of reasoning or not seems largely
irrelevant - though Cooper denies that the syllogism is part of the
agent's practical reasoning at all.The important fact is that the
structure of the syllogism is. in the rational agent's
consciousness,whether or not it is rehearsed,as the deliberate
desire to achieve x sometime.and the perception that 'y will
achieve x and I am unhindered from doing y now'.
The general question of which good I am now to pursue through
practical reasoning is also relevant here.This is not a question of
a special reasoning process.What I here and now ought to be doing
is not a matter of choice:we cannot deliberate about ends.It is a
matter of desires and of our perception of our
circumstances. Generally,we do not say 'this is part of
eudaimonia;what can I do here and now to achieve it?'.Rather,if our
desires have been properly formed and controlled by the development
and encouragement of the moral virtues,what we will desire in any
particular circumstance will be the possibility of doing what will
best serve to attain our good,and what we will perceive will be the
best means of doing this.The moral virtues are crucial:perceiving
just what,in particular,one ought to do in any circumstances is one
of the skills of the phronimos.
I will go on in the next part of this chapter to discuss
Aristotle's opinions on education into and practice of the moral
virtues,the role of dialectic,and the relation of practical to
theoretical activity given that both have a place within the
structure of eudaimonia.
fart Two,
Ve will not understand the relation between the lifetime of morally
and socially virtuous activity and the lifetime of contemplation in
eudaimonia until we can explain something of the nature of
enquiry.Consideration of ethics in independence from other forms of
enquiry and from those factors which condition ethics itself makes
it impossible to understand how the relation I have suggested
between moral activity and theoria can occur.I begin with a
quotation from Alastair Maclntyre's Whose Justice?Vhich
Rationality?(Duckworth; 1988).
'The principles which nous grasps are those from which we argue in
setting out those sound deductive arguments which have the status of
demonstrations. Demonstration is thus dependent on dialectic for the
acquisition of the premises which provide it with a starting
point.And this...is equally true of theoretical enquiry and of
practical reasoning,unsurprisingly perhaps since the first
principles of theoretical enquiry into the nature of practical
reasoning and of the practical reasoning which issues in action are
one and the same. ' (p.91)
Maclntyre's thesis is that we do not have in Aristotle's ethics and
politics a theory as such of practical reasoning from first
principles,a theory of what the constitu/ents of the good life
are,and of how one who is concerned to live the good life ought to
proceed.Instead we have a treatise designed to provide those who
already have some conception of the good life with a theoretical
understanding of this,and of some of the sorts of reasoning they
ought in consequence to undertake.The conception of the good life
does not come from ethics,and could not be taught to others by
ethics.It is gained in various sorts of ways from those around us
who already lead the good life.The ethical treatise is a course of
lectures upon such a life given by one qualified to impart a
theoretical understanding of it.The matter of rational action,which
is the goal of ethics,cannot be taught by. ethics.This is learned in
other ways which ethics then explains,thus making future rational
actions more likely and more efficient.lt follows that ethics is
incapable of teaching those without knowledge of rationality what
rational action is.Rational action cannot be taught from some
universal set of first principles,but only from a shared conception
of what rationality is from which basis the practically wise elder
can begin to explain the mechanism of rationality.First
principles,the beginnings and ends of rational actions,are not
available for deliberation.
Aristotle is always concerned that we do not lose the particular in
any enquiry.'Ve must,as in all other cases,set the observed facts
before us and,after first discussing the difficulties,go on to
prove,if possible,the truth of all the common opinions about these
affections of the mind' (N,E. 1145bl). In ethics, particularly, this
attitude affects his view of the enquiry.Ve know from Book 1,3 that
it is of the nature of morality and of the ways in which we discuss
it that we will reach rough outlines and broad conclusions only and
that we must be satisfied with this even in the detail of our
theory.The problem we have with this,and which Maclntyre
addresses, is that the closer the concepts and arguments of a
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theoretical enquiry are to being dependent upon the beliefs and
outlook of a particular social grouping identifiable by its view of
the world and the human good, the less explanatory power these
concepts and arguments have for those who do not share these
views. If ethics cannot address the uninitiate .but is only the
theoretical self-reflection of a shared morality.it does not have
the capacity to explain eudaimonia to those who do not (by this
shared morality's standard) know it,or to criticise it for those who
do.Aristotle's conception of ethics,then,is apparently a self-
indulgent theoretical explanation of phenomena with no power to
criticise or to authoritatively teach or convert.
If this is so,we are left with a dilemma if we wish to follow
Aristotle.Either we accept Aristotle's own concept of
eudaimonia,realising it is not a theoretically defensible object for
US., but accepting it on some pragmatic or idealistic ground, in which
case we are holding a Final End not for its self-sufficiency and
ultimacy,but because it contributes to another more basic end,which
is absurd;or we reject Aristotle's conception of the good life but
retain the theoretical form of teleological explanation and the
Final Good,introducing and defending a form of the Final Good which
is compelling to the aspirations of our society. This,however,is to
import from Athenian and pre-Christian ethical theory an explanation
of a twentieth century Good,both of how it comes about and of how we
explain in terms of it,and to graft this explanation onto that Good
with no further explanation of how the two have relevance to each
other.To thus sever the tie between action and theory,which is so
close for Aristotle,is not absurd,but it does ignore first that the
twentieth century conception of the Final Good is likely to make
reference to forms of theoretical explanation of,and by,the Good
which are non-Aristotelian,and second it gives no reason for
grafting teleology on to our conception of the good other than
academic faith or fondness.
Maclntyre tries to answer these two points for the Aristotelian by
accepting the idea of a culturally determined Final Good but
explaining this by an Aristotelian conception of theoretical
explanation supposed to be acceptable whatever conception of the
Final Good we hold because it is redefined non-teleologically in
terms of developing traditions which reveal and exemplify
conceptions of the Final Good.He hopes to show the genuine
explanatory power of culturally determined concepts by emphasising
that these are arrived at within a living cultural tradition:they
are developing responses to historical phenomena by a particular
people,and not merely contingent on-the-spot responses to random
collections of phenomena the adequacy and appropriateness of which
is simply a function of their efficacy.Because our explanations are
in terms of theories constructed within historical processes,they
can have explanatory value not only to those who are within these
processes and accept these theories,but also to those outside who do
not accept them, in so far as they understand them in terms of the
relevant historical processes which locate the theories within the
whole scheme of developing traditions.Our theoretical concepts are
particular and contingent upon historical circumstances, but just
because of this they have explanatory value for those outside these
circumstances when they adopt a historical perspective.
Because traditions develop,and because they alter their own
boundaries and affect the boundaries of other traditions.it is
possible to adopt this historical perspective.When we do so,when we
explain things at the level of traditions and not just from within
the theories of our own tradition,we demonstrate the compatibility
of a culturally determined Final Good with an Aristotelian
conception of theoretical explanation,for we demonstrate
understanding of explanatory concepts alien to our conception of the
Good but derived from a conception of the Good coherent because it
is established in the same way as our own conception.
However,Macintyre's response cannot be correct.I have great sympathy
with his attempt to demonstrate the dialectical foundation of
ethics,but the problem here is that traditions are distinguished
adequately only from a position outside themselves,and are
understood only in relation to other traditions.When we understand
an explanation historically as 'within' the tradition of fifth
century Athens,Gaullist France,Calvinist protestantism or
whatever,we have succeeded in adopting a point of view which
explains the relevant actions not only as 'theirs' or 'ours',but as
'its';one which explains them impersonally.Such an explanation is
understood because it is placed within terms of historical
generality and the general is discriminated not by its relation to
individuals,but by the relation of the boundaries of the historical
tradition to those of other traditions,and by the relation of the
explanation to other explanations historically effective upon
it.Now,such a historical understanding,although it allows us to
interpret the thought and behaviour of alien or remote beings,is
quite different from the understanding in terms of their Final
Good,the moral understanding,which those within the tradition have
of their own actions.It can no longer have the particularity or
conventionality of morality, what Aristotle calls the imprecision of
ethics,which is crucial to explanation of action in terms of the
Final Good.Instead this historical understanding looks for the
precision of a science as it attempts to fit forms of explanation of
action together and into the general pattern of developing
traditions and this pattern within the universal of
history.Historical understanding of actions,understanding which
depends on adopting the historical perspective towards a conception
of the Final Good,is a different understanding from that of one who
holds the conception of the Final Good.
The tradition model of Aristotle's theory of explanation of action
explains only the establishment of particular conceptions of the
Final Good and,in the light of these,the coherence of (to us) alien
forms of explanation;it does not provide what for Aristotle is
rational explanation of actions:explanation in terms of the theory
of the virtues.Macintyre may give a theoretical understanding of
alternative forms of rational explanation,but this understanding
does not include the sort of explanation of actions which we have
from within a tradition.In particular,he cannot be said to have
demonstrated that any,and every,culturally determined conception of
the Final Good is compatible with the tradition account of
Aristotle's conception of theoretical explanation because,though the
latter might account for the former,he cannot show that the former
in every case can include the latter.Explanations in terms of a
Final Good may not be compatible with the tradition theory of
explanation,in which case he has the problem of explaining why we
should accept it since for Maclntyre a society's first principles
are its fundamental units of explanation,
I think that the particular and the epochal,or general levels of
explanation simply cannot be synthesised in the way Maclntyre has
tried.He might reject the label of synthesist,pointing out (p.173)
that he is aware of the difference between rational justification
within a science,and of a science.My point,however,is that he is
committed to showing how the justification of a science - through
dialectic - can be itself justified through some generalising
historical process,and that he neither properly explains this
justification of dialectic,nor reconciles the generalising
historical perspective with the perspective of the agent whose
conception of the Final Good has explanatory value ultimately only
because of its historical,tradition-based justification.
If we are to mount a defence of Aristotle's theory of rationality,we
must retain the conception of theoretical explanation as the
reflection of the standards and opinions of those who hold a
particular conception of the Final Good,and we must also cope with
the demand that this be made compatible with the need for
explanatory power in theory.My suggestion is that understanding of
theoretical explanation requires the notion not of tradition but of
community.If we develop this it allows us to interpret theory as
explanation of very particular phenomena in culturally determined
terms, which have explanatory weight but which have this without the
need for appeal to universalising or general forms of explanation.I
will be developing this idea through succeeding chapters.Here,I say
only that my line will be that the life of a community exhibits
within itself not only the current norms of explaining,but also in
its memories,stories,reminiscences, records and,in particular,its
teaching,the understanding of how these became the ways of
explaining.In,particularly,the teaching of a community we discover
not only the ways of rational explanation,but the account of why
these came to be,the story of the development of the concept of
rationality.Through all the formal and the informal institutions of
enquiry theoretical instruction can be given not only in what to do
to be rational,but into what rationality is.
My claim,following Aristotle,is that in N.E, we have an example of
instruction to that part of a community which has discovered how to
be rational,but not what rationality is.The student of the Ethics
approaches problems and questions of rationality through the
concepts of the virtues,but he does not yet see these concepts as
having developed from within his community of enquiry and as having
been adapted in the light of its growth:he has,but does not
understand rationality.He is not yet fully rational,but is in the
state of wonder in which,repeatedly, for Aristotle,philosophical
enquiry has its starting point.The success of a text like N,E. on
this reading depends on the degree to which it can articulate the
still living history of the community it addresses.It must recreate
from the multiform and fragmented perceptions of the community's
members their way of explaining things,including their explanation
of how this way comes about.It must also teach that in general it is
by doing what it itself does that rationality is not only taught but
exercised.What is vital,then,is the form of the text, for this is the
initiation of already rational beings into the structure of their
own forms of explanation of rational action.As such,the text must
recapitulate the genesis of these forms in the student,account for
their occurrence,describe their operation,and show itself to be a
further product of them. The successful text is faithful to its
subject matter (present explanations of rational action),and,because
it is itself a product of that subject matter,to current forms of
theoretical explanation.
The immense intellectual importance of Aristotle's text is that it
not only explains the rationality of the virtues (the standards of
rational action) and does this in accord with the standards of a
science proceeding from first principles,but also explains itself.It
does this in various ways,but specifically in its acknowledgement of
dialectic.This places the subject matter of ethics,rational
action,within the context of a theory of the determination of first
principles not just of the science of ethics,but of all sciences.By
doing this Aristotle marks the relation between ethics and the other
theoretical studies,and emphasises that in this relation ethics has
a fundamental role because it studies specifically that
activity, imprecise and in^ac^irate, in which the propositions of
dialectic become manifest in action.In the rational actions of
individuals - virtuous actions - we discover the propositions of
dialectic,those held by the totality,the many,or the wise (Topics
104a8),become ends of human beings.We will discover when we come to
Thomas Aquinas that for him rational enquiry,study of the forms of
explanation,is not grounded upon dialectic,but is itself dialectical
enquiry.For him, explanation of rational action,ethics,and all other
forms of explanation,are alike the work of dialectical enquiry.For
Aristotle,however,dialectic is a pre-rational basis on which all
forms of rational explanation depend for their first principles.
My argument is that the achievement of Aristotle's theory of
practical rationality lies not in the particular concepts of
M.E..which many still try to build into a contemporary
'Aristotelian' ethics,but a/ in its conception of the relation
between such a body of concepts and theoretical enquiry into
rational action;b/ the relation between such theoretical enquiry and
the education and training in which the practical concepts are
learned;and c/ the understanding of this theoretical
enquiry,ethics,as dependent on the the pre-scientific standards of a
particular community,dialectic.
These points require in turn consideration of the relation between
the particular concepts of Aristotle's virtue theory already
discussed (particularly, eudaimonia) and the way in which these are
taught in ethics;the relation between primary moral training and
this ethical teaching;the theory of dialectic.The separation of
these three enquiries is, however, a deep error,for it is dialectical
enquiry into the opinions,the endoxa which concern morality, which
gives rise to the process of ethical enquiry,which leads to the
possession of the practical wisdom necessary for training the young
in the virtues,which then qualifies them for a course of ethical
instruction ....and so on.Ve must however deal with these points
separately because the argument for the overall account is that they
mutually support each other.It must,nevertheless,be remembered that
they represent a single unfolding process of enquiry which differs
only in the varying degrees of reflective awareness of the enquirer.
The Ethics is addressed to those who already have a knowledge of
virtue but not an understanding of it (see 1095b3-8).Those who heard
the lectures,then,were not being introduced to a quite new set of
concepts but to a justification of concepts they already
held. Aristotle and his pupils had this much in common.What the
pupils do not have,and he does, is the virtue of practical
wisdom:the acquired disposition which so affects desire,perception
and all the forms of reasoning that the agent can coordinate and
organise all the other virtues so as to deliberate means to the
good.As this virtue allows him to orchestrate and to bring into play
the other virtues,the wise man is qualified to introduce his pupils
to the relations between all of the concepts of the virtues which
enter into the community's ways of explaining,and to explain the
development of this method of rational explanation in the history of
the community - the development his own virtuous development has
recapitulated.
This view of the role of ethics accords well with Aristotle's
declared beliefs about the method of ethics. Much of the method can
be discovered at the start of the Book 7 account of akrasia.
'Ve must as in all other cases set the observed facts before us
and,after first discussing the difficulties,go on to prove,if
possible,the truth of all the common opinions about these affections
of the mind,or,tailing this,of the greater number and the most
authoritative;for if we both refute the abjections and leave the
common opinions undisturbed,we shall have proved the case
sufficiently' (1145bl-7).
The material to be discussed is not the personal selection by the
teacher of facts with which he is acquainted.It is
phainomena,'observed facts' in Ross's translation.That they are
'observed',however,does not fully bring out the shared and common
nature of Aristotle's appearances (see Nussbaum Fragility of
Goodness p. 243). Owen CTithenai ta Phainomenai' in
J.Barnes,M.Schofield and R.Sorabji eds..Articles on Aristotle
vol.1..London:1975-9) shows that the phainoraena are not the mere
data of bare perception,but those beliefs about perceptions,or
'facts',which are apparent in our everyday usage.So teacher and
student will share beliefs concerning the subject matter of their
enquiry.These beliefs are associated with the 'common opinions' on
the subject at hand.These opinions are those 'held by all men or by
most men or by the philosophers' (Topics 104a8).The students will
possess these in so far as they have been already introduced to the
virtues by precept and example,and the teacher will have them in
virtue of his practical wisdom.Beginning with the endoxa.then.is a
way both of beginning from authority (because these are the beliefs
of the many and the best) and from a common ground.
Since these common opinions have a multiplicity of sources,we are
bound to encounter difficulties and conflicts among them. After
surveying the opinions,which itself shows the pupils something of
the relations between these and therefore of the explanations of
them,the teacher of ethics turns to the 'difficulties'.Here he will
discuss any conflicting alternatives,and,using the skill he
possesses as phronimos, seek solutions.He is capable of choosing the
answer which best coheres with the common opinions (the third
requirement in our description of ethical enquiry) for he is
practiced in the forms of thinking which Topics describes as
necessary for arriving at first principles,and in the forms of
thinking involved in practical reasoning.In choosing the alternative
which best fits the whole range of the endoxa,he confirms the
authority of the opinions which he as phronimos, and those (parents
and others) who first introduced his pupils to the virtues as
phronimoi,absorbed in their own moral maturing.These opinions
according to the method of Aristotle's Ethics represent the pre-
scientific beliefs of the community.It is those of these that
concern the explanation of human action,those he considers to
represent the moral beliefs of the community,which the teacher of
ethics will explain in his theoretical account of rational action.
Ethical enquiry resembles all enquiry in its concern for saving the
appearances,but in ethics the appearances,the endoxa.are also the
subject matter.The objects of theoretical study of the explanation
of the growth of plants,the life of the gods,or the processes of
generation and corruption are the growth of plants,the life of the
gods and generation and corruption,and how we explain these in the
science is determined by the pre-theoretical endoxa from which we
grasp the first principles.However,the objects of ethical study are
the endoxa concerning the explanation of action themselves:there is
no neutral specification of what are rational actions (as one can
specify what are animals,gods,and life and death) but only the
opinions of a particular community as to how actions are to be
explained,opinions which then give us the criterion of rationality
and the first principles of ethics.
The fact that in theory of rational action alone the subject matter
as well as the first principles of the theory are the endoxa
concerning explanation is important because it suggests that the
method of this theory,unlike that of any other sorts of theory,must
not only respect the appearances by reasoning specifically from
them, but must never contradict them by introducing into the scope of
the theory anything that is not the opinion of the most, the best or
of all.The theorist of plant growth may also be a discoverer and
expert who can bring new botanical evidence gradually to the
novice,but the moral philosopher cannot intelligibly introduce any
new evidence or data concerning rational action to his audience.It
is the audience alone which could conceivably introduce new data to
the phronimos. This is why we find confusing those scattered remarks
in the Ethics where Aristotle appears to be saying that human nature
(every last human being) requires health,good looks,honour and so
on.We naturally believe there is some extra-political,1 natural'
standard of the good to which the moral philosopher,like the
expert,has access.But the wise man has access only to his
fellows,and the hints of basic goods in Aristotle's text are
elements of Athenian morality and not of some hidden universal
morality.
It is precisely because of this methodological difference between
ethics and the other sciences that I differentiate the theoretical
study of our beliefs concerning rational action from all the other
sciences:the latter are theoretical explanations of phenomena and
the former theoretical explanations of our pre-theoretical forms of
explaining action.Ethical explanation is a process of demonstrating
how we come to have the present opinions,and therefore that those we
specify are the present opinions,the standard of rationality.lt is
not a process of demonstrating from the present opinions,qua first
principles,the nature of certain,independently
specifiable,phenomena.This difference obtains it seems to me because
ethics is closer than any of the other sciences to dialectic.Ve have
already touched on the notion of dialectic.Before we can explain it
and,by relating ethics to it,understand the relation of dialectic to
the method of Aristotle's Ethics,we should first consider the role
of the primary moral training given to the young and its relation to
ethics.I preface this with a consideration of the aim and the
subject matter of ethics which will defend the present claim that
teacher and students share knowledge of the virtues.
At Book 2,2,right at the beginning of the actual treatise on the
virtues for which Book 1 has prepared us,Aristotle writes,'the
present enquiry does not aim at theoretical knowledge like the
others (for we are enquiring not in order to know what virtue is,but
in order to become good,since otherwise our enquiry would have been
of no use)'(1103b26-28>.This appears to contradict what I have said
about the nature of ethics.However,although it is true that the aim
of ethics is not knowledge of virtue but becoming good,the aim of
ethics will not be achieved unless virtue is known,rather than,for
example,merely imitated in virtuous action.Unless the agent
possesses practical wisdom he will not be capable of rational
action:his virtuous actions will be performances and not
habitual.'No one becomes good unless they are first wise':harsh as
this slogan seems.it accords well with the work of the philosopher
who explains rational action as that ultimately aimed at
intellectual contemplation.Ethics is a theoretical study:it provides
theoretical knowledge of the virtues by scientific methods,but its
aim, as Aristotle says,is not this knowledge but the turning into
phronyimoi of those who study it, or rather, the performance by them of
rational actions.
After the passage quoted,Aristotle goes on immediately to say 'the
whole account of matters of conduct must be given in outline and not
precisely,as we said at the very beginning that the accounts we
demand must be in accordance with the subject matter' (1104al~3;the
reference here is to 1094bll-27>.Ethical enquiry is concerned with
the particular,here the endoxa.not with the universal,and thus it
cannot have the precision of other scientific enquiries (1104a6:'the
account of particular cases is yet more lacking in
exactness').Taking this together with the above passage,we have the
picture of ethics as a study different from others in that its end
is practical (individuals becoming good) and its subject matter is
particular (the endoxa),not open to study by definitions (which
concern the universal) but only explicable 'in outline'.Just as in
discussing the method of ethics we saw the connection between
ethical enquiry and the opinions of the many and the wise,which the
students know and the master both knows and understands,so in
considering the purpose of ethics and its imprecision we see the
orientation of ethics towards the becoming good of the individual by
theoretical study of the opinions.Ve can understand now why it is
only when the students already possess the knowledge of the good
that teaching of ethics can take place. It is not only that this is
the necessary 'starting point' for learning how to apply the general
rule to particular situations (1095b4-8), but that the end of ethics
and the subject matter of ethics are one - the end is the future
becoming good of the individual,and the subject is the individual as
sharer within the community of the common endoxa.The student must
already know the good because the aim of ethics is not this
knowledge,but good action which depends upon this,and because the
subject of ethics is not the universal (which could be taught from
the particular),but the particular itself,the endoxa,which cannot be
taught.The subject matter and the aim of ethics confirm the claims
so far made concerning the method of ethics.
Having shown the conception of ethics requires that master and
student share knowledge of the good,we shall enquire how this comes
about.As the good is defined with reference to activity in accord
with virtue,knowledge of the good must begin with this activity.We
must consider the process of moral education in which the practice
of virtue is acquired.
Book 2,1 makes a contrast between intellectual virtues which are
acquired by teaching,and moral ones which are acquired 'as a result
of habit' (1103al4-18).This could lead to difficulties in
understanding how moral virtue might be imparted from one to
another.Habit does not seem to provide either for reasonable
persuasion of the young,or for their successful discoveries of the
reasons for their elders' patterns of behaviour.These difficulties
are avoided if we understand the contrasting ways of acquiring
virtue as acquisition through practice,though without
understanding,of virtuous acts in the case of moral virtues (we are
'made perfect by habit' 1103a25);and acquisition through 'experience
and time ' (al6> of those virtues whose objects are in the case of
practical wisdom,not individual actions,but the ability to marshal
and organise (morally virtuous) actions,in the case of philosophic
wisdom,truth,and in the cases of the other intellectual virtues
objects of various different sorts.The contrast is not between
different ways of acquiring different virtues,or the temporal order
of acquiring virtue,but between the different logical components of
acquiring virtue.Virtue is learned,and in the case of our actions we
must learn the virtue of practical wisdom gradually through
'experience and time' as we are building up the habits of morally
virtuous action otherwise we will be unable to deliberate towards
the good;and we must act while we are learning wisdom in the way we
perceive to be virtuous otherwise we will not gain the character
with which we will discover our good and discover our desires coming
into line with our good.
The beginning of the acquisition of virtue lies in the advice of
1143bll-13 that we 'ought to attend to the undemonstrated sayings
and opinions of experienced and older people or of people of
practical wisdom not less than to demonstrations'.In the
undemonstrated sayings of the experienced of the community we find
the source of our practical wisdom.We may not at this stage
understand this,but we can begin to habituate ourselves in those
opinions which those of practical wisdomdo understand.Thus we can
provide ourselves with the means of building up our propensity to
act for the good,and we can familiarise ourselves with the first
principles of ethical enquiry through which we may come eventually
to understanding of the virtues.The morally virtuous character which
will lead us to virtuous action will not,however,be acquired simply
by listening to and agreeing with the undemonstrated sayings;with
the best will in the world we will not acquire virtue without doing
virtuous things.
Aristotle does not seem to think we must force ourselves to imitate
unthinkingly our elders.Instead he concentrates on the fact that for
the uninitiate to begin to practice virtuous acts he must first see
his situation in the way in which a morally experienced man would
see it,and must not only make being virtuous,but also doing the
things the virtuous do one of his goals.He must see what the
phronimos sees is to be done,and must want to do it.The discussion
of actions done in accord with virtue and those done for the sake of
virtue in Book 2,5 <1105a27-34) adds two conditions related to
these:he must wamt to do virtuous actions because they are virtuous
actions and for no other reason,and he must allow disposition
towards virtuous action to become part of his permanent
character.The total explanation here of the process of virtue
acquisition makes it clear this is no automaton-like process of
imitation and ignorance.
The four conditions mentioned in Aristotle's account of acquisition
are explained with the interdependent notions of
induction,perception,habituation and education into virtue.This
account is in no way continuous,but is scattered throughout the
text.However,it does seem to indicate elements of Aristotle's vision
of primary moral education,and it does suggest a coherent
explanation of the transformation of the morally immature into
students of the virtues.Induction,for Aristotle,is the process in
which we infer from a number of instances the universal these
exemplify.This movement from particulars to universal is a form of
inference in which we grasp in a non-deductive way the truth
concerning the type of things we have been examining.This grasping
is described as an act of intuitive perception,of nous,The object of
this perception can then be understood as the starting point of a
science in which particular instances of this universal are
studied.The account of induction in moral education (see Sorabji in
Rorty ed. p.215) is given at 1143bl-5.
'The intuitive reason which is presupposed by demonstrations grasps
the unchangeable and first terms,while the intuitive reason involved
in practical reasonings grasps the last and variable fact,i.e.the
minor premise.For these variable facts are the starting points for
the apprehension of the end,since the universale are reached from
the particulars;of these therefore we must have perception,and this
perception is intuitive reason'.
This is far from a clear acount.but it seems nous grasps the first
principles in practical reasoning from among 'variable facts',that
these point us toward the end of our piece of reasoning,that the
relation of variable facts to end is that of particular to
universal,and that nous must be perception-like in its ability to
grasp the variable facts. The proximity of this to the advice to
listen to the elders (bl3) makes it likely, as Sorabji thinks, that
this is Aristotle's account of how we come to see our situations as
the phronimos would see them. Ve consider the particular things the
experienced do,the reasons they give for doing them,perhaps attempt
imitating them. Then from consideration of the particular facts of
their situation and of our present one,we infer the universal
concerning what is to be done,and this object of nous provides us
with the end,and the starting point,of our practical reasoning.Doing
what the elders do thus leads us to see our situations as they would
see them:in terms of the end which is to be pursued.
We must also take this end over into our own desires as one of our
goals;not just something we strive for in so far as we are learning
virtue,but something we strive for because we want it.This is a
matter of upbringing.Normally education into the virtues will be
sufficient to inculcate in us pleasurable feelings at virtuous
action (1104bll:'we ought to have been brought up in a particular
way from our very youth, as Plato says,so as both to delight in and
to be pained by the things that we ought;for this is the right
education').But the connection here is not merely contingentFor
moral excellence is concerned with pleasures and pains;it is on
account of the pleasure that we do bad things,and on account of the
pain that we abstain from noble ones' (b8-10);'if the virtues are
concerned with actions and passions,and every passion and every
action is accompanied by pleasure and pain,for this reason also
virtue will be concerned with pleasures and pains'(bl3-16).Pleasures
and pains often lead us astray.We ought to have been brought up so
that our very desires are such that they harmonise with what is good
and shrink from what is not.
It is then part of being brought up and educated in the virtues that
by acting virtuously one begins to take pleasure in acting
virtuously.lt seems obvious, however, that one could act like the
virtuous without acting virtuously;that one could perform the
actions without wanting to.But this is to forget that virtuous
actions are done for the sake of reaching the good. We do not act
virtuously for the sake of virtue but for the sake of achieving a
life of a certain sort.Once the young learner comes to know
eudaimonia his virtuous actions and his desires will be one,for he
will hold as the final end of his actions something of self-
sufficient and ultimate desirability,and,furthermore,this something
will be not only reached, but realised in virtuous action.At a
certain stage in his moral education he will come to know the object
of supreme desirabiltiy,and his desires will alter;so long as he
does actually complete the course and acquire practical wisdom, they
will not fall out of step with the performance of virtuous action
again.
This, of course,also acounts for the fact that the learner must
perform virtuous actions because they are virtuous.If virtuous
action has intrinsic value,and we cannot fully be trained in virtue
without recognising the supreme desirability of a lifetime of action
in accord with highest virtue,it follows that at some point in his
moral education the student will experience an alteration in his
desires which,he may realise,means he is now acting virtuously not
in order to gain entry into the moral community, but because he is
now in it.
The remaining of the four conditions was that virtuous action must
become part of the student's character.To ensure this, there is no
alternative but habituation in practice,and then consolidation of
this through coming to understand virtue by learning from a man of
practical wisdom.With this requirement we cross from basic moral
training to the study of ethics.Ethics is the final object of study
in this section,in particular the relation between dialectic and
ethics.
Ethics is intended for one who has knowledge but not understanding
of virtue.Understanding of virtue will come only with practical
wisdom which is 'concerned with the ultimate particular,which is the
object not of scientific knowledge but of perception' (1142a27).This
virtue,like the other intellectual virtues,can be acquired only with
experience and time. Furthermore, given its concern not with the
universal but with the particular (see 1141bl6),practical wisdom
requires the arching experience of a lifetime;it cannot be wholly
gained simply by exposure to the practical wisdom of others
(1142al2-19).There certainly will be no practical wisdom without
induction,perception and habituation,but because its concern is with
the ultimate particular and not with a universal arrived at through
induction,the goal of practical wisdom is the sort of perception of
one's situation not as one instance of a universal,but as a
particular,unique,unrepeatable state of affairs of
which,however, virtue allows us to make some order;the sort of
perception that comes with a lifetime.Practical wisdom, born of long
experience,allows us to see situations which to the uninitiated
appear discrete and chaotic as falling under the order of virtue
which suggests that even in this confusion there is an appropriate
action to be performed. Practical wisdom is perception not of the
first principles of action governing one's situation (this is
nous), but perception of one's situation as governed by such-and-such
principles of action.
If practical wisdom is the point of ethics,and,as suggested, this is
a question of learning the practical ordering of one's life,and
learning this over a complete lifetime,what role can ethics play in
reaching this?
I believe that ethics,theoretical study of rational action,has a
vital role within the cultivation of practical wisdom because of
Aristotle's conception of the nature of ethical enquiry.Ethics does
not choose its own method; its subject matter determines this,and its
subject matter does not exist in a pre-determined vacuum but is
provided by the projects of pre-theoretical enquiry continuing in a
particular community at the moment.When we engage in theoretical
study of the virtues we do not disengage ourselves from the world of
practice of the virtues and form our own project of enquiring how to
perform rational actions.We merely practice the virtues in a more
critical way;not through induction,habituation and experience over a
lifetime,but through applying to the subject matter of induction and
experience - the endoxa - those questions which the phronimos, the
teacher,has raised in the course of his lifetime of acquiring
practical wisdom.We consider the 'observed facts',raise difficulties
and alternatives,and finally choose the solution which fits best
with the endoxa.This method of ethics is theoretical study of the
practical,but is not divorced from the practical,for the method is
dictated by the subject matter - those opinions which are held (the
virtues) - and it is taught by one who has acquired practical wisdom
as the recapitulation by him,at the level of theory,of the practical
experience of his life.(Aristotle is clear,however,that ethics is. a
science. See, for example, EjJLl. 1227b23-5 where virtue, not inference or
reasoning,makes the end of practical reasoning right and this is
described as a 'starting point' - arche - the usual description of
the first principles of a sciencejand 1227b28-30;'as in theoretical
sciences the assumptions are our starting points,so in the
productive the end is starting point and assumed').
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I do not think the text is clear whether practical wisdom can be
acquired without ethics in the course of a complete fully virtuous
life. I can make little sense of anyone achieving the full set of
virtues,including the ability to marshal all of the moral
virtues,without the sort of self-conscious learning of practical
wisdom at a stage during one's life through formal,or perhaps
informal,study of ethics.Also,the claim that wisdom must be learned
if life is to be virtuous accords with the conception of eudaimonia
as intellectual.In any case,ethics,alone of the sciences,is not
severed from practice and studied for knowledge.The basis for this
understanding of Aristotle's Ethics is not his remarks on ethics,but
his theory of dialectic.
Dialectic is the means of providing sciences with their first
principles.It is,therefore,nan-scientific,or pre-scientific.J.Evans
(Aristotle's Concept of Dialectic.Cambridge: 1977) has argued that
dialectic is to be understood as a quite distinct enterprise from
that described in the various other texts of the Organon (p.93-
4).However,he also believes it is not separate from the argument of
the ethics,but is responsible for the account of dynamic progression
in ethical thought which the argument of the ethics puts forward.Ve
must discuss how dialectic reconciles within itself this dynamism
and the production of first,undemonstrable principles.This is the
explanation of my suggestion that the fact Aristotle's ethics is
directed to those sharing his particular,Athenian conception of the
good should be understood in terms of the forms of explanation of
action they accept and the history of their community which lead to
these forms being accepted.
Dialectic explains this process of coming to accept the current
forms of rational explanation.It also explains how dynamic progress
and particular context-bound explanations of rational action by
first principles can occur within the same community. By doing
this,it explains how the practice and exercise of virtue is an on¬
going process which yet does provide certain first principles;how
the content of practical wisdom is never exhausted in knowing but
always enlarging itself through the virtuous actions it causes;and
how the study of rational action,ethics,can both be the study of
pre-theoretical enquiry as a developing activity of a community and
the learning of a particular set of first principles.
The object of Topics is the understanding of dialectical
reasoning.This reasoning is distinguished from demonstration which
moves to conclusions from true and primary premises (see V.Kal.Qn
Intuition and Discursive Reasoning in Aristotle,Leiden;1988 pp.22-31
on the broad distinction between two forms of dialectic,the
syllogism and induction, in Topics). Dialectic 'reasons from opinions
that are generally accepted' (100a30).Premises are true and primary
if believed on the strength of nothing but themselves;opinions are
generally accepted if 'accepted by everyone,or by the majority or by
the philosophers' (100b22).Dialectic helps as a training of the
mind,in casual encounters,and in the sciences (Book 1,2).The latter
it serves as follows:
'It has a further ((to raising difficulties)) use in relation to the
ultimate bases of the principles used in the several sciences. For it
is impossible to discuss them at all from the principles proper to
the particular science in hand,seeing that the principles are the
prius of everything else:it is through the opinions generally held
on the particular points that these have to be discussed,and this
task belongs properly,or most appropriately,to dialectic:for
dialectic is a process of criticism wherein lies the path to the
principles of all enquiries' (101a36-b4).
Dialectic,then,is not one of the several sciences;has no concern
with truth,but with those other subjects which have as their goal
truth or 'truth in agreement with right desire'.
The starting points of dialectic are many:'a dialectical proposition
consists in asking something that is held by all men or by most men
or by the philosophers,... provided it be not contrary to the general
opinion'(104a7ff.),in addition to views like the generally accepted
ones,propositions which contradict contraries of the generally
accepted ones,and opinions in accord with the recognised arts.The
problems dialectic deals with are also many (104bl-3:'a subject of
enquiry that contributes either to choice and avoidance,or to truth
and knowledge,and that either by itself, or as a help to the solution
of some other such problem';and the subject must be one on which
people hold no opinion, or concerning which the people contradict the
philosophers,the philosphers the people,or each among
themselves). How, then, does dialectic ever come to group these
opinions concerning an unlimited range of subjects so as to provide
undemonstrated principles for the sciences?
The answer to this is excellently given by Nussbaum (ch.8,3) in a
section on the principle of non-contradiction.In Metaphysics 4.4
Aristotle describes how to answer one who mistakenly demands a
scientific proof of the principle.The famous answer is that you make
the objector speak,and if he does,you show he has already
presupposed the principle in questioning it.The interesting point is
that the questioner demands the proof from apaideusia - 'for it is
apaideusia not to recognise of what things you should look for a
demonstration and of what you should not'. Nussbaum explains that
apaideusai is lack of paideia,'the education by practice and precept
that initiates a young Greek into the ways of his community; the word
is usually translated 'acculturation' or 'moral
education'' <p.252).So what we are pointing out to him by getting him
to speak is that he is exhibiting some form of break with the
community we have in common,made manifest in his questioning the
basic structure of our language itself.The truth and primacy of
first principles rests in their being true for us:they are the
starting points of discourse of a certain sort for one with whom we
share a cnminnn form of life. With one who did not share a sufficient
variety of practices and institutions with us there could be no
argument concerning first principles,for even if he had a strong
alternative, though conflicting,set,we would lack the common ground
of a shared set of concepts in terms of which we could discuss our
differences.
With practical first principles as well as theoretical ones the key
lies in our shared community of understanding and practice.One who
can question the principle that we ought to act for the sake of the
virtues has put himself outwith our community,though one who wants
to understand why it is we are to act in this way has not.It is for
this reason that those who attend the lectures on ethics should
already have had some moral training so that they are already inside
the moral community, and beyond asking such questions.The first task
of dialectic is, by enquiry of the many and the wise, to establish
those first principles from which the various sciences
proceed,and,especially in the case of ethics,those by which it ought
to proceed.This enquiry is not, however,something carried on formally
in the home or the academy;it is pre-scientific, and is progressing
as long as the community is acting upon and living by and reflecting
upon the norms of the day.The presuppositions of thought and action
in the community are continually engendering the principles of
thought and those of action,the virtues which will be perfected in
the science of ethics.
This view of the first principle may seem to clash with that of the
close of Book 2 of Posterior Analytics.At 100b8 we are told that of
'the thinking states by which we grasp truth' scientific knowing and
intuition are always true. Intuition,however, is 'more accurate' than
scientific knowledge (b9).Scientific knowledge is discursive,but the
primary principles from which such demonstration proceeds are 'more
knowable than demonstrations' (blO).It fallows,then,that there will
not be scientific knowledge of these principles,but that they will
be known through the 'more accurate' intuition.lt is nous that knows
the first principles.However,Aristole is clear that knowledge of the
principles is neither innate,nor a sudden acquisition:'it emerges
that neither can we possess them from birth,nor can they come to be
in us if we are without knowledge of them to the extent of having no
such developed state at all' (99b31).He cannot make sense either of
having the knowledge from birth or of realising,or gaining it
without any pre-existing knowledge of the subject.Yet we do know
first principles,so the answer must refer to a process different
from innatism or discoveryTherefore we must possess a capacity of
some sort...a congenital discriminative capacity which is called
sense perception' (99b32-5). Knowledge of first principles is
acquired as a process proceeding from sense perception of
particulars.Aristotle goes on to describe how in certain animals
this perception leads to retention of the sense-
impression, systematisation of it, memory, experience, that is,the
'stabilisation' of the universal,and,from this,the skill of the
craftsman and the knowledge of the scientist.
This description of the inductive process of coming to know first
principles makes clear that all such states of knowledge are from
sense perception (100all),and that sense perception leads to the
knowledge because of the capacity of certain animals - humans - to
process impressions inductively.Inductive sense perception leads to
the knowledge of first principles;nous is that one of the 'thinking
states by which we grasp truth' which knows them.
Inductive sense perception alone,however,would not suffice to reach
first principles.It must be directed.It might have been directed by
nature,innately,or by intellectual development,but Aristotle never
favours these suggestions.It cannot be directed by
experience,because experience is a result of perception
(100a6).Instead,I claim,it is directed by dialectic.I have stated
already that dialectic accounts for the production of first
principles,now,in making this compatible with the account of sense
perception producing the knowledge of these and nous knowing them,I
mean also to indicate how dialectic accounts for the dynamism of
intellectual and practical enquiry.
The relation of sense perception to nous in the inductive process in
which we come to know first principles is that of nous to perception
within practical reasoning.At 1142a20-30 we read that nous is of
'the limiting premises', 1 while practical wisdom is concerned with
the ultimate particular,which is the object not of scientific
knowledge but perception'. This is 'another kind of perception than
that of the qualities peculiar to each sense' (a30-l>;not the
perception of qualities,but that intelligent perception by which we
see that the object before us is a triangle.Again,at 1143bl-5 we
read that nous grasps the 'minor premise' as 'starting point' in
apprehending the end.The relation of minor premise to end is
expressed as that of particular to universal,and we are told there
must, there!"ore be 'perception' of the minor premise,and that this
perception is nous,intuitive reason.In the first passage we
apprehend the minor premise by nous and practical wisdom concerns
itself with the 'ultimate particular' which is the object of an
intelligent perception.In the second we apprehend the minor premise
by nous because it plays the role of particular and must therefore
be perceived and the sort of perception in question is nous because
the result of this perception will be apprehension of an end,which
is always the work of nous.The sort of perception in both cases is
not the simple perception of qualities,but the intelligent
perception of things.
The point is made in two different ways:in the first case,by
speaking of the concern of practical wisdom which is for the
particular,but the 'ultimate' particular,thus invoking intelligent
perception;in the second case,by introducing the induction of
universals from particulars in sense perception,but comparing this
to grasping the end from the premise in practical reasoning which is
not inductive,but more akin to perception,intelligent perception.The
relation of intuitive reason,nous,through which we know the minor
premise,the variable facts,to intelligent perception in practical
reasoning is the same as that of sense perception,through which we
know the particular,to nous through which we come to know the first
principle,in the inductive process described in Posterior
Analvtics2.
The importance of this is that we can now see how dialectical
enquiry,through which we come to know the ultimate particular with
which practical wisdom concerns itself,gives rise to a sort of
perception which is nous,and how this perception operates as the
result of inductive sense perception.The ultimate particular of
practical wisdom is practical and it is imprecise:it is the
performance of good action by the standards of the good of the
community.I have already described in the section on moral training
and education how the inexperienced come to know the community's
standard by saturation and inductive habituation in its culture -
the virtues - and how this process is continued in ethical enquiry
at the feet of one who has practical wisdom, who reasons in accord
with the standard of the virtues.Upon completion of this process,the
student is qualified to act in the light of the good,a standard
which is still imprecise because it is that of a particular
community and will be applied by him in his own particular
situations,but which is now the abject of intuitive perception.
In moral training and ethical enquiry dialectical enquiry is very
close to the surface.Because the object of moral education is
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practical and imprecise,dialectical enquiry concerning the community
endoxa is much more apparent than it is in species of non-practical
enquiry which are characterised by precision and simplicity of
subject matter (see Metaphys.ics982a25-8). In the theoretical sciences
which are pursued for the sake of knowledge of the universal
dialectic is further from the surface - though it is still evident
in that it is the conclusions of the syllogisms of theoretical
investigations which provide the subject of fresh enquiries, and the
first principles can alter on the hypothesis of radical alteration
in the endoxa.In that science which concerns the 'ultimate
particular1,however,we can fallow the operations of dialectic
clearly, in our own moral maturing and in the method of Aristotle's
Ethics,as discussed above.
Ve now know that when dialectic,whether pursued through ethical
study or for its own sake,reveals to us the 'ultimate particular'
this is grasped as knowledge of first principles of rational action
by nous.This is a sort of intelligent perceiving of the nature of
the good which provides us with the end of our practical
reasoning.The abject of this intelligent perceiving,which
dialectical enquiry has revealed,has.the form of knowledge of
principles because of the operations of inductive sense
perception.That is,dialectical enquiry can confront the good,but
this is not perceived,through nous, as. the good - we do not have
knowledge of first principles of action,principles which must be
followed if we are to attain the good - unless induction through
sense perception has occured to transform sense impressions of
virtuous activity into knowledge of the virtues.
This shows that knowledge of first principles can both be provided
by dialectic and known by nous.It also demonstrates how dynamism of
intellectual enquiry is explained by dialectic.Dialectic concerning
the opinions is always below the surface of scientific enquiry,and
is clearly apparent in the case of ethical enquiry.Although distinct
from dialectic,ethics is always transparent to dialectic:to study
ethics is. to take part in an enquiry with first principles,but given
the complexity, particularity and consequent lack of precision and
predictability of ethics,the perception of situations in accord with
these principles as appropriate situations for certain action
requires constant involvement in the activity of dialectical
enquiry.Practical wisdom - the object of ethics - is not to be once
achieved and subsequently put into operation;it is acquired only so
long as one has learned that one has to be the sort of person
constantly engaged in the enquiries of the community so as to
understand what is to be done in every situation if the good is to
be achieved.
That practical wisdom requires constant involvement in dialectic is
the truth behind the remarks that the object of study of ethics is
both practical,and the result of participation in the community
mores by social creatures:the virtues ethics teaches require active
participation in the shared life of the community.This explains why
ethics can never be a 'completed science' - it involves dialectic
essentially,and dialectic is pre-scientific.It also shows that the
initial basic moral training,ethics and dialectic cannot properly be
considered in independence of one another.The points concerning the
practicality,particularity and imprecision of ethics can only be
demonstrated and understood if we grasp the interconnections between
the political community,the science of theoretical enquiry into
rational action and the practices of basic moral training.
The evidence for this account of the special relation between ethics
and dialectic is from Topics.Dialectic.like ethics,is imprecise.lt
involves 'the doing of that which we choose with the materials that
are available' <101b7),and is done such that 'if he omits none of
the available means,we shall say that his grasp of the science is
adequate'(lOlblO).This is because,like ethics.it is concerned with
doing and not with knowing;not with demonstrating the truth of a
propostion but with convincing a particular person,using logical
forms of argument,of the truth of a proposition.For example,'You
should display your training in inductive reasoning against a young
man,in deductive against an expert' (164al3~14).Its concern is with
the particular and not the universal.Also,dialectic requires for its
practice that the one of whom you enquire is not just anyone but
someone suited to the task:'Do not argue with everyone,nor practice
upon the man in the street:for there are some people with whom any
argument is bound to degenerate' (164b9-10).And a little further on
we are told,'Vherefore the best rule is,not lightly to engage with
casual acquaintances,or bad argument is sure to result.For you see
how in practicing together people cannot refrain from contentious
argument'(bl2-15).There is,therefore,a close connection between the
practice of dialectic and those with whom we share a certain common
form of life,and dialectic is a form of reasoning which is
practical,imprecise and concerns the particular.
This suggests that dialectic must be very closely related to
ethics,This relation is of distinct enquiries,but ethics is uniquely
dependent on dialectic not only for its first principles but also
for its practice:we cannot turn from dialectic once we have the
first principles of ethics as we can with,for
example, mathematics, but must keep taking part in dialectic.This is
so because knowledge of first principles of rational action and of
ethical method is not sufficient for acting virtuously,which is the
point of studying ethics;this requires living virtuously within our
community.This alone,the practice of virtue,gives us the moral
perception which he says is of the 'ultimate particular'.
As ethics does not simply take its first principles from
dialectic,but involves dialectical enquiry directly if we are to
attain its object,it seems obvious that ethical enquiry will be
dynamic.lt may,therefore,proceed and develop without end,and this
despite the fact that it is enquiry from a set of first
principles.It is not of the nature of ethics that there is some
truth it will reach upon which the science will be completed.A
complete,per impossibile, science of ethics would be redundant
because ethics is engaged in only for the sake of teaching a truth
whose nature,unlike other truths,is not invariable,but is constantly
changing:truth in agreement with right desire.
If this account is correct,the sort of practical/moral life outlined
in the first section as eudaimonic though not the highest good
towards which every action of the virtuous must be directed,can be
represented as a life lived as the result of learning and practicing
the principles of action of the whole community,most of its members
or the best of its members.This learning may come as the result
simply of moral training,or of this together with ethical enquiry of
some sort and specific pieces of dialectical reasoning.Such a life
of action in accord with moral virtue is not,I claimed,the highest
good,but a means to this.However,it also possesses value in itself
because it is. a means to the highest good.Ve now have the grounds
for stating why this is so.A life of moral/practical virtue will be
one which is immersed,whether directly or through its moral training
or through study of ethics,in the endoxa,the opinions of the
whole, the many or the best. A practically virtuous life is not merely
lived within a set of first principles of rational action,but is
pursued within the endoxa of one's community. These endoxa are not
just producers of principles for the sciences;they are the form of
life of a community, those beliefs which are criterial for membership
of a particular community. To live within them is to identify
oneself as a member of a community,to take one's role as a
citizen,and to take responsibility as a citizen for
practicing,developing,extending, revising and teaching the endoxa.
A life of practical virtue satisfies the criterion of ultimacy in
that it is founded on the endoxa which are the most basic
beliefs,and satisfies that of self-sufficiency in that though
theoretical contemplation is higher.it is not actually 'other' than
acting in accord with the endoxa but reasoning based on the endoxa
grasped by nous,intuitive reason,as first principles.The relation of
dialectic to ethics explains how theoria can lend ultimacy to
practical forms of activity which are means to it:because it has
ultimacy in the first place only from the endoxa which dialectic
considers;and how it can lend self-sufficiency:because the
principles from which theoretical contemplation proceeds are nothing
other than the result of nous applied to the result of considering
the endoxa,and therefore ultimately take their own self-sufficiency
from the endaxa.
Contemplation and the various forms of moral/practical activity
are,then,conceptually inseparable for Aristotle.Thus eudaimonia must
consist both of activity in accord with the moral virtues and of
theoretical contemplation because performance of these distinct
species of activity have their common source in the opinions of
particular communities. The relation of dialectic to ethics also
shows that Aristotle's account of rationality is mistakenly
interpreted as absolutist.The forms of practical reasoning from
first principles are explained not by appeal to an external and
invariable standard,but by the dynamic basis provided by the
activities of pre-scientific enquiry,non-theoretical
communication,in particular communities,and the exercise of
intuitive reason in grasping the present results of these enquiries
as first principles.Activity directed towards the goad,rational
activity,proceeds from first principles,but does not have its
beginning in any source outside the opinions of the community,and
that these are what they are is,of course,only ever contingently the
case.
The concept of rationality which I have attributed to Aristotle will
provide the basis for a structurally basic account of rationality as
activity.whatever the theory of rationality we construct.That is,the
notions of a community and of the members of that community
communicating in a pre-theoretical yet theoretically basic way are
the foundations of my own account of rationality,which I understand
as anterior to any theories of rationality.I will attempt to explain
the ways in which these notions are basic to rationality by next
considering Thomas Aquinas's theory of practical rationality.This
combines Aristotle's understanding of the relation between dialectic
and ethics with the biblical idea of God's Law, or the Eternal Law,to
produce a 'Natural Law' through the principles of which we discover
not the identity of rational action with the rule of the cosmos,as
the Stoics thought, but the identity of reason with dialectic in the
human community.
Chapter £BQ
I have argued that tor Aristotle rational action is action
performed as a result oi a perception oi one's situation iormed by
the moral and intellectual virtues and deliberated correctly as
means to the Final End ol a lifetime oi virtuous activity.I have
also claimed that all theoretical enquiry,including moral
enquiry,is based ultimately upon the contingencies of the common
opinions of the members of particular communities;that study of and
reasoning about these opinions is dialectic;that basic moral
training and informal education in the opinions is the first
qualification for the study oi all the sciences and for the
possession of the practical wisdom which is the character of one
who typically performs rational actions;and that practical wisdom
is the result of the study of the science of ethics,a study which
resembles dialectic in many respects,but differs in that its aim is
good action, whereas the aims of dialectic are intellectual
training and the production oi first principles of science.
This conception of ethics explains it as based upon a complex of
intellectual capacities some of which we might like to call
'practical' - perception,training,action - and some 'theoretical' -
education,induction,judgement,exercise of intellectual virtues -
operating within contiguous and overlapping processes of early
learning,moral training and particular exercises of the
virtues.However,the very fact that ethics is based upon all of
these,shows that the theory/practice distinction is of no more use
in understanding Aristotle's concept of ethics than the opposition
of reason to passion is of use in understanding his concept of
rational action.To say that Aristotle's ethics is practical -
because of its end - or theoretical - because it reaches its end
only by teaching the first principles the phronimos must possess -
is unhelpful because it obscures the fact that it is the basis of
ethics that determines both its end and its principles,and this
basis is a practical/theoretical complex.
Ethics,like all scientific enquiry,proceeds by demonstration from
first principles,and these are arrived at and maintained only so
far as one has an understanding of the current endoxa which is
given only through participation in forms of non-theoretical
activity.The overlapping borders between the theoretical and the
practical in this conception exist,then,because ethical enquiry
concerns,and takes place within,the exercise of various
intellectual capacities which cannot be described as either
theoretical or practical,but form a complex of both.For
Aristotle,enquiry,even of the most abstract sort,demands
participation in those on-going practices of the community which
provide and sustain its first principles,just as rational action
requires not only reasoning,including participation in ethical
enquiry,but participation from earliest years in non-rational forms
of activity.The interrelationships between the concepts of
theoretical and non-theoretical activity,and demonstration and
dialectic upon which Aristotle's theory of rational action depend
demonstrate just how far Aristotle is from the Cartesian and post-
Keformation dichotomies of theory and practice,reason and passion.
By considering Aquinas's theory of practical rationality we will
see that for him the idea of rational action as action correctly
directed towards the life of activity in accord with the highest
virtue and the idea of enquiry as apprehension of the endoxa as
first principles form a single theory of (good) activity as the
participation in enquiry of the soul within the (true human)
community.
Thomas Aquinas,
Thomas Aquinas (1225-74) was a Dominican teaching friar.We cannot
understand his work if we lose sight of this.As a preaching
friar,his teaching is directed to the final end of the
communication of the Gospel through his preaching.His vocation is
not teaching or theoretical contemplation;it is preaching.This
means that unlike Aristotle's,his works cannot aspire even to the
form of a completed science. The result of intellectual effort of
even the greatest sort for Aquinas is frustration at his inability
to say anything,however slight,concerning the mysteries of the
Final End of his system,of God Himself.Aquinas's Final End stands
always outside Aquinas's forms of communication, attainable only
through a form of communication beyond human language which
occurs,for most, only after death. I will return to the role of
communication and of theory within Aquinas's teaching.In the
meantime it is to be borne in mind that theoretical labours occur
within the context of preaching,communication through the spoken
word;and that no forms of human communication alone can carry us to
the mystery of God which,for Aquinas,is the Final End of all human
communication.
Aquinas believes that the good is that to which things move because
of their own principle,or intrinsic nature.All things tend to the
good.Only human beings do good,but all things,in so far as they are
what they are and not distorted by external influences,tend to the
good,in most cases inevitably.The end to which human beings move by
virtue of their human nature,in so far as they are not unnaturally
affected,for example,by the passions,is one to which they tend
through their natural inclinations (Snmma Theologiae■trans..English
Dominican Fathers,London;1920,1-2,94,2).It is not,like the
Aristotelian end,first known through inductive perception and then
pursued as the result of deliberation in particular circumstances
for the sake of the life of highest virtue.Rather,for Aquinas the
human end is that which human beings,in so far as their humanity is
undistorted.are pursuing in their actions.Its primary determination
is by human nature,and not by sense perception and reasoning.This
does not mean that moral training and practical reasoning are
irrelevant to good action,but that these only succeed because human
beings,when their minds are cleared of the passions and any other
intellectual or perceptual obstacles,do tend by their nature
towards the good:their relevance is secondary to that of nature.
Let us try to explain this.Aquinas holds that the rational mind
works both as principle of assertion and as principle of
activity.That is,in our rational operations we endeavour either to
know the world,or to bring about some alteration to or within the
world:to act.The speculative and the practical operations of reason
are distinguished by the 'intelligibility' or prime category which
falls under our apprehension in each case.In all apprehension being
is an inseparable notion and (1-2,94,2) the first nation.When it
operates under this intelligibility alone reason operates
speculatively.In so operating.it first affirms a principle,which it
cannot explain by demonstration,to the effect that nothing can be
affirmed and denied at the same time.This is the First Principle of
all theoretical reasoning.Our knowledge of the world proceeds from
it and from those other principles contained in various ways within
it.There is,however,a farm of apprehension of which the
intelligibility or prime category is not being,but good.This is the
apprehension of reason directed towards action:practical
reason.Such apprehension in so far as it is a species of
apprehension,has as its intelligibility being,but as 'the
apprehension of the practical reason' it first grasps good.The
practical reason grasps good first because it is reason operating
so as to influence the world,and such behaviour is built out of
individual acts each of which are for ends represented to the
rational being as good. Good is, therefore,the prime category of the
practical reason, and the first principle of practical reason is
that good is that which all things seek.This principle is the
ground of all principles of activity.Because it is the basic
practical principle,we can express it as follows:'Good is to be
done and pursued,and evil is to be avoided'.
Aquinas says at 94,2 that as a principle of practical reason the
first principle is also a precept of the law,the Natural Law.This
is the Eternal Law of God ('the type of Divine Wisdom,as directing
all actions and movements' 93,1),in so far as it is participated in
by man. The Law of God is not to be confused with the laws of God
given in,and drawn from,the Decalogue and found in legitimate
religious practices (the Old Law),or with the Divine Law through
which God directs man to his true,as opposed to his natural,end
(91,4).The Eternal Law is the actual pattern of God's sustaining
and governing power,participated in by rational human creatures
through the Natural Law.The concept of the Natural Law is the
uniquely rich and flexible idea with which I shall be mainly
concerned in this chapter.I will be approaching it in various
ways,but the first characterisation of it which must be made is as
participation in the Eternal Law.
The notion of participation in Divine Wisdom is the explanation oi
the moral relation of man to God favoured by Aquinas.The classical
expression of the concept of reason as participation in cosmic law
is the Older Stoicism of Greece.We will return to this,and need
only here understand that for the Stoics this participation takes
the form of a natural awareness of what is right by the standards
of cosmic order.This natural awareness,something like a genetic
determination towards those preferences appropriate to our
constitution (A.A.Long Hellenistic
Philosophy.Duckworth;1974,p.171ff.),is explained in the history of
early Stoicism in a number of ways varying from the sheerly
biological to the specifically ethical.One dimension of this
awareness,however,and the mast basic in early Stoic thought,is a
form of basic impulsion (trans. Horme) provided by nature to certain
ends.Aquinas's version of this impulse of nature to certain ends
also has a strong biological aspect.The term is 'naturaies
inclinationes' (1,2,94,2).We have an inclination of nature to those
ends appropriate to the sort of beings we are.These are grasped by
the practical reason as good,but the initial registration of the
Cosmic Intelligence in our consciousness is as felt,not
rational,tendency towards certain things.When he talks of the
Natural Law as a participation in Eternal law Aquinas means that
rational natural beings,human beings,have an awareness of what is
right the first element of which is the experience of inclination
towards certain fundamental ends.
It is because the ends to which nature inclines us,those which
involve participation in Eternal Law,are also grasped by reason as
good that the precepts of law are understood by us as principles of
practical reason.We should note that this does not mean that we
must know in what our ultimate end,the end to which we are guided
by Divine Law,consists and why our particular legitimate ends are
good in order to do good.We already participate in our nature in
the Final Good in so far as we tend towards the objects of our
natural inclinations as ends.However,we shall see when we come to
the concept of synderesls that as a matter of fact Aquinas does not
think a human being,however uninformed or unintelligent,will ever
be in the position of merely pursuing good ends without any
activity of practical intelligence.
The interrelatedness of the concepts of reason, law and nature is
the distinctive synthesis of Aquinas's thought,in general and in
theory of rationality in particular.This interrelatedness,the
equation of practical reason with Natural Law,is what I will
discuss in what follows in order to explain its role as basis of my
account of rationality as activity whatever theory and norms of
rationality one accepts.I will consider first the relationship
between human nature as Aquinas conceives it and the Final Good,and
then the various problems raised by the relation oi the natural
inclinations to practical reason.Aquinas's theory of practical
reason will then lead to the claim that he also has a more basic
conception of Reason as such,and that it is on the basis of this
that we can interpret Aquinas's theory in terms of a concept oi
activity.I will discuss this concept in the second part oi this
chapter and try to show that it is as iundamental to Aquinas's
theory of practical rationality as his concept of the natural
inclinations through which we participate in our Final End.The
compatibility of these two concepts,and their interdependence
corresponds to the interdependence of Aristotle's theory of
dialectic and his concept oi eudaimonia.
Aristotle's Final Good is a good achieved within our lifetime,a
good which is reached within the context of the
human,political,community.It is,in fact,a lifetime dominated and
structured by certain farms of activity.Ve have noted that his
Ethics does not - except lor occasional scattered hints concerning
basic goods such as honour,good looks and health - provide specific
guidance about what we are to do,and that this guidance,when it
occurs,concerns the rationality of his awn community.I have said
his text must be understood as a theoretical treatise,although its
goal is not knowledge but rational action:ethics is theoretical,but
the purpose of ethics is not.Because it is theoretical,and because
the relation of ethics to dialectic means that it involves
indulgence in the pre-theoretical opinions of a particular
Human Nature and the Final Good,
community,Aristotle's ethics cannot provide us with answers to our
moral and practical problems.The message of the Ethics is:if you
have practical problems,you can only deal with them practically,and
doing ethics for yourself is one of the things you need to do in
order to be able to do this.
The sense that in the Ethics one is never actually being told what
the good action towards which virtue disposes us is. is simply a
reilection of the kind of text the Ethics is.It is not that
it,vacuously,holds that rational action is virtuous action,and
virtuous action rationally determined, but that it holds rational
action is activity in accord with what one knows to be the virtues
and one's knowledge of the virtues is what makes one a member of
that community in which one's life and actions take
place.Aristotle's text should only be read by one who already knows
and possesses the virtues:it simply introduces theoretical study to
these.If we do not already know the sort of thing we ought to do to
solve our practical problems,the Ethics will not help us;the sort
of moral discoveries we have to make are at a more primary level.
The fact that Aristotle's text does not have as part of its
function the giving of particular guidance and that his concept of
eudaimonia is that of a goal attainable in this life appear to be
related.His text studies the beliefs of the community;it reflects
the community,and the standards which the community maintains
are,at their most perfect,the Final Good.The theoretical study
which is ethics describes the endoxa and shows that rational action
is that directed towards the achievement of the endoxa themselves:a
whole lifetime in which all action accords fully with the opinions
of the many and the best,and is consciously directed to this accord
because it is believed to be good.
Aquinas,however,is writing a quite different sort of text.His is
the text of a preaching friar,and as such,guidance is of the
greatest importance. He could not be a theorist of virtue in
Aristotle's sense:his theoretical study could not merely reflect
and give theoretical explanation of the virtues.His role as
preacher is that of one who teaches from authority;his purpose is
not to describe the common beliefs and to give correction of others
by the standards of the common ones,but to prescribe beliefs.As a
preacher who is also a theorist,his theoretical activities are
engaged in only for the sake of preaching.As we shall see,the task
of prescribing beliefs is not the simple matter of dogmatic
assertion of moral principles often foisted upon
Aquinas:prescription lies within the dynamism of dialectical
enquiry.However,since he teaches from authority,Aquinas's Final End
must lie outside all particular human communities.His interlocuters
do look to him for concrete practical guidance,but they seek this
either because they cannot find satisfaction from within the day to
day life and beliefs of their own community or because the common
beliefs have been challenged and confused by other beliefs the
truth of which is incompatible with the commonly perceived
truths.That is,they seek practical guidance from him as one who not
only addresses the problems scientifically,who articulates the
norms,but who is able also to confront the problems
authoritatively,to confirm and, if necessary,to revise the norms.
We will see that the method of Aquinas's theoretical response to
the practical problem is to bring to bear the endoxa of alternative
communities to the exhausted or threatened ones of his own
community,and,in dialectical enquiry,to charge these with new
life.He does not present the community's response,but looks
further;thus his Final End does not keep within the limits of any
human community.It cannot consist of any form of activity requiring
the context of human community at all,for the accepted standards of
any community are as vulnerable to dialectical revision as those of
any other.So the Final End must transcend this context
altogether.For this reason the Final End of the Natural Law is not
a 'natural' end,the end of the (universal) natural species of
man,but a 'divine' end,governed by the Divine Law.This is why
Aquinas's Natural Law is not a law of nature but the way in which
natural,rational beings participate in Eternal Law.
Eudaimonia lies outside any human community. A lifetime of
activity,even of the most virtuous sort,cannot be the goal which
determines the rationality of actions,in so far as that lifetime is
a participation in the norms of a human community.Our Final End
cannot be a lifetime of activity because the human lifetime is
spent in society (94,2). Eudaimonia is realised outside the locus of
activity,the human community,and thus outside the forms of a human
lifetime.Yet it must consist in the activation of one or more of
our human potentialities:it must be an end human beings are capable
of achieving and can pursue.The activation which is realisation of
our highest good must consist in an operation of our highest
part,the speculative intellect: the 'highest power in respect of its
highest object' (3,5).Its highest object is the essence of the
First Cause (3,8).Thus the Final End consists in an intellectual or
contemplative enjoyment of God.This is possible in its full
form,Perfect Beatitude,only at the end of a human lifetime, but is
possible in an imperfect form (1-2,3,5) through particular
contemplative activities,and to a lesser extent through the
direction of action by the practical intellect so as to achieve
those goods of the body without which a life directed to the Final
End of Perfect Beatitude would not be possible.
Perfect Beatitude, the goal of all human activity (1-2,1,6), is far
from a simple intellectual apprehension of God of the sort which
might be achieved in devotional contemplation or theological
study.First,at 1-2,4,6 we are told that Perfect Beatitude will
involve the flourishing of the body.This accords with both the
Christian doctrine of a bodily resurrection and the Aristotelian
teaching concerning the relation of practical/moral activity and
theoretical activity in eudaimonia. And second,Perfect Beatitude
involves transformation in the act of contemplation,and a more
radical transformation than that ol bodily death.In Summa Contra
Gentiles(eds, English Dominican Fathers,London;1924) eudaimonia is
most clearly expressed as a sort of vision:'the intellectual vision
of the Divine Substance' (3,53);'vision of the First Truth'
(3,63).This vision is passible only when in a sense we have been
granted the eyes of God:'In order for God in His essence to be
known by any created intellect as is required for the Divine
Substance to be seen,the created intellect must be elevated by
action from on high' (3,53).So to contemplate God is already to be
occupying,to the extent to which one is fitted for it,His
perspective;to have,by a gift of His,His sight.This shared
vision,or understanding,exlains why the Beatilic Vision is best
described as a sort oi union in which the Known and the knower are
indistinguishable, though this is caused solely by the giit of the
Known.Perfect Beatitude,then,though involving the chasm of
death,does occur within the locus oi the body - though not within
that of the community - and is a contemplative engagement of the
intellectual part,now divinised by gift of God.
These points serve to disengage Aquinas's Perfect Beatitude from
the intellectuaiist strain of his work which encourages the
criticism that he merely adapted Aristotelian scientific
contemplation and replaced the first pr-inciples with the First
Cause.They also suggest a degree of continuity between a goad
mortal life and Perfect Beatitude which makes the Thomist concept
oi Imperfect Beatitude quite coherent.To the extent to which
Perfect Beatitude involves the body we might expect our mortal
lifetimes to be guided both by the end of the body's welfare and
the ends which embodied mortal beings must pursue if they are to
safeguard the lives,and bodies,of themselves and their fellows; and
to the extent to which Perfect Beatitude is experience of God made
possible by His gift we might expect our lives to be guided by the
ends of trying to obtain knowledge of Him and of worshipping
Him. The ends represented by personal welfare and morally virtuous
activity (.works of virtue are particularly important, 1-2, 5, 7) , and
the ends represented by contemplation directed towards God and the
worship of Him constitute an Imperfect Beatitude because they are
the true human beginnings of the process which will culminate in a
radical,perfect,still human,experience of God after death.Imperfect
Beatitude,then,is activity in accordance with virtue (1-2,5,5),both
practical and intellectual/contemplative (3,5).
God does not programme us lor virtuous activity but causes us to be
(free) efficient agents of all our own actions.Thus we can lose
(5,40) Imperfect Beatitude,and if we lose this,particularly if we
lose the Beatitude of morally virtuous action,we make more
difficult the ultimate goal oi Perfect Beatitude,for loss of virtue
is corruption oi will (5,4) and rectitude of will is necessary for
happiness (4,4).This again suggests that Perfect Beatitude is the
culmination of something begun an earth.
We must now relate this conception of eudaimonia to the theory of
Natural Law,having noted that the Final End to which our rational
actions are directed is not in the normal sense a natural
one.Aquinas believes that we are,all of us,already in possession of
the knowledge of what to do in order to approach Beatitude,and to
participate in our earthly lives in the Eternal Law by means of our
actions.This knowledge is explained by the theory that all have
awareness of the principles oi practical reasoning through the
fundamental disposition of synderesis,and the theory of precepts oi
Natural Law of which we are aware because oi the lundamentai
naturales incllnationes we experience.We must first discuss these
and their relation to our Final End.
Natural Law.
At 1-2,94,2 he gives an ordering of the natural inclinations.Man
shares with the whole of nature an inclination towards the good, or
rather towards that good which is fitted to his nature;he shares
with non-human animals an inclination towards such things as sexual
union,and the rearing and education of the young;and he himself,the
rational animal,has certain inclinations - to know the truth,in
particular concerning God,and to live in society.Corresponding to
these inclinations certain precepts can be formulated concerning
the preservation of human life; limitations upon sexual
relations,the care and education of the young,and so
on;knowledge,particularly of God,preservation of formal social
structures and respect for community life.We must be clear of the
nature of these inclinations.
First,fundamental though the list may seem,Aquinas's natural
inclinations are not an exhaustive list of the ends of virtuous
action;they do not add up to the determinate content of Imperfect
Beatitude.This is clear from the Responsio of 94,3 where particular
virtuous acts qua particular acts are distinguished from the
concept of virtuous action:all virtuous action is prescribed by
Natural Law,but nature does not incline us to all particular
virtuous acts,rather these 'through the inquiry of reason,have been
found by men to be conducive to well-living';and from the Responsio
of 94,4:'although there is necessity in the general principles (of
practical reason;,the mure we descend to matters ol detail,the more
frequently we encounter defects.' The precepts,then,are only the
most commonly shared and general starting-points of virtue.
Why is there such a shared knowledge of the Law? Obviously,because
all human beings possess a rational soul.Recently (Mark
Jordan,Aquinas;Ordering Wigdom, Notre Lame;1986; it has been argued
that the 'Treatise on Law' can be read as the practical counterpart
of the speculative knowledge of the soul given in
psychology.'Knowledge oi the Natural Law is knowledge of the soul's
own teleology' (p.135).Jordan is rightly fascinated by the
incompleteness of the deduction of moral principles Aquinas offers
('It is as if the soul's teleological knowledge of itself produced
insight into its fundamental lack' p.139),but I do not think he
gives sufficient consideration to the extent to which the virtuous
activity of the structured soul is a participation in Eternal Law
which ensures the soul's enjoyment of its own Final End.The
teleological ends of the soul do simply open up the questions of
which particular actions are moral,questions to which the
community's experience and individual reflection can alone provide
answers,but the natural inclinations of the individual to these
ends provide a participation of the individual in his own Final
End,Beatitude,which introduces to rational action a necessity as
indispensable to it as the contingency introduced by the norms of
the community.
How Natural Law can contain both this necessity and the sort of
contingency characteristic of Aristotelian dialectic is the
overarching theme of my section here. To understand how the natural
inclinations can both involve a participation in the Final End yet
also do no more than open up the means of discovering a way of
participation in the Final End will require a certain historical
background. We must understand the notion of a Final End and First
Principle which pervades nature;how it can not only pervade
nature, but be participated in by (all of) naturejthe nature of
participation;and the nature of human - rational -
participation.This will require brief consideration of,in
turn, Stoic thought,the concept of the metaphysical hierarchy,the
metaphysics of participation,and detailed discussion of what I
believe to be the complex understanding or 'account' of rationality
behind Aquinas's apparently simple adoption ol the outline of
Aristotelian practical reason.
Xfte Final End as Participation.
The relation between the concept of law Aquinas develops and that
of nature is obviously influenced by Stoicism.The Stoic hierarchy
of nature receives its unity from the material pneuma which is
found in ali things (see B.Inwood.Ethics and Human Action in Early
Stoicism.Oxford:19b5.Part D.This principle differentiates itself
at different levels of the hierarchy.In inanimate objects it is the
object's particular powers of organisation and stucture;in plants
it is this and in addition the power of growth;in animals,these
plus the power to move through horme(impulse). In human beings to
impulse is added the power of control given by the possession of
reason.Human beings possess not only the capacities of presentation
(of stimulus,from the environment; and impulse to the object of
presentation,but those of assent to the presentation,and reason
directed to the impulse.
I do not wish to argue that Stoicism is a dominant influence in
Aquinas's thought (on this,see Q.J. Brown. Natural Rectitude and
Divine Law in Aquinas.Toronto:1981.p.44;.but only that the early
Stoic conception of a hierarchy of nature,irom stone to God,unified
by the same iorce-in-diversity,and manifesting at its higher levels
an impulse whose generation (but not whose control) is beyond the
control of the individual is the model of a teleology ol ends which
are both of the creature and of his Superior which we find in
Aquinas.The understanding of the teleology of ends of the soul
within Aquinas's Christian framework depends on the location of
these ends both intimately within, and imperatively above,the
individual,a bi-location best suggested by the Stoic theory of the
soul.
Of course,as a Christian writer Aquinas has available a vast
resource of Christian thinking and legal thinking which already
concerns the relation of the concepts ol nature and law and which
is Stoic (Cicero De Legibus:Gaius.Digest:Isidore of Seville,Isldpri
Hispalensig Bpiscopi EtyaologlpruiP slve orlginum iibri
xx,5,4,quoted G,Verbeke The Presence of Stoicism in Medieval
Thought,Washington:1963,p.56).The relation of these concepts within
the context of a teleology of ends directed to a Final End is
Aquinas's own attempt to introduce the Natural Law not as a
challenge to eudaimania,but as the means of christianising
eudaimonia by defining the virtuous subject as participant already
through his nature in Beatitude.One reason this attempt succeeds is
that early Stoicism possesses a conception ot law within which the
directed impulse of the Individual is not other than the impulse
which runs through the whole of Nature from its Origin to the
lowliest creature.'But none oi them ((Greek appeals to
divine,unwritten law)) rests on a philosophical conception oi a
physis that grounds nomos;this appears in stoicism with its
doctrine of physis as an immanent logos....and its definition of
virtue as 'living according to nature'... It is this 'nature',the
divine ratio,..that is immanent, eternal and immutable... that founds
human laws.Its operation is most eminently visible in man's first
'instinctive' (physikos) impulse toward self-preservation that
gradually extends to embrace all of mankind' (F.E,Peters.Greek
Philosophical Terms: A Historical Lexicon.New York;1967,p.131-2)
Participation,
As well as this Stoic background to natural inclinations, we must
take acount of the neo-Platonic background to the hierarchy of
inclinations to understand how it is possible for nature,at every
level,to participate in its own Final End,and in particular how it
is possible for the virtuous human being to participate in his
Final End here and now in his earthly and mundane actions.The great
neo-Platonic source ot the concept oi hierarchy is the Pseudo-
Dionysius (Celestial Hierarchy,only in De Caelesti
Hierarchia.ed.P.Hendrix,Leiden;1959;and Ecclesiastical Hierarchy.in
The Eccleciastlcal Hierarchy.ed. T. L. Campbell,Washington;1955). ' Ps. -
Dionysius is the virtual author of the term with the lexical
meaning which it has possessed ever since' (R.F,Hathaway.Hierarchy
and The Definition of order in The letters of Pseudo-Dionysius.The
Hague;1969,p.21).For Aquinas,man experiences natural inclinations
given his membership of the natural order explained in terms of
hierarchies of being.The great Hierarchy is,of course,of the
greatest theoretical importance to Aristotle (De Anima2.2-3) and to
the Stoics (see Inwood's discussion at p.18-27).However,Pseudo-
Dionysius was the first to make explanatory use of the term itself
as well as describing creation and the Creator in hierarchical
fashion (see Hathaway pp.39-60).
For him the hierarchy is apparent not only in the structure of the
universe,but in the enquiring mind which attempts to gain
knowledge.Thus we see hierarchical thinking revealed in the
affirmative and negative 'ways' in which we approach God either by
applying to him the perfections we apply to creatures,beginning
with the highest (see Divine Names in C.E.Rolt.Dionysius the
Areopagite oh. the Divine Names and Mystical
Theology.Macmillan: 1920).or by excluding from Him all
imperfections,beginning with the lowest (Mystical Theology)•In this
context,the stylistic and methodological examination of Dionysius's
Letters Hathaway provides is important.As the text oi the Letters
of Dionysius dramatises the descent of God and the ascent of the
philosopher (p.82),so this hierarchical form of thinking must
characterise the activity of the enquiring mind.
For Aquinas there is a similar correspondence between the
experience of the enquiring mind,of rational nature,and the
hierarchical order of nature.The order of our individual discovery
of the natural inclinations to particular ends is that of the
created hierarchy of nature.The ontological order is recapitulated
at the species level through the experience of the individual
rational enquirer.The importance of the concept of hierarchy here
is that it explains the concept of participation by nature in its
own all-pervasive source and end.In particular,it explains how
Aquinas was able to connect the whole content of Natural Law,all
the natural inclinations,to the summit of the scale of
Being,eudaimonia,so that rational pursuit of the ends of daily lire
by human beings could become,here and now,participation in their
Final End.
The background to the understanding of just what participation is
includes the,again neo-Platonist,theory of illumination. The divine
light is a favourite theme of Pseudo-Dianysius (for
example.Celestial Hierarchy 3,1Hierarchy is a sacred order and
.knowledge and activity fashioned on the model, as far as
attainable,of the godlike,and conducted proportionately by way of
divinely given illuminations to the imitation of the divine.')The
metaphysics of light is also treated by Proclus (see the
diagrammatic description by A.S'heppard - Studies on the 5th and 6th
Essays of Proclus' Commentary on Plato's Republic,Gottingen;i960 -
of the world organised according to horizontal and vertical
'lines');and light is the mode of Being of the One of Plotinus (see
the discussion of Ennead 5 in J.Bussanach.The One and Its Relation
to Intellect in Plotinus.Leiden:1968,ch.5),The participation of
beings at every level of the hierarchy in the divine Light is not
an argument of Aquinas's (though see here S.C,G, 3,53) in the
context of natural law,but the notion of the hierarchy of being as
participation to different degrees in the Light which is God is an
Augustinian theme (see especially De Trinltate 12,15,24 quoted in
Copleston Historvvol.2.London:1959.p.62) which would presumably
have been part of the standard thinking of Aquinas,and which is
made use of by him in other places (for example,the discussion of
the active intellect in S.T.1.85.1.4).The diffusion of God through
creation (often dramatised for particular purposes in His
appearances as Fire,Cloud,Dove) is a standard notion in Scriptural
writing,and something which must be tackled by any philosophy which
sees part of God's role as sustaining creation.Christian thought on
this topic,and in particular the neo-Platonic thinking on the
metaphysics of light,gives a further part of the background to
Aquinas's effort to show the entire hierarchy of natural
inclinations,and the whole of a human life,and not only the highest
inclination,as related to the Final End,the End which structures
and supports it,as a participation in It.
Human farticipation,
We must now explain just how Aquinas believes the Natural Law
understood hierarchically as participation in our Final End
operates at the human level,at the level of rationality.By
explaining Aquinas's understanding of rationality,we will explain
his view of the relation of nature to Law within the human being.We
will find this requires moving some way from the familiar
Aristotelian model of theoretical/practical reason.It
will,however,show how the theory of rationality 1 suggest we find
in Aristotle when we relate his ethics to his dialectic can be
expressed in terms of the structure of Aquinas's own work and his
central concepts of reason, law and nature.Just as the dialectical
account in Aristotle is compatible with his 'official'.N.E,.theory
of rationality,and explains how it comes about,so the 'deeper'
account in Aquinas is compatible with his own theory of practical
reasoning,and also explains the continuity and dynamism of the
process by which human beings come to construct theories of
rationality.For Aquinas,the legitimate promptings of nature which
the Stoics identified with the divine Law become participation in
the Eternal Law of the divine Being not simply in virtue of the
'divine' reason which nature-as-it-is-experienced through human
beings possesses,but by their rational adoption and the free assent
to them in forms of activity structured by community norms. These
&0
norms, the instantiation of the particular community's theory of
rationality,are accounted for,ultimately,by the natural
inclinations:they are the ways in which we will follow the natural
inclinations;and,eventually,they will be overthrown as they became
too restrictive for our pursuit of the natural inclinations.
The first part of my discussion of how the Final End becomes
operative in human nature,of the structure of practical reason,is
exposition of Aquinas's own theory.I will move in the second part
of this chapter to discuss the 'deeper' account of rationality in
Aquinas.
How can every natural inclination be a participation in the Final
Good? This is so because for Aquinas natural inclinations are not
only experienced as felt inclinations,but are grasped by reason as
the way of pursuing goodness itself.They are immediately made the
objects of practical reason through its First Principle which it
formulates as 'good is to be done and pursued,and evil
avoided'.This principle,we must note,is not of the same status as
the principles in which the actual objects of particular natural
inclinations are formulated as ends which are to be pursued.The
First Principle of practical reason,like the First Principle of
theoretical reason,the Law of non-Contradiction,is contained
within,rather than one of,the primary principles of practical
reason,those in which the ends of our natural inclinations are
formulated as goods to be pursued.The First Principle does not tell
us to pursue any specific good,but tells us to adopt the attitude
of pursuit,the practical,or intentional attitude,itself.(see the
reading of G.Grisez,'The First Principle of Practical Reason' in
A.Kenny ed.Aquinas,London:1969).Whenever we act,we are 'acting
upon' the First Principle,that is,it is the principle of our
behaviour;whenever the abject of our action is one of those ends to
which our natural inclinations prompt us and which our reason
grasps as good,we act not only upon the First Principle,but act
rationally.The principle of all action,then,rational or not,is
formulated as 'good is to be done and pursued,and evil avoided';the
principle of a rational action is a principle of reason in which
the end of a natural inclination is apprehended as a good to be
pursued.
Ve follow the precepts of Natural Law in our action by acting upon
such principles of practical reason.So the relation of the natural
inclinations to the Final Good is explained by Aquinas's conception
of practical reason.At the top of the hierarchy ot inclinations are
those man has qua rational being.His rational faculty,his highest
faculty,is the means of his reaching God intellectually,and the
faculty through which what Happiness he can have on earth will be
achieved,and perfect Happiness finally mediated.Through it he can
apprehend the objects of the inclinations he experiences qua
rational.and those he experiences qua animal and qua creature,as
goods.Consequently,it is through the operation of reason that man
is put in touch with his Final End:reason grasps objects of
inclination as ends which are to be pursued,which is to say as
steps on the way to Beatitude,to the Good.The precepts of the
Natural Law,which our natural inclinations make apparent to
us,become the way of participating in Eternal Law by means of the
A/
adoption of their objects as goods by the practical reason and the
subsequent assent to the principles which reason formulates in
action.
This explains how Aquinas relates natural inclinations to the Final
Good.We must now move to consider the way in which the practical
reason operates through the natural inclinations as the agent
pursues his good.As we have explained that in pursuing any good of
his - acting upon any of the basic principles of practical reason
or any derived from them - the agent is pursuing his Final Good
(.see 1-2, 1,6), it will not be necessary to remind ourselves that at
every stage of practical reasoning the agent in pursuit of a
particular good is thereby in pursuit of eudaimonia.
The first thing to be said about the operation of practical reason
is that it apprehends a number of basic or primary principles which
possess self-evidence and from which more specific principles or
conclusions of practical reason are drawn.The First Principle of
practical reasoning,or Principle of Intentionality,is founded on
the notion of good,that which all things seek (94,2).As practical
reason is reason directed to behaviour which alters,to action,and
good means 'end of action',the First Principle of practical reason
must be 'good is to be done and pursued,and evil
avoided'. Furthermore, ' All other precepts of the natural law are
based upon this:so that whatever the practical reason naturally
apprehends as man's good (or evil) belongs to the precepts of the
natural law as something to be done or avoided'(94,2).So all
primary principles of natural law are based on the First
Principle.The things to be done are discovered in basic principles
of reason;in operating practically,that is,according to the
Principle that 'good is to be done and pursued,and evil
avoided',reason apprehends the objects of natural inclinations as
goods and formulates each of these as a basic principle of reason
which can function as starting-point of action.It is when the agent
acts in pursuit of an end he. describes as good but which does not
reveal itself as part of the structure of our human good revealed
in the primary principles of practical reason that his action is
evil. The agent here is still rational in the weak sense that his
behaviour is governed by the First Principle:he is capable of
action.Full rationality,however,consists not only in performing
actions well calculated to one's ends,but in pursuing an end which
reason itself understands as a good.Such pursuit alone is striving
after the human Good,performing a good action.
Before explaining just how practical reason operates through the
natural inclinations to cause human beings to eificiently pursue
the Final Good,we should brieily consider the status of principles
of practical reason.We are told at 94,2 that the First Principle is
self-evident.Self-evidence for Aquinas means 'self-evident to us'
or 'self-evident in itself'.A proposition self-evident to us is one
such that if we know the subject of the proposition,we know the
truth of the proposition ('analytic');a proposition sell-evident in
itself is one such that if we know the subject,we need not know the
truth ofthe proposition though to the wise its truth is
B/
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obvious.Aquinas's example oi the former is 'two things equal to the
same thing are equal to one another';and of the latter,'man is a
rational animal'.Now the First Principle is self-evident in
itself:one who can use "good" need not know the truth of the
proposition 'good is to be done and pursued,and evil
avoided',though its truth is obvious to the wise man who has
studied.The other,primary,principles of practical reason are also
self-evident.Their case,however,seems mare complicated.lt may seem
that the principles formulating objects of inclinations as
goods,and so as ends to be pursued - 'life is to be preserved where
possible','children are to be reared to the age of reason','truth
is at all times to be sought' - are propositions such that one who
knows their subject knows their truth.However,it also seems that
one might know and understand 'the preservation of life','the
rearing of children','truth' without thereby knowing these are to
be pursued.It would not be sensible to fail to pursue these
things,but one who lacked wisdom might know in what these things
consist and yet deny they are to be pursued due not to intellectual
failure,but to a defect in education,the destructive influence of
the passions.One who yet lacked the virtues might know what these
goals are,yet be unable to grasp them by reason as human goods. 80
the self-evidence oi the primary principles in which the
constituents oi the human good are formulated is also self-evidence
in itself.
The aspect of virtue in Aquinas's theory of practical reason to a
great extent reintroduces Aristotelian material either already
introduced,or irrelevant to my continuing argument.The main point
for my purpose is that the role of training in moral virtue,and of
education,is as vital to the smooth running of the intellectual
virtues for Aquinas as it is for Aristotle.I will briefly outline
his concept of virtue in order to make this clear.
Virtues are habits disposing us towards good acts (1-2,55,1);virtue
is 'a disposition in relation to a thing's nature,and to its
operation or end,by reason of which disposition a thing is well or
ill disposed thereto'(49,3).Ve know from 18,4 that a good act must
be good in four ways,and thus in our moral evaluations and
assessments of responsfbility we must pay attention to more than
the end of the action.However,it is with respect to its end that
the agent forms the intention oi performing a particular
action,therefore the disposition to an end which is grasped by
reason as good,an end whose pursuit is pursuit of the human good,is
the firmest indication of a virtuous action.Virtue is a disposition
to act rationally,'a permanent disposition to act in conformity
with reason' (E.Gilson.Christian Philosophy of Thomas
Aquinas.London:1957, p.201).
Such a disposition is not within us by nature (63,1),but according
to 'aptitude' and 'inchoatively'.That is,both in respect of our
rational nature,and of our individual bodily natures we have a
natural aptitude for virtue,but the perfection of virtue is
something which is acquired through the performance of rational
acts because it is the rule of reason alone which establishes the
good towards which virtue disposes us (63,2).Aquinas is clear about
the acquisition:'a man needs to receive this training from
another,whereby to arrive at the perfection of virtue'(95,1).He
says all are inclined to undue pleasure;those who by good natural
disposition, custom or God are inclined towards virtuous
action,require only 'paternal training' for the acquisition of
virtue,'which is by admonitions';those prone to vice must be
forcefully restrained however.The major responsibility for
habituating in virtue,then,lies with the father and the law.
For Aquinas,not all of the intellectual virtues require the moral
virtues in order to function;in fact,only prudence does.Prudence
concerns particular situations of judgement and therefore requires
the moral virtues to ensure the agent does not favour self over
others,present over future.Prudence determines how we are to do
what we ought to do;it is an intellectual virtue concerning not
just knowing,but living well.It is,therefore,a necessary part of
efficient practical reasoning which requires the moral virtues. The
practical reasoning of a human being,however,also requires certain
other moral virtues.The 'cardinal' moral virtues perfect the
will:justice produces fairness concerning what is due;temperance
prevents passions pulling us to irrationality;fortitude prevents
passions which hinder us from acting rationally.Training in moral
virtue is therefore required if one is to be practically rational
just as it is by the ethics of Aristotle.
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We now need to ask what is the relation of basic principles of
practical reason to the First Principle,and how this explains the
connection of the objects of the natural inclinations to the Final
Good.Ve have already mentioned that Imperfect Beatitude must
include morally virtuous action as well as intellectual
activity,and that even Perfect Beatitude will involve practical
activity to the extent that the Beatific Vision will be possessed
by embodied souls.It is also clear that God will be more concerned
with our performing good acts than with our knowing truths,for
when we behave so as to achieve the ends of the natural
inclinations and those ends proceeding from these we behave so as
to rationally alter ourselves,while when we behave so as to gain
knowledge we attempt to conform our rationality to the world.The
First Principle,which is the principle of action,then has a clear
relation to our Final Good in so far as the actions we perform are
good ones.that is,in so far as the good we pursue is the human
good discoverable in the structure of our natural inclinations.The
objects of these inclinations reveal the structure of the Final
End. How they do this is understood when we consider them as goods
formulated in basic principles of practical reason.
The First Principle not only gives practical intentionality to the
mind,but is the substantial source of the other principles of
practical reason which are derived,though not deduced, from it.That
is not, however,to say that it is the first of a chain of practical
principles.It is source of others in that given its nature as
principle of action,it is the first and necessary condition of
rational action:it is principle of action;therefore it is
principle of rational action. Thus Maritain (Man and the
State.London:1954. p. 81) calls it 'preamble and principle of
natural law.'As a necessary condition of rational
action,however,there is no intrinsic reason why substantive
principles of rational action should be derived from ii. rather
than from some other,independent source of rationality. However,we
must remember that the First Principle does not simply tell us to
do good,but also to avoid evil.It functions,therefore,as a
principle of choice: not only is it necessary condition of
(any, including evil) action,but it also makes the requirement that
agency involves discrimination of ends, and the representation of
some to oneself as good and others as evil.Agency involves not
only pursuing the good as we perceive it, which may not be the true
human good,but also avoiding the evil as we perceive it,which may
not be the true,forbidden evil.Since the principle of action does
not merely activate the mind to pursuit of goods,but steels it to
avoidance of evils,it cannot function as a purely formal principle
of action:it requires that whenever we act and so describe certain
ends as 'good',we also describe certain,other ends as 'evil' and
so as impossible grounds of action for us.
As the performance of any action involves ruling out the
possibility of our performing certain other actions,particular
operations of the First Principle are never purely formal but
always also selective,providing reasons for doing what we do.We
can,therefore,say that the First Principle,the principle of
action,since it involves choice (choice is of the intellect as
well as of the will,1-2,13,1) and limitation of the range of
possible actions,is the source of the rationality of behaviour and
that substantive principles of rational action
are,therefore,derived from it and not from some other independent
source of rationality.
As the relation of basic principles of practical reason to the
First Principle is so intimate,and the form of their derivation
from it much more immediate than logical deduction (it is their
'preamble and principle'),the connection between it and our Final
End (Beatitude requires moral/practical activity,and the First
Principle is the principle of such activity) implies a connection
between basic principles and the Final End.The Final End has no
constituents that are evil,none contrary to the human good,and
therefore only those actions which are part of the human
good,those directed to ends which are truly constituents of the
Final End,constitute pursuit of eudaimonia. The ends of these
actions are formulated in principles which are derived from the
First Principle,and derived from it as. a first principle of a
being who occupies the place in the hierarchy of nature of a
created thing,an animal,and one who has the property of
reason.That is,they are described as 'good' in principles of
action derived from the First Principle as means of following the
natural inclinations of the agent.However,these principles also
just are the basic principles of practical reason, the first
formulations of the human good when the mind is being directed by
the practical reason.Therefore,those actions - behaviour
consequent upon the First Principle - that are part of the Final
End are those actions performed upon principles corresponding to
the natural inclinations,and the latter principles,being also the
basic principles of practical reason,very obviously share the
connection of the First Principle to the Final End.They do so
because they are not only derived from it as principle of
action,but because they are the first principles the practical
reason forms once it apprehends the objects of the natural
inclinations.By grasping these as goods practical reason reveals
them to form the basic structure of the Final End realisable
through action.
Having explained the relation of the First Principle to the other
primary principles of practical reason,and the relation of the
primary principles to our Final End,we can complete the outline of
Aquinas's theory of practical rationality with the concepts of
synderesis and the secondary principles of practical reason.
Synderesis is described at 94,1 as 'a habit containing the
precepts of the natural law,which are the first principles of
human action.'It is a disposition of the mind consisting in a
tendency to know the basic principles of the natural law.It
corresponds to the disposition of the mind known as intellectus,or
understanding,by which the mind has a tendency towards knowing the
first principles of theoretical reasoning.Synderesis is a natural
disposition.He writes at Quaestiones Bisputatae de Veritate
(ed.R.W.Mulligan,Chicago;1952,16,30) that no one can lose it.It
is,furthermore, infallible (16,2). Synderesis,therefore,provides
for every human being a knowledge of the basic principles of the
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Natural Law,and,with regard to this knowledge, cannot provide
incorrect information.
The development of Aquinas's concept of synderesis from Stoic
antecedents and medieval authorities has been well documented (see
G,Verbeke,The Presence of Stoicism in Medieval
Thought:T.Potts,Conscience in Medieval
Phi 1osophv.Cambridge: 1980). The point I wish to emphasise about
synderesis is the way in which it explains for us the relation
between what we would call Aquinas's conception of value and the
theory of reasoning.This can be usefully clarified by a criticism
of 0'Conner's (Aquinas and Natural Law.London:1967.p.72)■He
asks,if 'good' means 'end of inclination' and reason grasps
objects of natural inclinations as goods,'why are those things
which are good in the sense of being sought after necessarily also
good in the sense of being the right kinds of things for us to
choose?' Why is the good,the necessary abject of value,also the
right,the necessary object of (correct) practical choice?
This is explained by synderesis,It is a natural disposition to
understand principles of action,of the Natural Law;an
inextinguishable and infallible power of the soul by which certain
basic principles of action are known to all.As such,synderesis is
also a 'potentiality of reason' (see de Veritate 16,1).That is,we
may view it as disposition towards the basic principles of
practical matters,or as a potentiality of practical reason ('it
exists in no other potentiality but reason').Ve should understand
it,then,as a natural disposition of the practical mind (the mind
governed by the principle of action,the First Principle)
possession of which entails that reason informs us that the ends
of certain inclinations are right objects of action,that these
ought to be pursued.The things which are good,which have value
because we seek them necessarily,are also the things it is right
(always) to pursue because questions of Tightness,of good
reasoning in particular circumstances,are far Aquinas questions
concerning the operation of practical reason,and the potentiality
of the practical reason is the natural disposition towards
apprehending necessary ends as basic principles of action.
0'Conner is wrong in the way he distinguishes the right from the
good,because any rational action is so because it stands in some
relation to the ends of those natural inclinations which
synderesis disposes us to apprehend by reason as human goods:a
right action is always derivable from a basic principle of
practical reason which formulates an unquestionable human good on
every occasion. Synderesis explains how we can close any gap
between efficient reasoning and the true human good,prudence and
the Natural Law,the demands of practical reason and of our human
nature,within Aquinas's theory.
Synderesis disposes us towards apprehending precepts of Natural
Law as basic principles of practical reason,and does so as a
potentiality of the practical reason.As well as these basic
principles,however,Aquinas has a doctrine of secondary principles
which proceed from them.Before considering the nature of these,I
will describe the process in which they are determined and in
which we reach conclusions concerning particular actions,whether
G/
from primary or secondary principles.This will involve the concept
of conscience.
The practical syllogism does not have the role for Aquinas that it
has for Aristotle of transferring the agent from decision to
action,but is the mechanism by means of which the agent makes
choices.The first principles towards knowlege of which synderesis
disposes us can be formulated as major premises,and relevant
factual information as minor premises. Conclusions about which
particular action to do are derived by a set of capacities to
which the term 'conscience' seems to be applied. Conscience is that
faculty by which we judge on the basis of practical principles and
particular facts what we ought here and now to do (see de Veritate
17,1 and 2; and cf.Albertus Magnus, Simma Creaturis. Opera
Omnia.ert.A.Borgnet. Paris:1690-9.2.72.1).Ve could describe the work
of conscience in the following way:synderesis disposes us to know
that p-type acts are wrong;perception and the intellect show that
x is an act of type p;conscience applies the fact that x is p-type
(from minor premise; and wrong (from major premise) ifl. x so that
it is judged that x ought not to be done.The full description
would then continue by explaining that what transfers us from this
judgement to action or restraint is an act of will which is a
voluntary act involving choice.Willing includes wishing,the
initial act of will which is involved in the making of a
particular practical judgement,and executing the command of the
wish by moving the body,which is the result of the practical
judgement.We need not here go further into the structure of
action.The main point is that Aquinas has a
sophisticated,Augustinian alternative to describe the role
Aristotle assigns to the making of practical syllogisms.
The other role of conscience seems to be in the derivation of
secondary from primary principles of practical reason (the best
discussion of this is R.A.Armstrong.Primary and Secondary Precepts
in Thomistic Natural Law Teaching.The Hague;1966).As conscience
deduces from the facts concerning an action and its wrongness that
it ought not to be done,so from a fundamental principle concerning
action,and particular facts it can also derive a secondary
principle concerning particular actions and describing what
specifically is to be done.The secondary principle contains
nothing not contained in the primary one,but simply makes this
more specific,relating it to a narrower field of action.The wise
will see (1-2,100,1) principles contained within the Natural Law
which the simple,although they know all the basic principles,will
not yet recognise.Armstrong puts this well: ' Primary principles are
concerned with details from the abstractions of real life....the
secondary principles are more deeply involved with the varying
circumstances and the details which surround any and every moral
action' (p.93).The question of how the secondary principles are
derived from the primary is a point of the greatest controversy.In
the fourth Article of 94 he insists that practical truth and
rectitude is not the same for all.At a glance,this seems to
undermine the Natural Law doctrine.However,we have seen reasons in
discussing Aristotle for holding that his views of the
imprecision,practicality and particularity of ethics do not
undermine the conception of ethics as theory of the
virtues,and,though I will not give explanation of this till
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later,we shouldaccept that Aquinas's Natural Law too will be
compatible with a non-absolutist interpretation.We are forced to
consider such an interpretation as we begin to move further into
the matter of the secondary principles.
The problem with the secondary principles and their status as
Natural Law is the lack of a clear theoretical explanation of how
specific practical principles are derived,and how specific they
can become. The more specific our conscientious examination of the
facts and narrowing of the basic principle becomes,the stranger it
sounds to call the derived principle part of the Natural Law at
all.Secondary principles are variously described as 'conclusions'
(94,4),'detailed proximate conclusions' which may suffer addition
or subtraction (94,5),conclusions following closely from general
principles (94,6),derived conclusions or 'partiuclarised general
farms' (95,2).And at 100,1 he writes about first principles,'from
which principles one may proceed in various ways to judge of
various matters',and considers the derivation of what exactly to
do as differing in degree of complexity according to the amount of
consideration needed to apply a first principle to one's
situation.Those cases in which derivation is virtually
immediate,in which the agent is actually not aware of the basic
principle but only of the specific one or perhaps only of the
decision and the desire to act,are not controversial.Here the
specific principle is a conclusion of the basic one:it is seen
without any intervening thought to be what the basic principle
implies in the circumstances, and is therefore rightly described as
part of the Natural Law because the secondary principle is no more
than the application of the primary one in a specific
case. However,when we must actually ponder in our circumstances
both those circumstances and the relevant primary principle
without being immediately aware of how the one applies to the
other,and when we must attempt to derive here a more specific
'bridging' principle,the question of what the nature of this
derivation is and whether its result is part of the Natural Law is
disturbing.
I would suggest an answer to this as follows.One who knows the
basic principles grasps objects of natural inclinations by his
practical reason,he understands them as goods.In any particular
situation we are concerned to discover our good,which,so far as we
are rational,consists in the end we should act upon as a means of
conforming with precepts of Natural Law.The basic principles we
have because we tend towards such knowledge through the natural
disposition of synderesis:due to synderesis,in any situation
calling for action we have the basic principles before our
minds.The rational agent will consider these and his
circumstances,and where perplexity about what the thing which
ought to be done is - not perplexity about whether he must.for
example,in the case of an opposing passion,do as he ought -
arises,he will either receive upon proper consideration of the
matter a determination of conscience in the shape of an immediate
conclusion or secondary principle that such and such ought to be
done;or,failing this, he will be obliged to initiate as an
exercise of conscience a process of derivation of his secondary
principle,This process of derivation will go beyond the knowledge
to which synderesis disposes us.
It cannot,however,include consideration of the secondary
principles because it is these we are attempting to establish,and
it cannot merely consist in consideration of the primary
principles and the facts of one's circumstances because this has
been tried.The process of derivation, therefore, must consist in
consideration of extra principles of action,the 'matters of
detail' which we are told (94,4) do not possess the necessity of
the primary principles.He writes at 95,2 that just as in art
'general forms are particularised as to details',so conclusions
may be derived from the Natural Law not immediately but solely in
accord with more general conventions of the human law. Part of the
human law,the Law of Nations.does consist of immediate derivations
from the Natural Law,but an equally important part,Civil Law,is
derived from the Natural law 'by way of particular
determination. ..according as each state decides on what is best
for itself'(95,4).This decision will be made with respect to the
common weal and the condition of those who will be governed by the
law (see the important discussion at 96,2).
It can be suggested,then,that where it is not apparent what the
rational agent is to do he will consider the primary principles of
practical reason,the facts of her situation and,as additional
'minor' premises the opinions of human law and custom according to
the conventions of the state as they apply to one in his
circumstances. When this is done he will be able to derive, though
without the certainty of logical demonstration or water-tight
deduction, and without the certainty which synderesis ensures we
have concerning the primary principles,a specific principle of
action in which the practical reason grasps what he is to do in
his situation.In this rational apprehension,due to the process of
derivation he has fallowed,he not only grasps his good in these
circumstances,but understands the reason why it is his good:he can
explain this in terms of primary principles,specific principles of
human law and custom,and the facts of his situation.Thus in an
important sense he is no worse off than one who succeeds in
knowing his good either through the knowledge towards which
synderesis disposes us,or through immediate conclusions from this
knowledge.
This explanation,if correct,indicates that to continue asking
whether and to what extent specific rational principles are a part
of the Natural Law is to deal in quibbles.The point about Natural
Law is that it cannot stand as an autonomous body of moral
knowledge with which rational animals are fully acquainted.It is
first of all a participation in Eternal Law and so looks beyond
itself to the will of God when it seeks the intelligibility of its
own principles.It is secondly the law not only of rational
beings,but of rational and natural beings;beings which live in
communities,rear families and rely on others of the same
species.Thus it must be understood within a social context,which
means that it must look ahead of itself to the laws and customs of
a human political community to ensure its own expression through
the smallest details of the activities of agents which are
progressively governed less and less by legalistic rules and more
and more by idiosyncratic conventions.The Natural
Law,thirdly,requires the Divine Law in order that nan may be
directed beyond his merely natural end,and in order (91,4) that
no
any uncertainties over the particularity of nan-immediate
conclusions of Natural Law,or any contradictions within them can
be answered. The content of the Natural Law is not,then,a fully
determinate matter; nor can it be fully defined by the content of
the other forms of law.Its most fundamental and general principles
are secure and are unambiguously known as the principles of
rationality due to synderesis and practical reason.However,as soon
as we move from these the content of Natural Law both expands and
becomes less certain in its concern for the way in which the
Eternal Law applies to the detail of what a particular agent ought
to do in a particular social context here and now to pursue the
specifically human good.The Natural Law is not the whole moral
law,but only the richest concentration of it in which it is
clearest how the different levels of law apply to human action.
This completes my exposition of the basis of Aquinas's theory of
practical reason.I will go on to discuss this with the intention
of exposing what I have called his 'deeper account' of
rationality.
Part Two.
In my discussion of Aristotle I argued that his theory of
practical rationality,the theory of the virtues,was in no way
absolutist because of his conception of the nature and role of
ethics,the role of moral training and education in rationality,and
the relation between ethics and dialectic.I wish to claim also
that Aquinas's theory of practical rationality,the doctrine of
Natural Law,is not absolutist.There are three reasons for this
claim.The third of these will provide the explanation of just how
within human nature - rationality - our Final End is participated
in.The first reason has already been mentioned.lt is that the
Natural Law is not an autonomous body of moral legislation.The
Natural Law is completed by the varieties of human law and
convention and the Divine Law.It is,therefore,not autonomous in
the sense that it does not legislate in independence of these
legislations:it is literally completed by these,and not merely
supplemented by them.The Natural Law furthermore,is human
participation in Eternal Law;this is what it is. Its essence is
participation of the fullest kind possible for human beings in a
more perfect legislation.It is not an autonomous body of moral
legislation,then,in the sense that it is not possible to give an
accurate deacription of it except in terms of another,higher,
legislation.
Since the Natural Law,the theory of practical rationality,is in
these ways not autonomous,it cannot be that the principles of
rational action are derived from a standard which is fixed and
guaranteed independent of context.Natural Law is a participation
in the Eternal Law,which is. absolute,but it is the participation
of a certain sort of being,and the basic principles of that
participation merely direct the agent towards very general
necessary ends of action pursuit of which depends on acknowledging
principles of human law,and obedience to Divine Law.The precepts
of Natural Law are not absolutist because they are a participation
in,and not a reproduction of,the principles of Eternal Law:they
participate in Eternal Law according to the nature of the
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participant,the human being;and this human participation requires
completion by principles of human convention which are not
absolutist.
The second reason for claiming that the precepts of the Natural
Law are not absolutist concerns the concept of practical
reason.The concept of practical reason which Aquinas introduces to
explain the normative hold on us of the precepts of Natural Law
depends logically on what I have called the First Principle of
practical reason,which is the principle of action,as well as the
grounding intelligibility of the basic principles of rational
action.The precepts of Natural Law we understand pre-rationally as
inclination until the objects of the inclinations are grasped by
reason as goods,ends which are to be pursued.This rational
apprehension,which is a recognition of principles of rational
action,occurs because the mind has a tendency towards
activity,towards the good,and in virtue of this tendency is drawn
towards achievement of objects of the natural inclinations as a
means of pursuing the Final Good.It is the achievement of these
objects (the 'Imperfect' End of practical rationality) that forms
the basis of one's rational principles of action:a set of
principles of action formulating the ends of natural inclinations
as basic goods.The concept of practical reason which explains this
rational grasp of precepts of Natural Law,our understanding of the
good,then,depends on the First Principle which is not one of the
principles of practical rationality,but the principle of action
from the practical directedness or intentionality of which the
principles of practical reason derive their normative pull.
This priority of the First Principle within practical reason means
that the Natural Law,in so far as it provides us with principles
of rational action,depends upon a prior teleology of action,the
sort of bare practical directedness which the First Principle
initiates.This entails that it depends also upon a concept of
reason as such - and not just human reason.Its dependence upon the
First Principle entails the notion of 'reason as such' because,for
Aquinas,the First Principle is one of the two fundamental
Principles of reason - along with the Law of Non-Contradiction -
which hold for all rational beings,and therefore would hold for
non-human rational beings who are not ruled by the Natural Law and
so are not subject to the set of basic principles of practical
reason.The existence of the two First Principles with their
intelligibilities implies the existence of a concept of reason as
such independent of the concept of human practical reason (the
Natural Law).This distinction is one which cannot be seen in the
case of theoretical reason because here it is disguised since the
basic principles of theoretical reason depend not at all upon the
nature of the reasoner but only upon derivation from the Law of
Non-Contradiction.
This logical dependence of the Natural Law upon a basic teleology
of action and a concept of reason as such means that the precepts
of Natural Law,even the general principles which are the same for
all human beings,are not absolutist. The First Principle is not
only principle of rational action,but principle of all action,of
any behaviour manifesting the minimal rationality of practical
directedness.Logical dependence on it of the principles of
rational action,therefore,indicates the position of rational
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action within the wider class of action in general - any behaviour
in pursuit of the perceived good.Rational action is action
performed for reasons which contain no element of deception or
error;action the end of which is truly our end,and not the
'imposed' end of passion or the external environment. The
principles of rational action are the same for all human beings
because of human nature,but if we consider the class of actions,a
class which will include,definitely for Aquinas,some actions which
are not rational,we will see that the criterion of action
itself,does not include reference to any particular sort of object
or end.The criterion is simply that the First Principle of pursuit
of good and avoidance of evil is in operation.whatever the agent
perceives to be good.Since the principles of rational action are
logically dependent on a First Principle which is principle of all
action and which,therefore, specifies no particular ends.then
despite the universal applicability of the ends of natural
inclinations to rational human beings,their necessity is only a
feature of human rational nature and not of rationality,of
rational principle,itself.The rationality of these principles
rests not upon the relation of the actions they prescribe to
reason,but upon the relation of the actions to us,our nature;the
actions prescribed are not rational because of what they are but
because of what we are.Thus even the basic principles of practical
reason are not absolutist for they do not consist in a standard of
rationality which is independent of the viewpoint of human agents.
The dependence of the First Principle upon the concept of reason
as such also indicates a further way of showing that the basic
principles are not absolutist.If they depend upon a principle of
action which is one of the two most fundamental principles of
reason considered in abstraction from sorts of rational beings -
reason as such - then alteration of them,though impossible,is
conceivable so long as there occurs no alteration in the concept
of reason as such.Variation or denial of the basic principles
might occur if different derivations from the First Principle were
made.Such derivations would be possible only in the case of
rational beings which did not share our human nature.For such
beings the basic principles of practical reason might not apply
though the concept and principle of action would,and their 'reason
as such* would be the same as ours.These points about the relation
between the principles of practical reason and the First
Principle,and between the principles of practical reason and the
concept of reason are of course connected:a rational being of a
different nature might have different rational principles,though
he would have the same principle of action and the same
reason,consisting of the principle of action - the First Principle
- and the Law of non-Contradiction.Aquinas's precepts of Natural
Law,then,are not absolutist,but are the only logical principles of
rationality for a human being,given his nature and his capacities
for action and reason.
The third reason for claiming the Natural Law doctrine is not
absolutist is the most important,and will occupy the remainder of
this chapter.lt will require consideration of Aquinas's text and
the nature of theory and of the relation of these to
rationality.It will also reveal what I think is the relation of
the Final End to human nature,depending for this upon the notion
of a 'deep account' of 'reason as such' in Aquinas.
Science,theoretical enquiry,is a particular exercise of
rationality.It must correspond to principles of theoretical
reasoning,but as itself a form of activity it must also aim at an
end which must conform to the legitimate ends of the basic
principles of practical reason,the human good.This much, I think,is
uncontroversial.However,I want also to claim that theoretical
activity is not only a sort of rational activity,but the form of
rationality itself for Aquinas, and that scientific enquiry,such as
is exemplified by his text,is the most perfect species of
theoretical activity, or rationality. The outline of the argument is
that we must interpret the principle of action,'good is to be done
and pursued,and evil avoided',as not only principle of
action,but, in the absence of specification of particular ends of
action,as principle of activity;this is so in virtue of the
concept of activity and of reason as such which,I claim,are more
basic to Aquinas than the categories of the practical and the
theoretical.Activity,in virtue of its principle,the First
Principle,is to be understood as always in a sense
theoretical.Science is simply that sort of theoretical activity
whose subject matter is theory itself (that is,theorising and
other current theories),though whose object so far as the activity
is rational,is the good - as is the case too with all forms of
non-scientific activity.Scientific enquiry,then,is the species of
rationality in which rationality,theoretical activity,takes itself
as its own abject.If this is correct,the claim is that the
doctrine of Natural Law is not absolutist because the
precepts,even of the most general form,are themselves the objects
of enquiry within a larger,on-going process of scientific
enquiry,theoretical activity,which is constantly developing and
altering as its objects come to be understood.Obviously this
argument will depend upon the dialectic of Aquinas.This will
provide the connections between rationality,activity and
theorising which are required for the remainder of this chapter
and the thesis.
We have described the First Principle variously as preamble to
practical rationality,practical directedness,and principle of
action.Yet despite its status as psychological cause of action,and
as one of the ultimate principles of the rational mind,it is also
a principle of explanation,and,in this sense,a theoretical
principle.The principle not only is the taking of intentional
directedness over one's behaviour,but is the explanation of what
happens when one understands the promptings of nature as good,as
providing objects of pursuit:it explains this,and it Le. the
practical intentionality behind particular acts.The principle of
action is theoretical because it is the explanation of action.
It is theoretical in another sense.It is not a component of
action,but a condition of action.For action to occur the
directedness which this principle provides must interact with
objects to which we are inclined.The psychological aspect oi the
principle,its intentionality,is,therefore,conceptually distinct
from action - though inseparable from it at the level of
experience - because not sufficient for action.This gives us a
notion oi bare activity,simple non-practical directedness of
behaviour,which is not action,but necessary for action.This
activity might be called theoretical in the sense that it is a
simple stretching out of the intelligent mind,as yet to no object
in the world,involving no relevant bodily movements,but only the
intentionality of the agent.In terms earlier-used,this activity is
a direct expression of reason as such;the preface to the practical
reason,but no more a piece of practical reasoning than the
ceaseless contemplation of the Law of Non-Contradiction is a piece
of theoretical reasoning.It is sensible to call the First
Principle in the form of this simple psychological experience,this
direct expression of reason as such,theoretical because it is an
experience of reason and because it will underlie all
activity,both theoretical and practical,as explanation of that
activity.There is reason,then,to label the First Principle
theoretical.Vhen we consider Aquinas's basically intellectualist
conception of the Final End,this makes still more sense.The Final
End is intellectual contemplation of God in union with Him, and all
rational activity will aim at this.We might therefore expect the
theoretical to penetrate the nature of all activity since it is
for the sake of a theroetical union that all activity is
undertaken.
The point of this is that if action rests upon a theoretical
principle,then all human activity,practical and theoretical,is
pursued through principles which are ultimately theoretical,and
thus the way is clear to show that because the basic principles of
rationality rest upon theoretical principle,the theoretical is the
source of activity's Tightness,its rationality.We are far from
this conclusion yet,but must begin,building on what has already
been established,to show that Aquinas's conception of theoretical
enquiry,science,is that of activity;that activity is,like
thought,a basic human condition (one of the two expressions of
reason as such),but one yet more basic than thought since thinking
too is an activity;that scientific enquiry is merely the most
perfect form of theoretical activity;and,as has been already
suggested,that theoretical activity underlies all human action as
well as all purely theoretical or 'intellectual' behaviour.
Unlike Aristotle,Aquinas has no extended study of method in his
works.This is what we would expect.The goal of his work is oral
communication and preaching.If the written work is ultimately a
means to preachlng.it is unlikely that it would form a separate
object of major study in itself.The nature of the written text
cannot,therefore,be clarified by a particular theory of enquiry
buried within the Summa.The method and nature of the works must be
discovered by considering the relation of the theoretical work to
the activities of preaching and scholarly teaching.
In the later middle ages the method of writing of anyone engaged
in scholarly work is determined by the method of study.For one,in
particular,who writes for the sake of preaching and whose work is
a contribution to the Final End of preaching only so far as it
teaches,the connection between the form of writing and the method
of study is obviously very close.Aquinas's teaching was done
always within,or in association with a university,most
notably,Paris.We need not here trace the well documented growth of
the universities (for example,S.C.Ferruolo The Origins of the
^IS"
University.Stanford:1985).but only note the relative novelty of
the first founding by authority of a university (Naples,by
Frederick the Second in 1224) to someone teaching in the second
half of the thirteenth century.Universities initially would base
their instruction around the seven Liberal Arts,the trivium and
quadrivium established both by the early monastic schools and the
contemporary professional schools and chapter schools of the
cathedrals.Scholars would then go on to undertake divine
learning:scripture,the Fathers,canon law,liturgy and so on.The
simple framework of division of the universities into faculties of
arts and theology was challenged very early in the course of the
evolution of universities by the intricate process of reception
into the west of the accurate translations of Aristotle.As it
stands,however, we must consider this simple hierarchical view of
learning and the effect of this upon the method of instruction in
order to determine the relevant facts about the stucture of
Aquinas's texts.
Learning,other than purely professional learning,was directed to
the study of theology.An arts education was the proper preparation
for study for the mastership in theology.Learning was also in the
hands of the clergy.Universities were clerical bodies in which one
would be instructed by those bound by their vows to the faith,in
the knowledge of the faith,in the hope that in time one would take
up the duty of passing this knowledge on.The hierarchical view of
learning of the thirteenth century is reflected in the very
structured methods of study the universities adopted.In all study
the lecture was basic.A lecture,or commentary took the form of a
literal reading and then a free commentary on a text,followed by
discussion.These texts were taken from collections known as
'Sentences',originally simple collections from Church Fathers but
often including commentary from the compiler, as in the famous
Sentences of Peter of Lombard.The Sentences were more than a mere
text book.Approval and long and extensive use gave them an
authoritative status so that in his commentaries upon them a
professor was not at liberty to reject the text but only to
interpret it,having first accurately expounded it.The second basic
unit of study was the quaestiones dlsputatae:the
presentation,explanation and proof of a particular proposition by
the professor,with formal replies to any objections raised.The
third,much less frequent,vehicle of study was the quaestiones
quodlibetales,a public occasion on which a professor would answer
questions asked at random on contemporary topics,his answers being
tentatively replied to by a bachelor and these replies themselves
formally replied to by the professor at a later occasion in the
form of a disputation summarising the whole session.
It is clear that the means by which teaching and learning were
carried on was primarily the disputation.Although the lecture may
have held greater importance for the student,the structure of the
lecture can be seen as basically that of disputation,and the
concluding discussion as a separate summarising
disputation.Lectures were,of course,quite different occasions from
disputations,but the method of both was disputational in that the
master would present,expound,interpret,and defend (see
A.Kenny,'Medieval Philosophical Literature' in Cambridge History
Ql Later Medieval Philosophy,eds.N. Kretzman,A.Kenny and
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J.Pinborg,Cambridge;1982;Kenny's ref.,p.20,to Peters on the
history of the lecture).Kenny (p.24) asks whether the origins of
the disputation might be found in the form of the lecture,but it
is clear that this is merely conjecture and that considered in
isolation from disputation the form of the lecture has little to
distinguish it as unit of study from any other form of
intellectual debate.Any teaching and learning requires
communication of understanding,and this involves questioning and
interpreting in the light of what is already known,and for the
early universities this is discovered in the structure of the
disputation which is common to the quaestiones and the
lecture.Once the institutions of community learning exist,the
disputational form of study in one shape or another is inevitable
(though see the view of A.Maclntyre Three Rival Versions of Moral
Enquiry. Duckworth:1990.ch.4 on the Augustinian background to the
quaestio).
What is unique in the institutions of learning of the medieval
universities is the common allegiance of all participants of the
learning community to a faith which permeates totally the nature
of the learning they are there to attain.This statue of affairs
used to lead to the opinion that the medieval programme of study
lead to sterility of thought.This opinion contains truth only so
far as concern for novelty is an issue.The disputational method
does not allow for originality of the sort we would normally
consider a virtue.In an intellectual environment in which there is
enshrined an authority established beyond doubt,students and
teachers and the institution itself seek to understand and to
communicate truth which is expressed in a body of propositions
which have absolute authority in virtue of their relation to a
prior set of authoritative propositions which are ultimately
related to a non-propositional source of truth.In so far as
scholars and masters function well they will understand and add to
this body of propositions.Rational debate,intellectual life,here
takes the form of interpretation of certainty,and communication of
this interpretation.Scripture and church tradition,which represent
certainty,are interpreted,for example in Lombard's Sentences.and
this interpretation is accepted by all as it faithfully states and
humbly interprets the propositions of scripture and the
church.Next,a master,accepting the authority of Lombard,states one
of the sentences and gives a commentary on it.This
commentary,because of its fidelity to orthodoxy,is approached by
the scholar as authoritative.He then enters into debate with the
master and his abjections will be rejected if contrary to the
authority for that very reason,and accepted if compatible with it
and incompatible with no other authoritative proposition.If,in a
varied series of examinations,the scholar's proficiency in this
process is demonstrated,he will in time become a
master.Obviously,then,originality,in the sense of novelty,has no
role to play in this process.Original commentary is welcome,but
innovation is not.
Originality does not only risk rejection,but is dangerous.Debating
with the master in order to have your point accepted by him not
because it is compatible with his thought but because it surpasses
his thought as an account of the truth is not only to offend his
pride,but to offend against authority.His authority is the vehicle
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through which orthodoxy has been communicated to you (only
advanced theology scholars would study the scriptures themselves
as texts).If orthodoxy is communicated in chains of
authority,diverging from the authority of any link of a chain is
indistinguishabie from diverging from orthodoxy itself. In a
society such as that of the medieval Christian universities where
encounter with the canonical text is impossible for most, and even
for the educated reserved until after many years
instruction, commentaries or interpretations of the text have an
actual authoritative identification with the text itself.To
challenge these is dangerous because it is by the sacred text and
tradition that society is ordered and governed.
The method of study guards against these dangers. Furthermore, the
writing of theological texts,each a considerable physical
labour,also guards against this.Licensed texts,works the faithful
might refer to,are written as a result of,or with a view to,the
process of teaching and learning.They therefore exhibit in their
structure the same authoritative derivation as the derivation of
the master's orthodox teaching.This did not, however,mean that all
written works had to be disputational in form.The twelfth and
thirteenth century masters also wrote 'sumraas'.
A summa was a free collection of doctrine whose form need not be
disputational.lt was generally directed to a particular purpose
(as Aquinas's S.C.G.is said to have been for the use of Christian
missionaries),or for the instruction of particular groups (as the
S.T. was written for Dominican novices).The summa allowed the
master to tailor his text's form to his particular purposes.The
approach to the subject matter was therefore more personal,rather
than reserving personal comment to an explication of the authority
being discussed.The summa became a popular form of text,and often
complex beyond the implications of 'summary' or
'compendium'.Famous summas were written by Bonaventure,Alexander
of Hales,Albert the Great and others,as well as Aquinas.
The problem with the summa was that although it gave greater
potential than disputation for personal creativity and tailor-made
design,it appears static compared to disputation.The summa was the
summary of thought to date on a particular topic or area,directed
to a particular purpose.Disputation,however,though it discouraged
innovation,was a dynamic process of continual debate in the light
of the common disclosure to which the whole community looked.The
masters could see themselves engaged in a process,an on-going
activity,in which the divine authority,the source of their
commission,was gradually,and ever more efficiently,disclosed to
the community.Thus the summa allows for a particular,and,to an
extent,personal summary and exposition of knowledge to date which
can go beyond individual propositions but which need not leave the
confines set by its own purpose,but such a text is limited by its
purpose and by the present state of knowledge which it
expounds.Meanwhile the disputation does not welcome radicals,but
does allow for an approach to learning as an activity of reason
employed in clarification of the faith.
This academic background to the work of Aquinas is of great
importance in understanding his approach to and method of
theoretical enquiry.Of equal importance,however,is the
Aristotelian background to his theory of rationality.When he moved
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to Paris from Cologne in 1252 Aquinas would already have learned
much concerning Aristotle and his classification of the sciences
from Albert the Great.Albert had great,though not
unlimited,respect for Aristotle,and would have shared the general
acceptance of his logic,and,in particular,of.his work in the
natural sciences.At Paris parts of Aristotle and most of the logic
had been lectured upon throughout the thirteenth century,though
always in the translations and commentaries of others,particularly
of Avicenna.Condemnation of the first attempts to teach
Aristotelian metaphysics occurred in 1210 at the hands of the
Council of Paris.In 1215 the papal legate intervened and
Aristotle's work was forbidden to be taught except for the ethics
and logic.It seems that although the condemnation was not
withdrawn in the bull of Urban the Fourth to the university in
1263,the metaphysics were being openly taught in the 1240's and
1250's (F.van Steenberghen,The Philosophical Movement in
Thirteenth Century.Nelson:1955.3).We need not here examine the
reasons for theological disapproval of Aristotle or the general
nature of Aquinas's Aristotelianism.My concern here is only to
note that throughout his time at Paris the goal of Aquinas's work
within the institutions of learning already described was the
creation of a firm philosophical foundation for theology,and that
the most challenging and topical source of philosophical thought
was the Aristotelian corpus.
The very completeness and comprehensiveness of the corpus,of
course,posed a considerable threat to theology and Christian
philosophy,as did the commentaries surrounding it;witness
Aquinas's treatise On the Unity of the Intellect
<ed.B.H.Zedler,Wisconsin;1968),against Averroes.As van
Steenberghen,and all philosophical historians of this period,make
clear,it was a time of considerable uncertainty in the university
community. Some sort of defence against new,Radical,Aristotelianism
was required,but the difficulties concerned not merely the content
of this defence,but the means of making it,given the nature of
philosophical debate as I have outlined it.If Aristotelianism
poses a serious threat to the unity of christian scholarship,if
the possibility of a formal separation of philosophical
speculation from theological is being raised,not only a brilliant
response,but one brilliantly demonstrating the unity of
scholarship is required.The disputational method,however,did not
favour the sort of innovation of content and form required;and the
other permitted forms of text did not easily allow for the view of
learning as the actualising of divine disclosure in rational
communication; they did not provide the means of scholarship
expressing itself as unity and progression rather than as expanse
of learning tailored by the text into particular topics and
particular purposes.
Aquinas's response, in its fullest version, is the vast Snmma
Theologiae written in the 1260's and 1270's.Vhen we consider the
material he had to either reject or unite,and the restricted
textual frame in which he could do it,the Summa obviously
represents maximum economy with optimum flexibility. The never
completed Summa was written in the disputational method.It has a
particular purpose,the instruction of novices,and a particular
'theme' in that it deals with the series of propositions leading
through natural theology,the divine attributes,creation,the human
creature and its participation in the Eternal Wisdom.However,the
content of the Summa is without limit in that its method
recapitulates the total progressive disclosure of authority to
date in a single,theological,text,and the series of objections it
responds to could be extended by minds other than Aquinas's so
long as they accept the total responses to date.
The objections replied to in the Summa and the authorities cited
add up to an incredible list ranging from the Fathers and the
traditional wisdom of the church,through Socrates and Aristotle
with all the ancient authorities he discusses,Pseuda-
Dionysius,Proclus and Plotinus,Cicero and Seneca,to Averroes and
Avicenna,Maimonides and A^icebron.This enormous repository of
information dealt with in the series of articled quaestiones means
that the fact the Summa represents the stage knowledge has reached
at one particular period of the thirteenth century is a positive
virtue of its construction:it is not frozen at this point,rather
the value of the disputational method,whose product is as
'complete' at any point as it is at any other,is demonstrated by
the fact that the Summa does achieve for a particular time and
purpose a current state of completion.The advantages of the Summa
do not limit the structure of disputation but indicate that this
structure is capable of providing concrete results at particular
times.
Since the disputational method is open to inclusion of as many
objections as can be raised to particular propositions and to
assertion of as many propositions as can be validly derived from
previous propositions, it has a dynamism which allows for
indeterminate continuation,and a unique perspective upon every
moment of any stage of the debate which allows for a recognition
of the reality of the views of the present without compromising
the integrity of the total process of divine disclosure.This
dynamism is,then,in a sense cumulative,but at the same time and in
any point open to complete revision.For this reason it seems to me
that the Summa,and the particular theories of the Summa,are not
accurately described as theories q£_ anything,though at all times
they must have had as their object something,but as theory become
activity:an incompletable process of theorising in which we are
invited to participate.
There are other disputational summas (.for example, Alexander of
Hales).Why is Aquinas's S.T. unique? The answer to this concerns
his theory of practical rationality,the doctrine of Natural Law.As
we have seen,the practical reason rests upon a First Principle,the
principle of action,which is one of the two irreducibly basic
conditions of the rational mind.We also saw that this principle
can be considered in abstraction from all particular ends of
action,both as an explanatory principle of activity of any form
and as cause of the experience of basic directedness which is
conceptually distinct from action.I suggested in connection with
these points that the principle is best described as theoretical
with no reference intended hereto the particular activity of
theoretical reasoning.
My point here is that this basic principle,the First Principle of
practical reason,is Aquinas's explanation of participation in
activity in general,and therefore of that sort of activity which
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we call scientific enquiry,such as the creation of S.T.■and that
it is,ultimate cause of our participation in activity.This is not
it must be emphasised an argument of Aquinas's;it is my attempt to
account for the unity of the structure of S. T. with the
particularly rich Thomist doctrine of Natural Law with its
components of Stoic 'impulse',neo-Platonic hierarchy,and
Aristotelian teleology.The First Principle of practical
reason,with its grounding on a pre-rational teleology of action,a
formal concept of 'reason as such',and its need to select ends of
inclination if it is to become actualised in action, must bear some
relation to the complex of acts,the participation in activity,the
highest form of which is theory construction,scientific enquiry.If
it is explanation of all participation in activity,as well as
principle of action and preface of rational action,the First
Principle is explanation of participation in that activity which
is the writing of a text.
Although not an argument of St. Thomas' s,the notion of activity as
a more basic category than either thought or action has some
support in Aquinas's writings.At Comm.in 1 Sent, (ed.R.P.Mandonnet
0.P.,Paris;1929) 31,2,1,ad 4 he writes,'Beauty is not an object of
desire except insofar as it assumes the nature of the good.Truth
is the same.' The point is clearly that the desirability of
truth,the end of the theoretical reason,is dependent on its being
seen as part of the good,the end of the practical reason.But
clearly truth is not a result of action in any direct way; rather
possession of the truth is the result of action.Therefore the
truth is part of the good not because it is an end of practical
reason,but because its possession is an end of practical reason.If
even the end of theoretical reason can fall under the province of
the First Principle of practical reason in so far as it is part of
the good,this suggests that this principle occupies a more basic
role in the constitution of the rational being than that of
theoretical reason,and that its basicness also goes beyond that of
the practical - since truth is not an end of action.This I style
its role as principle of activity,the expression of reason as
such.
Further evidence consists in Aquinas's opinions concerning the
construction of basic principles.Although we are disposed towards
knowledge of these principles respectively by the habitus of the
intellect and by synderesis,they are not immediately known by the
intellect but constructed from dialectical enquiries and sense
knowledge (see S,T..la. 85,8,reply to ad 1:'In the acquisition of
demonstrative knowledge principles and elements do not always come
first since,at times,we come to the knowledge of intelligible
causes and principles from sensible effects';la,85,8,reply to ad 3
suggests the objects of the intellect are not first known because
of their similarity to the intellectual faculty,but because of
their relation to the form of the object already in the
knower,suggesting that in knowing them we need not first know
principles; la, 85,3 Responsio claims knowledge of singulars
precedes knowledge of universals - sense knowledge precedes
intellectual - and that the more general knowledge always precedes
the less general ). Commentary on Physics (R. J.BlaCkwel1,R.J.Spath
and V.E.Thirkel eds.Yale;1963) confirms the priority of sense
knowledge over intellectual in us:'But we should understand that
there he takes "singular" to mean the sensible individuals,which
are indeed better known to us,because sense knowledge, which is of
singulars,in us precedes intellectual knowledge,which is of
universals',Lecture 1. 8. Comm.in Post,Anal, (only in Qpera
Omnia.vol.1.ed. T.M. Zigliara. Rome: 1882) 1,20,on cap.ll,27ff.
CDialectica enim est de communibus; et aliqua alia scientiae est
etiam de communibus scilicet philosophia prima. . .Sciendum tamen
est qoud alia ratione dialectica est de communibus et logica et
philosophia prima...') supports the reading that the first
principles of all sciences are established dialectically (see
Maclntyre's analysis of this passage and of Comm.in
Eth.1.lect.11,12 at V.J? V,R?p.172-5).If the principles of even
intellectual enquiry depend upon sense observation and
participation in the dialectical enquiries of the community, then
all rational principles,both practical and theoretical,can be said
to depend upon forms of activity which,though they involve thought
and action,are preparatory to the rational activities of right
action and true thinking.
Such activity will depend logically upon the First
Principle,certainly as principle of action,but the point is these
actions are not performed to achieve the good,but to give
knowledge of basic principles which will be the grounds of actions
in pursuit of the good.As the First Principle has here the role of
causing activity which will lead to the good indirectly by
providing knowledge of rational principles,it is not only
principle of action,but also of a sort of activity more basic than
action:dialectical activity aimed at knowledge of principles.This
suggests again a concept of activity more basic than the
categories of either thought or action though participation in
this activity does involve the use of both thought and actions.
That activity is more basic than thought (because thinking is as
much a form of activity as playing rugby) and that it is more
basic than action (because it is conceptually separate from ends
of inclination,and because rational action rests upon
participation in forms of pre-rational activity),and that the
method of enquiry of Aquinas's text is that of participation in
the activity of theorising I now take as demonstrated.The question
now is the relation between the category of activity and the
participation in such theoretical activity.The concept of activity
rests,I have suggested,upon the First Principle,'good is to be
done and pursued,and evil avoided',with the reference of 'good'
and 'evil' either unspecified since the principle is not here
principle of action and so does not function as pursuit of
specific ends, or specif ied as an objective (such as knowledge of
principles of rationality) which will contribute ultimately
towards achievement of the good.When we consider participation in.
activities we see that the references of 'good' and 'evil',not as
ends of action, but as objectives of complex activities, must be
specified.The difference between specification of 'good' and
'evil' as ends or as objectives is the difference between pursuing
the perceived good through behaviour which is a mere means to
it,and pursuing it through behaviour which is believed to be an
actual participation in it.Basically,we can say that when we
specify the good as something to be achieved not by means of our
behaviour,but by means of what our behaviour accomplishes in its
performance,then we specify an abjective and not an end,and our
behaviour is a participation now in the good.Such participation is
what I have described as activity.
Now,if I am correct,and there is such a difference between the
role of the First Principle in the performance of actions and in
the participation in complex activities,interesting conclusions
follow concerning,in particular,scientific enquiry.lt is possible
to describe scientific enquiry as participation in one sort of
activity without describing it either as thinking activity or as
practical activity.What makes the activity participated in
scientific is not that it involves the theoretical and not the
practical reason,but the nature of the good participated in in
this form of activity.The good in question,if it were being
considered as the end of actions, might be called knowledge;but
here we are concerned with this good so far as it can be
participated in by human beings.We can call it the establishment
of orthodox,or permissible propositions.Scientific enquiry,for
Aquinas,is activity aimed at the establishing and clarification of
authorised propositions by means of consideration of these and of
heterodox propositions.
If the nature of scientific enquiry is determined not by the sort
of operation of reason involved but by the abjective of the
activity participated in,then it cannot be said to differ from
other forms of activity in its thoroughness or
'objectivity':science is differentiated not by a particular
operation or degree of reason,but by a particular
objective.If,then,we consider participation in any other form of
activity,such participation is not more or less 'theoretical' than
scientific enquiry but simply participation in a different
theoretical activity,participation in a different good.We can,of
course,ask whether this good is a true good,part of the human
good,but such enquiry into the rationality of an activity
establishes only whether its objective is or is not part of our
Final End,and not that participation in it is more or less an
engagement of reason, an engagement of the First Principle, than
participation in any other activity.
The relevance of insistence on this is that if we can claim that
any activity is distinguished not by its degree of either
practical or theoretical rationality,but by its objectives,and
that activities are evaluated by the relation of their objectives
to the Final Good,then activity is an engagement of reason at a
more basic level than the practical/theoretical dichotomy.It is
caused by,and explained by,the First Principle,one of the two
necessary constituents of 'reason as such',operating not as
principle of action but as basic psychological cause of activity
in general and theoretical explanation of complex particular
activities.Now,as this principle has already been shown to be
theoretical in virtue of its causal and explanatory
roles,activity,which is caused and explained by this principle,can
be claimed to be theoretical in this limited
sense.Activity,whether basic or complex,is not practical:it is
either pre-practical intentionality of the First Principle,or
theoretical coordination of actions into patterns of pursuit of
the good.Science is not a theoretical species of activity,but a
species of (theoretical) activity which has as its objective the
correct consideration of theories and theorising.The theoretical
is not the preserve of science hut is the nature of the most
psychologically basic,and of the most intellectually complex human
behaviour:activity.
The flexibility of "activity" - it is familiarly both the
fundamental expression of movement of a human being as non-
intentional behaviour and the description of complex projects
participated in through the performance of clusters of actions -
might seem to be sacrificed for the intellectualist connotations
of "theory".However,what has been said should show that 'theory'
is being used not to connote 'more scientific',but to indicate
that all attributable human behaviour involves at the least some
degree of intellection.Just as all thinking is activity,so every
act is theoretical in its dramatising of prior intelligent
imagining.The theoretical is present as intelligent component in
all activity - the most complex activity participated in and the
most basic activity registered in the body - this is what makes
such behaviour activity rather than movement:if there is no.
intelligent element there.no proposition formulated,nothing has
been done.Activity is differentiated from will in respect of the
minimal degree of this intellection.Will necessarily involves the
intellect.lt functions specifically in response to intellectual
apprehension of a good (1-2,8,2) and to the efficient means to
that good (15,1).However the intellectual component of activity
need not be judgement concerning a good or a means established by
deliberation;it need only be a proposition formulating the
performance of certain behaviour which,but for the
proposition,would have been something which merely happened to the
agent.
Theory in this sense does preserve the ambiguity between complex
actions and the most simple intentional behaviour,but it also
allows us to distinguish these in terms of the complexity and
completeness of the proposition formed upon which we pursue the
objective of our activity. The complexity and completeness of this
proposition no doubt,though I will not pursue the suggestion
here,also gives us grounds for establishing when will is present
and when it is not.These remarks justifying the description of
activity as theoretical because of the need for the theoretical in
explaining the psychological and explanatory connotations of
activity are also intended to support the earlier claim that the
First Principle is a theoretical principle because of its role as
psychological cause and as explanation of activity.
My final concern here is to relate what has been said concerning
activity and theory to rationality.I have suggested the First
Principle of practical reason,the ground and preface of the
Natural Law,is principle also of activity,and in doing so have
suggested an account of the relation of action to simple,pre-
practical activity and to activity considered as a complex
phenomenon. The doctrine of Natural Law explains rational action by
rational grasp of objects of certain inclinations as goods.As I
have located rational action within the context not only of the
class of actions,but of activity which is explained by the same
principle of action at a level prior to its prescription as
practical reason,we would expect explanation by the Natural Law
too to be situated within a context both more basic
psychologically and more complex at the level of human
participation.The precepts of Natural Law,the ends of natural
inclination, must themselves be subject to a more basic explanation
which must explain also our participation in more complex human
activities.
The explanation of the natural inclinations,I suggest,is human
nature as. theoretical,as intrinsically tending towards activity at
the most basic level.The ultimate ground of human nature is the
urge to participation in the creative act,the act of God;the
tendency towards doing.If we understand this as human
nature,rather than the Aristotelian theory of nature Aquinas
himself held,it is then possible to explain natural
inclinations.They are still basic to rational action in that they
are the first precepts of human nature,however as this is now seen
to be an intrinsic tendency to theoretical activity and not the
existence of a certain sort of essence,they need no longer be a
determinate set of the aspects of our good,but can be understood
as inclinations towards features of whichever forms of activity we
choose to participate in.Natural inclinations,then,though we can
still hold they are basic to rationality of action,are themselves
explained by our individual participation in activities.Their
existence is explained by activity in the psychologically basic
sense:we just are beings which are essentially active
tendency;their sort is explained by activity in the complex
sense:our pursuit of particular objectives through participation
in various forms of activity provides us with inclinations to the
ends of acts which structure these activities.However,the question
of the rationality of these forms of activity presents a
problem:on what basis can activities be rational if not on the
basis of right action (which would be circular) or natural
inclinations (which are to specifiable objects of action,and not
objectives of complex activities)?How does the concept of human
nature as theoretical activity explain the objectives of our
activities in such a way so as to rationalise them?If we return to
the example of dialectical activity aimed at the discovery of
basic principles mentioned earlier we can find an answer.
What this involves is consideration of common standards with the
goal of establishing basic principles.The production of basic
principles by such dialectical enquiry into the opinions of the
many we have already shown to have a place in practical reasoning
by supplying norms of human law and convention in detailed cases
of rational action.My suggestion now is that the criteria by which
forms of activity are to be evaluated,criteria which,unlike those
of action,cannot be provided by inclinations of nature,must then
be discoverable through such enquiry.It is in terms of the
received standards of the community that the question of the
rationality of participation in particular activities,the question
of the rationality of objectives,is determined.
Such theoretical activities as dialectical enquiry,however,we have
already said,are forms of activity no more thorough or theoretical
than any others;they differ only in their object:theories and
theorising.Participation in that form of activity which gives us
knowledge of which activities it is rational to participate
in,then,is not a first-order participation which provides a
privileged sort of knowledge;it is simply a matter of one activity
influencing our other activities.Furthermore, how it does this is by
consideration of 'theories and theorising',namely those activities
in which the many of the community do presently take part ,
• Rationality of activity not only has its source in the activ/Ties of
the community,then,it is. the activities of the community.Rationality
of activity, which is basic cause of, and complex explanation of,our
individual practically rational actions, simply is the conformity of
activity to the present standards of activity. Community norms direct
the basic drive to activity towards objectives which are
rational,and these activities then pattern the ends of natural
inclination into objects it is rational to act so as to achieve.
If rational activity is that activity which is participated in in
accordance with norms subject to alteration and development,a
particularly important and useful example of rational activity will
be activity which not only reveals the present standard,but which
reveals also the dynamism by which the present standard is being
tested and revised.Such a sort of activity,of course,is a text like
Aquinas's S.T. which possesses the capacity of the summa to
comprehensively survey the present to a particular end and the
capacity of disputation to make apparent the process of disclosure
of the truth through the establishment and repeated defence of
authorised propositions against objections.lt is because Aquinas's
Summa has the form that it does that the criticism most likely to be
raised by contemporary readers,that rationality is grounded in self-
evident basic principles which we cannot accept,is the wrong sort of
objection.The text demonstrates that rationality can both consist in
activity and prescribe self-evident principles because the
principles,their self-evidence and the thirteenth century concept of
the nature of the good are all particular propositions within the
historical,and quite contingently structured,process of
participation in theoretical activity.The connection between
dialectic and disputation in S.T. is unmistakeable. The claim now is
that rationality in a very important sense is that particular form
of theoretical activity which is scientific enquiry,and that the
text of such enquiry has a special status if it makes its
disputational nature clear as the thirteenth century quaestiones do.
The relation of the First Principle and of the concepts I have
derived from it to the structure of S,T means that certain of the
virtues of S.T. can be understood as marks of rationality
itself.First,the method of proof which we discover in S. T. is not
that of a highly deductive derivation of certain conclusions from
self-evident premises.Proving propositions is participation in a
form of non-completable activity;proof is not demonstration,but
activity.This activity,for example in the case of S. T. .is not merely
a method of putting the argument of S.T. forward,but is very largely
what the argument of S.T. is. That is,the nature of the Summa is
theory of rationality:it makes the rationality of the faith happen
through colossal philosophical synthesis;its disputational structure
means the activity it involves is crystallised as particular
demonstrations while allowed to develop as continuous
rationalisation of the faith by consideration of propositions
through new objections.The theory of rationality which S.T, is is
emphatically not Aquinas's theory of the dual operation of reason as
practical and theoretical.This is simply one more theoretical
construction within the process of active rationalisation of
faith.My point is not that the doctrine of Natural Law and the
logic of Aristotle are in some way not correct;rather,the form of
the disputational Summa allows them to be both correct,and
themselves propositions to be defended against,revised in terms
of,and perhaps rejected in favour of,those propositions the theorist
raises as objections.
Aquinas does teach the precepts of Natural Law to his novices,but he
also teaches that theorising,theoretical activity itself,is the
performance of,or the demonstration of,rationality.Rationality is
theoretical activity,and,paradigmatically,it is theoretical activity
concerning theoretical activities:scientific enquiry,theorising
about theoretical enquiries.When we ask,'yes,I know this and this
are rational,but what is the rationality they actually have? What
rationality?",the answer is 'rationality is participation in
activity;especially it is participation in that intelligent activity
that considers the propositions of other intelligent activities and
seeks answers'.We do not define rationality;we exercise it. How we
exercise it - the various processes of acknowledging received
propositions,recognising 'objections',operating the common rules,
revising propositions - is explained by Aquinas with the use of the
Aristotelian concepts of dialectic,first principles and practical
reasoning and the medieval methodology of scholarly enquiry.The
disputational terminology of his own explanation is probably of
little use to u£.But Aquinas's principles and methods do indicate
more accurately than any other combination of content and
form, argument and text,including Aristotle's,certain necessary
features of rationality.Rationality is activity;it is dynamic:not
relativist in the crude sense of modernity,but constantly open to
reasonable revision in the light of 'objections' which prove to be
of greater explanatory capacity than the principles;it is
theoretical,and paradigmatically theoretical enquiry into other
theoretical enquiries;it concerns proof,but not as certain
demonstration but as ongoing activity.
The key to the explanation of the relation of the Final End to human
nature,then,is rationality-as-dialectic, or as I have expressed
it,rationality as theoretical activity.This is what I have referred
to as the 'deeper' account below Aquinas's theory of
rationality,which is responsible for it and for all theories of
rationality. This position of an account of reason being responsible
for the dynamism of all directed activities, including the activity
of constructing a theory of the way in which one pursues one's
activities,a theory of rationality,is the one I hold,and which I
will go on to defend against two strong alternatives,and then to
develop in the context of a theory of morality.
The Thomist basis of this position is not complete without
acknowledging the nature of the community in which for Aquinas the
current standards of theoretical activity are given and activity is
participated in.This will be a major theme,particularly of the
morality section,of this thesis.For Aquinas,this of course is the
community of faith.The main difference between Aristotle's community
and Aquinas's is that Aristotle's is self-determining in accordance
with continuing pre-rational dialectical enquiry whereas the
dialectical enquiries of Aquinas's community are not pre-rational
but are themselves the rational enquiries.Rationality for the
community of Aquinas is those enquiries currently taking place from
the position of those principles,now accepted as orthodox,which were
originally arrived at through just such enquiries.The division
between rationality and dialectic,science and the common
opinions,does not exist for Aquinas.And this,of course,is because of
the faith.Because the community of faith is a community headed for
some final consummation or disclosure which is both its telos and
the ultimate Principle behind all its principles of activity,its
Creator,the enquiries of the community are never solely self-
determining, but are already determined by their adherence to the
principle at source - scripture and the church - and the Principle
as goal.The common activities participated in,then,those which
provide and reflect the norms of enquiry of the community of
faith,are rational right down to their roots.The sort of community
it is means that it does not rely merely on the dialectical
justifiability of its first principles for its standard of
rationality:its nature as ecclesiastical transcends the distinction
between the scientific and the dialectical so that its first
principles are dialectically justified only because of their role in
structuring activities within the community which do tend towards
its attainment of Perfect Beatitude.
It is because of this that the community of faith must have
authority structures which are not merely political,but which define
authoritatively the rationality of activities,which express and
safeguard the Final End.Aquinas's teaching,of course,is located
within this chain of authority.The Thomistic view is that those
authority structures can both be necessary and not contrary to the
unhindered dynamism of rational development. Authority does not
entail the impossibility of freely reinterpreting all
propositions,including those of this authority,and of revising or
rejecting any,including those upon which the authority is
constituted.lt is possible to hold to and respect au(Bj!ority, and so
to proceed in conformity with supernatural destiny,without accepting
any proposition as absolute in the sense of beyond rational
question,beyond theoretical enquiry.Aquinas's vision of the rational
community is extremely important in showing how a community
constituted and sustained by authority and existing for a definite
purpose can yet possess the dynamism of full rationality.Authority
and dynamic rational enquiry are not incompatible.It is because of
this reading of Aquinas that I claim the principles of his theory of
practical rationality are not absolutist.
I summarise the relevance of Aquinas for the remainder of this
thesis as follows.First,his application of Aristotle's belief in the
importance of the common beliefs of a community to a community which
is not political but under authority deriving from same canonical
source.Second,the discovery that the first principles which for
Aristotle are explained by the endoxa can be challenged in
theory.and not only at the level of pre-theoretical dialectic,by
opinions from other communities or traditions of enquiry,and can be
reinterpreted by our understanding even of these alien norms while
not being sacrificed to them. Third, the demonstration that prooi is
an incompletable activity and one in which we ourselves and those
who come after us can take part.Fourth,the insight that
theorising,particularly about theory - whether of
biology,epistemology,paleology or rationality - is actually the
paradigmatic rational activity: in participation in theoretical
activities with theory as their subject and theoretical advance as
their object we discover the fullest extent of rationality.
I believe these four points structure in crucial ways our
understanding of rationality.They are not a theory of
rationality, but add up to an account of rationality criterial for
any theory of rationality,however far from the Thomist tradition it
appears to be.Rationality is participation in theoretical activity
within a particular community of enquiry;the existence of basic
principles of rationality and authority structures in such a
community need not impair the dynamism of rationality,but actually
help to clarify the activities of the community as ceaseless
questioning of orthodoxy in order to approach by dialectical enquiry
the unambiguous assertion of the truth.
Chapter Three,
The tradition of Natural Law thinking is wider than the natural law
theories of the early Roman and Greek Church Fathers and the
medieval theologians.Natural Law tradition is not the subject of
this thesis,but the foundational concepts of Natural Law are,and
since my treatment of these concepts in discussing Aquinas is so
different from that ai the tradition,I must provide some discussion
in support of my views.The part of this discussion intended to
indicate the weaknesses of the tradition will discuss representative
views within it from a Thomist perspective.
I understand by the 'natural law tradition' a wide class of
views.These views fit the following rough description:natural law
theories are theories holding that all significant problems of human
life can be solved if we understand human beings within a context or
'family' which not only explains their behaviour,but which,in
situations in which a particular response of an individual is
required,allows the individual to know what response to make in
virtue of certain facts about this context and certain operations of
reason,in all which cases this response is objectively true without
compomising its particularity.The tradition,then,is a moral
tradition,and one in which the basic concepts which have come down
to us are,surprisingly,not law and nature,but action,reason and the
human good:Aristotelian concepts.The relation of the original Stoic
concepts to the later Aristotelian ones within Natural Law tradition
doe not concern me here.
For Aquinas the 'family' in which we are located is that of the
universal order of which human beings have membership through their
rational animality and their participation in Eternal Law.1 have
explained how I think he has an account of rationality which
successfully explains how we participate in Eternal Law,through
conformity with Natural Law,while existing as individuals in
particular human communities,born into certain ways of understanding
and acting which limit the possible ways in which we can behave. His
explanation of this conformity is by means of a highly developed
version of the Aristotelian concept of practical reason and by the
fullest possible participation in the forms of theoretical enquiry
through which the medieval masters effected the communication of
knowledge.
Before reason can grasp first principles,I have argued,Aquinas
requires,as does Aristotle,absorption in the ways of the community
and in its forms of understanding.The great advance with Aquinas is
that the processes of dialectical enquiry within a community are not
only pre-theoretical,but continue with theorising:actual
intellectual debate,and not just demonstration, concerning the first
principles themselves is possible for a member of Aquinas's
(ecclesiastical) community.For him, although the Final End is
external to all dialectical enquiry - rational principles cannot be
'free-floating' in the way Aristotle's inductively established ones
are - first principles are nevertheless not established by dialectic
and then handed to the scientists,but are open to challenge and to
re-interpretation from other intellectual communities,as well as
constantly subject to development and interpretation from within the
ecclesiastical community.The reason Aquinas can allow for
development and advance at the theoretical level and not only the
pre-theoretical level of the endoxa is that although his Final End
is determinate,his community of enquiry,unlike Aristotle's Athens,is
not simply one which is political,but one whose membership
transcends different societies,restricting itself only to rational
nature,human beings.Although depending upon community norms for its
first principles as much as Aristotle's,then,Aquinas's
community,because it is larger than any particular political
community,is able to challenge first principles from bases outside
the internal endoxa.Dialectic is non-scientific for Aristotle just
because ethics must culminate in politics.For Aquinas dialectic is
scientific because first principles of ethics,and all first
principles,are the reflections not just of political endoxa,but of a
rationality which is exercised through the most basic human natural
inclination,which is shared by all human beings,and which therefore
involves challenging ourcurrent first principles with all
alternatives.
This understanding of Aquinas led me to claim that it is theoretical
activity which is rationality,and that it is in theoretical activity
directly concerning first principles - theoretical activity
concerning (theoretical) activities - that we discover paradigmatic
rationality;and that it is of the essence of such activity that it
is non-completable: its end would be the destruction of
rationality.These are the features I wish to defend as basic to an
account of rationality.
I am going to look at two modern English writers of the Natural Law
tradition within the field of jurisprudence. My aim here is to ask
whether they maintain the successful unity of Aquinas of overall
human 'context' providing objectively true answers for individuals
in particular situations,and if not, whether they develop successful
alternatives.
William Biackstone's Commentaries on the Laws ai England
(ed.J.Chitty,London;1826) attempted to do for English law what the
celebrated Viscount Stair had achieved for Scots law a century
before: to provide a systematic codification of the law within the
context of those beliefs in terms of which all concerned with the
law understood and explained it.Blackstone's work does not have the
scholarly approach of Stair's (J.,Viscount Stair.The Institutions of
the Law of Scotland.ed.D.M.Walker.Edinburgh:1981)■This is because
Blackstone addresses his work not only to those habitually concerned
with the law,but to any man who had reason to become involved with
the law or to understand it. I am discussing Blackstone rather than
the greater Stair because his remoteness from Aquinas and the
classical renaissance lawyers (Grotius,1583-1645;and Suarez,1548-
1617) means that there are themes in his theory of law different
from any so far mentioned. The heart of this theory is contained in
the 'Introduction' to the Commentaries,
In section two of the 'Introduction'(vol.l) law is described as a
rule of action,and action attributed to rational,irrational,and
inanimate things.it follows there will be different sorts of law to
cover the actions of these very different subjects.Laws are
prsecriptive,that is,laid down by a superior.God impressed
principles upon created matter,and upon its motion,and upon
vegetable and animal life:'the method of animal
nutrition,digestion,secretion,and all other branches of vital
economy' (p.34).Bon-human creatures invariably obey laws:to be what
they are depends upon this obedience.Human beings,however,have
reason and free will,and they are commanded to use these to regulate
their conduct.The form of regulation,however,is not complete self-
determination. Man 'is entirely a dependent being' (p.35),and so far
as he is dependent he must regulate his conduct in accord with the
will of that upon which he depends.So reason and free will mean that
men do not invariably conform to law,but that they are able to
receive and assent to the law,and to fulfil it through these
capacities.Consequently the law human beings assent to is a law
prescribed as iitting for one who has reason and free will,that
is,one who can assent to law,and who is also able to dissent from
it.The object of I^Sp's dependence,however,is God,and his dependence
upon God is absolute.Man must regulate his conduct,then,in absolute
conformity to God's will.
The will of God is known as the law of nature.For man this consists
of laws by which man's freedom is 'regulated and restrained'
(p.35),and which are understood through some property of his
nature.Because of God's wisdom, the laws he lays down for man are
'founded in those relations of justice that existed in the nature of
things antecedent to any positive precept'(p.35).These are the
'eternal,immutable laws of Good and Evil.'In so far as they are
necessary for the conduct of human behaviour they are discoverable
by reason.
There are a number of differences between this theory of natural law
and that of Thomas Aquinas.First,for Blackstone the law of nature is
God's will,rather than that law obedience to which allows man to
participate in God's will.Second,the laws of nature discoverable by
reason restrain and guide free will for Blackstone.Far Aquinas law
is not a matter of restrainng will,but the way in which God allows
the creature freely to realise itself in the manner appropriate to
it.Third,Blackstone acknowledges laws of good and evil antecedent
even to God's legislation.Thus,God may be the cause of all existing
good and evil but the nature of good and evil pre-exists even His
legislative activity.Finally,he believes human reason discovers
these immutable relations of justice only in so far as these are
relevant to human conduct,that is,in so far as the Creator reveals
them to us in the laws of human nature.The implication is that
justice,the standard of goodness antecedent to God,exists quite in
independence of us,is only selectively relevant to us or relevant to
us only in one of its aspects,and is thus discoverable by us only in
a restricted way.
The first of these points, equating the law of nature with God's
will, is consistent with Blackstone's belief that law is prescribed
by a superior. This view,so one-sidedly championed by Austin in later
years,notoriously gives no grounds for obedience except self
interest:it fails to distinguish the authority of the legislator
from his power. It is not clear in what sense laws are
prescript!ve,especially when we consider laws apply to
rational,irrational,and inanimate things;it is not clear laws
require a prescribing agent or agency;it is not clear why we ought
ever to obey a legislator on whom we are not completely
dependent,and why we ought always to obey one on whom we are
absolutely dependent.Vorst of all,it is not made clear how
conforming to the command of a superior can be fulfilling
specifically human nature.If human nature is rational nature,and if
the will of a superior is communicated to human beings through
reason,and the test of right action is simply obeying this
command,then human nature (rationality) is merely the vehicle of
obedience.But if reason is human nature it ought to be not merely
the means of knowing and obeying the law,but itself (at least part
of) the object of the law.For Blackstone it is not the flourishing
of rational beings which is the mark of the natural law,but the use
of reason to restrain human beings by assent to the will of a
superior being.
Contrast this with Aquinas.For him obedience to the Natural Law is
cooperative participation in the creative wisdom of God.When we obey
a precept of natural law we accept a principle of practical
reason:we adopt a certain sort of directedness,a certain prompting
of the inclinations is understood by reason to be the basis for
behaviour in pursuit of the good and in avoidance of evil.The object
of the inclination which reason grasps as a good is the proper end
of that individual,that which in these circumstances conforms it
towards its Final End.These natural inclinations are implanted by
God,which is to say (91,1) they are judged by the Eternal Law.What
practical reason does in grasping the objects of the inclinations as
ends of action is to engage in rational participation in the eternal
Law (91,2):it is participation because the 'rule and measure1 which
is obeyed is in man both as as that which is ruled and measured.and
as that which rules and measures.Rational participation in the
Eternal Law is Aquinas"s definition of Natural Law.Whereas for
Blackstone law is the command of a superior, and Natural law is the
command and will of God,for Aquinas it is the participation of
rational beings in God's wisdom,a participation made possible by
actions intended to accomplish the proper ends of man,which actions
constitute the life lived in accord with man's Final End. Natural Law
is both the command of God and the means of leading a flourishing
human life.
The second point I made concerning Blackstone is that the law of
nature does not restrain will,but guides it through reason.He
considers the law reason discovers to be a check upon unfettered
human freedom. He is right that it guides free will,but not that it
restrains it.Again,this can be understood by considering
Aquinas.Aquinas does not conceive of freedom as the capacity to
stand in a neutral position with respect to certain goods,and then
to choose one of them.Freedom is primarily being the cause of one's
own behaviour.This has two elements:realising there are certain
objects which a being such as me must choose,and myself acting so as
to realise these without such action being caused by any other agent
or intervening factor.There is a connection between those objects a
human being must choose and the capacity of a human being to be sole
cause of his actions:in the choice of any other object,whatever else
we can say of the choice,the agent is not sole cause of his
actions.Whatever goods he successfully achieves by his actions,he is
not in pursuing them pursuing any part of his human good,the good he
must pursue,and not to be pursuing your good in any of your actions
is something which occurs only when passion or some other
intervening and distorting factor has intruded upon practical
reasoning.I am sole cause only of actions directed towards my good;I
am free only when I choose to do what I must do.
The implication of this is that for Aquinas when I act freely my
action is dependent,for free actions are not 'chosen' by me from
some fictional position of neutrality,but are 'imposed' an me by my
nature,by myself. The first lesson of freedom,then,is that we are
restricted,limited by the restrictions of our own nature and what we
can do to serve it.Since our free actions are those self-caused ones
which fulfil our natures,the law of nature cannot be conceived of as
a check upon our freedom.The law of nature is human participation in
Eternal Law through the apprehending by reason of the objects of
natural inclinations as goods of practical reasoning.It cannot
restrain free action since free action is action undertaken by me to
achieve these ends;it can only ground this action by showing its
reasonableness,by showing that reason grasps the ends here pursued
as goods.Natural law guides free will by revealng its objects as
rational;it gives reason for what we do do as exercises of our self-
causation. It cannot restrain free will because it is on no occasion
apposed to free will.Free will is being one's awn cause,being
oneself;the natural law is the way of guiding the will by
reason,through that faculty which determines human nature.The self
which we realise in free action is the rational self;and the natural
law is both discovered through reason,and consists in the fulfilment
of rational nature,In allowing him to discover natural law and to
live by it God allows man to be the sort of being that he is. He
gives back to him his freedom to realise himself as a rational
being.This is the meaning of the famous doctrine of Aquinas that God
causes man to be sole,though secondary,cause of his own actions
(la,103,6).
My third point concerned Blackstone's belief that the nature of good
and evil pre-exist God.The point here,I take it,is that God could
not make it the case that living dishonestly,for example,is
good,because living dishonestly is excluded totally from the meaning
of 'good' (or is included explicitly in the meaning of 'evil').This
line of thought is the equivalent in practical matters of the idea
in theory that God could not create such monsters as square
circles.God is limited,as are we,by logical possibilities because
these imply no restriction upon His powers,but set the framework of
possibilities.Similarly,God is limited by the nature of justice
because this implies no restriction of His powers,but defines the
area of His goodness.
This view, which lifts the nature of good not only from the
deliberation and understanding of human beings but also from the
will of God,cannot be correct.If it were,not only would unanswerable
questions about the nature of the relation of justice to the
omnibenevolence of God arise,but such questions would make necessary
an understanding of God which is at odds with the whole biblical
tradition.If goodness precedes God,among whose fundamental
attributes goodness appears,God must be only either the upholder or
the promoter of goodness;but if this is the sense in which we are to
understand 'God is good',then God must be an agent;but there is no
way in which God might be an agent for goodness is a fundamental
attribute of His,therefore moral error is not a possibility,and so
God is not an agent in any conceivable sense;therefore goodness
cannot precede God (for the view that God is not part of the
universe and not an agent,see H.McCabe.God Matters.
Chapman,London; 1987, Part D.I suggest that the view that there are
certain matters,logical or practical,which 'not even God' could
alter is held as the result of there being certain sorts of creative
acts of God which not even the finest human understanding could
comprehend.
When we say 'not even God could make this different' the error we
make is to place God within the appropriate sort of creative
activity along with us,and to claim that whereas we,definitely,could
not square the circle or make it the case that living dishonestly is
good,God,narrowly,fails to do this.However,it is not true that there
is an activity,logic or ethics,which ws. cannot do well enough,and
not even God is sophisticated enough at,to produce certain results
within.This is so because what would have to happen in producing
square circles or making dishonesty good is an act of
creation,something only God,and never we,can do (la,104,1).We can
only do good or think truly;we can never make good or truth.Ve can
create only in a secondary,or efficient way (la,103,6).We cannot
produce existents,and if living dishonestly is to be good,new
being,new forms of life,must be created.Just as the truth of 'there
exist square circles' would require new shapes open to geometrical
analysis,so the practical truth of 'living dishonestly is good'
would require new actions and patterns of living open to ethical
investigation. Human beings cannot create new forms of being: we can
make squares and circles,deceptive actions and honest actions,but we
cannot create a new phenomenon of shape or action which cannot be
accommodated by logic or ethics (square circles cannot be fitted
into our geometry;virtuous dishonesty cannot be fitted into our
ethics).Since we cannot make new forms of being,and only God Whose
very being is Esse, can, the sense in which God is creator is quite
different from the creativity of His creatures.He does not occupy a
universe of creativity with us from which His success and ours can
be judged in logic or in ethics.
It may not seem to follow from this that it is false that there are
certain things that could not have been otherwise,and thus that
Blackstone is wrong in holding that justice is antecedent to
God.Perhaps we cannot speak of 'even God' being unable to change
certain things,but could it not still be the case that He is. unable
to change these things?This lingering doubt is due to holding out
the categories of the logically possible and logically impossible as
distinct and exhaustive categories,and,naturally,upon pain of
inconsistency,holding that 'not even' God's will can achieve the
logically impossible.But if the relevant category is not that of the
logically im/possible,but that of creation or creativity,then the
creation of 'good dishonesty' is a matter of a degree of creation
that we cannot comprehend.That is,if square circles and good
dishonesty are instances of the primary creative causality of God
and not of human,efficient and secondary,causality,their
inconceivability is explained not by a distinct logical category
(the logically impossible),but by a degree of creativity which we
cannot comprehend.Thus we can say God's power to create (various
forms of being) is unlimited,and we cannot comprehend all of it. We
can comprehend only that part which has fallen within our
experience,and which appears to us,necessarily,under the categories
of human activity.It could be that God will make living dishonestly
good though we do not have the language in which to frame this
possibility.It is not a possibility which could be part of the
Natural Law.
Finally,I think Blackstone is wrong to say we can know of 'the
immutable relations of justice' only so far as this is relevant for
human conduct,and that God reveals this information to us in the
laws of nature.Certainly we do not know all that there is to be
known,but it is wrong to see this as knowledge only of part of good
and evil.Ve know good and evil in that mode appropriate to human
conduct.This is not less knowledge than God has;nor is it different
knowledge from that God has:the reason our knowledge is limited and
God's is not is that we can only entertain it and apply it in a very
restricted set of ways.We can express our knowledge of good and evil
only in particular languages and with the conceptual limitations
these possess,and we must pursue good and flee evil in action only
in those ways in which it is possible for human beings to behave. We
are limited by our finitude both as language users and as embodied
beings.God,however, enjoys perfect knowledge of good and evil (He has
perfect knowledge) and He is perfectly good (He does not pursue
goodness).We have,then,the same knowledge as God,and we do not have
'lesser amounts' of it than God has.Instead,we have this knowledge
in that we can express it and pursue it as human beings,while God
has it in that He has omniscience and omnibenevolence in unity.God
does not choose to reveal to us some of the knowledge of the good in
the Natural Law (and keep some hidden);he allows us to participate
fully in the knowledge and enjoyment of good in a human way.
This point is of great importance in understanding the deterioration
in the Natural Law tradition.It is worth emphasising.If human beings
have knowledge of good and evil and God has this too,and God's will
is that human beings pursue the good,it is not likely that they
possess a different sort of knowledge from God.If so,we would have
to explain how the Natural Law,that we pursue the goods of human
nature,is grounded upon the divine will,and how human agents
understand this as the will of God.It is also not likely that human
beings possess less knowledge about good and evil than God,because
if the language of quantity is to be used.it seems clear humans can
possess in certain ways more knowledge than God.For example,only
human beings can act so as to pursue good (ends);therefore human
beings possess practical knowledge concerning the good which God
does not have.A quantificational approach can lead to great
errors.We might claim that in respect of those human attributes
negatively attributed to God - not material, not fallible,not
inconstant - human beings are more accomplished than God - more
substantial,more flexible, more unpredictable and so on.This
indicates the great advantage of the Thomistic view of the knowledge
of good and evil as the possession of the natural law:the
participation of a created being that is human and rational in the
activity of God after that manner appropriate to it.We can fail to
participate fully in this activity, or crave a more intense form of
participation, but what we cannot do is to ask for a knowledge of
good and evil,a form of life,other than that appropriate for a human
being. With the theory of the hierarchy of laws within which Natural
Law is rational participation in Eternal Law Aquinas can explain how
our knowledge of good and evil is not lesser than God's or different
from God's,but yet is never full or perfect knowledge because it is
practical knowledge,knowledge of what human beings are to pursue.
Blackstone continues his 'Introduction':if the exercise of right
reason alone gave knowledge of first principles of natural law,few
would know these,Due to His goodness,God has created us such that
self-love,'that universal principle of action' (.p. 36), is sufficient
'to enquire after and pursue the rule of right.'By self-love is
intended happiness, attainable only through right conduct.This
connection of right action to the 'universal' principle of action
reduces the law of 'obedience' (again) to 'man should pursue his own
true and substantial happiness'.This is the foundation of ethics or
natural law.
There are various problems here:what is this happiness which seems
to be necessary and sufficient condition of action? How is it
discoverable independent of the law of nature? Often we mistake that
which promises pleasure as the self-love for the sake of which we
ought to act,and if there is to be a criterion marking off 'true and
substantial happiness' from pleasure,this must surely be knowledge
of first principles of the law of nature.Ve might also mention the
frequent unhappiness of the just,not merely the loss of pleasure of
the martyr but the deep lack of satisfaction of the faultless,if
pedantic,upright but unimaginative human being.The real
problem, however, is not the question of how happiness leads us to
pursue justice,but of how it leads us to enquire after justice.
Happiness may be harmonised with justice or virtue,as Kant may have
thought,but how can it lead us to enquire into what is right to do?
Concern with my happiness - for Blackstone, acting upon the universal
principle of self-love - can have no influence in prompting me to
the discovery of what is good,even if it is true that following
self-love is pursuing good.That is,even if we are so constructed
that the impulse to true and substantial happiness is. always an
impulse to justice.it does not follow either that we are constructed
to enquire after the good or to discover what the good
is.Blackstone's theory,like all natural law theories,is concerned
not only with doing the good,but with discovering objective
principles of the good and pursuing one's own good in particular
situations as it is deduced from these principles together with more
immediate considerations.It must explain not only pursuit of the
good,but the pursuit of the good because it is. the good.It must, that
is,contain a theory of practical reasoning.Blackstone's concern with
the motivational role of what he rather hopefully calls happiness
blinds him to the facts that his theory must appeal to
principles,that it must explain the role of reason in constructing
and in applying them,and that,ultimately,this requires large-scale
theoretical enquiry.He seems not to appreciate that for the natural
lawyer enquiring into the good is not a supplementary or luxury
activity,but part of the substance of ethics.
On the role of reason in discovering in particular situations what
means will achieve true happiness Blackstone invokes revealed law to
counteract the corrupting influence of passion.Revealed law is found
in scripture alone,which is really part of the law of nature as it
tends always to man's happiness.Again,he distinguishes revealed
law,which is. the law of nature,from what we call the natural law.The
latter is what 'by the assistance of human reason,we imagine to be
that law' (p.38).Revealed law has 'more authenticitynatural law
does not have equal authority as we cannot be certain of it.
To re-state the position of Aquinas on Natural Law:revealed law is
an expression not of Natural Law but of Eternal Law;it is continuous
with,not distinct from,that body of first and of derived principles
formulated in the minds of all who have reason,and guarded by the
church,as the Natural Law.Ve do not 'imagine' this body of
principles to be Natural Law:it is. Natural Law,and we know its
principles by the disposition of synderesis which is infallible.It
is discoverable through reason,and it is this rational participation
in Eternal Law which allows us to talk of the Natural Law.Ve could
not know the Natural Law more clearly than we know it when we grasp
it by reason in the form of first principles:this is not imperfect
knowledge but perfect human knowledge.lt has authenticity;we can be
utterly certain of it; its au(ta^/ority is equal to that of
scripture.Vhat is defective is not the natural law but our
commitment to the Natural Law due to the influence of passion or
other obstructions.Because of this,we have scripture.But scripture
does not have greater authority than reason when it grasps the first
principles of practical reasoning.
In the biblical tradition,that we must use reason to discover what
to do,and that our passions are disordered,is explained by the
conceit of the Fall.After the Fall we become human beings:creatures
who are not only free, but have the full use of reason and full
experience of the passions. The point of Natural Law theory is that
through reason,our fallen nature,we are still offered a means of
reconciliation through pursuit of the good.Now,however, it must be
pursued, sought with effort and won. In these terms,we could describe
Blackstone's mistake in limiting natural law as failing to see the
difference between the imperfection of reason (qua fallen faculty)
and the operation of reason in natural law theory.It is part of the
theory that reason can give certain knowledge,even though
reason,like all post-Fall categories,is imperfect.
This is as much of Blackstone's argument as I shall consider.The
point of this has been to demonstrate ways in which the natural law
tradition failed to appreciate the sort of synthesis Aquinas had
started.There is,of course,a history of this failure still to be
written from the philosophical point of view.I have dealt with a
peripheral figure because by his time the differences between
Natural Law tradition and the theory of Aquinas were profound. A
serious history,however,could be written of the theories of
Suarez,Grotius,Puffendorf,Hobbes and Locke.Their syntheses are
really secular,despite their theological learning.They aim to
produce theories of the state,the relations between states and
between theories of law.In respect of their principles they are
classed with Aquinas:they attempt to produce a philosophy based on a
conception of human reason.However,he attempts not just a synthesis
of all social and moral constructions through an objective account
of reason,but a synthesis of all those first principles upon which
different societies and individuals have built and explained their
moral and intellectual systems,a synthesis of all the principles of
reason themselves,and the understanding of this requires that we
enter into the process of construction hot only of our own or of
Thomas Aquinas's first principles,but into the whole process of
dialectical enquiry in which all first principles are arrived at
and then defended against the strongest rival alternatives.
Blackstone is a good example of how far Natural Law had become a
theory.not an intellectual activity.lt is clear that for him Natural
Law is a way of advancing his philosophical and legal theses.It is
no longer the engagement in theoretical activity,but one sort of
theory.Again,the history of the change from rationality seen as
theory to theories ofsuch and such which it is. rational to hold if
they are verified has still to be written.Aquinas has become
elevated as an authority,a type of theory,and the one thing Aquinas
would have desired - that we turn from rigid adherence to theories
to open intellectual enquiry into the strongest challenges to the
principles of our theories - has been sacrificed for the attraction
of one more bundle of attractive explanatory theses in the shape of
'theory of Natural Law'.
The objects of Blackstone's synthesis are the received
interpretation of classical natural law and the body of knowledge of
civil and criminal law available to experts and laymen in eighteenth
century England. His Commentaries have a practical use;they will be
read as a manual.His theory.his 'natural law',becomes an
Introduction to his text.The project of Aquinas's Summa needs no
introduction. It is simply one stage within the process of creative
theoretical construction which rationality is,and in which we ought
all to be participating.Blackstone prefaces his work with the
classical theory of Natural Law,believing,in common with many,that
this is a way of providing a theoretical underpinning to the ideas
and conclusions he will go on to produce.He does not recognise that
if he is to write as a lawyer within the Natural Law tradition,his
project must be the justification of the principles and
presuppositions of the theory and practice of the law of England by
those principles he has inherited through his intellectual
tradition,and not the wholescale adoption of the received classical
picture of Natural Law theory and the dropping of this into place as
the theoretical preface to English law.
The Natural Law tradition ought to have taken up the challenge of
Aquinas to engage in the non-completable project of theoretical
enquiry into principles.Instead it developed as yet another theory
of morality and rationality to play the role of explanatory
principle in the chosen theories of philosophers and other
intellectuals - and,of all things,an absolutist theory.By the time
of Blackstone natural law has not died, but it has became
petrified:neither abandoned by radical theoretical departures,nor
transformed,but simply pulled along like dead wood as a
justification of a codification of law.
John Finius,
My final aim in this section is to consider a twentieth century work
which again follows the natural law tradition.John Finnis's aim in
Natural Law and Natural Rights(Oxford:1980) is a statement of
classical natural law theory developed so as to provide a way of
understanding and solving the major problems of moral
philosophy,politics,law and,broadly,'our place' in the universe.He
seeks to locate the basic goods of human life;to explain the value
pertaining to human goods;and to discover those principles,explained
by these values,behaviour in accordance with which is rational
pursuit of the values.That is,he constructs related theories of
value and action.The complete statement of these two he conceives as
a theory of rationality in terms of which we can solve
moral,legal,political,indeed all,problems of relationships in which
human beings are involved.The key terms of the theory of rationality
will be reason,action,practice and the good,thus it is a theory
within natural law tradition.
Again,we have here a synthesis which might appear to be well within
the mode of Aquinas.Finnis takes present day beliefs from moral
philosophy,jurisprudence,political theory and,briefly,theology,and
argues that the 'theory' of natural law is compatible with these,and
if properly articulated and developed,can be shown to answer the
problems of explanation and justification which arise within these
subjects.The version of natural law he defends possesses an
explanatory potential far more sophisticated than Blackstone's,but
again the 'synthesis' is actually the imposition of the principles
and categories of what he understands as classical theory upon
contemporary principles and concerns.His version of natural law is
particularly indebted to the concepts and arguments of
Aristotle,particularly the practical concepts.My point is not that
the use of Aristotelian concepts in contemporary theory is somehow
wrong,but that if their application is to be rational in the way of
Aquinas they ought to be first made the object of rigourous
theoretical enquiry together with other principles representing the
strongest contemporary positions within moral philosophy,politics
and jurisprudence.Finnis's method is iirst to construct a 'Natural
Law theory' of rationality,consisting of theory of value and theory
of action,and then to apply this to the major contemporary concepts
and problems in the hope of providing rational explanations of these
and justification of those solutions which he believes to be natural
law ones.
This understanding of natural law is ultimately no more successful
than Blackstone's. I will not make explicit contrasts between Finnis
and Aquinas as I did with Blackstone.However,straightforward
philosophical criticism of Finnis is not only intended to expose his
weaknesses,but to demonstrate that to take an Aristotelian-Thomist
position in theory of rationality is not loyalty to the sort of
Natural Law envisioned by Aquinas,but the betrayal of that Natural
Law,and perhaps ultimately its death.The 'elements' of natural law -
the human good,the concept of action,the theory of reason,the scheme
of the virtues - cannot be stripped from medieval communities to
serve as the components of a context neutral and universal account
of rationality. Theory of rationality cannot merely be constructed and
used as explanatory tool of human life,for theory of rationality is
the 'theory' that rationality is no more than the activity of
theorising,and any tools which our theories provide are by-products
of rationality,not rationality itself.Ve cannot construct theories
of rationality to play explanatory roles,because what rationality is.
is the explaining which we do,whether in moral
philosophy,law,theology,politics,physics,or whatever.Rationality is
theoretical activity,and the answer to 'what (option) is rational?'
is 'that which (current) theorising shows to be rationally
j ustifled'.
The core of Finnis's theory is that there are a number of forms of
human good.The irreducible forms of human good are absolutely basic
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values. They are knowledge,life,play,aesthetic
experience,friendship,practical reasonableness,and 'religion'.In his
extended treatment of the first of these (ch.3) he writes,
'Commonly one's interest in knowledge,in getting to the truth of the
matter,is not bounded by the particular questions that first aroused
one's desire to find out.So readily that one notices the transition
only by an effort of reflection,it becomes clear that knowledge is a
good thing to have (and not merely for its utility),without
restriction to the subject-matters that up to now have aroused one's
curiosity'(p.61).
So knowledge is good 'in itself',which is not to say it is worth
having knowledge,or consequentially valuable,or supremely
important, but only that if we are asked what we are doing,answering
that we are pursuing knowledge makes our conduct intelligible.He
claims that the recognition of a basic value such as knowledge is
self-evident.This does not mean it is recognised outside the context
of experience:in fact.it is only in experiencing the urge of,for
example, curiosity carrying us beyond our particular concerns to
related matters that we recognise the basicness of knowledge. When we
express our understanding of such a value we provide potential
starting points for reasoning,principles of practical reasoning,such
as 'doing what will further inform us is good'.Such a principle of
practical reasoning is not a rule directing behaviour,but an
'orientation' of practical reasoning which is specifiable in many
more specific principles such as,for example,'increasing one's
information about contemporary moral philosophy is a good thing'.It
thus directs our reasoning by opening up for it
possibilities,limited only by our particular circumstances
(expressed by factual premises in the reasoning),which are all ways
of participating in the basic good of knowledge.
The practical principles,and the first principles of logic,are
precisely that which is known without demonstration; they are
presupposed in any practical activity.Their validity is based upon
that of no other principles,and on no feeling or impression of
certainty.They represent practically necessary ends.Finnis
demonstrates this practical necessity of the principle concerning
knowledge by showing any argument against its validity will be self-
defeating. To seriously assert that knowledge is not a good is to
commit oneself to the truth of this assertion and thus to the value
of truth,precisely what.Finnis thinks,the assertion denies.
Finnis cannot so extensively treat,or convincingly assert,the other
basic values.There has after all been no time at which the claim
that knowledge is an absolute good,a sufficient reason for any
otherwise non-controversial activity,has been wholly
controversial.However Finnis wants to claim that 'the urge to
question' (p.65) is not the only basic urge.Anthropology and history
show that all societies have placed some value upon human life,and
some restrictions upon sexual activity;that they are concerned with
leisure,friendship and so on.However many practices and institutions
we look at we see respected a few quite basic human values.These are
few,though their realisations are many and varied.They are basic
forms of the good understood by the practical 9intelligence,and
realised in particular cultural activities.We are required to ask of
ourselves what are the basic forms of the good which we recognise
and by which we make intelligible the conduct of others' and of
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ourselves.Finnis,then,has no special licence to provide a list of
basic values - he cannot prove them - but following his personal
meditation affirms: life, corresponding to the urge towards self-
preservation; knowledge; play, activity pursued for its own
sake;aesthetic expreience;friendship,on the Aristotelian
model;practical reasonableness itself;and religion,experiences of
extra-terrestial order.There are no other goods which are not ways
of pursuing these goods,individually or in combination,or conditions
for their pursuit.Finnis says of the basic values that they are
self-evident,that they cannot be reduced one to another,and that
each,in reflection can be considered the most important. Expressions
of understanding of these values are practical principles suggesting
participation in the various goods through the initial activity of
practical reasoning.These principles 'have been called in the
western philosophical tradition the first principles of natural
law,because they lay down for us the outlines of everything one
could reasonably want to do, to have and to be' (p. 97).
This is the natural law theory of value re-asserted by Finnis in a
form he supposes acceptable to,and already at work in,the correct
explanations of the problems of, contemporary law,politics and
morals.Significantly.it makes no appeal to God. The second stage of
the theory of rationality before his application of it in these
particular spheres is the theory of reasoning.
The values are all equally worth pursuing.They cannot,however,be
pursued haphazardly by a rational person, for one of them is the
value of practical reasonableness which we part/cipate in just by
ordering our participation in all seven basic values. It is when
practical principles are applied to particular situations that the
questions of ethics can begin to be asked, and how they are to be
applied is the problem of theory of practical reasoning.Finnis's
theory is a theory of underived methodological requirements for
practical reasoning.If one is to be practically reasonable,there are
certain requirements one must observe.Without these there is no
focusing of one's urges and desires into that sort of structured
unity which gives one one's own set of goals and personal
values,encourages efficiency and effectiveness of personal
resources,and which is the result of practical reasonableness and
the mark of the rational man.These requirements,which are also
basic,underived and irreducible,can be regarded as aspects of one
another (p.105).They are:a coherent plan of life;no arbitrary
preferences among values or between persons;detachment from specific
projects,yet commitment to them; effectiveness of methods;respect for
evrey value in every act;favouring the common good;following
conscience.
These requirements, Finnis believes,generate morality.Each is a 'mode
of moral obligation or responsibility' (p.126),for each plays its
part in generating arguments of this form: a/requirements 1-9 are all
aspects of the real basic good of freedom and reason;b/any of these
requirements can be satisfied in such and such a situation only by
or best by doing x;c/x should be done.So the language of morality
consists in the concepts with which we express and understand the
requirements of practical reasonableness,and these are the basic
elements of his theory of practical reasoning.The real work of his
text is to show the compatibility of this two-tiered theory of
rationality (.practical principles expressing basic
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values; requirements of practical reasonableness by which practical
principles generate action and morality) with contemporary deeply
held beliefs so as to explain and answer the major questions of
moral philosophy,politics,jurisprudence and, minimally,theology.
In the chapters in which he discusses particular moral,legal and
political concepts in terms of his theory of rationality Finnis's
work is important.However,it does not follow from the fact that the
theory allows him to make advances that the theory is correct.To
judge a theory of rationality we are required not only to recognise
that it usefully addresses contemporary problems,but to have
assurance that the problems it demarcates are the problems, and that
the solutions it proposes are correct solutions.Any theory of
rationality does more than provide answers;it proposes a way of
perceiving which presents certain features of our situation as 'the
facts',and certain issues arising from these,therefore,as 'the
problems'.The world does not present theory neutral parcels of facts
which,given our needs and wishes,present problems for us.Rather
conceptions of rationality and received moral categories determine
both the facts we see, and, through the effect of these conceptions
and categories on our needs and wishes,the problems these present
for us (for a good discussion,see Q.0'Neil1.Faces of
Hunger,London;1986).
A successful theory,then,will not merely address in what may be a
random or haphazard way a number of commonly perceived contemporary
problems: it will establish itself within these perceptions as
authoritative,thereby giving grounds for evaluating and,if
necessary,rejecting,'existing' problems and a basis for solving the
problems which remain. The reason for its establishment as
authoritative cannot make appeal to some more universal and neutral
concept of rationality,otherwise this and not the candidate theory
of rationality,would be the correct terms in which to explain and
solve human problems. 0'Weill believes the reasons for a theory's
establishment include the conditions that it is not solely
abstract,that it can apply to all relevant centres of agency,and
that it can criticise particular centres of agency.I think this
cannot be the criterion of a successful theory of rationality
because it already includes the assumption that rationality concerns
action,and must be accessible to and critical of centres of
agency.These assumptions define the theory as within the
Aristotelian/Kantian tradition of practical reason,and therefore do
not preserve the free dialectic between contemporary beliefs and the
firmest challenges to these from among any of their alternatives.
Generally,the test for a successful theory of rationality or of
anything else must be simply that it answers the needs of those who
enquire or live by it,and that it explains and solves the problems
all other theories and methods of reasoning do,together with
explaining how they do this.This,on the Thomist model suggested
above,is sufficient for theoretical success.It does not mean the
successful theory must present only the view of facts and solutions
of the current norms;but that if it is to surpass these.it must
explain what they explain and explain why they explain it.
On this account of what it is to be a successful theory a number of
points can be made against Finnis's theory of
rationality.First,there is the nature of basic values.He tells us a
good deal about their properties,but I am not satisfied we are left
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clear about their nature.Values are not parts of the world existing
prior to human actions.They are realised in activity,and it is the
activity, not the value, which is part of the world.Value is
discovered in certain forms of experience,and this experience
already Is. participation in the value.But if we can participate in
basic values and these do not exist apart from the activities in
which they are realised,why,then,are they not products of human
creation? Why are they not subjective and personal rather than
basic? They have no existence over and above the activities in which
they are realised,so why say at all that they are 'participated in'
rather than created;and why,then,think there are any determinate and
universal values at all?
Finnis,of course,believes that these can be self-evidently
recognised as irreducibly good for man.However,the only way in which
he could show that there are basic objective values and that these
are realised only in human activity is to show that certain
activities and the objects of certain activities are goods for all
human beings.By presenting a theory of human nature in which certain
forms of activity - play,practical reasonableness,aesthetic
experience and warship - and certain goals - life,knowledge and
friendship - are aspects of any full and complete human life he
could demonstrate that there are basic non-subjective values,and
that they exist only in the engagement of humans in activities - for
some are activities,and the others could be experienced only through
human activity.Finnis has no theory of human nature.He lacks, and is
happy to lack,the political context of Aristotle's values and the
context of created nature of Thomas Aquinas.His appeal is rather to
the self-evidence of values and to the intelligibility they confer
upon all behaviour.There are problems enough with the epistemology
of this,but the fundamental difficulty is that the idea of basic
values which cannot exist in independence of particular forms of
activity is an idea belonging to one particular tradition of
theorising about human nature - theories which explain human nature
as primarily active,and impelled through rational activity to pursue
the good - and Finnis has no such theory to contribute.He simply
drags along the Aristotelian/Thomist natural law tradition,as does
Blackstone,with no attempt at synthesis of contemorary moral
standards with their serious opponents.
There are also epistemolagical problems with his approach.He is
concerned to construct his theory without appeal to God,and without
involving moral obligation until the stage at which the practical
requirements direct activity within the particular circumstances in
which we find ourselves.To do this requires not suggesting a source
of value,for,he believes,if we knew such a source,the values would
cease to be truly basic,and instead we would have an obligation to
the source of the values to respect the values,an obligation
preceding our reasonable decision to pursue the values
themselves.However, it does not seem to fallow at all that there
would be an obligation to the source of the values.Would there be an
obligation to evolutionary development if this were shown to be the
source of human values? What would it mean to have an obligation to
God? Or,if values were shown to arise because of universal social
and practical needs,how could we be obliged to respect values
because of the political institutions and practices which are their
source?The obligation would be owed not to the source of the values
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but to the objects of the values.Even if in certain formulae there
might be obligations to the source,our question must be why do we
have these,and since the source is. ultimate,the answer could only be
'because of the nature of the values it grounds' in which case the
values are basic after all, and the source of -the obligation.
In any case,Finnis dislikes the ontological spirit of such
arguments,and turns instead to the self-evident.Vhen we recall the
ease with which the self-evident can be appealed to in order to
justify sheer immorality our distrust of such appeals within moral
philosophy must be strong.Finnis holds self-evidence is very much a
matter of personal reflection,but he does attempt to direct us to a
particular sort of self-evidence.It is not a matter of universal
assent or of feelings of certainty, but a recognition that some
things are basic:there are some reasons for acting which are in all
circumstances sufficient ones,and which require no further
justification.This is based on the principle that in practical or
theoretical matters the truth of some proposition must be
presupposed,either first principles of logic or basic practical
principles.
Even if this is correct.it neither fallows that the practical
principles whose truth must be presupposed are those Finnis
asserts, or that they must be based upon abjective and basic
values. Why not, for example, claim all action presupposes the
practical principle 'that is not to be done which one could not wish
all others similarly circumstanced to do' or 'satisfaction of
personal preferences is to be pursued unless this conflicts with
self-interest'TFinnis gives no reason why either of such principles
might not be recognised as practically basic;principles which seem
to have as good a claim to basicness as his,and which do not suggest
the existence of objective values.His appeal to self-evidence is
ultimately no more than a hard headed personal appeal for
teleology.He is left with the simple argument that we ought to
appeal to intuition and experience,and that when we do so not one of
us will discover that there is any value which is not one of his
seven basic goods,or that we can pursue a good which is not
ultimately participation in one of the seven basic values.
I do not understand why we should appeal to self-evidence and not to
reasoned argument concerning the nature of the human good and the
structure of value.It seems clear that self-evidence is extremely
unlikely to produce a list of principles concerning which there
might be widespread agreement leading to interpersonal use.In this
respect it is a weaker appeal than the Aristotelian appeal to the
many and the wise,or the appeal by rhetoric.This line of criticism
has,however,been pursued many times. It would be more useful to
criticise his account of self-evidence through his reliance on the
concept of the intelligibility of behaviour.
He holds we know something is a value if it makes behaviour
intelligible.How,we know something makes behaviour intelligible not
necessarily when we know what the behaviour is,but simply when we
know that it is behaviour - when we see it intelligibly - and when
we know that this intelligibility is caused by this other thing (to
know P makes behaviour y intelligible need not be to know what
((sort of)) behaviour y is,but only to recognise y as ((a species
of)) behaviour and to know that we know this because of P).But if we
know something is a value when it makes behaviour intelligible,and
to know something makes behaviour intelligible is simply to
recognise that there is behaviour and to know that P provides us
with this knowledge,then it seems we can never identify particular
values.For so long as we know that there is something,P,which causes
us to see certain movements as behaviour but we do not know what the
description of that behaviour is,then we can only individuate P -
say that P is a value,has value conferring properties - but not
identify which value P is, say what are the properties P confers. If
knowing something makes behaviour intelligible does not imply
knowing what sort of behaviour this is,we have no way of knowing
what value it is that is doing the work.
If knowledge of individual values does not follow from recognition
of the behaviour upon which they confer inteligibility,it follows
our knowledge of values,at least on Finnis's proposals,is a very
uncertain matter. It becomes particularly difficult to know what is
meant by self-evident knowledge of values which are involved in any
intelligible behaviour.For if identifying values is always something
more than just understanding certain behaviour as intelligible,then
that there are certain values somehow at work in all intelligible
behaviour is no help in discriminating which values are self-
evident. That is,if recognising behaviour entails in no case knowing
the intelligibility-conferring value,recognising behaviour, however
many times,will never entail knowing what the basic values
are.Finnis will then be forced outside his position of knowing
values by their intelligibility-conferring power to an alternative
account of traditional introspective certainty or universal assent
in explaining the self-evidence of basic values.
I suggest that Finnis can only give his list of, admittedly
plausible,basic values omitting,for example,pursuit of
pleasure,because he already has,prior to his notion of these
values,a concept of the good which allows him (philosophically) to
state,and not (intuitively) to recognise,the irreducibi1ity of
certain values.This concept,Aristotelian/Thomist eudaimonia,is held
by Finnis as an act of philosophical,perhaps even religious,faith.It
is wrong to suggest that the basic values are self-evident to all
human beings:they are the value components of the theory of the good
to which he finds himself intellectually committed.His use of self-
evidence fails because,once again,he has entered into wholescale
adoption of the classical natural law notion of a plurality of goods
in which we participate,and is holding this belief steadily,without
regard to the sort of theoretical synthesis Aquinas proposed in the
face oi the intellectual sterility of self-evidence.
There is a further criticism to be made concerning Finnis's notion
of reasoning.He accepts the complete practicality of theory of
rational conduct,and contrasts this with purely theoretical subject
matter,the subject of logic.Theory of practical rationality
considers man as practically reasonable;logic considers truth,and
judges the efforts of man to be reasonable in theoretical
deduction.Reason functions in two ways,and in theory of practical
rationality we can ignore its theoretical operation.This contrasts
with the description of theory of rationality derived from Aquinas
as not a theoretical enterprise concerning a practical subject or a
purely formal logical study,but as itself constitutive of
rationality.This does not mean that reason is 'solely'
theoretical,but that reason,whether involved in matters oi the
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highest abstraction and logical purity or in the formation of
principles of action,can only operate by means of construction
of,and derivation from,theoretical standards,or principles.This
account does not mean that there is no theory of practical reasoning
within theories of rationality,but it does mean that different
conceptions of rationality will award a greater or lesser role to
reasoning,and that the soundness of the practical reasonings of the
members of one community may not be intelligible to those outside
that community.At the very most, as will be shown in chapter 7,a very
general description of the characteristics of calculative reasoning
may be given.What is definitely not possible is the sort of appeal
Finnis makes to the Aristotelian practical syllogism in discussing
both his practical principles and his requirements of practical
reasonableness (p.63;p,126).
At these critical points in his argument Finnis invokes the
practical syllogism to show how practical principles can serve as
the starting points of reasoning,and how all of the practical
requirements can play a part in reasonable decision making.Yet he
never ^mounts a defence of the practical syllogism as the basic form
of reasoning.He does say that the basic value of practical
reasonableness corresponds to the urge to order our lives and
actions effectively (p.88),that this entails the practical
requirements,and that these.rationally applied to our particular
circumstances,will generate beliefs about moral obligations and
responsibilities.But what is there causing us,or showing us it is
reasonable,to apply these requirements 'in the rational way',that
is,for Finnis,syllogistically (p.126)? Finnis neither gives argument
for this highly traditional way of understanding reasoning nor
develops it beyond the very basic paradigm of Aristotle.
He believes the form of the syllogism allows us to formulate the
want of the agent so that instead of a blind urge getting the
desired object is seen as a way of participating in an intelligible
good:it becomes a major premise.Channelling urges into pursuit of
intelligible goods,then,is the role of the practical syllogism.lt
seems to me,however, that Finnis is then open to the criticism that
it is not values after all which are important, but the values only
in so far as they are efficient means of satisfying otherwise
indistinct urges.This,we should note,is a problem which does not
arise for Aquinas whose natural inclinations Finnis has in mind. It
does not arise far him because his natural inclinations are never
merely 'blind' urges but are 'written' into human nature in its
context on the scala naturae.and so necessarily are linked to
value.Once again,Finnis's account has all the disadvantages of
simply adopting concepts without either adopting the theory of human
nature which is their context or providing an alternative theory.
Modern rationality theory,which frequently places such foundational
emphasis on satisfaction as a value,really demands from Finnis an
explanation of why basic value is found not in this,but in certain
goods in which we participate as a reasonable expression of our
basic urges and desires.This requires an explanation of why these
urges are linked with goods,an explanation of just what basicness
means,and this is the theory of human nature which he is lacking.The
criticism of his treatment of the relation of basic goods to objects
of desire in the syllogism,then,is that it does not show values
cannot be regarded as controlled means of sarisfying strong
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individual urges or desires,which would then receive an importance
in the theory which,in the absence of some sort of account of human
nature,would disqualify it from the natural law tradition in which
Finnis wishes to locate it.
The flaws in Finnis's argument,like those in Blackstone's,point to
his proclaimed adherence to what he conceives of as a tradition,but
which really consists in the ossification of certain principles of
historical Natural Law.His accounts of community,justice,law, rights
and authority are the finest part of his work.These learn from the
tradition of Natural Law while not attempting to preserve it in a
way which would make it impotent in the explanation and solution of
contemporary problems,
The tradition which I have been criticising has bequeathed to us
from the Aristotelian tradition of the thirteenth and fourteenth
centuries those concepts of rationality and ethics which exercise
and puzzle us in philosophy and in life.The concepts of
reason,action,the good,the virtues and the practical/theoretical
distinction understood very much as the medievals understood
Aristotle to understand them form a great part of our theoretical
repertoire for the explanation of human behaviour.Unlike Maclntyre
in After Virtue(Duckworth:1982).I do not think this legacy leaves us
with the impossible choice of nihilism or a reconstructed theory of
the virtues.I believe that the survival and use of these concepts is
the best possible demonstration that in the pure contingency of
social and conceptual change they have endured because they answer
to the needs of those who use them, and because they are rationally
defensible over many challengers so far.Maclntyre's belief that
common concepts can be surviving fragments from another world
picture and that intentional revolution will be required in order to
rescue them by grounding them anew is wrong.If they are still being
utilised,they already have their grounding context,they are part of
our world picture; if they have ceased to be used, they will have been
overthrown by the altering needs of the community and its changing
theoretical standards, but we cannot stand outside these and write a
book like Maclntyre's advocating their overthrow. The revolutionary
text,by definition,is not spoken from within the community
endoxa,and therefore on my account,and,I think,on Maclntyre's too,it
is not a product of rationality.
Nationality is theory construction from particular norms,which can
in turn revise those norms, but this revision is only by way of
contest between current orthodoxy and alternative
challenges.Maclntyre's skirmish is between the 'fragments of the
virtues' and the challenge the modern world mounts to these.but the
rational synthesis is between the explanatory norms of
modernity,including the virtue concepts,and any feasible challenges
to them. The battle is always,so to speak,joined from within the
ranks;and this means that we are never called upon either to face
the pessimism of Nietsche or to raise ourselves heroically,as he
claims Benedict and Trotsky did,above our communities.
What is particularly bad about the species of Natural Law theory
which lifts the thoughts of,for example,Aquinas and puts them in
modern dress is that it treats the problems modernity has raised for
it as deviations.Things never progress;things merely escape from
within the safe boundaries of Natural Law theory,people make
errors.This violently irrational outlook must be resisted.We have
enough pseudo-problems without our real problems being denied.In
particular,this outlook is anathema to Aquinas.He may speak of
'first' principles,but their primacy is simply the proof that the
method of arriving at them is correct.It is his way of theorising -
debate in accord with the standards of the community,and then debate
between 'our' first principles,those of others,and other strong
challengers to primacy - which provides a context in which
objectively true answers can be given to particular questions
without compromising their particularity.We must not confuse this
account of rationality with the theories of rationality of any
particular theorist within this understanding,including Thomas
Aquinas,and we must resist any theories of rationality external to
this understanding which deviate from it by claiming to offer
explanations of human conduct in terms of principles which hold
universally irrespective of the normative standards of the
communities within which particular agents act.
We must also recognise that from within our culture,our
community,the language required in order to be able to state this
account of rationality is itself contingent and a product of current
theoretical concerns:we cannot state this in revolutionary
language. And for us., this language is often very much the language of
the Aristotelian tradition.If what I have said is
correct,rationality,theoretical activity,is not so much producing
and writing theories as taking part in ongoing theoretical
activity; we will be doing this,and our writings will show this.The
account of rationality as theory,therefore,and paradoxically, can
only be stated by me. as the Aristotelian claim that rationality is
practical as well as purely formal.
The greatest threat to this understanding of rationality is the rise
of the concept of the individual self as rational and moral
chooser.This movement from the standards of the community to the
location of value within the autonomous and embodied person is what
I must defend the Thomist position against before attempting a
justification and moral defence of it.The two main positions to
discuss are Kant and Kantianism,and what can be roughly called
utilitarianism.Utilitarianism I will look at in a number of
different versions and related alternatives as this is how those who
hold the theory hold it at present.Kantian theories,however, agree to
great extent in their principles and in their interpretative loyalty
to Kant.For this reason I will consider Kant himself, and Kantian
arguments only in relation to his own theory.
Chapter Four
It is often assumed that Aristotle's and Aquinas's theories of
ethics are distinguished by their commitment.to a standard of
rationality which has its roots in a conception of invariable
(human) nature.I have suggested that this is not the correct way to
read Aristotle's ethics and Aquinas' s gumma.. Actually, it is in post-
Cartesian challenge to Natural Law and Aristotelian theories of
rationality that a conception of absolute and invariable nature
becomes a priority.
Cartesian rationality is a matter not of acting and living in
accord with the best theoretically defensible standards,but of
knowing.Descartes's concept of reason is one which is grounded in
the powers of the mind to intuit by a certain sort of purified
internal perception pieces of absolutely certain
information.Rationality is the acquisition of the sort of knowledge
which is given by clear and distinct perception (Principles.1.45:in
ed.M.D.Wilson.The Essential Descartes).Because it is knowledge
certified by reason itself,derived by the enquiring mind from its
own structure,this knowledge has not only the property of truth,but
also the property of ultimacy: it is prior to,and hence foundation
of,all other knowledge the mind might possess.
Among the tasks which this conception of reason leaves Descartes's
successors is the determination of the objects of this
knowledge.Are they truly foundational,and if so,do they have an
existence independent of the knowing subject;if they do,what is the
form of this existence?However these questions are answered,the
reality that is posited as the object of knowledge of the rational
mind is distinguished by its foundational character.Whether the
reality is God,the self,sensory experience, substances, monads or
nature.it is something without which there is no rationality,and
upon whose head the rest of rationality is raised.Much of modern
theory of rationality,post-Kantian theory,is coloured by the same
attempt to discover something more basic than the institutions of
enquiry themselves; some object for the enquiring mind the
possession of which constitutes knowledge,and entails the rest of
rationality.
My claim in discussing Kant will be that his practical philosophy
relies upon a foundational concept,a concept of the absolute and
invariable, but that this constantly proves to be a hindrance to
him. Kantian rationality relies upon the post-Cartesian stance of
the individual clearing his mind of distractions
(inclinations,passions),in order to achieve true and certain
knowledge and objective determination of will, and it is concerned
to discover the degree of independence of the object of knowledge
and the ground of will from the knowing and willing subject.The
moral theory which this search for the unconditioned results in is
frustrated by its dependence upon this concept of invariable
rational principle,or law,and the inability of the structure of the
theory to support the concept.By criticising Kant's moral theory I
mean both to indicate weaknesses in a strong alternative to the
account of rationality as theoretical construction of community
norms that ^ am proposing,and to provide a response to one of the
two most sohisticated absolutist theories of practical reason:the
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theory that the will can not only possess an object whose status is
objective,but an abject with the power to determine it
objectively.This theory is a product of the 'rationality as
knowledge' school bath because of the conception of pure reason
which precedes that of pure practical reason,and because it holds
morality does not concern goods received or activities
performed,but the very form oi the will,the legislative nature of
practical reason in moral willing,It requires a response because of
its popularity,and because it is incompatible with my notion of an
account oi reason at a deeper level than particular theories of
rationality.
The critical philosophy as a whole is an attempt to analyse the
scope of reason,and to show in this analysis that reason is the
ground of morality,and that this is compatible with science.Kant
holds we can only know the world through perception which itself
affects our knowledge (Tmmanuel. Kant's Critique of Pure
Reason.trans.N. Kemp Smith, Macmillan; 1982,A50/1).However,we do think
of the world as it is beyond our experience (A49/1-7;Note to
'Preface to Second Edition' p,34-5:Critique of Practical
Reason.trans.L.V.Beck,Hew York;1956,42-3).Our perception of the
world has a certain a priori form (space and time), but it also
consists in a certain 'given' which leads us to postulate a world
beyond our perceivings.We cannot know of this world,but,he
believes,the unorganised data of experience - which we sometimes
apprehend as. unorganised - do come to us from it in
perception, memory and imagination.This contribution ('the synthetic
unity of the manifold of perceptions'.C.P.R..A177) is made
intelligible not by experience,which it makes passible,but by
something which goes beyond experience.This something,Kant
believes,is reason,and it is by constructing a critique of reason
that the detail of the contribution of reason,and of the world
beyond experience,to our experience is determined.This involves a
'transcendental deduction' in which we attempt to show the forms or
categories by which reason makes the manifold of perceptions
intelligible.This parallels an earlier transcendental deduction in
which Kant demonstrated the forms under which alone sense
perception is possible.The two deductions give a priori knowledge
concerning the contributions of the knowing subject to sense
experience,and of reason to the organising of this experience so as
to make objective knowledge possible.
This knowledge of the a priori basis of experience is 'pure
philosophy' (Groundwork,trans.H.J.Paton,The Moral
Law.London:1985.388) which may be practical or theoretical.When not
purely formal,it consists in the metaphysics of nature and of
morals: the study of the principles which govern what is and what
ought to be.These a priori principles are peculiar in being
synthetic: they are not true simply in virtue of their terms; yet
they are known independent of any experience. Their basis as outside
experience and as making experience possible means that they have
the status oi law,necessary principles, if there is to be experience
at al1.Metaphysics of morals is the search for what fundamental
synthetic a priori laws there are concerning what ought to be.The
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search for the moral law depends upon a critique of reason
demonstrating the intelligibility of the contribution the world
beyond experience makes to our moral experience.That is,discovery
of the moral law is preceded by a critique of practical reason,in
which it is explained just what the contribution of the world
beyond sense experience is to our knowledge of what ought to be
done,and how it is possible for reason to determine the will in
accordance with this.Before beginning to trace Kant's answer to the
question of how reason can be practical,we have to consider the
relation of the theoretical to the practical philosophy,the
relation of the metaphysics of nature to the metaphysics of
morals.In particular,we must consider the place of the Ideas of
reason in the framework,for it is because of these that Kant can
give the primacy of reason to the practical,and so turn on its head
much oi the Cartesian,and the Natural Law traditions which
understand rationality to concern the theoretical primarily.
The Critique Of Pure Reason, and The Critique of Practical Reason
are are not intended to be read as two treatises on quite separate
operations of the rational mind after the pattern of Aristotle's
theoretical and practical reasoning.To understand the moral
philosophy it is necessary to understand at least this much of the
critical enterprise:that the theoretical reason is restricted
because of its dependence on sensory experience for knowledge
(Groundwork 452:'understanding cannot produce by its own activity
any concepts other than those whose sole service is to bring
sensuous ideas under rules and so to unite them in one
consciousness:without this employment of sensibility it would think
nothing at all.'),and because of its ultimate dependence upon Ideas
which lack theoretical content totally.These restrictions upon
knowledge are to be contrasted with the condition of the will which
is made practical by pure reason.The moral will is characterised by
autonomy,the property by which the agent legislates for himself in
favour of the moral objective.By contrast with the positive
property of autonomy,the knowing intellect is restricted to how the
world is,how the individual's senses are functioning,and depends
upon the non-theoretical Ideas of reason.
The Ideas of reason are not part of knowledge,for their objects are
not known in experience (A311).But if our knowledge is to
increase,we must make use of these Ideas as devices or 'regulative
principles'.The first of these Ideas is that of freedom.If we are
to conceive of ourselves as theoretically rational,as beings in
pursuit of knowledge,we must assume we are free (Gr. 448).We
cannot, however, know we are tree,for we cannot know freedom (Gr.
458/9) since to know something is to explain it,to put it under
laws of nature,and this would be putting under laws of nature,what
we can only understand in terms of absence of laws of nature. So, we
assume freedom so far as we believe ourselves to be theoretically
rational.Freedom is not self-contradictory,and it is not impossible
by the standards of theoretical reason (C.Pr.R.3-4).but it is not
discoverable in experience.It does not conform to the laws of
nature,and therefore.it has no content for speculative knowledge;it
cannot be known.Thus,if we are to acquire knowledge,we must assume
we are free from causal necessitation though this freedom itself
cannot be known.Kant elsewhere shows that theoretical reason also
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requires the Ideas of the soul <C.P.R.A341-4:C.Pr,R,122-4).God
(C.Pr.R.124-6) and also of the world in general,or teleology
(C.P.K.A684: Gr.436n:C.P.R.A651-2).
Theoretical reason may have been unseated from its Socratic
stronghold by being obliged to assume what it cannot know,but when
we turn to practical reason the theoretically empty Ideas are given
a new life and content,and consequently give to practical reason a
new authority.It is the facts of moral consciousness in Groundwork
which allow us to come to understanding of the moral law,the law
which governs reason made practical;but this law,we will
discover,is simply the principle of autonomy,the law of
freedom.Thus, freedom is demonstrated.Similarly, if human beings
could not expect eternal existence and could not assume the
existence of God,the Final End of rational beings could not be
realised and so could not be striven for (C.Pr.R.122-134),and the
moral life would then no longer be a real possibility.Once we
assume the facts of the moral consciousness,the demonstration of
the Ideas follows.The postulates or Ideas 'which the speculative
reason only exhibited as problems which it could not solve' now
'justify it in holding to concepts even the possibility of which it
could not otherwise venture to affirm' (C.Pr.R.132) due to their
practicalnecessitv.Because they are practically necessary,the
problematic Ideas of theoretical reason become properly justified
concepts.Further,they are united a priori in 'a practical concept
of the highest good.'(133),our Final End,which practical reason
must assume as its necessary object (134).This again justifies
theoretical reason in affirming them,though it still has no
knowledge whatsoever concerning them.They are no longer
theoretically empty,though their use is strictly practical.
These remarks on the relation of the theoretical to the practical
reason in Kant must be borne in mind because in criticising what
might be called his 'absolutism',his reliance on the foundation of
rational conduct upon something absolute and universal,I intend
also to criticise Kant's concept of theory and of the unity of
theory and practice.I hope it will appear that my notion of
theory, which does not distinguish between (.speculative; knowledge
and (practical) determination of will,is preferable.If,as I will
argue,Kant's practical rationality is unacceptable because of
reliance on concepts which he cannot permit himself,it follows that
the theoretical reason which depends upon concepts only justified
by this practical reason is undermined. This then allows the
possibility of reinforcing the claims of my: concept of theory as a
sort of intellectual activity the limits and the character of which
are unrestricted except by the explanatory norms of particular
communities.
Pure Practical Re&san.
The question addressed in C.Pr.R. is 'can pure reason itself
determine the will,or does reason determine the will only in
circumstances in which the will is also empirically influenced
7'Pure reason consists in those rules or concepts which are a
priori,that is,not at all based on experience.The question whether
pure reason can be practical is,then, the question of whether the
will can be determined to action solely by rules and concepts which
are not derived from experience.Such rules and concepts,which do
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not differ from individual to individual and which do not vary with
the different experiences of individuals,exhibit the absolute and
invariable character which I spoke of as grounding the Kantian
conception of rationality.The differences here between pure
practical reason and Thomistic and Aristotelian practical reason
are obvious.Aristotelian practical reasoning,in particular,which
relies an experience,desires,deliberation,means/end
reasoning,perception and judgement, has to be contrasted with the a
priori character of pure reason.
There is a difficulty in understanding this.Kant insists that
purely rational,non-empirical, determination of the will is
possible.He must,therefore,either rely on our ordinary moral
consciousness to prove his point,or he must provide a
transcendental argument:if no story drawn from our experience can
explain the possibility of full (moral) practical rationality,the
only alternatives are to demonstrate its existence in ordinary
moral consciousness,or to prove its possibility by showing it is
required by something else whose existence we must accept.These are
the two separate paths Kant follows in Groundwork and C.Pr.R. . What
we must appreciate is that for Kant,consulting ordinary moral
consciousness is a different matter from the sort of consulting
Aristotle has in mind when he appeals to the variety of individual
experience and the necessary feature of personal judgement which
must both be recognised in practical reasoning.Such
consultation,for Kant, would be introduction of empirical data.We
discover the form of Kantian 'ordinary consciousness' when we
remember that for him, the sort of elements which make up individual
experience for an Aristotelian are elements of practical reason in
which the will is not solely determined by reason:they are elements
belonging to practical reasoning which is not moral, but merely
prudential or technical;and that 'ordinary moral consciousness'
excludes such elements,being simply the direct effect upon
consciousness of the determination of the will by law.
Kant holds that we can subtract all the stuff of individual
experience, the merely prudential,and still retain a common
experience of 'moral consciousness' in which we will discover the
operation of pure reason within our individual lives. Ve will only
be able to comprehend his demonstration of pure practical reason
from ordinary consciousness if we have first made this distinction
between moral and prudential reason.If we have not,we will be
unable to perform the subtraction which leaves behind the area of
consciousness in which the purely rational determination of the
will becomes apparent.If we cannot observe the mind except through
its frame of 'everyday' experiences,we will be unable to see that
aspect of it in which pure practical reason is not only a
possibility for us,but a fact of our lives.
The distinction between prudential and moral reasoning is made more
of by Kant than by any previous philosopher.Our welfare and
happiness as finite and embodied beings depends on the satisfaction
of needs and desires.Much of our action,naturally,is directed
towards this satisfaction,and so towards our happiness.Such
actions,and the reasoning preceding them would be taken by many to
be paradigmatic of morality.However,according to Kant,such
action,even when directed to the happiness or welfare of others,is
not moral it this is what determines it.It is not moral because the
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will is being determined not by pure reason but by
experience:experience of what will produce happiness and
satisfaction (C,Pr.R.58).and experience of how best to get it
(Gr.415).However desirable,this empirical conditioning of the will
is non-moral.
To begin to understand why nothing empirical must enter into the
determination of the will in moral action,although in speculative
reason there can be no knowledge except what comes from
experience,we must construct a fairly large part of the argument of
Kant's moral philosophy.Ve will discover that the nation of purely
rational determination follows from the nature of moral worth,and
that this is settled by appeal to the facts of moral
consciousness.We will also discover that the contrast with prudence
is basic to Kant's theory because of his belief in the notion of
the agent's interest in the ends of all his actions which requires
him to distinguish the taking of a sensuous,or prudent,interest in
action from the sort of interest we take in the ends of moral
action (see Gr.413n).I will argue that the attempt to combine the
inherited picture of action as behaviour directed to the attainment
of a end in which we have an interest with the new notion of acting
from (non-sensuous) interest in the ends of reason is finally
incoherent. The moral determination of will described in Groundwork
is incompatible with the psychology of action presented in C■ Pr.R.
and Metaphvsic of Morals.The concept of a non-empirical interest in
the end of an action to which we are motivated by the a priori
claims of reason alone is a false one.
The Argument of Groundwork Ch&pter 1.
The argument of C.Pr.R. moves from the Principle of Morality to
showing how this accounts for the experiences of the moral life,and
eventually to showing how this reconciles theoretical with
practical reason.In the Gr. Kant argues from the facts of
consciousness of what he takes to be ordinary moral experience to
the principles,in particular,the Supreme Principle,of
morality,which must,he says,hold if such experience is to be
veridical and not illusory.
A good will,in chapter 1 of Gr..is the only thing unqualifiedly
good.This is so because its goodness consists not in what it
wills,but in the form of willing it exercises.Its goodness consists
not in intending or achieving,truly good,ends,but in its acts of
willing.These acts are determined directly by reason.But if reason
affects the good will not by setting a certain class of ends for it
or by assisting it in achieving its ends,what exactly does it do in
becoming practical? This notion of goodness requires the concept of
duty.
The motive of duty represents motivation apart from
inclination,motivation to do so-and-so because of the principle or
maxim on which it is to be done and for no other reason.Actions
done from this motive have moral worth.
'An action done from duty has its moral worth,not in the purpose to
be attained by it,but in the maxim according with which it is
decided upon;it depends,therefore,not on the realisation of the
object of the action,but solely on the principle of volition in
accordance with which,irrespective of all objects of the faculty of
desire,the action has been performed'(Gr.399-400).
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So moral worth is found only in the doing of an action which is my
duty;a good will is one which acts on the motive of duty;and
(Gr.396) reason produces wills which are good in this sense.It does
this by both revealing our duty to us,and prompting us toward
this.The second of these tasks concerns the way in which we take a
non-sensuous interest in moral action.The first must be understood
with reference to the concept of principle or maxim.
Kant believes that all action is purposive (Gr.427)■directed
towards an end or 'object' (C.Pr.R.34).and that in all action we
have an 'interest' in these ends (Gr, 459n),Practical reason sets
goals,contributes in various ways to our interest in them,and
formulates means of achieving them. It does so by producing a
special sort of principle;a principle of will.These 'subjective
principles of volition' or maxims (Gr.420n) are a very peculiar
form of principle,a 'practical principle',which has became popular
again in recent moral philosophy.The point about those maxims which
pure reason produces is that these reveal to will its duty,and so
the source of its moral worth.Because of this,we can say something
about the nature of maxims in general.They are not only the basis
or cause of action,but also,since only when a certain class of them
is acted on does a will possess moral worth,the grounds of
evaluation of the practical life of a willing being.Maxims, then,are
both the efficient causes of action,and the determinants of the
moral quality of human conduct.This combination of something which
both causes action and is criterion of the quality of action,that
is,something which serves not only as a cause of action but as a
reason,a justification,is best characterised as an
intention.Intentions are the causes of actions,and it is by
evaluating intentions that we most usually judge an agent's
behaviour. Maxims,then, can be thought of as intentions;the
mentalist counterpart of what in chapter 2 I called activities.This
is also the opinion of Onora O'Neill ('Kant:After
Virtue',Inquiry85;Faces pf Hunger,London;1986,ch.6) who describes
maxims as the fundamental purposes or 'dispositional intentions' of
a person:those purposes she will assert as her
own, and, generally,act on.
Maxims are described (Gr.420n) as subjective principles of
action,and contrasted with objective principles which are 'valid
for every rational being.'Subjective principles are empirically
determined,ultimately to do with self-interest.Objective principles
can be thought of as the subjective principles which all would form
if they had control over their inclinations (Gr.401n).They
are,then,the sort of principles in which reason itself reveals to
us our duty.As control over human inclination is not
universal,objective principles appear as imperative commands of
reason.These imperatives,hypothetical when the commanded action is
good because of some purpose or inclination,are categorical when
the action is 'objectively necessary in itself'(414).required by an
objective principle.The command of reason in a hypothetical
imperative is not a command to act from duty because dutiful action
is not action which is good in the light of a certain purpose,but
action whose quality is derived wholly from its maxim
(399).Categorical imperatives, however,are valid for all rational
beings in virtue not of any subjective purposes or wants,but of
their rationality.They command that our maxims be such that all
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might hold them as principles of action if their rationality were
not distorted by inclination.This necessity means that objective
practical principles are practical laws (420). (Law is defined at
420n as 'an objective principle valid for every rational being.1)So
there is a law to the effect that we ought to make our fundamental
intentions such that they concern not actions which suit our
purposes or inclinations,but actions which might be chosen by all
if they could choose apart from the influence of inclination.
It is in determining the will by those maxims the agent adopts
because they might be held by any rational agent (objective
principles) that practical reason reveals our duty.This is the duty
that reason urges a good will to follow.In determining the will by
this class of maxims reason asks it to operate in accordance with
those ends that are objectively necessary for rational beings,This
sort of command or imperative can be described as a law because of
its objectivity.To act from duty is,then, to act upon that law valid
for all rational beings.Acting from the motive of law alone has
moral worth.
This is the outline of chapter 1,'Ordinary Rational Knowledge',of
Groundwork. There follows the passage to 'Metaphysics of Morals'in
which the synthetic a priori moral law is formulated and
explained, and the 'Critique of Pure Practical Reason' in which Kant
reveals how the moral law is possible. To this point we have founded
the categorical imperative and indicated the way in which pure
reason can be practical.My criticisms of Kant are going to revolve
around the concept of interest and the doctrine of freedom.They
depend,therefore,on those parts of C.Pr.R. and Gr. in which the
motivational role and the possibility of pure practical reason are
discussed.I will show first that the basic account of pure
practical reason given so far depends upon the plausibility of
Kant's concept of interest,but that this concept is inadequate.I
will then discuss the doctrine of freedom,and conclude that it
cannot be invoked to compensate for the inadequacies of Kantian
interest.I will suggest that Kant could save the basic account of
the categorical imperative only by placing his faith in his own
Doctrine of Virtue.the 'natural law theory' of Kant.As part of his
concern,however,is to demonstrate the failings of natural law,Kant
could only,I claim,appeal to D. V. by accepting an alternative
normative assumptionconcerning human dignity.I finally consider
modern attempts to defend Kant's own conception of rationality.The
failure of these implies the failure of Kant to explain rationality
by use of a concept of the invariable and absolute he cannot permit
himself to have.
The Argument of C.Pr.R.
In C.Pr.R. Kant begins by describing practical principles as those
containing 'a general deterj/mination of the will, having under it
several practical rules' (19).Principles which presuppose objects
of desire are empirical.They can provide subjective determination
of the will,but not the objective determination of law.All
empirically determined principles belong to the general principle
of self-love or happiness.'To be happy is necessarily the desire of
every rational but finite being,and thus it is an unavoidable
determinant of its faculty of desire' (25).We are beings with
needs.These are related to pleasure and displeasure,and,as these
are known only empirically,the requirement that we pursue happiness
is not a law.Thus any principles based on our finite and needy
nature,for Kant,our faculty of desire,are empirical and so do not
qualify as abjective principles,principles valid for all rational
beings in virtue of their rationality.This is because 'if a
rational being can think of its maxims as practical universal
laws,he can do so only by considering them as principles which
contain the determining grounds of the will because of their form
and not because of their matter' (Theorem 3,27).It is 'the mere
form of giving universal law',in abstraction from all material
factors,all objects of desire,which must be the determining ground
of the will in all practical legislation.What the agent must ask
himself,then,is whether any of his practical principles could serve
as universal laws;whether he possesses a principle by which the
will is determined not by its object but by the mere form of law
itself.
The answer is that determination by the mere form of legislation is
passible only for one who accepts the principle 'so act that the
maxim of your will could always hold at the same time as a
principle establishing universal law' (31).This takes us to the
point at which we left Gr.It is necessary in C.Pr.R. for Kant to
now make the transition from this principle to the facts of moral
experience.The analytic method of C.Pr.R. achieves this by the
concept of autonomy. In Gr. this comes last following the
fundamental law derived from moral experience.In C,Pr.R, it follows
the statement of the law,as the explanation of what makes the law
possible,and so precedes the analysis of moral experience.
C.Pr.R..Problem 1 (29):what is the character of will which can be
determined by the mere form of law? As form is not an object of the
senses,it cannot determine natural events in accordance with the
law of causality.The will which it determines is,then,free of
causality.The determination of free will by pure reason,which is
determination by the form of law itself,is the adoption by the
agent of a practical principle to the effect that action is to be
in accord with the bare form of legislation itself.This pure and
formal principle is the fundamental moral one,the basic objective
practical principle.lt can,therefore,be construed as a law to the
effect that the form of universal law-giving alone ought to
determine the will.If the moral law is the law that no law,but only
the form of legislation,ought to determine the will,then the moral
law is the law of freedom from all determination of will by sources
external to the will itself.It is,therefore,the law of freedom,or
the law governing the free will.Kant's name for the form of
internal self-legislation commanded by the law of freedom is
autonomy.
At Theorem 4 (33) autonomy of wi11,independence from all material
aspects of law-giving,is described as the sole source of all moral
laws and duties.Autonomy is understood both as freedom,and as the
legislation of pure practical reason in the autonomous
determination of will.Thus it binds within itself the command of
the law of freedom that we determine our actions by no law but the
form of law, and the consequence of this that in moral action the
initiating principle is one the will gives to itself and does not
take from any other source.The concept of autonomy, then,links what
the moral law commands to what one governed by that law does. In
other words,it carries us straight from awareness of the
Categorical Imperative to the experience of one governed by it,to
the facts of the moral life.
Kant turns to the facts of the moral life in Chapter Three which is
headed 'The Incentives of Pure Practical Reason'Incentive' is
explained at 72:'a subjective determining ground of a will whose
reason does not by its nature necessarily conform to the abjective
law. 'The problem of pure practical reason can therefore also be
understood as the problem of how the moral law can be an
incentive,for of all finite beings it can be asserted that their
reason does not necessarily conform to objective law.Kant also
introduces the concept of an interest:'it indicates an incentive of
the will so far as it is presented by reason* (80).As the
objective determining ground of a good will is the moral law
itself,moral interest,the subjective determining ground of a good
will,must be a pure interest of practical reason.The concept of
maxim depends on that of interest,therefore a moral maxim rests
upon an interest in law as such.An action in whose subjective
determination there is no inclination but only the interest in law
is a moral one,one which forms part of our duty.The exclusion of
inclination from human beings leads to constraint,and the
consciousness 01 this is displeasure,felt in proportion to the
constraint.As the agent exercises constraint through reason,it also
leads to feelings of self-approbation,but even these admirable
practical feelings are not allowed by Kant to enter the
determination of a moral action.Determination is objectively by
reason itself through the moral law,and subjectively through the
moral interest which is now described as respect (76) for the moral
law.
At 87 Kant asks for the source of this duty in which we have an
interest independent of all inclination,for 'something which
elevates man above himself as a part of the world of
sense, something which connects him with an order of things which
only the understanding can think.'The answer is
freedom,independence from nature.Ve belong to two worlds (88),and
we,naturally,see ourselves as belonging to the higher one,and hold
our membership of it in great reverence.Because of this we
understand that 'Man is certainly unholy enough,but humanity in his
person must be holy to him' (88).Because of this understanding,we
believe that rational creatures alone in creation cannot be seen as
objects.Our autonomy over nature means we cannot be used merely as
parts of nature.The fundamental moral law thus leads through the
consciousness of everyday moral experience to the understanding of
rational beings,or persons,as ends in themselves:they do not merely
follow the ends of nature but set ends,and therefore are themselves
ends of absolute value.
To understand this is to understand that autonomous beings,beings
whose wills can be objectively determined purely by law,and who are
capable of morality only because of their freedom from nature,are
themselves the grounds of that respect for law which is the
subjective determinant of the moral will.That is,as the freedom of
a rational being is the source of her duty, freedom, autonomy, is
itself to be reverenced by rational beings,as also the ground of
their interest in the law,for if freedom is the source of objective
law,it is also the source of our interest in law which is merely
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the subjective flip-side oi objective determination.If persons are
the grounds of the interest which is subjective determination by
law,then respect for persons forms a subjective principle of
determination. As this subjective principle is given by reason
itself,and so determines the wills of all rational beings.it can be
expressed as a law,or objective principle - one valid for all
rational beings - to the effect that persons are to be treated not
merely as means,but always as ends.It is,therefore,a second
formulation of the fundamental abjective law:'Act in such a way
that you always treat humanity,whether in your own person or in the
person of any other,never simply as a means,but always at the same
time as an end' (Gr.429).This formulation ultimately leads to the
particular examples of duties - objective ends necessarily pursued
by rational beings - examined in D.V..
Motives »nd, Interests,
The derivation of the Formula of Ends as moral law is best seen in
Groundwork (427-9).I believe that this formula and the Formula of
the Kingdom (433) are necessary to Kant because he wished to pay
attention both to the moral worth of dutiful action and the
teleology of action as directed towards an object of our
interest.My argument will be that Kant's reluctance to sacrifice
the purity of the motive of duty does not allow him to give an
explanation of interest and that this breaks the back of his
theory.
We cannot overrate the importance of the empirical lor Kant.The
work of rationality is the adopting of ends,and every piece of
willing,prudential or moral,is directed towards the achievement of
an end (Or.437) in which we have an interest.The holding of ends is
connected (Gr.412) with following a law.Rational nature follows
ends by internalising the idea of law and deriving actions from
this.Rational willing does not bypass human interests for something
called 'rational interests' in determining itself by pure
reason,but brings human interests into line with rationality by
adopting maxims which conform to universal law.Kantian rationality
is not a strict,legalistic deontology,for all action, moral and
prudential, is a striving to realise ends in which we have an
interest.The will must always be determined by a subjective ground
or end (Gr.427:C.Pr.R.34).Pure practical reason is only possible
because we have an interest in the abject of our willing
(Gr.460n:C,Pr.R.61.'good' is an object of the faculty of desire of
reasonable men).There is no Kantian doctrine that dutiful
motivation is consequent upon a purely intellectual apprehension of
moral truth.Moral action is simply a particular sort of action:one
directed towards an end which all might hold,an end which is a
suitable candidate for adoption as universal law.
However.it is ot the essence of Kant's theory of moral worth that
an action is done upon a motive which does not include inclination
as a factor.There is,therefore,a difficulty concerning interests in
moral actions,and how they can be non-inclinational.Also,an action
which has moral worth is done not because it is 'good solely as a
means to something else' but because it is 'good in itself'
(Gr.414).There is,therefore,also a problem concerning the ends oi
moral actions,and how they may be subjective determinants of action
but not determinants of moral worth.In prudential or technical
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reasoning dutiful motivation and subjective interests in ends are
well apart. In moral reasoning,however,they must come together in a
coherent account of moral willing, if Kant's conception of pure
practical reason is correct.
Given that we must have some sort of interest in moral
motivation,certain basic remarks can be made about the relation
between motives and interests.We should note first that Kant
believes an explanation of how the idea of the law,which is not an
object ol experience,can cause an effect found in experience,how it
can interest us,is impossible because
inconceivable.Reason,however,must have 'a power of infusing a
feeling of pleasure or satisfaction in the fulfilment of duty'
(Gr.460) if it is to be practical.This feeling is not the reason
the law is valid:it does not explain our interest in law,rather,the
law interests us 'for it is valid for us as men in virtue of having
sprung from our will as intelligence and so from our proper self'
(Gr.461).An explanation of this interest is,however,'wholly
impossible',for it is the result of 'a special kind of causality'
(460) in which the cause does not exist within experience,and so it
is inconceivable.This does not worry Kant because at this point of
Groundwork he has,of course,already shown the validity of the
categorical imperative, that pure reason does determine the will.If
the categorical imperative has been demonstrated from the notion of
the intelligible world, non-empirical moral determination of will is
possible,and the question of how,though fascinating,is irrelevant
to the demonstrated truth that it is.
However,I have not yet granted the truth of Kant's theory of
noumenal existence grounding the possibility of autonomy upon
which the proof of the categorical imperative rests.I have not
done so precisely because I believe his concept of ireedom is
dislocated if the theory of the good will is incompatible with the
general philosophy of action.It literally has no place in
explaining the reconciliation of the moral with the conditioned
empirical world if these two worlds can be shown to be
irreconcilable.As I do not grant Kantian autonomy for this
reason,it remains a concern to me that interest in the ends of
moral action be explained if any sort of pure practical reason is
to be possible.I am, furthermore,not about to accept Kant's claim
that explanation is impossible here because the cause of this
interest is outside the world of experience,because that there is
such an intelligible world and that the moral law is part of it is
precisely what I am not prepared to grant.My next concern,then,is
to expose Kant's failure to produce a concept of interest which
could account for motivation of agents by the objective moral
law.Exposing this failure will throw doubt on Kant's suggestion
that this cannot be explained because the explanation is in
principle inpossible,and later criticism of Kant's doctrine of
freedom will give firm grounds for rejecting the concept of
autonomy and with it the suggestion that moral interest cannot be
explained because its object is outside the conditioned
(heteronomous) world of experience.
Theories of morality generally contain one of two types of account
of motives.We can describe these as desire-based ana non desire-
based accounts. Accounts of moral interest,attempts to answer the
question 'why be moral ?',may also be divided into two
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categories:desire-based accounts,and accounts based on some
conception of the good.Deontologists tend to postpone as secondary
considerations of interest until the primary matter oi possessing
the correct motivation is determined:the question of orientation
towards the right precedes the nature of the good which explains
our interest in this.Kant does not fit in to this deontological
mould far he wishes to preserve an account oi interest - one based
on a conception of the good - with his account of the moral motive
- a non desire-based account - and to give priority to neither
one.This causes the great strain in the practical philosophy
between the critical works and the metaphysic of morals;between
objective principle and incentive;the Formula of Universal Law and
those of Ends and the Kingdom.I want to focus upon this tension:in
order to be weak enough to be compatible with the doctrine of moral
worth our interest must be insufficiently strong to engage
finite,sensuous beings.
Interests motivate as well as motives. They do so,however,in
different ways. Motives give to the will principles of
action,accessible to agents as general or long-term intentions,and
also make efficacious upon the will principles to which we would
otherwise simply do lip-service (for example, moral principles).They
do not determine the will to action itself:we may shirk or postpone
action we have a motive for doing.Action requires the formation of
specific intentions explained by a/ more general intentions,which
are either given by motives (self-motivated) or supported by
motives,and b/the circumstances in which we find ourselves.Some of
these circumstances will,of course,be sufficient to generate new
motives themselves - to motivate us towards new or altered
principles of action,Some moralists explain the mechanism by which
the will is motivated as the formation of desires,others as the
formation of principles without the intervention of sensuous
elements (the former tend to talk of 'motives' as an extra piece of
explanatory baggage;the latter talk simply of the 'motivation' of
the will towards forming intentions to do that which we have a
reason to do).Intuitionists,some Kantians and certain moral sense
theorists hold the latter,while most utilitarians would hold some
version of the former.
Interests too can be said to motivate,for they are the reasons for
possessing motives (as well as reasons for our motives in the sense
of causes,they are,of course,also reasons for possessing motives we
have not yet formed). They can be explained either as basic desires
or as conceptions of the good (things like the stoic impulse to
self-preservation,the Hobbesian Natural Law that peace is to be
achieved,the the utilitarian repulsion at the anticipation of
pain,the principles known through synderesis according to
Cicero,Aquinas,A1bert the Great,Bonaventura and others).Thus one
might believe that there are certain very basic,'given' desires of
a human being which explain,and 'suggest',his motives and so the
principles he adopts (which motivation in turn may be either
explained as forming desires,or as quite non-sensuous determination
of will towards principles),or one might believe that there are
certain facts about a human being which constitute his good,his
'ideal' or his true 'life-plan',and that these explain and suggest
his motives and consequent principles (this vision may be of the
type philosophers have tried to attribute universally,or it may be
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the personal and idiosyncratic vision of an individual).Interests
motivate in so far as they cause the motivation which leads us to
act,or give us reasons to motivate ourselves.
Now there is no reason why someone who holds,as Kant does,that
action with moral worth is done from motives that are non desire-
based cannot accept an account of interest explaining these
motives.That is,if it is held that moral action is action not done
for anything else but done because it is good in itself.it may
still be held that our motivation to do this particular thing
because it is good in itself,or our motivation to do the good in
itself in general,is explained by our interests - either our
fundamental desires or conception of the good.Charles
Larmore, (Patterns of Moral Complexity. Cambridge:1967,ch.4)
speculates that it does not follow from the fact that morality has
an 'empirically unconditioned scope' that we 'must have an
empirically unconditioned motivational basis for heeding its
demands' (p. 84). Larmore's concern is to emphasise the role of
individual judgement,experience and character formation in
morality.My point is that the 'unconditioned scope' of moral
motivation does not preclude an explanation of motivation in terms
of a pre-moral level of interest constituted by (empirical) desire
or a conception of the good in which doing what is good-in-itself
plays a (the?) vital part.
Kant,however,does not produce such an account of interests.Ve would
expect him to provide an account based not upon desire (which would
introduce heteronomy),but upon a conception of the good;and the
materials of this conception are substantially contained in the
heavily traditional pattern of duties he sets out in D.V..and in
the much more particularistic Metaphvsic of Morals in general.Kant
does not produce this account because he has a much more famous
doctrine in the wings to account for moral motivation, the
practicality at pure reason:the doctrine oi freedom.
C.Pr.R. on Interest,
I will be giving reasons for rejecting Kantian freedom.First, I will
look at the Critique's discussion of the concept of interest.This
seems to support the claim in Groundwork (459-60) that no
explanation of moral interest is possible.Unfortunately,though he
cannot explain it,Kant makes great use of this idea.It is quite
clear that at the basis of the theory of rational action is a
theory of action as behaviour directed to the satisfaction of some
aim which has registered itself either initially or upon reflection
as a wish or need,what L.W. Beck (A Commentary on Kant's Critique oi
Practical Reason,Chicago:I960,p.34) calls an 'impulse'.Then in the
case of minimally rational action,the agent 'takes an interest' in
the object of this impulse.This does not mean that what is already
subjectively felt is felt by the agent in a more intense or more
personal subjective way,but that the demands and implications of
prospective action are filtered through the agent's intelligence in
such a way that whether he ultimately opts for this action or
not,the internal impulsion towards it has registered as some sort
of a good.In Beck's words,'intelligent action is action whose
motive is an interest guided by appropriate conception and not a
blind and naked impulse' (p. 35).
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In moral action this interest must be retained in same form if we
are to take action upon the motive of law itself - act upon purely
dutiful motivation - for finite and sensuous beings cannot pursue
the law except on the basis of a basic internal tendency,however
much overlaid with intellection,towards its object.But there seems
to be no mechanism within the system for explaining how the formal
law can motivate the sensuous being at the level of impulse to its
object.The obvious explanation would be that obedience to the law
is desirable given some inevitable component of all human
conceptions of the good,and therefore it is an object of
inclination.However,the basis of moral motivation on possession of
a precedent interest is viewed as 'heteronomy',the subjection and
contamination of formal law by the empirical realm of cause and
elfect.this being the reason why no explanation of moral interest
can be advanced.lt is not at all clear to me,given the distinction
between them,why Kant should insist that moral motivation and
interest of a conception-of-the-good sort are not compatible.
However,he insists there can be no such external influence in truly
moral motivation, and is f orced back onto two tactics to deal with
this potentially lethal problem.First,he attempts to show the
compatibility of the teleology of human action with the pure
determination of will of a rational being:he constructs the
doctrine of freedom. This allows rational human beings to straddle
the categories of the unconditioned and the empirical,for they are
free in so far as they are rational,and may be simultaneously
rational and subject to the conditions of embodiment. Second, he
includes,in 'The Aesthetic of Pure Practical Reason' a discussion
of incentives,interest,what he calls the 'moral interest',and the
moral feelings.
An incentive is a 'subjective determining ground of a will whose
reason does not by its nature necessarily conform to the objective
law' (C.Pr.R.72).and an interest is 'an incentive of the will so
far as it is presented by reason' (80).Interest,therefore,is a
concept applying to beings like human beings;one which has its
effect in subjective determination;and it is given by reason:it
does not exist prior to the activity of practical reason,but is a
feature of that activity.Interest in the moral law can then be
understood as a presentation of pure reason to sensuous beings by
which their wills are subjectively and immediately (Gr.460n)
determined to that law abjective determination towards which is the
work of the law itself. The law which determines the good will
objectively also determines it subjectively through this
presentation of reason to the will, and this presentation is
necessary because of our sensuous nature (the aspect of ourselves
that entails we do not necessarily conform to law). Though
subjective and a necessary effect of our sensuous nature,moral
interest might, then,be described as an interest of reason in itself
(or in terms of the wille/wlllkurdlstinction. as an interest of
willkiir in the objective determination of wille by law. See
H.E.Allison,Kant's Theory of Freedom.Cambridge;1990,p.135).
It is necessary,given Kant's account of human agency,that reason
has the 'power of infusing a feeling of pleasure or satisfaction in
the fulfilment of duty' (Gr.460).and this feeling is here equated
with moral interest.Reason,then,causes us to have feelings - not so
that we act morally, but as a result of our acknowledgement of duty
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(Gr.401n:they are the effect not the cause of the law in the
agent).Part of the effect of the law is to give us feelings such
that we take an interest in it,but this is an interest taken in the
objective determination of will by law,and not a (subjective)
interest from which we can act when we act morally (Gr. 413n: 449)■Ve
do not act,then,out of moral interest;rather we take an interest in
the moral law since,and because,as well as its objective
determination,it determines the will subjectively.
'Taking an interest' in the moral law,rather than acting 'from
interest' in other grounds of determination, is 'immediate'
(Gr.460n:401n) because,unlike other, mediating, feelings, moral
interest is not an element within agency over and above
determination by law but merely the subjective effect of this
determination on consciousness (401n),This,then,is supposed by Kant
to be the way in which reason can produce this feeling:not as an
effect of reason upon consciousness,but as consciousness of
reason,of the law.However,he also wishes to talk of moral interest
as (Gr.460) the result of a special kind of causality:one which is
inexplicable since only the effect (interest) and not the cause
(law) is located within experience.It is clear here that Kant is
playing upon two different meanings of cause.The law is being
considered as cause of our interest in the sense (A) that if there
were no objective determination,there would be no question of
subjective determination (the latter follows as the consciousness
of the former);and in the sense (B) that the objective (i.e.
outside sensuous causation) determination is causing a feeling
within the sensory realm which then stands as the 'first cause' of
action (behaviour motivated by this feeling).These two instances of
causation have in common that they avoid the cause/effect relation
of the natural,material world:in the first instance causation is
immediate;in the second it is non-empirical.
I suggest that in neither case has Kant produced a concept which
explains how sensuous creatures can experience the dutiful
motivation he has described,for it is a concept of interest which
must explain our particular motivations ('having an interest' must
precede 'taking an interest',contra Kant,even though each entails
the other),and what Kant has in fact done is to utilise his concept
of motivation to explain our particular interests.In case A the
moral law explains interest as following immediately from it as its
effect in consciousness;in case B it explains interest as a
sensuous effect of the unconditioned upon experience.In both the
cart has simply been put before the horse since the task of
explaining how this formal moral law can be grasped by our sensuous
make-up has been subtly replaced by the Kantian question 'how might
the objective law of practical reason produce an effect on
subjectivity and so lead to action within the phenomenal world
?',which anticipates the Kantian answer,'given that we are free and
autonomous,it does and must'.The strain in Kant's theory between
requiring the moral feelings to be efficacious in our 'taking an
interest' but not to touch our motivation leads to this remarkable
shift of emphasis in which motivation is given precedence over
interest.Another way of expressing this is that Kant has
equated,explicitly,'taking an interest' with 'having an interest'
because of his belief that all interests are presentations of
practical reason (a belief which depends upon his view of agency as
maxims formed by practical reason - rather than by the motivational
effect of interests upon practical reason),whereas 'taking an
interest* is in fact a species of motivation,and any feelings
operative within my taking an interest in morality must thereby
affect the motivation upon which I act.
It may be objected that this is Kant's originality:to invent a new
concept of moral interest as consciousness of duty.However,Kant
accepts that all action,including moral,is action directed to an
end of interest or 'impulse',and he relies,in 'The Aesthetic' upon
a coherent doctrine of moral feelings to harmonise this with the
theory of the dutiful will in order to demonstrate the actuality of
the practicality of pure reason.He is committed to showing that
human beings may turn from self-love and pursue an interest which
has as its object moral action,and he cannot demonstrate this
simply by the assertion of pure motivation and the 'inexplicable'
fact that it causes the feelings of moral interest without which it
could never became efficacious.Again,of course,the Kantian response
is that duty is not merely asserted but demonstrated by the
deduction of transcendental freedom (and that the positive
conception of this freedom as autonomy - the self-legislation of
morality - is sufficient of itself to explain our interest in
morality): if freedom is proved, we sio. act upon a motive of duty, and
so must have an interest of the type he describes in morality.
It is this ireedom we must next address,but not as the doctrine,as
Kant supposes,which both demonstrates and justifies the concept of
moral interest,but as a possible alternative to what I believe is
the impossible task Kant sets himself of providing an account of
human interest in the objective law.Ve should notice,however,that
even if Kantian freedom were correct and so could substitute for
interest in explaining how we can be moral,he would still be
required to produce a coherent psychological story explaining how
the (now demonstrable) morality actually motivates a will which is
sensuous.Just because our interest in morality would have been
shown to be the result of our freedom and not of fundamental
desires or conceptions,it would not follow it has therefore been
shown how we are motivated by duty.
It should be noted that in those places where Kant tries to give
content to his notion of moral interest he provides nothing extra
which might explain how the psychology of a free individual might
be affected.The moral feeling which is preeminent and in which
moral interest consists is respect, which is intrinsic to objective
determination (C.Pr.R.74). Respect alone is a feeling 'not received
through ouside influence but one self-produced by a rational
concept' (Gr.401n), The problem is not that the concept of respect
is a weak part of Kant's theory. In fact,the way in which he
develops and makes use of it suggests respect could serve as
candidate for the interest,in my sense,which explains our
possession of moral motives. However,Kantian respect could not
perform this function because its occurrence is inseparable from
particular acts of objective determination of will by reason.This
is clear because if respect is the subjective rendering in
consciousness 01 law,respect occurs inseparably from particular
determinations of will. As it occurs on a case by case basis,respect
lacks the status of a background,permanent and complex involvement
of the human agent which could explain his moral motivation.
Similarly,respect does not possess the content needed to explain
how objective law might affect the psychology of free human
beings,for respect,unlike any other feeling,cannot be understood in
terms of inclination (C.Pr. R.92.I take '...the feeling of respect
of a kind that no man has for any inclinations whatever...' to mean
that the object of respect cannot be an object of inclination,but
instead is the law,and that the sensuous component of respect is
not its object,but the overwhelming effect of this object upon our,
subjective,inclinations).Respect consists simply in the humbling
experience of recognising our maxims of self-love for what they are
in the face of the objective moral law (C.Pr.R.116/117:to see
respect as subjective determination which is sensuous is an
'illusion'.Rational determination is never more than 'the ground of
the feeling of pleasure',and the fact that the cause of this
feeling leads to 'an impulse to activity' which is what
feelings,too,generally lead to,should not cause us to say it is the
reeling in the case of rational determination which leads to a
activity).Respect is not a feeling of pleasure,and may even run
totally counter to all pleasurable impulse (an 'inner
satisfaction. . . merely negative with reference to everything which
might make life pleasant',88).
I think 116/117 is ultimately unclear as to whether the subjective
determination which is respect for (interest in) the law includes
pleasure as an element of itself,or merely causes pleasurable
feelings once the will has been determined by rationality.In either
case it seems clear that any sensuous feeling present is not that
part of (or that effect of) subjective determination (respect)
which is responsible for the involvement of human beings with
morality.Therefore respect lacks the phenomenological content to
explain how the moral law might engage the psychology of free human
beings.
Despite its failure as an acceptable account of interest,
respect,the subjective ground of objective determination,is
responsible in Groundwork for the Formula of Ends which tries to
reconcile the moral worth of duty with the necessity of an
absolute, material end,and the Formula of the Kingdom with its
appeal to the highest good of happiness proportionate to morality
(C.Pr.R.124).It is through respect,then,that we do see the union of
worth and interest,morality and happiness,duty and end in Kant's
work.However,these new categorical imperatives are simply
formulations of the objective law which Kant can introduce only
because ol his insistence on the inseparability of interest and
dutiful motivation.This inseparability does not mean he can
successfully unite duty and interest within the new principle oi
Ends or the principle of the Kingdom,but that these new principles
of subjective interest have no separate status apart from the
primary principle,the formula of Universal Law,the principle of
Duty.Although they treat of the subjective interest of the moral
agent,they do not help us to understand this since they do not add
to the doctrine of formal legislative determination of will, but do
no more than represent,and re-represent,this objective
determination at the subjective level.
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Kant's own explanation of the determination of the will by pure
reason,of the possibility of the categorical imperative,is the
doctrine of freedom. My quarrel with Kant over freedom does not
concern the First Critique's Third Antinomy which he resolves
through a non-natural causality,transcendental freedom, or the
argument by which the notion of freedom is given reality as an idea
in C.Pr,R..or the supposed deduction of freedom in Groundwork3t but
the concept of freedom itself.I do not think Kant's concept is a
concept of freedom, and though it may be validly deduced,and even
successful in the resolution of the antinomy,it does not succeed in
grounding the practicality of pure reason (which I believe would
require the concept of interest Kant cannot,or rather will
not,produce),and so does not demonstrate that morality is pure
rationality.
As creatures of the world of nature we are,according to
Kant,determined by causes both inside and outside ourselves;as
creatures free from this world we can ourselves cause our actions
without there being any other cause of them outside our own self-
determination. Freedom from the empirically conditioned world of
sense means for Kant that we can take an interest in non-empirical
determination of the will.As we have seen,he does not believe that
this phenomenon of 'motivation without inclination' requires an
explanation in such terms as desires or personal conceptions of the
good - a concept of interest.This is the most radical part of Kant's
theory to my mind. When he discusses the power reason has for one who
is free Kant comes closest to removing the moral feelings altogether
and substituting for his own the thesis that in so far as we are
noumena.we do 'take an interest' of a quite non-sensuous sort in
purely rational determination.
If we look to Groundwork(438).it is argued that rational beings as
ends in themselves must be able to regard themselves as making
universal law:they must choose actions not from any point of view
within nature,but from the point of view of their own intelligible
existence.'Accordingly every rational being must so act as if he
were through his maxims always a law-making member in the universal
kingdom of ends.'He is free from all 'dependence on interested
motives',and therefore free from the law of nature.The ends of his
actions are in no way conditioned except by 'the mere dignity of
humanity, that is,of rational nature in man' (439).Morality consists
in action willed apart from all interested conditioning,autonomous
action.Such autonomy,apparently restricting,is,in fact,liberating as
it a/lifts man above natural laws, and b/'invests him with dignity as
the author not only of his free actions,but of the moral law itself
(440).
The moral will is the autonomous will,and this is a will which is
determined by the form of universal legislation itself and by no
other object.This species of determination is freedom in its
negative sense.The positive sense is the experience of autonomous
willing itself,the exercise of 'the property which will has of being
a law to itself' (447).Moral willing and free willing are one
whether freedom is understood as independence,or unconditional
authorising of acts.
Kant must show not only what freedom is, but that we are free; not
only demonstrate what freedom would be for an imperfectly
rational, that is, a human, being, but demonstrate that the wills of
human beings are free and determined apart from any objects of
sense.To this end he argues that reason must see itself as free from
any other influences otherwise it could not understand its
judgements as its own: freedom is a necessary property of agency
(Gr. 448). Furthermore, in their aspect as intelligence,or
noumena,rational beings see themselves constantly as apart from
sensuous conditioning.When they view themselves as author of the
moral law (which we have seen they must do so far as they possess a
good will>,then,and when they exercise their agency human beings are
self-determining and independent from natural causation.They
actually are free,rather than only possibly free,with respect to
agency and the moral law.
They possess a second sort of freedom with respect to agency:the
freedom to themselves initiate a causal chain within the natural
world;to determine themselves not by law,but by a maxim of prudence
through which desires are satisfied and the objects of need sought
(see Allison, ch. 3). This is the sort of freedom we most often
understand ourselves to have,but it is essential that we distinguish
this,practical, freedom from the freedom of pure practical
reason,transcendental freedom.The latter is not only morally
fundamental,rather than merely morally permissible, but is also
experienced not only as duty,the categorical imperative,but as an
expression of our autonomy.Practical freedom,freedom within nature
may be exercised with awareness of the moral law,but only with
awareness of it as restraint which we either attend to or
ignore;transcendental freedom,in the positive sense,is exercised not
just in the knowledge of the moral law,but as the expression of the
moral law.It is because of the capacity of the rational agent to
himself mirror this law of rational willing completely in that very
determination of will in which the law is operative that his
authorising of action is also his authorising of that law;it is
because the law he authorises is authorised in an act of will which
is determined by the law itself that his authorisation of it is an
expression of his own will as it is made practical by pure
reason.Authorising a law and willing in a fully rational way are
one:giving expression to one's fully rational self and authorising
the moral law are indistinguishable.Freedom,then,is inevitable for a
human being who is willing in a fully rational way.
The demonstration that the will is free does not imply an
explanation of this.The question of how freedom is possible is (459)
unanswerable.In the light of this,ultimately there is no explanation
(459-60) of why rational beings take an interest in morality.This
will fail to disturb only those not just convinced by Kantian
freedom,but convinced that it is a concept of freedom:that Kant's
concept of the autonomous will satisfies all the conditions ot a
concept of freedom. I am not convinced of this,and so I believe that
a concept of interest ot the kind outlined earlier is required by
Kant if he is to demonstrate pure practical reason.I will suggest
later how such a concept might be constructed from components of
Kant's own Doctrine of Virtue.and how this might be made compatible
with the Categorical Imperative.
In one respect Kant's account of freedom is definitely
correct. Freedom is not merely not being compelled to choose one
thing so as to be able to choose another.For Kant,such freedom from
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particular empirical causes simply reintroduces the question of
freedom with respect to the determination of the will towards the
particular action which we do elect to perform. The error in the
thinking which claims freedom is 'from' one thing so as to enable us
to choose another is in the notion that freedom is 'from' things at
all.Belief in this idea regards choice as havering above options and
able to descend on any one with equal facility depending upon
conditions (.beliefs and desires) which the agent may with equal
facility satisfy.No particular option holds him in any way that is
outside his control.Thus he is 'free from' ties to any x so as to be
able to choose any a,b,or c.However,those who accept this must
either hold that the agent who does choose a,b,or c is also free
from choosing this,or that he is not.If he is not,then he is not
free in rejecting x,for he has exchanged thraldom to it for thraldom
to a or b or c;if he is,then he is free both from what he chooses
and from what he does not choose simply because he does choose one
of them.But if he is 'free from' what he chooses and what he does
not choose merely in virtue of choosing one of them,choice,the
exercise of which is being used to demonstrate freedom,is neutral
with respect to freedom:otherwise it would not be that his choosing
of 'a' could leave his freedom unaffected.However,if choice is
neutral with respect to freedom,it cannot be that any act of choice
is sufficient to demonstrate that agents are free from what they
reject and what they choose,because the series of rejecting one for
another might be continued with respect to b,c,d...n,and the bare
fact that the series of choices in neutrality to freedom is
continued gives no grounds for asserting that freedom has been
proved.
Such theories were well-discussed in the original debates by the
Church Fathers,and in their revival by the medievals, in which the
complexity of different meanings of the term 'free will' was first
exposed (see B.Giison,ihe Spirit of Medieval Philosophy,
London;1936,ch.15).The notion of not being compelled to choose an x
was part of this complexity, and a valuable part,as Aristotle,among
others, saw (N.E.3).However.the fact that today worries concerning
medieval questions such as which 'part' of the agent does the
hovering,that is,what is a chooser,persist indicates the
difficulties of this particular tangle.
In discussing Kant we can say both that he must be taken to hold
freedom is from the whole world of things,and that free action
requires some reference to things.In its negative sense it is
independence from the world,and in its positive sense it is mastery
over the world which requires personal ends and interests,even in
morality.Ve require both these components to understand his
doctrine:it is both that we are independent from nature,and that we
have mastery over it.It is,then,a kind of transcendence which raises
us,in so far as we are rational,to the status of God and the
angels:it requires us to be in the world so far as we have
autonomous mastery over it,but not of the world in that we are
independent of natural causation.My criticism is that this omits the
most important features of freedom.
It is true that freedom concerns the relation of choice to the
totality of one's existence as an individual.However.it is not true
that this relation is that of a non-empirically conditioned cause to
noumenal existence. Freedom is that property by which one's choices
are one's own choices - nothing more;and this certainly does not
restrict one's freedom to that part of one's existence decribed by
Kant as rationality,To talk about free will or free choice is
primarily to talk about that set of choices which relates to the
area of her activity in which alone an agent can properly,or truly
be said to choose.Freedom,at least as it is applied to human
beings,refers to the restricted area within whose perimeter the
agent can truly choose for herself - an area we find it very
difficult to accept as restricted.Only with regard to this small
part of the cosmos can I be held fully responsible.
Consequently,only in so far as I do have an area in which I have
such direct influence can I be enrolled in morality.Understanding
this should be humbling as it teaches how small the extent of my
direct influence is and how restricted the grounds of my moral
identity are,but also uplifting as it suggests how great the area
outside freedom is in which we may have an influence which is not
wholly our own,but which can operate through the mediating practices
and institutions of the morality in which we are implicated.
Freedom and morality are linked,but are not co-extensive.Freedom
locates my individuality,which allows me to grow into,and within,a
moral community in which my actions can be moral ones without
necessarily being free ones:they can be actions which are not wholly
mine.If freedom did not take this limited form,grounding our moral
nature but not constituting our moral actions - those distributed
through the media of moral practices and institutions - we would be
overburdened and oppressed by the situation in which every action of
ours which has in any way moral implications (probably,every action
of ours) is a free action,one for which we are liable to bear full
responsibility.Instead, freedom is limited in comparison with
morality (morality need not consist in actions which proceed from
choices truly mine) though it grounds it in the sense that it is the
'key' to membership of a moral community;and freedom is limited with
respect to action in general because those actions which proceed
from choices truly mine form only a small set of my actions.
What does it mean to say that our free actions are those which are
the result of choices truly ours? Peter Brown (Augustine of Hippo:A
Biography p.374,quoted in M.ignatieff,Needs Of
Strangers.London:1984.p.62) describes the distinction of St
Augustine between 'the freedom to make choices,and the freedom which
comes from knowing that the choice one has made is the correct
one.'The point is that the choices we are free,in the sense of
able,to make are never self-guaranteeing:1 free' choices need not be
examples of choices it is right or natural for us to make.When we
make these latter choices,we are free in choosing what we know to be
good - as well as exercising freedom (ability) of choice.Freedom
here is not just a property of our choices as we determine the
will;rather we are made aware in the making of a certain sort of
choice that s££_ are free. Choosing certain objects is freedom not
because of any leature of our choosing,but because of the nature of
the objects chosen,The freedom of knowing 1 have chosen correctly is
a gift of grace;when this is given,the soul is as certain of its
choices as the body is certain of the presence of great
pleasure.Gilson (Christian Philosophy of St
August!ne,London:1961.p.323 n.85) explains the distinction between
liberum arbitrium and libertas as between 'man's free choice,the
evil use of which does not destroy nature' and 'liberty,which is the
good use of free choice';the human will 'retains its free choice,and
it gains liberty' Cp.161).It is free to receive liberty.
Augustinian Grace is not under discussion here.The point I am making
is that freedom contains,at least,two components:the ability to make
choices and the ability to make the right choices. The right choices
are the ones 1 decrlbed earlier as those 'truly' mine.Freedom
cannot simply be 'from' x so as to be able to choose y, for this says
nothing about whether y is more likely to be the object of a choice
that is truly mine,something in the choice of which I realise my
liberty.However,freedom also cannot be,as Kant seems to think it
is, freedom from all objects,for freedom does require not just that I
can,but that I actually do,choose some objects:those objects which
are not just alighted on by me,but are objects of choices truly mine
to make. Freedom must be 'among' objects:not 'freedom from', but
'freedom to' adopt the objects of my proper choices.
This liberty I have when I know I choose right,can be understood as
having the ability to choose these objects no matter what.I argue
for this as follows:this freedom is more than just the ability to
form choices:it is the ability to make choices referring to objects
of a certain sort;a fully free subject,then,is one who realises
liberty because among his practical abilities is one referring to
the correct objects;this is not an ability placing no restrictions
upon choice,but a necessary substantial ability of a free being,in
so far as he is free,linking him to a certain restricted range of
goods;it is therefore an ability which a free being cannot lose:loss
of it is loss of freedom.I am free when nothing can cause me not to
be able to choose things of a certain sort. Freedom can be
understood,then,as an agent's being bound to certain things;being
unable to lay down the ability to choose them. Ultimately,it must be
understood in terms of our natural dependency,
So understood, freedom need not war with the everyday concept of
freedom as having the ability to choose this,but,should I want to,to
choose that.They are two intertwined notions.One assesses the degree
of compulsion or lack of it in my choices;the other concerns whether
the objects of my choices make them choices truly mine or indicate
that they are mediated through some institution or process in which
I participate.A choice which is mediated to some degree by social
institutions,one which does not result in liberty,may be compelled
or uncompelled,and this to a certain degree;and a particular choice
of an object which is truly mine to choose may be compelled in
certain circumstances.lt is important to get this correct.A mediated
choice which is compelled is in some way a distortion of choice:the
media have ceased to be media and have imposed upon my will.A direct
choice of myself which is compelled,however,is,so long as the
compulsion is exercised by the particular object of the choice,a
distortion of choice,but not because of the imposition of something
external upon my will (for the object is one of those I might
properly choose),but because I have caused,or allowed,myself to be
unable to choose freely from (in the everyday sense of 'freely') the
objects ot those choices properly mine to make.Such compulsion is
the result of over-identifying my self with, or allowing mysell to be
dominated by,one particular thing from among those from which I can
truly choose. Here,I,and not external and mediating objects,have
impinged too much upon my own choices.This compulsion violates not
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my ability to make choices truly mine, then, but my ability to make
choices:my ability to choose x (an object oi a choice truly
mine),but,should I want to,to choose y (also an object oi a choice
truly mine). Both notions, ' choosing from' and making choices whose
objects are truly mine to choose,are bound up with each
other:inability to perform the former results in inability to make
those choices truly mine to make;inability to perform the latter
results in inability to choose my actions 'from' a full range
including those that are the objects of choices truly mine to make.
When I choose to do,and do,something which is the object of a choice
truly mine to make, then,this action has two elements:I cannot lay
down the ability to choose the objects aimed at:I am always able to
choose them;and I can be sole cause of the action:it need not
be,though it may be,in any waycompelled.The question is not only how
I can be an uncaused cause,but how with regard to certain choices I
cannot help but be an uncaused cause? The answer is that something
must cause me to be such that there are always certain actions which
when I perform them have absolutely no other cause but me (see
H,McCabe.God Matters.London:1987,p. 11-15; R. Chlsholm 'Human Freedom
and the Self'in G.Watson ed.Free Will.
Oxford:1982:Aquinas.S.T.la.54.1-2).Something causes me to be sole
cause of certain of my actions,and when with respect to any of these
actions I am not sole cause,it is because 1. have over-identified
myself with its object,or because some external compelling factor
has intervened.Any hint of paradox here is resolved when we
understand that what causes me to be free (self-causing) is not
actually a something at all,a rival with me in the issue of who
should cause my actions,but that causal influence which determines
me as me.It and I do not dispute over which should bring about my
free actions:it causes me to be this individual such that there are
certain actions I cannot but be able to do; I cause myself,when I
choose to perform one of these actions,to do it.Freedom,then, is
being constrained to have the ability to make certain choices;and
whenever I act upon such choices,I am sole cause of my own
actions,unless I have over-identified with one such choice or
something external has intervened.
This conception of freedom is basically Augustinian in its
separation of ' freedom from' and liberty (see Augustine De Libero
Arbitrio.trans..M.Pontifex.London:1955.iii.3.7:ii.19.51 on how our
will can take itself as its object,and so elect for liberty),but
consists in a conception of liberty which relies on the position of
Aquinas:God's causality,uniquely,is esse.he actualises the essences
of all creatures;the degree of perfection of certain essences is
such that they can themselves create,they can function as
efficient,though secondary,causes of existence;God thus causes
certain creatures to be such that they can in respect of bringing
about existence be sole cause of their own actions.The structure of
this concept explains the connection between freedom and the self-
identity of the individual,and so his potential for membership of a
moral community, I have not specified what the objects of 'choices
truly mine' might be,but I have claimed that if freedom is to be
connected with self-identity and morality it must be understood not
just as absence of compulsion over a range of choices,but as
inability with respect to the objects of certain choices to lay down
the ability to make those choices, and, by implication, inability to
destroy one's individuality or to remove oneself from moral
community.
What may be controversial in this is the idea of a cause causing me
to be sole efiicient cause of my truly free actions.If Kant had been
right that freedom consisted in a region of .autonomy,an intelligible
world,then such a cause would not be necessary.As it is,freedom is
within this empirical world of particular things and concrete
events,but consists not in freedom from any one of them,but in
inability not to be able to do certain of them.Thus,an explanation
is required of why there are certain things within the world I am
always able to choose.It is the necessity of such an explanation
which irees a theory such as mine from the criticism of Chisholm's
Thomist theory by H.Frankfurt (Watson ed.p.93).
Perhaps,he says,this theory is true,and self-causation is an
irreducible feature of human agency,but why is it good.why should we
care about such freedom? Augustine and Aquinas escape this criticism
because of the conception of Grace and of the power of reason to
transform the natural inclinations into objects of principles
(Augustine,pe L.A, i,8,18:Aquinas,De Malo,trans.,A.Fegis,New
York;1945,q.6).If the free will of a self-mover is the product of
divine Grace or the expression of practical reason,free actions are
good.I am not here wishing to claim either of these.However simply
acknowledging that there is something which causes me to be me,to be
free in the core of my choices,dissolves the force of Frankfurt's
criticism.If,unlike Chisholm,we restrict the boundaries of freedom
to a certain determinate set of choices which constitute our
individuality,and which do this because of something which causes us
to be sole efficient cause over a certain portion of our practical
lives,we can invoke the factors of our self-identity,our integrity
as agents,and our potential for membership of a moral community as
the reasons why freedom of the will is a good thing.To be able here
to specify the nature of the cause which causes me to be free but is
not an object in the universe,and to suggest at least the passible
objects of choices which constitute a human individual would make
this thesis complete.lt would,however,carry it beyond the limits of
scholarship,for our community does not recognise either the depths
of the individual self or the reasons for the mystery of its
creation.Ignatieff is right (p.101) that we have not found an
alternative to Augustinian Grace,and that we must.
Moil-Kantian Freedom and The Concept of Interest
Kant is right that freedom must be explained by the relation of
particular choices to the whole life of a person,and not
economically,by the ability to lay down one thing for
another.However,the cause oi freedom is not noumenal.lt is not
human beings in so far as they are free from nature,but a cause
external to human beings which causes them to be able to choose
rightly within the natural world.This examination has shown that
Kantian freedom cannot do the work oi a concept of interest,or
remove the need for such a concept if pure practical reason is to
be demonstrated.For although a being Iree from nature could
conceivably take a 'pure' interest in rational choices,human beings
cannot be 'free from' nature and thus cannot make purely rational
choices if this involves non-empirical determination.He is right
that morality concerns my freedom,my true identity and my
dignity,but it does so not because it is founded upon my noumenal
existence,but because it is grounded upon those of my (wholly
phenomenal) choices that are truly mine.
An account of moral interest developed along with this
understanding of freedom would explain that my interest in the
objects of choices truly mine - and not my freedom from them
through autonomy - explains my engagement with a moral
community,and,ultimately, my possessing the moral motives I
do.Interest would be best explained here not by fundamental desires
but in terms of the individual's conception of the good.This would
make reference to his true choices,his self-identity,which would
explain how he appreciates the Tightness or appropriateness of
certain of his choices.Such an account of interest might be made
compatible with Kantian dutiful motivation if those actions of
which I am sole cause, those truly mine, were to include the sorts of
wide and narrow duties which Kant expounds in the Metaphvsic of
Morals.Then my interest would consist in a conception of the good
in which these duties played a fundamental role,and explained my
moral motives. By also including a reconstructed theory of the moral
sentiments we might explain when these motives were based on
inclination and other empirical factors ('personal,or wide
morality'),and when, though accompanied by empirical factors,they
instead were based on the granting oi principles concerning our
interest to the will by pure reason.In the latter case we might
seek to demonstrate this process of motivation as the realisation
by the agent that certain principles of action are universalisable
for human beings.
The relationship between this latter form of motivation and
motivation which we possess because of our conception of the good
but which does not refer to universalisable actions but to actions
we want to perform (actions which must be morally permissible,at
least specifiable as ways of fulfiling 'wide' duties - for
example,to the self) is unclear,but there are materials for
explaining it within a revised Kantian account of the moral
sentiments.Actions which result from choices 'truly mine' could be
explained as actions the motives of which transcend the principles
of particular moral communities and social institutions in one of
two ways:either the motive provides me with a principle which all
members of all moral communities must will,given the structure of
their interests,or it consists in the importance to myself of
certain activities or projects of action which may conflict with
the standards of my moral community,but not with my,or anyone
else's,recognition of universalisable principles in the light of
the structure of interests.Whatever its detail,such an account of
interest could retain both Kant's formal philosophy and his
treatment of the moral sentiments and of the ethical tradition in
the Metaphvsic of Morals through a concept of interest,and by the
abandonment of Kant's own doctrine of ireedom. As my subject is not
Kant, but 'Kantianism' I want now to consider the implications of
such a re-working of Kant.
The Metaphvsic of Morals is the actual working out of the
determination of will by non-sensuous motives in a being which
cannot escape his sensuous nature.Duty is the necessitation of
choice by law;because of our sensuous nature,this is experienced as
constraint.This constraint is either socially imposed as law in
community,backed by sanctions and aiming at the consistency of
individual ends of action with freedom (Doctrine of Law),or
experienced as self-constraint 'by the mere thought of the law'
(Doctrine of Virtue.trans.M.J.Gregor,New York;1964,379),constraint
which reconciles the necessitation in law with freedom (Doctrine of
Virtue).The self-constraining of free choice by the law makes
possible 'inner freedom.'It does so because the law,in order to
test the ends inclination proposes in the face of duty,must also
propose ends.It proposes 'necessary' ends,ends given a
priori,determined by pure reason.As only I can give myself an
end,these ends are compatible with my freedom. Freely adapted
sensuous ends and particular necessary ends that are freely adopted
produce the experience of self-constraint,inner freedom.
The argument that pure reason must produce necessary ends is,I
think,valid.Kant argues that if it is to combat sensuous ends.it
must do so (D.V.380);and also that if some ends of action were not
necessary,or duties,all ends would be valid only as means in which
case moral philosophy as he conceives it would vanish (384).This
ancient argument is, I think,valid,though not always useful,in
whatever torn it appears.Together tbese arguments demonstrate that
reason determines the will to certain necessary ends which are
duties.Since these are necessary,they do not depend on the
contingencies of sensuous inclination;they are,therefore,determined
by pure reason.Again,how we take an interest in such ends is not
explained.Here,particularly,such an explanation seems necessary.We
are told that in purely rational determination restraint or virtue
(defined as:'fortitude in relation to the forces opposing a moral
attitude of will in us' 380) is exercised in the face of
inclination,and that for this to occur reason must do what
inclination does - form ends - and somehow outdo inclination in
this.The ends,though determined purely by reason,must confront and
overcome ends of sense in a being which is definitely not a holy
being.Objective determination of necessary ends,then,not only
involves determination in independence from inclination,but
determination in independence from inclination which yet meets the
conditional necessity that the having of ends of inclination
imposes upon me,and dissolves this.They may be objective and purely
rational in origin,but that is not sufficient for these ends to
take a practical hold oil us which will weaken and overcome ends of
sense.For objective necessitation to be practical we must possess
an interest in these ends such that without losing their purely
rational determination of subjective will,they can stand with,and
defeat,conflicting ends of inclination.
Such an account,as 1 have said,could be desire-based (we might
desire the ends of reason - rationality itself - just as we might
desire the ends of beauty or love without this abject being itself
sensuous),but within the Kantian system it would more naturally
take the form of a conception of the good.In D. V. the basic
elements of such a conception are found. .Necessary ends are of two
sorts: the strict ends of universal obligation,and the 'wider' ends
which limit the boundaries of personal choice without specifying
particular necessary choices.The argument for the revised
Kantianism would then continue:our interest in these necessary ends
arises because they are truly ours,they are ends which underlie our
identity,and which,therefore,are the source of our freedom.lt will
not be surprising to discover that in Kant's text the content of
these necessary and objective ends carries us back to the structure
of human nature as understood in classical Natural Law tradition.
The elements of our interest,or at least of that part of our
interest which explains our moral motives, suggested by D. V. are
self-perfection and the acknowledgement of the happiness of
others.Self-perfection (386) consists in the cultivation of natural
capacities,including the understanding,and of the moral will. The
recognition and pursuit of others' happiness consists in making
their ends mine (387).Personal happiness has no place in this
theory of duty because it is an inevitable tendency of human
nature.Self-perfection and benevolence are duties of wide
obligation:they do not specify exactly how far one must go in
cultivating capacities or adopting others' ends,When the detail of
self-perfection is discussed however (see 418),this is seen to give
rise to certain particular narrow or negative duties (forbidding us
to act contrary to the end of our nature),and particular wide or
positive duties (commanding us to adopt ends aimed at our
perfection).These duties must be acted upon in the first case to
preserve ourselves,and in the second to improve our moral standing
by cultivating all of our powers (natural and moral).Corresponding
to the abjective division of negative/positive is a subjective
division of duties to self as human animal and duties to self as
moral being.These refer in the first case to instincts of
preservation of the subject and or the species,and to the ability
to enjoy animal pleasures;and in the second to the harmony of one's
maxims with one's dignity as a person.
When the detail of the wide duty of benevolence is discussed this
is divided into duties that are due to the other and duties that
are not. Recognition of these duties is accompanied by the feelings
of respect and love.Duties of respect are narrow or negative in
comparison to duties of love (449):I am obliged to show
respect, whereas love obligates only the receiver.The 'duties of
respect' are modesty, moderation, and love of honour;the 'duties of
love' are beneficence,gratitude and sympathy. Then fallows (467) a
discusion of the duties which arise between men in special
circumstances,
This structure of duties,the practically necessary ends,provides a
specific example of a possible scheme for understanding the objects
of choices which are truly mine:things which I cannot help but be
able to choose, and which form the kernel of my interest,my
conception of the good. These duties may not exhaust my interest -
there may be turther objects of choices which are truly mine and
which explain the motives 01 my particular actions - but 1 am
caused to be such that when 1 choose at least these things as goals
of my actions i am aiming for what I cannot help but be able to
choose and am sole cause oi my own actions. This combination of
constraint regarding what 1 am able to choose and self-causation
may exist with regard to certain of my non-moral,or even
immoral, choices also (my interest may persist totally outside the
moral sphere),but that is a question concerning the identity of the
individual - a personal question - and his moral history (his
relationship to his moral community) about which little of any
generality can be said.
We should note that in my revised Kantianism it is self-perfection
and altruistic happiness together which constitute moral
interest,for the happiness of others cannot interest me 'purely'
unless somehow connected to sell-perfection (of,for example,moral
capacities),and self-perfection cannot interest me morally at the
cost oi the happiness of others.Thus this conception of interest
includes both negative duties of prohibition - against
suicide,fornication,lying,disrespect,immodesty - ana positive
duties of permission - development of natural skills and
talents,moral will, sympathy and benevolence - which straddle the
divide between sell-concern and concern for others.
Positive and negative Duties,
In terms oi a conception of interest I would explain Kantian
positive and negative duties as follows.Negative duties explain why
we hold motives of duty which consist in wholly non-sensuous
principles ('principles of pure reason'in the Kantian terminology)
concerning action the goal of which represents a true choice lor
all human beings,and how there can be such principles.That is,there
are objects of choice which no human being can turn her back
upon;these,therefore,provide a motive for any human being hoiding
rational principles of action designed to achieve them,and this
without any sensuous determination;to act upon such a principle is
to act upon a choice that is truly one's own and of which any human
being might say 'this is a true choice of mine';it is,therefore,a
formal,or objective,principle requiring that the maxims of our
actions conform with the true choices of ourselves (the ends of
nature in ourselves) and the true choices of others (those required
by respect for them).Negative duties explain and express the
content ol Universal Law which requires us to act so as not to
frustrate the objects of choices which are universally (mine +
others') true choices.
Positive duties explain why we hold subjective motives for action
consisting in principles the content of which is not purely
rational,but reflects our personal ends while not contravening the
requirements of Universal Law,All human beings have as part of
their interest the development of natural and moral capacities and
the demonstration oi loving action towards others;but there is
latitude within individual cases as to what principles of moral and
loving action this will lead to.Such duties,therefore,do not
constitute the Universal Law,and do not give to the will motives of
conformity, but explain our interests in self-development and
benevole.nce, and give us principles which ref lect our
personal,particular and sensuous ends within the context of
this,1 morally permissible',sphere.Positive duties express that part
of our interest which while sensuous,concerns objects - personal
development and loving action - which represent true choices for
all human beings,while not entailing particular principles of
action for any human being.
I am not only free to choose to perform such negative and positive
dutiful actions,but have or exercise liberty in choosing to do
them:they are objects of my right or true choice.The universal
aspect of the negative duties component of this concept of interest
gives to principles of pure reason the authority to confront and
overcome ends of inclination;the fact that our holding these
principles as motives is explained by a complex conception of the
good,our interest,involving more than merely formal principles
explains how pure reason can compete with inclination at all.The
subjective aspect of the positive duties component of the concept
of interest allows freedom of choice,in the sense of ability not to
choose what I do choose but to choose something else instead.This
structure of freedom within the pattern of practically necessary
ends accommodates bath what fits human beings for the moral
community and what individuates them.The inalienable component of
interest - represented by the negative duties - provides everyone
with the bare qualification to enter into moral community with
anyone else;the latitude of the wide component - positive duties -
guarantees the distinctive identity of agents within the moral
community,as does the differentiation and specialisation of the
ends of personal experience.
A Possible Kantian Response.
This reading of Kantian philosophy with a concept of interest
derived from Kantian material validating a completely non-Kantian
theory of freedom is the basis of an attempt to reconstruct part of
Kant's practical philosophy omitting some alleged defects.lt could
fairly be claimed,however,that this reconstruction is too deeply
unKantian and too hastily foisted on Kant.For example,self-
perfection and altruism not based upon a natural law teleology
would be a more acceptable revision of a concept of interest for
Kantians.The difficulty would then be to explain why these form the
centre of human interest without resorting to a teleology of human
nature,represented by me as a domain of choices with respect to
which we are caused to be self-causers.
I suggest that the only other explanation for this would have to
take the form of an assumption by the Kantian:a practically
rational human being assumes not only her own freedom,but also that
human nature is of such value that it cannot but be furthered in
herself by the cultivation of all her powers and assisted to
flourish in others by the adoption of their legitimate ends.That
is, we could retain my suggested concept of interest only by making
a purely evaluative asumption of human worth.We must develop
ourselves because human beings are of such value that if any
\i<\
practical project is to be pursued at all,that of self-development
must be pursued;we cannot develop others, but we can assist their
development into full flourishing by increasing their happiness.
Kant himself is,of course, committed to the ideal of absolute human
worth, and this is the point of the second formulation of the
categorical imperative. However, for Kant this is a formulation of
the moral law itself.The categorical imperative must have an object
of supreme value if it is to indicate ends which are objective and
necessary.He argues as follows that this object is persanhood:the
point of the categorical imperative is to make individual choices
passible tor a plurality of rational beings by the criterion of
universalisability;no member of this plurality,therefore,can be
subordinated to the will of any other by that other's choices for
this would amount to a denial of universalisability; thus the
rationality of individual agents is the true and absolute object of
the moral law.The notion of absolute value of rational beings here
is,then,derived by Kant from the structure of rationality itself.
However,much as he needs this notion of absolute value,it cannot be
derived from the categorical imperative.A first reason is that t he
content of the practically necessary ends refers not to the formal
ingredients of the structure of rationality,but to the needs and
capacities of human rational beings.These material ends cannot,I
think,ever be derived solely irom the premise of Universal Law:from
logic,ultimately,only logic follows.Therefore the value which they
possess must originate from more than the categorical imperative
alone.More important, the first formulation of the categorical
imperative says that what I will ought to be what I and everyone
else can together will.But what I to will is not and cannot be
given merely by the structure of the categorical imperative. It has
no substantive normative implication.As soon as we try to apply the
categorical imperative, Kant thinks,we will realise the truth
concerning human dignity and worth.But,in fact,with the doctrine of
freedom exposed,we see the Kantian 'proof' of absolute value of
persons amounts to no more than an assumption:without the doctrine
that agents are free from natural determination their role in the
universalisability test is not that of centres of value,but merely
choice or intention 'bearers'.There is no longer unconditional
value in the individual - there is no reason lor considering her an
object of respect - but only the conditional value of the agents'
possible choices.Thus Kant too is shown to be holding the principle
of absolute human (.rational) value as an assumption: a purely
normative one,just as the categorical imperative is purely formal.
I suggest this assumption, which we must admit if we deny both
Kantian freedom and my alternative to it but wish to retain
universalisability with my suggested concept of interest,must be
isolated from the moral law itself,and its structural role in
Kantian ethics acknowledged.It underlies the theory of practically
necessary ends held by Kantians who do not place an emphasis on
natural law teleologies - even if tne necessary ends are not tormed
into a concept of interest as 1 have claimed.Non-teleological
Kantians who deny the workings of this assumption in their thought
when they face the discussion of practically necessary ends must
provide an alternative to this account (itself an alternative to my
revised Kantianism): all rational human beings make the assumption
that humanity is of utter value,and so possess the practically
necessary ends ai self-perfection and altruism as part of their
interest;this component of their interest explains their holding
moral motives both of 'pure reason' (.negative duties) and of
'personal rationalityduties of latitude.
There is a certain benefit in holding a Kantianism based upon an
ethical assumption.On this reading Kant's achievement rests neither
in grounding ethics in a teleology of hunan nature nor in the
concept of pure reason.It consists rather in the discovery that
ethics can escape the heteronomy implicit in theories of human
nature and so be purely rational,but only if it is acknowledged
that there is an absolute value in humanity as such which explains
the interest Call) human beings take in purely rational
determination,Despite the great fight not to say this,and his
belief to the contrary,if Kant is not interpreted in terms of the
theory of freedom and interest I suggested,I cannot see in what
other terms so many aspects of his theory can be preserved than
those of a normative assumption. The importance of this Kantianism
would be that we now have a new way 01 looking at human nature:not
in terms of desires, or needs or sentiments, but as a whole the value
of which cannot be reduced to,or explained by,the nature of any 01
its constituents.For a practically rational being,a being whose
reason can affect his actions,this assumption of human worth is
enough to produce all he needs to be able to perform not only
actions into the production of which rationality enters (prudent
actions,and actions in response to positive,wide,duties),but also
actions motivated by pure reason (actions in response to negative
duties,determined by the categorical imperative).
The normative assumption upon which this view of human nature is
based reconciles ethical and metaphysical considerations within
itself. This is so because if we know that human beings are of
absolute value,we know much of the sort of thing that human beings
are.The normative assumption,if it holds,explains to us that we
know what human beings are not through knowing their essence but by
knowing their worth.Normative status is not posterior to
metaphysical being in the case of human beings:instead it replaces
questions of essence which become ways of classifying human beings
and their attributes.This approach opens up several interesting
areas of enquiry.If human nature has the structure of absolute
worth,enquii-y into the nature of persons is misplaced and should be
replaced with enquiry into what sort of persons or what sort of
attributes of persons are relevant in judging that one object of
absolute worth can be treated in a different way from another.That
is,the role of the metaphysical question now becomes the political
one of investigating differences between persons and reasons for
different treatment of them.
Two Kantians.
Among those who have tried to base a purely philosophical account
of rational and moral action on a non-normative assumption of human
nature,and also to stay within the Kantian account of 'motivation
without inclination' I think Thomas Kagel in Possibility of
Altruism (Oxford;1970) is one of the most successful.lt would be
well to consider this alternative both to the revised Kantianism I
suggest,and to the introduction of a normative assumption.
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Thomas Hagel,
Bagel's intended conclusion is a deience of other-interested
action. His position is Kantian in that it takes as f undamental the
opposition between rational and other sorts of motivation, and also
because it explains rational and moral motivation in terms of the
agent's metaphysical conception ol himself.lt is decidedly un-
Kantian in that it separates rational self-interested action from
altruism and gives the former actual and epistemological
priority. Motivation is Magel's central concept,and the motivational
element in rational action is a function of the formal structure of
reasons.Generality is the central feature of reasons.If there is
reason to do something in a certain situation,this situation must
be specifiable in general terms allowing the same reason to be
present in different but like circumstances. Thus,if there is reason
to feed the baby when hungry today,there is the same reason for
feeding it if it is hungry tomorrow,and there is also a reason for
feeding it if it cries - for if it cries,it is hungry.
Nagel says we must understand reasons in terms of the relation of
means to ends.One way of understanding this is to say that
accepting there is a reason for doing something is attaching a
value to the doing of that thing.Value has generality,and is
therefore not time-dependent,so the influence of reasons extends
over time.This accounts for prudential action - doing now what is
of value because of how it will affect my future.We must,Magel
thinks,accept such reasons because we must look at ourselves not as
fragmentary beings,but as living a comtinuous life all stages of
which are stages of my. life even though they are not 'now'.My life
forms a whole each part of which l,so far as I am rational,must be
equally concerned with. Similarly, we cannot avoid seeing our
individual situations as examples of a more general pattern in
which another may be placed in a relevantly similar situation.I am
not only me,but someone in the general scheme of things.It is
because we must see others as equally real with ourselves that we
can have the interest in others which we do have in ourselves.This
Involves extending reasons I believe others have to consider my
interests into reasons for me considering their interests.All
reasons express objective values,and the particular facts of 'now'
and 'me' are not crucial features of the structure of reasons but
exemplifications of the truth about reasons:that they extend over
time by having force at particular times,and that they exist for
all similarly situated individuals by having force for any
individual in this situation.
It is an assumption for Magel that all stages of my lile are
equally mine,and that all other persons are equally real.That is,it
cannot be justified in isolation but is necessary if we are to
admit other considerations which we are not prepared to give up.It
is not a normative assumption.He describes it as metaphysical
himsell.Its content is the continuity of the experience of one
individualand the continuity of all individuals of the same type.It
unifies all the presents within a life and all the lives of a
sort.But it is no more successful as a metaphysical assumption than
Kantian freedom.lt is mistaken,and it can ground no substantive
moral,or even rational judgements.
It is mistaken,I believe,because my primary conception of myself is
not of one with a continuous life some or all of which is of
concern to me.In terms of what I have said already,the fundamental
reasons for my motives comprise my interest.This is formed both by
those rational principles I share with others, formal principles of
negative duties, and those 1 form within a social framework in
particular ways which depend upon my personal needs and
experience. When I reflect on my own identity it is this content of
interest,I have claimed,the objects and the source of those choices
which are truly mine, those I have liberty in making,that 1
consider.This means that my prior conception of myself cannot be
that of a continuous whole,because the identification of myself
depends on the knowledge of my interest which makes essential
reference to a social context through its universalisable and
personal latitude components.
This does not,however,mean that I must then see myself as 'merely
one among others equally real'.This would simply open up the
spectre of atomism in a different way.To claim that I see me and
others as equally real,but as separate beings,each viewing himself
as a continuous and not staged life and as an individual among the
many,repeats the error of seeing oneself as an atomic life,but now
with a larger number of instances.I simply do not conceive of
myself 'first' as continuous rather than staged,nor do I conceive
of myself as individual 'first'and as one among others equally real
'second'.My primary self-conception concerns, centrally, my
interest,and the core of this,of itself,enters me in a moral
community.
There can be no purely metaphysical self-conception involving no
moral understanding because self-conception cannot help but lead to
knowledge of that part of ray interest which explains my having
moral motives.My suggested normative assumption differs from
Wagel's,then,in its explicit normativity and in the concept of the
person it suggests. Personal identity consists in a number of
universally shared necessary ends and a number of shared necessary
ends the scope of which may be less than universal,that is,which
may allow for differences between individual communities and
personal preference and experience.The virtue of this Kantianism is
the content it suggests for the concept of interest,and this
content's complex structure as a combination of universal necessary
ends and ends whose necessity refers to their existence as social
rules or boundaries and not to their particular content,thus
allowing great latitude in their f ormulation. Such substantial
content,as we shall see him admit,cannot be grounded by Wagel's
theory of rationality.
If we are not convinced by Magel's metaphysical intepretations,what
we are left with is a theory of rational motivation whose success
must depend on its validity in a straightforward way.This
introduces my second criticism. I agree that reason might be
considered as determining action without other intervening
motivationai factors,However,this would require an explanation not
just of how this happens - which Wagel provides - but of how
reason,rational determination itself,has a value ascribed to it by
its relation to our interest which accounts for our going in for
rational determination at all and lor our accepting and valuing the
results of successful rational determination.Without this
exlanation of our interest in non-sensuous motivation Wagel's
account is open to the criticisms earlier levelled at Kant for his
attempt to prove purely rational determination of will without a
concept of interest.
Bagel has no such an account oi value.He holds we ascribe value
when we accept reasons,and that in doing so we conquer our
prejudice towards the present moment and the self:the influence of
the reason extends to structurally similar circumstances and to
similarly situated individuals.He remarks at the close of the book
that this gives no guidance concerning which values in particular
we are to promote, what 1 ought to do.In particular,why we should
accept reasons to perform actions determined by pure reason is left
unexplained.He does consider briefly the contradiction involved in
having objective reasons to do certain self-prefering things,but
has no answer. He believes we must look for a subjective judgement
upon which everyone agrees;nothing else will suffice because even
if we discovered some truly objective principles,subjective
disagreement concerning them may occur among individuals.
This certainly indicates the inflexibility of his theory compared
with my revised Kantianism which allows latitude in the performance
of many 'objective' duties - the positive ones - and to a certain
degree in the question of which duties we have.The problem is that
Nagel's theory of practical reasoning never could reach substantive
moral conclusions.There is no basis upon which subjective agreement
could be reached because within his account oi practical reasoning
there is no true treatment of subjectivity.A11 reasons possess
generality;they,thereiore,embody values which are objective.But the
problem with assenting to this is that the personal and particular
concerns oi Individuals,who will perform the actions and be
affected by them,do not enter into the derivation of the theory ol
reasoning which attempts to explain how actions are chosen and
value is assigned,just as,1 claim,they are not reilected in the
purely metaphysical assumptions with which Bagel has attempted
to'interpret' the theory.Again,this contrasts badly with the
revised Kantianism which allows lor subjective preferences in its
distinction between difierent sorts of duties.Because of this,the
argument lacks normative implications:reasons are formal conditions
through which value can be transmitted because of their freedom
from material particularity,and,as with Kant, from purely formal
rational structure,however interpreted,no ethical considerations
can be drawn.So the theory oi value or of the good which he admits
he has not provided could not be provided as his position stands.He
cannot,there!ore,produce substantive moral conclusions,or
conclusions concerning rational action in general.
Like Kant's,Bagel's theory fails because of the lack of explanation
of our interest in general,and of the relation of the universal in
human interest to the particular and personal.Unlike Kant's
work,however,Kagel's does not contain the legacy of teleological
concepts in terms oi which an account of interest could be
constructed.He has only his metaphysical 'interpretations' to turn
to,and these are no more successful than Kantian freedom.
It will be useful finally to look at an interpretation of Kant
which does attempt to derive irom his account of pure
universalising reason the conclusions concerning moral and rational
action which he believes may be derived from it.
Prior a O'Neill
Onora O'Neill (lor example,'Kant:After VirtueInquiry 26:Faces of
Hunger.London;1986;'Consistency in Action' in N.Potter and
M.Timmons,eds.Morality and Universailsabilitv.Dordrecht;1986)
believes that Kant's account of practical reason escapes criticisms
based on its formalism. The practicality of reason rests in its
being brought to bear on what is particular and local.This is
expressed in maxims, and these we should understand as underlying
intentions:intentions responsible for coordinating an agent's more
specific intentions,those governing the particular acts
constituting a certain sort of action.Her example here is welcoming
someone by making tea.This complex action is constituted by many
particular acts - switching the kettle on,fetching cups and so on -
and the specific intentions I exercise in performing these acts are
orchestrated by the underlying intention of welcoming my
guest.Maxims,therefore, are not specific rule-like guides to right
and wrong, but quite general expressions of the underlying moral
quality of a life.They are general guidelines:categories of
virtue.Kantian virtues are those maxims which are moral ones -
those explicable as self-development or beneficence.Despite their
feature oi permanence, as with all maxims the outward expression of
virtues in specific intentions and actions varies considerably.
Given a view (Maclntyre's,in After Virtue) of modern society as
deeply fragmented, 0'Neill thinks Kantian virtues,with great
latitude permitted in their expression,may be the only sort of
virtues available to us.If there is no universal standard of
right,constancy of virtues can refer only to the inner underlying
quality of a life and not to outward specific actions.Moral maxims
are those underlying intentions which are
shareable.Universalisation tests which maxims are such that il
acted on by some individual they cannot be acted on by one or mare
others.Thus O'Neill believes universalisability consists in
conformity of our underlying intentions - a conformity which cannot
be realistically sought by us in our specific intentions and
actions.She believes universalisation is a workable test of
rationality and so of morality,but that it is also an attempt to
show how virtuous intentions must be supplemented by particular
ones taking account of the particularities of the world.So
universalisation tests whether our maxims are shareable and whether
they can be applied in the particular circumstances of the changing
world.Specific moral conclusions,then,are derived from underlying
virtuous intentions (moral maxims) plus particular premises
including those in which specific intentions for performing moral
acts are formulated. This does not involve us in relativism because
the social settings and practices giving rise to these premises are
themselves judged in terms of the underlying virtuous intentions.
Kant,therefore,has the means of determining in which particular way
social institutions and practices ought to develop.This is
determined not in terms of teleological disclosure,or of any other
determinate conception of the good,but by the elements of
universalisability and instrumentality in his theory which guard
against the spectres oi elitism and the holding of maxims not
practically realisable by the adoption of more specific and
particular intentions in the changing world. Thus Kant's formal and
nan-determinate theory can ground maxims oi virtue and substantive
conclusions concerning moral and rational action.
The lack oi a determinate conception of the good for man
is,according to this interpretation,one of the advantages of Kant's
theory as it tits it for the modern world,He- can account lor the
simultaneous existence oi a number,and even a conflict of right
actions in the world while maintaining an account of value in terms
of fixed but very general categories of virtue.It will
not,however,do.The difficulty concerns the concept of
universalisability and the nature of the virtues.
If the life of the virtues is the life of appropriate underlying
intentions,we must ask in what their appropriateness consists.This
cannot be in any way a question of their Tightness for on this
interpretation Tightness depends upon virtue and not vice
versa.0'Neill says (Inquiry 26 p.396),'even if we can establish
which maxims a person of virtue must adapt we will still not be
able to establish that action of any specific sort is morally
obligatory.'Duty is a reflection of virtue on a particular
occasion;worth precedes obligation. Appropriateness cannot be
explained by Tightness.Neither can its explanation rest in any
facts concerning the culture or circumstances in which an
individual finds himself because traditions and cultures are to be
judged in conformity with the underlying moral maxims or
virtues:they too are posterior to virtues.
For Kant himself virtuous action is action in accordance with the
'inner' standard of morality: those acts in which we can exercise
autonomy through universal legislation.It is action which we can do
because it is iegisiated for by ourselves rather than externally
(D.V.379).The contrast between the inward conformity of virtuous
maxims and outward conformity is not between maxims and some more
specific intentions,as it appears to be on O'Neill's account, Dut
between maxims of virtue and externally legislated maxims, ' maxims
of justice'.The concept of virtue gives no grounds for marking off
certain maxims as 'appropriate' grounds of more specific action-
oriented intentions.Virtue is essentially internalised
universalising self-legislation, the inner experience of autonomous
determination of will.Of itself.it provides no criterion of
appropriateness. It is by looking outside the virtuous quality of a
life to the universalising moral law by the application of which
virtue is created that we discover what makes maxims correct for
Kant: conformity to the law.
O'Neill agrees appropriateness rests in universalisability,but how
does her view oi universalisability fit with her account of what a
virtuous maxim is? She distinguishes states of character from
intentions to do specific acts and discusses universalisation only
of the former.However, states of character,or virtues,cannot be said
to be 'appropriate' if universalisable because such underlying
features can only be universalised in so far as they are
experienced as intentions to do,to act.Universalisation cannot make
a state of character morally appropriate but only show one in what
actions virtue would be found;which are morally appropriate.The
'appropriateness' of those states which are virtues must be
grounded not simply by universalisability because once we reach
this we are at the stage of asking what one who is (.already - as
demonstrated by the very fact he is asking the question as a
practical one) of virtuous character ought,here and now,to be
doing,and not what it is to be virtuous.0'Neill believes that by
making virtuous states of character essentially practical -
fundamental intentions to do something (though very general and
indeterminate intentions) - she gets round this problem:if virtue
is a form or intention.it may surely be
universalisable.However,though her interpretation seems to
accommodate the virtues and the principles of action,maxims, it does
not accommodate Kant.
'Moral appropriateness',or virtue,for Kant,is both the pre¬
disposition towards those ends to which a will under universal law
must determine itseif so far as it is to determine itself at
all,and the actual determination towards those ends
(D.V.p.37:p.41.54/5.69.71'Note').We do not universalise in order to
discover virtuous maxims;rather,it is in so far as we universalise
that we are virtuous:we are disposed towards certain ends of
necessity in universalisation.0'fleill sees that virtue and
universalisation are not independently specifiable for Kant, but she
interprets this as follows:virtue = indeterminate universalisable
principles of action.The truth is that for Kant virtue is both
a/caused by underlying morally good dispositions,and b/ the
expression in action of universal law by one who conforms to this
in self -legislation (D.V.379).0'Weill mistakenly identifies virtue
with the maxim, that which we seek to universalise;but precisely
Kant's point is that virtue is not just the disposition towards
universalisation (moral action),and certainly not the object of
universalisation,but the condition of one who through
universalising legislates for himself.The interdependence of the
inner standard on the outer,of virtue upon universalisation,of
worth upon Tightness,is not explained by understanding virtue as
indeterminate and general principles of action,which become
determinate and morally correct through a consistency test in a
particular situation. It. is explained by interpreting the formula oi
universalisation of maxims (however general or specific to be
determined by the content of the maxims alone) as internalised
self-legislation in which the autonomous agent discovers ends which
must,or must not.be pursued.
Virtue or worth consists in the disposition to self-legislate and
the actual conformity of actions with self-legislation.Virtue and
universalisability are certainly interdependent for Kant,but not
because virtue is possession of moral maxims and universalisation a
test oi the morality of maxims, but because of the inner experience
of one who sincerely follows the categorical imperative and
universalises.lt is in the internal act of obeying universal law,in
autonomy,that virtue consists.This is why it is both pre¬
disposition and act,for one who is autonomous remains so even when
not currently engaged in self-legislating action.So,appropriateness
of moral maxims is a matter of the categorical way in which they
are given to the self in universal legislation.Underlying shareable
intentions are not categories of virtue:virtue is possessed and
exercised in the internal self-granting of such intentions.it is
not an attribute of them.Virtue is the condition of the autonomous
agent in universalising,not the mark of the possessor of
universalisable intentions.
I have paid little attention to the detail of Kant's own accounts
of universalisation and virtue.What concerns me is that O'Neill's
account of these should not be lightly accepted.She wants to find
an appropriateness in virtuous maxims which rests on
universalisability and which makes no reference to specific right
actions - which must also pass the Kantian universalisation test -
in the belief this will suit modernity. She wants both to maintain
the independence of moral maxims as 'appropriate' and the standards
of appropriateness as formal.Kantian autonomy,however,thrusts
virtue Inside the experience of the agent:virtue in Metaphvsic of
Mora1s is inward conformity to law,and the resolute disposition
towards this conformity. Universalisable maxims and virtue cannot be
identified for Kant botn because virtue is dispositional while
universalisable maxims are particular,and because the 'inner'
experience of virtue is had in particular acts of self-legislation
while moral maxims, through their universalisability,are
general.This contradiction in Kant is resolved by the dual nature
of virtue as pre-disposition and act,and the fact that
universalisable maxims,though general in their scope,are freely
chosen by agents.As I have explained,I accept neither that the law
conformity with which is virtue can interest us as Kant has
described it,nor the Kantian doctrine of freedom.I do not believe
we can save Kant without fracturing his theory;thus I have
fractured it.
On my account, moral maxims are particular though fundamental
intentions which yet do not go deep enough to express the
underlying moral quality of a life.We still need tD ask one's
motive in welcoming a guest.And then we may try to discover my
reason for holding this motive. We can go all this way down when we
are interested in reaching the fundamental 'quality' of an
individual's life.'Why act on this universalisable maxim?' may
entail an exploration oi those personal duties at latitude and
those components of interest which do not have the character ot
duties at aii.it is these features of a human being,as well as his
recognition of the need ior conformity with universal law,which
'fit' him for a moral community.The moral quality 01 a lite runs
right down through the detail oi individual interest.it does not
rest at the individual's contorming with universal law through
holding shareable and realistic maxims.
This concludes my investigation ot Kant.O'Neill does not
convincingly show that it is possible to draw from his premises the
substantive conclusions Kant believes can be drawn.She believes
these premises already contain all that is necessary,but,1 have
claimed,this relies on an inaccurate interpretation of Kantian
universalisability and virtue.Thus Kant is undefended against my
criticisms, and my 'revised Kantianism' remains as my best attempt
to reconstruct Kant.However,even if it is accepted,Kant has simply
explained the possibility oi a certain motive to action - pure
reason - through a concept of interest understood as a personal
conception oi the good whose content is either determined
teleologically or assumed. This would not be a theory ot rationality
to make all other theories redundant;it leaves the interesting
questions of why motivation by this non-sensuous lactor, 'pure
reason' , is rationality unanswered because they could only be
answered by a thorough examination of the concept of interest
suggested,and this is something which does not occur in the
Critique.The failure to produce the concepts of an 'absolutist'
theory of rationality, which I believe Kant must have if his theory
is to survive,suggests the failure of the conception of theory as
acquisition of (timeless) knowledge,whose finest product theory of
rationality was to be.Theory is not acquisition ol knowledge,and
rationality is not the universal structure of the knowing mind.
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chapter five
The most important source lor the concepts of present day
philosophical thought about rationality is utilitarian theory.In
this chapter we are not dealing with a specific theorist,or one
school of theory.Utilitarian influence cannot be traced to any one
source in the way theory of virtue, classical Natural Law theory or
Kantian theory can.Consequently my method here will not be
historical, but an examination of certain features of utilitarianism
which appear centrally characteristic of at least the more well-
known varieties.I will also examine concepts of certain non-
utilitarian theories which appear to me to have arisen and gained
support only in opposition xo the challenge of utilitarianism. This
piecemeal treatment 01 contemporary moral philosophy is,I think,the
only possible one given the fragmented nature of the present
debate.
Utilitarianism,like Kantian thought, implies that some part at least
of rationality is universal lor all rational beings.It is lor this
reason that,however fascinating and sensible an approach it may
have been to social and political problems of nineteenth century
England,a utilitarian account 01 rationality ought to be
rejected.There is a distinction between the explanation of,or
by,principles within a conception of rationality and the
explanation of how these principles came to be:it is possible tor
principles within a conception of rationality to function as
explanatory and justificatory norms and for the success of these
principles to be criticised from outside the conception because of
their implications, or the means 01 their establishment.We can
criticise principles of a theory of rationality,even popular
ones,if,for example,they tail to base practical reason in shared
activity:if they are absolutist. Utilitarianism must be rejected for
just this reason.It involves the claim that some part of
rationality obtains in independence of the historical facts of the
principles of particular communities.
Utilitarian theory involves a deep misconception of theorising
about the practical.The utilitarian believes that with his quasi-
scientific calculus or measure of action he accounts completely for
the practicality of moral and technical activity,However,the
utility calculus can never achieve the status of certain,protected
first principle/s,because, as I shali argue,there are no first
principles of morality whose primacy is beyond revision.As the
calculus aspires to,but has,no certain status,the theory basing
morality on the calculus cannot be correct.Instead,I shall argue
that the practicality of morality consists not in the 'practical'
content of its principles but in the very activity of theoretical
construction in which these principles are established.
The utilitarian and those who define themselves in opposition to
him ought to acknowledge that their debate is not a tortuous means
to some truth of the matter,but itself the truth of the matter.The
project of theoretical enquiry that is present philosophical debate
over practical rationality should not be conceived of as a rivalry
between,lor example,Kantianism and utilitarianism as to which is
the true position,but as an attempt to construct from the elements
of these theories current in contemporary social and individual
thinking,and irom other strongly opposed theoretical norms,a
position whose reasonableness is a feature simply of the enquiry
which establishes it. Aristotle's theory of virtue and Aquinas's
theory of natural law,unlike some later parodies,do not seek to
demonstrate a standard oi rationality independent of their own
enquiries. Instead they present accounts of rationality which
explain first principles respectively as established
dialectically and in accord with shared standards of understanding
and practices, and as established by theoretical activity
(establishment through intellectual enquiry;self-evidence of
established principles to those within the community of
enquiry).Utilitarianism attempts to construct a concept of the
practical as achievement of ends by means of a universal logic of
action rather than a concept of the community as the forum in which
an understanding of the practical can be reached through the
activity of enquiry.It fails in its conception of action and in its
attempt to establish favourable states of consciousness as the ends
of action.
I begin by considering the main features characteristic of most
utilitarian theories.1 will consider pleasure and
happiness,maximisation,common or non-philosophical morality,needs
and benefits,the ideas of social contract and harmony, utility and
rights,the notion of a science of ethics and the ill conceived
picture of morality as a set of practical rules or
guidelines.Criticism of utilitarian theory will conclude with a
rejection of this account of rationality and will lead to an
attempt to explain morality as the standard means of communication
of particular communities concerning their everyday shared lives.A
morality,I will explain,is to be evaluated by a standard external
to itself,but which is the reason for,and the goal of, (any)
morality's existence.This standard I will call ethics,explained as
the communication of individuals as individuals and not as role-
structured. At the level of experience it is discovered in the form
of charity,or love.Morality,like rationality,I hold,is nothing
more than the dynamic norms of particular communities;but unlike
rationality the principles of morality are evaluated not just by
their explanatory success over alternatives,but also by their
success in bringing about the experiences which are fundamental to
individual human beings,that is their communication with others at
the purely individual,and not the community membership,level.
Since it is not my aim here to provide a deimition oi utilitarian
theory,I will simply sketch the main features before beginning to
discuss them.Classical utilitarianism is based upon the belief that
we ought to increase pleasure and to decrease pain,adopting the
most efficient means in our circumstances lor increasing
pleasure.Most utilitarians now would reject this grounding belief
and explain their theory in terms of desire or preference
satisfaction.This allows for a more realistic and flexible
psychology,an account of personal dignity and autonomy, and the
reasonableness of acting to achieve that to which we attach
value.It seems to me,however, that the justification of preference
utilitarianism rests ultimately upon the concept of psychologically
basic and normatively fundamental values of pleasure and pain.
The second general feature at utilitarianism is the division
between actor and intention in agency.The rationality oi my action
is determined by the reasonableness of my intentions seen as a
function of the utility of my aims. It is not the effectiveness of
my intentions as a means to my pleasure,or that of those close to
me or like me,which determines their reasonableness;but their
effectiveness as a means to pleasure per se. From the belief that I
ought to act so that pleasure per se be increased it is easy to
deduce that I ought to act so as to lead to the greatest general
increase oi pleasure (I ought to act so as to cause as much
pleasure as possible is said to imply I ought to act so as to cause
the pleasure of as many as possible).This thesis must
answer,then,not the familiar difficulty of how another's good is
sufficient to motivate me,but the problem of how pleasure,the
concept of the good, by itself is sufficient to motivate me.If it is
not my,or our,pleasure which is determinant of rational action,but
simply pleasure in itself,what is the explanation of agency? How
does the agent form intentions in the light of his good if his good
is severed from his values and needs and is simply the good as
such?
Most distinctive of the traits oi utilitarianism is its concern
with increase or with 'upping',the desire to
maximise, optimise, satisfy or generalise something.Utilitarians
cannot truly encourage stasis - aesthetic,contemplative or
imaginative - as such,but hold that even such activity ultimately
has value only because it exercises our potential for
increasing,enlarging and bettering. Utilitarianism is a restless
prescription tor life:it bases its concerns upon nudging sentient
life ever upwards,always in search of value,never
acknowledging value in terms other than achievement.lt
utilitarianism were true,then however righteous,we would not be
acting morally unless enlarging the stock of value.Such a life
could not even allow for the expression of forms of value which are
not achievements.The language of utilitarianism is value-
reductive ; but values cannot be reduced.
Apart from its major features,utilitarian theories share certain
other characteristics which help explain their large-scale
acceptance.At first glance utilitarianism appears a straightforward
and accurate analysis oi non-reflective morality,in accord with
those moral feelings generally admired. It seems sensitive to the
sentient side of human affairs,and even to non-human sentient
lite. It seems to explain what is right about satisfying our desires
and achieving the objects of our deep needs,and to provide a method
for coordinating the multiplicity oi satislactions demanded by any
society.lt seems to some IT,Sprigge.A Rational Foundation of
Ethics.London;1987;J.Sumner,The Moral Foundation of
Rights.Oxford:1989) that those rights which we must acknowledge are
both justified by contemporary versions of utilitarianism and
correctly understood as conditions of a well-functioning
utilitarian society.Utilitarianism can,then,appear well qualified
as a theory of social life.It harmonises the explanation of
personal rationality,rationality of action,with the explanation oi
right social and moral decision making, borrowing this harmony from
the unity of its conception oi practical reason as efficient
utility maximisation in all circumstances.
Pleasure and Pleasurableness
'Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign
masters,pain and pleasure.lt is for them alone to point out what we
ought to do as well as to determine what we shall do. ' (Bentham. An
IhtfQduQtiQh to the Principles ai Moral? and
Legislation.eds.J.Burns and H.L.A.Hart,London;1970,p.11;.Bentham
not only thought that pleasure fundamentally mattered,but that only
pleasure mattered.'Now,pleasure is in itself a good,even setting
aside immunity from pain,the only good:pain is in itself an
evil;and,indeed,without exception,the only evil.' (p.100)Mill
believes that the 'theory of life' upon which utility is grounded
is that 'pleasure and freedom from pain are the only things
desirable as ends;and that all desirable things.... are desirable
either for the pleasure inherent in themselves,or as a means to the
promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain.' (Utilitarianism,
ed. M. Varnock,London;1979,p.257).
If we are to admit the idea of the intrinsically desirable at
all, it seems bizarre not to extend this to pleasure.However, perhaps
pleasure should be seen as a factor which implies the category of
the intrinsically desirable rather than a candidate which either
does or does not qualify for it. Bentham says pleasure is in itself
good and pain in itseli evil 'or else the words 'good' and 'evil'
have no meaning' (p.100).Perhaps then the truth is that 'pleasure'
can be used in such a way that it is part of its meaning that
pleasure is explanatorily basic and sufficient in explanation of
action,that 'good' and 'evil' are fully understood with final
reference to it,but that it is also possible that 'pleasure' not be
used in this way and instead,for example, eudaimonia fulfil the role
of pleasure in our explanations oi action.The basic explanatory
categories of societies are not all the same,and categories like
pleasure and eudaimonia may have in common their capacity to serve
in explanations in which all other categories,including the other
(that is,pleasure or eudaimonia),are reducible to the basic
one.However,when we look at the concept of eudaimonia we have a
theory oi rational action worth considering,especially if,as I have
suggested,it does not entail absolutism.Vhat is the theory of
rational action behind the utilitarian concept of pleasure,and is
the concept acceptable?
The claim of pleasure to be the fundamental determinant oi right
action is a claim about what is basic,and it is an empirical
claim.Aristotle establishes the claim oi eudaimonia dialectically
and the concept demonstratively;Aquinas establishes Beatitude
through the theory of the continuity oi the Natural Law with the
Eternal Law;Kant derives the categorical imperative from iormal
features of reason;the utilitarian appeals to pleasure as a basic
good,and establishes its claim by its explanatory success.it is the
motivational role of pleasure in desire and behaviour which implies
its potential as determinant of rational action;and it is the
basicness and universality of this leature of motivation in desire
and behaviour which suggests the moral Tightness of acting so as to
increase pleasure.The appeal to the equal applicability oi pleasure
in rational,especially self-interested,action and in moral action
is the reason for much of the attraction of classical
utilitarianism.However,for this appeal to succeed there must be
widespread beliei that pleasure can and does motivate personal ana
moral decisions,and lor this there must be substantial and accurate
agreement on the identification of pleasure.Without this,the
empirical appeal to the basicness of pleasure in explanation would
not succeed.
The common sense view of pleasure is of a sensation which is
repeatable,yet is linked to appreciation of different sorts of
objects.We take pleasure in things of very different sorts;we do
not work to create pleasure in ourselves through or by means of
things.It seems true that even when the objects of experiences are
very different,the qualitative difference between experiences of
pleasure,except for those at the extreme opposing ends of the
pleasure-displeasure spectrum, is oiten either indiscernible or
speculative.Thus there seems to me to be no difference between the
pleasure at seeing tonight the friend I see every lew days and the
pleasure of drinking ground rather than instant coffee.This
verification by introspection confirms the thesis that pleasure is
a repeatable sensation,a thesis which wars with the other
component of the common sense,sensation, view,that pleasure is not
just created tor ourselves by ourselves but is taken in things of
different sorts as our way of appreciating them.However,inability
to discriminate qualitative difference may be nothing more than
that: our inability.Unlike pains,pleasures do not burn themselves
into our memories or take over the whole space of consciousness as
they are felt.It may be that only extreme differences in pleasures
and differences which I have reason to register because of the
importance of the objects to me are apparent.The view that pleasure
is a repeatable sensation found in appreciation does not commit us
to the view that pleasures are qualitatively identical,though it
does imply that many pleasures are not qualitatively
distinguishable.
The view of pleasure as a sensation does have drawbacks.If we
imagine a scale of sensations rising from faint disturbances to
violent spasms, we must be able to imagine the corresponding objects
and activities in which pleasure is taken situated on a similar
scale rising from,for the individual,the routine though mildly
interesting to the engrossing and extraordinary.Despite differences
in the scales caused by individual past experiences,memories and
interests,each model will be causal:to some degree,there is a
correlation between a pleasure experience and its cause,that
without which it would not have been.However,a cause-effect
relationship is not plausible as an analysis of pleasure.Nozick
(Anarchy,State and Utopia.Oxford:1974,p.42) showed how far fetched
it would be to talk of the pleasurableness of experience apart from
the activities of a full human life.Ryie ('Pleasure' ,Pi 1emmas.
Cambridge;1954) showed how odd it is to contrast the experience of
pleasure even conceptually from that which it is pleasure in or
at:the pleasure of going for a walk is not caused by the walk as a
tickle is caused by the grass 1 walk barefoot on.This contrasts
with pain which we can separate successfully from the cause of
pain.We can also make qualitative distinctions between pains which
are not at extreme ends of the pain spectrum and in which we have
no vested interests or memory claims. The pain of indigestion,for
example,is reasonably similar in intensity to the pain of a
headache,but the felt quality of these pains is quite
distinct.Pleasures,unlike pains,cannot be thus distinguished and
cannot be separated from their objects in a simple analysis oi two
components with some sort of causal relation between them.
An acccount of pleasure must take into consideration the fact that
pleasure is not something that can be successfully aimed at in
itself.I may increase my understanding of the Mozart piano
concertos in order to have again the sort of wonderful experience I
have had in listening to the familiar twenty first concerto,but I
cannot study Mozart's works in order to pursue pleasure.These two
objectives conflict.I may want pleasure,ana hope to get it,but I
will not get it if I aim simply at it,considering the Mozart
concertos as a means to it.This is not only a point about the
relation between pleasure and its object,but also a feature of the
motivation of pleasure.It cannot be sufficient motivation to
action.Actions motivated by desire can be done purely because we
want to do them; actions motivated by pleasure cannot be done purely
on the motive of pleasure:at the very least they are done because
of desire for pleasure.Pleasure is 'a motivation' towards
action,but it does not motivate,if by 'motivate' we mean 'act as
sufficient motivation'.Because it does not motivate in this
sense,it can never be aimed at directly as the satisfaction of a
desire can be aimed at directly, but only through the focus of some
'hot' motivation such as desire.Any expression,'! am doing y for
the sake of pleasure' means 'I am doing (pleasurable) y' where the
character of y explains why we are doing it,but not wholly in terms
of y's pleasurabieness.
To be motivated to act I understand as being caused to act.When
motivated by desire the strength of the desire to do as we want to
do may be such that it causes us to do it either without further
reasoning or irrespective of any further reasoning.This is not
failing to act for a reason,as we do when helplessly impelled by
desire: it is a low-level reason identical with the motivation
involved in the case; it is acting sheerly because we want to.The
various degrees and patterns of reasoning in which motivation and
reasons are distinguished are not my concern here.What I want to
show is the difference in the role of pleasure as
motivation.Pleasure could not be even a low-level reason for
acting;it could not be motivation in the broad sense in which the
motive is sufficient (reason for) action at all.When desire causes
us either to act or to consider action, we are in a state of
wanting;when pleasure functions as motivation, we are not in the
grip of pleasure,but suitably excited at the anticipation 01
pleasure.In those cases in which the motivation of pleasure does
lead to action what happens in straightforward cases is that the
idea of a particular pleasurable experience or activity causes us
to form the desire lor this experience due to a/memories of similar
experiences,and b/the desire for the pleasurable sensation this
experience promises; this desire may then cause us to act or to
consider acting so as to have this experience.The motivational role
of pleasure is restricted to the idea oi the pleasant activity
(which motivates only due to other beliefs - a/ - and another
desire - b/ - and then only motivates a desire),and - in b/ - the
sensation 01 pleasurableness (.which helps motivate the desire to
act so as to bring about the pleasure experience only because it is
itself desired).The ambiguity ol 'motivation' should not lead us to
equate the roles ol pleasure and desire in action.Their logics are
quite diiierent.
Ii pleasurableness as a quality ol experience can be operative as a
contributory motivation towards doing what will give us such
experiences though it cannot itseli motivate us to do what will
achieve them.it seems we can separate pleasurableness tram the full
experience at involvement in pleasant activities,at least in order
to understand how anticipated pleasure motivates. In fact,we can
separate them upon firmer ground than the need to understand the
motivational role of pleasure.Pleasurableness need not exist in all
pleasant experiences:the pleasure of having a walk need not consist
in being in a continuous state of felt pleasurableness;and
pleasurableness,unlike painfulness,can exist apart from pleasant
experiences.Pleasurableness is a sensation which stands in the same
relation to pleasant experiences as imagining stands to seeing.We
can only see an orange ii there is one,the light is good,our eyes
open,but we can visualise an orange in any conditions:visualisation
depends only upon past experiences of seeing oranges,and can happen
at will.Similarly the sensation of pleasurableness relies upon
previous experiences of involvement in pleasant activities
(activities in which there is absorption and which tend to produce
the sensation of pleasurableness) but can be obtained at will,when
we remember these past experiences or anticipate future ones we
expect to be pleasant.So when the conditions are not appropriate
for providing us with involvement in pleasant activities we can
still experience pleasurableness,just as when the conditions are
not appropriate for seeing an orange we can still imagine
oranges.The difference that pleasurableness is more likely to be
felt unhidden does not seem important here.The fact is that
pleasurableness,the constituent of the complex, pleasure,which has
partial motivational power,can be felt in independence of full
pleasant activities.We might express this by saying that the
anticipation of the sensation need lack nothing that the felt
sensation caused by an actual pleasant experience
possesses:although not every anticipation of the sensation involved
in pleasure feels like the sensation itself,such anticipation can
feel like the sensation.
If this is correct we have an account of pleasure which is more
complex than the common sense view,but retains some of its
features.There is indeed a sensation involved in pleasure,but there
is more:there is a structured involvement of a certain sort in
particular experiences or activities.The sensation
aspect,pleasurableness,may be susceptible to different degrees of
qualitative distinction when it occurs within the context of
individual pleasure-giving activities or experiences.However,when
we experience the sensation outside the context of these
activities,as anticipation, memory or unbidden feeling.it appears to
be identical on every occasion,losing this identity only when it is
diflerentiated 'from outside' by the imagining of,or experiencing
of,pleasure-giving activities.The sensation itself does occur in an
undifferentiated,but identical,and identifiable,disturbance of
consciousness.This account explains why pleasure appears to be both
separable from and caused by what we take pleasure in,and also
constituted by it.It also sketches the role of pleasure in
motivation.It does not imply there is not substantial agreement
concerning the nature ol pleasure,but suggests the common sense
view,which seems content to exist with ambiguity,contains no more
than the seeds oi a correct account,and is susceptible to the
exploitation of its ambiguity.I said classical utilitarianism would
require widespread agreement on the identity- of pleasure in order
to ground an empirical appeal to the explanatory basicness of
pleasure.My account suggests widespread agreement, and so a
successful empirical appeal,are unlikely.To refute the case of
classical utilitarianism I must also show that no theory of the
explanatory basicness of pleasure could be constructed.
Even given that we do not aim at pleasure in our actions,some may
be tempted to say that it is iundamentallv pleasure that we seek.It
is difficult to understand what this might mean.If it means, a/ that
we ultimately seek nothing but pleasure,it is simply wrong.Pleasure
is not satisfaction of desire.Someone may pursue the apprehension
of war criminals all her lire because of a passionate commitment to
natural justice,and no one can correctly reduce her aim to
pleasure.lt may,however,be that she is pursuing this project
because she wants to very much,even if she does not recognise or
acknowledge this desire.It cannot mean,b/that ultimately our only
motivation is pleasure,lor I have already claimed that pleasure is
never a suificient,but only ever a contributory, motivation. It
cannot mean,c/that it is participation in pleasurable activities
that we seek in all our actions,because there is at least one class
of actions - actions done purely because I want to,done to satisfy
a desire - which is not aimed at this end.It seems to me that the
grounding oi rational action in psychological motivation in the
form of pleasure is a particular example of the general error of
grounding rational conduct in motivation theory which so many have
admired (see £.Anscombe,'Modern Moral Philosophy' in Hudson ed. Ihe
Is-Uught Question.London;1969;Nagel,Possibility ol Altruism;. The
argument oi this thesis should illustrate this error.
Pain and Suffering.
Many utilitarians,despairing of the hedonist premise,have based
their theory on the belief that right action is determined by
considerations of the relief of pain and suffering and prevention
oi future pain and suffering.Nothing,however,could be more
misconceived as first principle of rational action.
Much of the attraction oi this position comes irom the unjustiiied
coupling of pain and suffering.It would be best to say that pain is
a sensation,but suilering is not.We will come to prevention oi
pain;let us consider suffering first.It would be next to impossible
to find a reason for disagreeing with the proposition that one who
encounters the suffering of another ought always to help.This
proposition has an immunity from moral criticism which suggests not
that it is basic to morality,but that it has a necessity anterior
to moral basicness.I will try below to explain this necessity as a
feature of linguistic communication, and this communication as the
successful expression of charity,the basic experience of being
human at a pre-morai level.We can understand why the relief of
sufiering has such necessity if we consider that the true demands
charity places upon us to help and relieve are in themselves
inexhaustible:every waking moment oi a life may be spent in the
reliei oi others,yet not even in the final moments of such a life
does it cease to be the case that we ought to continue to work
towards the relief of the suffering of others.It does
not, however, follow that it is always wrong to fail to do so. In
themselves the demands of charity are without
limit. When, however, they are experienced through the practices and
institutions of a morality,the explanatory frame of a particular
community, these demands will be mediated through a system oi
responsibilities and freedoms which will be both an interpretation
of them,and will limit their necessity in order that we may lead a
full liie in accord with the standards of our society.The
prevention and relief of suffering is a basic,and a
universal,requirement,but it is not morallv basic,and it requires
moral interpretation.
In order to clarify just why something we might all feel inclined
to describe as a touchstone of morality is not a basic moral
principle it will be useful to briefly anticipate my account.In
accordance with the understanding of rationality as the theoretical
enquiry of a community proceeding from particular norms and
concerning whatever subject matter the previous history of such
enquiry has introduced as topical,and with the notion of theory as
activity,I will present a conception of moralities as the forms of
explanation current in particular communities, mediated by
individual habits,institutions and practices,by which the members
of those communities understand and justify their actions at the
level of everyday affairs.This conception is in debt to
Wittgenstein's notion of practice,his belief in the
interrelatedness of concepts and methods of explanation in the
contingencies oi forms of life,and the extension of Wittgenstein's
thought by such as Rorty (Contingency.Irony and
Solidarity.Cambridge: 1989). Holiday (Moral
Powers.London;1988), McCabe (Love.Law and Language.London;1968),and
Lovibond (Realism and imagination in Ethics,Oxford;1983)■This
conception of morality,I claim, does not rule out,but relies upon,a
tiraelessly valid standard of action rooted in the utter
unavoidableness of charity,experienced most obviously in love.
Moral standards develop not because we are too weak to live a life
of pure charity without them,but because as essentially
communicative creatures,creatures whose nature is language,we are
required not merely to help create and to enjoy the highest
possible forms of life,'the life of love',but to construct these
for ourselves through particular historically conditioned
communities. That is,we explain,understand and justify not only to
reach beyond ignorance and uncertainty and to solve our practical
problems,but because doing this is what human life consists in.What
distinguishes human life is not the perfect communication and
understanding of individuals,but the communication of individuals
through the contingent linguistic structures of their
communities,including those which mediate an interpretation of
love.Charity is criterial for us,but it is not one of our goals:it
is moral action that is the indispensable mark of a human life.This
character of charity as sufficient determinant of conduct but
insufficient mark of a full human life clarifies the point that the
demands of charity are inexhaustible though failure to always
pursue them is not wrong.The point is that in such action
expressive of charity as the relief oi suiiering we have conduct
which is not just admirable and required,but whose necessity is a
feature of charity as interpreted by a particular morality, and this
interpretation will always limit the inexhaustible demands of
charity by the obligations and responsibilities of the standards of
the morality.
Relief and prevention of suffering,then,may even be the determinant
of all right action but they are not morally basic for it is not
necessary that every morality advocate them as the ground of every
moral action.1 agree in a sense with those utilitarians who give
prevention of suffering priority - not because it is morally basic
but because it it one expression of that bonding between humans
which it is the role of morality to interpret and to balance
against the norms of conduct as these have been historically
constructed within moral communities.
Those who claim the basis of morality is the reduction of pain are
on more infirm ground.The sensation of pain - unlike the experience
of suffering - is something all reasonable people have to insure
against.Those who have intuitive certainty that this is the worst
felt human experience may be correct,but this implies neither that
it is the worst experience for a human being nor that the relief of
pain is the most important requirement of admirable human
life.Those who hold the latter generally do so because they believe
that even in the cases where pain brings about a good result,such
as the understanding and acceptance of vulnerability which serious
illness and deprivation alone can bring,pain is always an evil
because of what it is like to experience it. Pain certainly always
hurts,but the assertion that the sensation of pain is. pure
hurt,nothing but hurt,tends unjustifiably to lead to the opinion
that its diminution is the aim of all constructive conduct:hurt
becomes a synonym for evil and wrong, and is thus easily placed in
opposition to good and right.However,because we feel pain as hurt
and hurt is bad is no reason to make prevention 01 pain morality's
goa 1.
Ve can compare pain's hurt with death's. Death hurts because whether
met gently or in fear it requires total aloneness:if another could
walk with us over the death moment,accompanying us into dying
itself, we could suffer death without its hurt,and there would not
be the same cause to fear death.This cannot be done,but we take the
evil out of death by making it a moment of
reconciliation,understanding and peace.A tranquil death will
hurt,but the hurt does allow tranquility.Pain hurts primarily
because the sensation of painfulness excludes totally enjoyment of
itself:it is never,even partially,qualified by pleasantness;and
also because it tends to limit our participation in enjoyable
activities and sensations.If we could find some pleasantness or
involvement with pain,it would lose its hurt;but this is
impossible. However, we can,by introducing other iorms of enjoyable
experience or sensation to the person in pain,reduce the evil of
pain,and,by discovering,perhaps new,value in these experiences,even
abolish its evil,The possibility of taking the evil out of pain by
introducing involvements which reduce the hold of the consciousness
over the person means that pain is not the antithesis of good.Only
utter agony excludes the possibility of any enjoyment
whatsoever,and as protracted agony is rare,pain reduction is
unlikely to be morality's goal.
The tendency of utilitarians to view pain as unnatural,something of
such worrying significance that it must be removed at all costs,is
a misunderstanding of our nature,and of what it is to be natural.Ve
are animal creatures in a natural world,and so will suffer.The
natural world does not run by theoretical principles of order and
perfection.It comprises at the animal level different species with
individual members of great numbers. The individual differences
between species and between members of same species create such
possibilities for the flourishing of one at the expense of the
other that pain and suffering caused by animal consumption is
always with us,not as grievous injustice but as the obverse of
being natural creatures and of being animals.And this is so without
considering inanimate natural phenomena which in their
unpredictability always signal the occurrence of pain for
animals.The only alternatives to being animal and pain-suffering
would be to be inanimate and without experience or to be non-
natural, an artificial construction,and thus not to feel pain but
also not to feel anything we had not been constructed to feel.
The point of giving an explanation of pleasure,pain and suffering
is to show that the utilitarian's use of pleasure or relief and
prevention of pain and suffering as the determinant of right or
rational action is wrong.Having done this to my own satisfaction,I
will consider the next feature of utilitarian theory which is what
I have dubbed 'upping'.
Maximisation.
By 'upping' I mean the belief of utilitarians that right action is
action which increases the good by maximising,optimising,fortifying
utility.The idea that moral action is action which achieves
something,which pushes ahead and adds to the sum of goodness lies
behind more than utilitarianism.All the leading moral philosophies
of our age are concerned not with being good but with doing
right.They are 'practical',but are severed from the virtues and so
from the context of goodness.The sophistication of cross-cultural
communication has made this concern with Tightness inevitable:when
we lace others of different moral cultures the question to be asked
is not 'what ought I to do to improve my own character and the
outlook of society?' but 'what,given the multiplicity of moral
outlooks with which we are faced,is the right thing for one to to
do in these circumstances?'.This shift is necessary given the
meeting of cultures and the great availability of information about
so many of the world's communities.What is regrettable is the
movement in this process away from any context of good.The
criterion of moral Tightness of action does suggest a standard of
behaviour common to all and independent of moral community, but it
is a standard which cannot be reached for there are no universal
norms given the dialectical nature and history of
rationality.Rightness cannot replace the life of the virtues.The
alternatives are to try to resurrect them in Aristotle's form as
Maclntyre does,or to replace that form,as I try to do with the
conception of a pre-moral dimension of human life as the necessity
of communication,known in our experiences of love.
Utilitarianism shares in the vision of morality as right action,and
grounds this in an invariable psychological value which allows the
utilitarian to claim for his right actions and the calculations
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leading to them the name of rationality.As well as the difficulties
with this account of value,the utilitarian asks us not only to
accept the account of right action with no further regard to the
context of the good,but holds that the distinctive nature of moral
activity and the test of moral character is the constant readiness
of the agent to submit his judgements and intended actions to the
measure of utility.The perfect moral agent is the fully efficient
reasoner.Even if the utilitarian allows that on most occasions
utility will best be served by not performing utility calculations
but by acting in accord with common sense or common opinion, he will
still have to ask that on every occasion the agent remain diligent
in order to be able to determine whether his next action is one for
which calculation is required or whether it is again one in which
he may trust common sense.It is the necessity of the reasoned
search for the highest,the most or the best satisfaction as well as
the basic necessity of enioving the satisfaction that is
characteristic of utilitarianism.This moral philosophy could not
have remained in vogue if it had not the support of the common
sense belief that though there may be many goods I pursue here and
now, there is one which it is particularly desirable or sensible to
pursue.This explains the attraction of the utilitarian's conviction
that we can make rational choices, choices continuous in their
determination with the most serious of moral choices,right down
through even the most everyday trivial matters;and the attraction
of the idea that practical reasoning is required constantly in the
moral life and is ultimately what is praiseworthy.
The 'upping',or maximising of modern utilitarianism introduces a
number of theories of the value to be increased.What interests me
here is not the measure of utility but the view of reasoning and of
the agent herself as utilities:moral and practical life and the
reasoning through which it is lived have value with respect to
their degree of efficiency and to nothing else.It will be well to
briefly indicate the contrast between this view and the view of
rational moral action held by someone like Aquinas.For him rational
action is performed for the sake of eudaimonia,but eudaimonia is
neither something which any one morally right action can give us
nor something ultimately granted as reward for right action.It is
not the former for it is a liietime of activity (this is the notion
of Imperfect Beatitude);and it is not the latter for action which
is right Is. action which realises eudaimonia. Instead Aquinas
believes that eudaimonia is both constantly postponed and endlessly
realised through virtuous life just because it is participated in
in every right action.In so far as we are souls heading towards
Beatitude eudaimonia is postponed in right action;in so far as we
are embodied moral/social beings it is realised in right action.We
are both fully happy and incompletely happy in acting morally:we
have the happiness constituted by doing good,and postpone the
happiness which will be the consummation of a life of goodness.
Utilitarians claim that for every action we perform there is some
right choice which will lead to us,or everyone,the world in
general, experiencing slightly more happiness or satisfaction than
it would otherwise do.The world's or a lifetime's happiness is
something which proceeds piece by piece with every individual
choice, some of which are of negligible importance or effect.A happy
life in the sense of a life which at some level is one of deep
contentment does not exist for the sincere utilitarian.His life is
a pattern of ceaseless choosing by which he intends to further his
life's own value,and this pattern is followed by the utilitarian
for as long as he remains a moral agent.
Utilitarian happiness cannot be the activity of creating happiness
units because right action is that which successfully maximises
them. Indeed,utilitarians often think,as Sidgwick did,that the
activity of maximising can be a bad thing.If everyone in our
society were to pursue maximisation,this might lead to less overall
happiness than if many continued to follow common sense beliefs
about fairness and justice.Utilitarian happiness also cannot
consist in the possession of the maximum happiness units at one
specific time or in one specific situation,for the very next choice
to crop up may present the reasoner with a totally unconnected
state of affairs in which he must start once again to maximise his
units.For example,the joy of passing the exam is succeeded either
by the joy of going to the party or by having dinner with my
parents;this choice demands that attention be given to new data
and a reassessment of alternatives which will allow us to see which
course will most further happiness,and in this task the happiness
of the exam victor becomes again only one unit within the
calculation of the present choice.It retains no privileged status
as the result of a previous well-made choice.
So,despite his official elevation of the value of happiness as the
determinant of rationality,the utilitarian can neither anticipate a
state of happiness beyond the happiness of the present moment,nor
enjoy happiness as the activity of increasing happiness units.This
does not mean that he has no concept of happiness, but that it is a
shadowy concept:it is neither quite utilitarian activity nor quite
what is achieved by any particular piece of such activity.Instead
it must be understood almost atomistically as 'specious present'
enjoyments, which have been won in the correct way by efficient
reasoning.The utilitarian wants to say that this conception of
rationality - reasoning which causes efficient gains in utility -
and the conception of the universal value of the unit of utility -
pleasure,priority preference satisfaction or whatever - allows for
a sufficient degree of unity and coherence of individual human
lives despite the atomism of the theory.Happiness is not cumulative
- for the utilitarian aims not at a lifetime of happiness but at a
general increase of happiness - but human life gains
intelligibility and unity not through growth and activity,but
because of the structural features of etlicient calculative reason
and the permanence and universality of utility value.The logic of
this practical means-end reasoning in which utility is achieved in
this insubstantial and piecemeal way is the 'upping' tendency in
utilitarianism.
Contemporary utilitarianism has produced a whole industry of
descriptions of the maximisation process which move iar from the
ideas of Bentham and Mill.For Bentham the procedure of maximisation
is secondary to the procedure far establishing the value of
particular pleasures by their satisfaction of various criteria of
the importance of pleasure;for Mill there are higher and lower
pleasures,and we must respect the judgement of those with
experience of both as to which is the most worthwhile.Bentham
understands pleasure as a sensation,and the agent as able to
distance himself far enough from the pleasure to guage its
importance. This is unacceptable given the nature of pleasure as
more than just sensation.Mill must be wrong because if not all
pleasures are qualitatively identical - if we are to take into
account the activities in which pleasures are realised -
maximisation ought to involve not only reckoning of the value of
different realisations of pleasure,but of the complex of intensity
of pleasurable sensation and degree of involvement with pleasant
activity.But there is no such complex account of value in Mill.
He writes as if the agent can detach himself from higher and lower
pleasures and assess involvement with each as a means to
determining the degree of pleasure to be expected from each.But a
Millian theory of practical reasoning would have to involve not
consideration of types of activity to assess expected pleasure,but
consideration of pleasurable activities as regards overall
pleasure,consideration of pleasant sensations as regards overall
pleasure,and rational comparison of both.Only in this way could the
insight that there are higher and lower pleasures,pleasures
valuable because of what they are and pleasures valuable because of
pleasure,be preserved.Mill's distinction actually postpones the
construction of a theory of utilitarian practical reasoning by
failing to compare the role of pleasure as sensational experience
and pleasure as structured involvement,thereby delaying any real
contrast between the value of felt experiences and diversity and
choice of activity in the full life.
From the many contemporary accounts of maximisation available I
choose one by Timothy Sprigge.This explains maximisation within the
context of an account of happiness,and has the advantage of
understanding practical reasoning not syllogistically but as the
pursuit of psychologically satisfactory experiences,a content
consciousness,because of the vital role of this in a happy life.
Sprigge (p.191; is particularly aware of the problem of confronting
happiness from within a utilitarian perspective.'ShouId we think
rather of the value of pleasures and pains as determined by the way
they affect people's happiness?' He holds that happiness is neither
a sum of pleasures nor a balance of pleasure over pain,but a state
the quality of which is related to the happiness or unhappiness of
its surrounding states.Happiness and pleasure as states of
consciousness are,he thinks,the same state.However,to experience a
number of pleasurable states does not thereby amount to a
corresponding state of happiness,because each instance of a
particular pleasurable state is affected by the particular
experiences around it.We experience happiness only where our whole
stretch of experience is pleasurable.'The overall happiness is not
a function of some atomic elements out of which it is composed, it
may be truer to say that the overall experience has a total heaonic
character of which individually discriminable elements are
inseparable aspects' <.p.l93;.So happiness is 'a pervasive quality
of experience as a whole1 which makes its elements pleasurable or
unpleasurable rather than a state arising from the pleasantness of
discrete experiences.He gives an example of looking at a beautiful
picture which is an individual pleasurable exprience.What really
matters is not this experience,but the overall experience of my
consciousness,in particularly whether or not it has that overall
pleasurable quality which is happiness.
This is sensitive both to the tact that happiness is not an end-
product to be aimed at through pleasurabie experiences,and to the
fact that such experiences and the experience of overall happiness
are not two distinct sorts of experience but two levels of the same
experience as this applies to a/particular experiences,and b/the
overall experience of a stretch of consciousness that contains such
pleasurable experiences.Sprigge understands that we do not achieve
happiness by pursuing individual moments of pleasure,but that
longterm happiness is only of value because of the individual
pleasurable experiences it contains (p.195). Maximisation for
Sprigge is. a question of pursuing particular pleasurable
experiences, not indiscriminately,but with an eye to the part they
play in the happy lives of individuals.We pursue pleasure not
blindly,as in the simpler and psychological theories of
hedonism,but because of the part particular pleasurable experiences
play in happy lives,happy consciousnesses.
Why ought we to be concerned with the creation of happy
consciousnesses? Because,Sprigge replies,of the pleasurable
experiences which constitute them.The determinant of right
action,however,is not likelihood of pleasurable experiences,but
likelihood of leading to a stretch of consciousness which is
happy,that is,made up of individual pleasurable experiences.That
the determinant of right action is happiness though the locus of
value is pleasure is so because individual pleasurable experiences
are pleasurable not because they are experiences of drinking
Sauternes,but because they are experiences of drinking Sauternes
within a stretch of conscious experience which is such that overall
it can be described as happy.The pleasantness of particular
experiences exists because they are happiness-conferring:because
these experiences lead to happiness they are pleasant
experiences.What differentiates pleasant experiences and
experiences of happiness for Sprigge is not just that the latter
are stretched out further in time,but that they depend upon the
nature of the other experiences surrounding the pleasant ones of
which they are made up,and that without this uniformity of
experience there would be no happiness.
Sprigge's account is appreciative of the complexities of the
relation of pleasure to happiness,a relation which must be
understood if happiness is to be understood,but it fails to show
that right action is happiness-maximising action.He says the only
reason for maximising happiness is because of what it is like to
have pleasurable experiences.These experiences do not alone
constitute happiness;rather happiness consists in these pleasurable
experiences together with the context of the other experiences
within which these are set.So in trying to maximise happiness we
must be trying not only to pursue pleasurable experiences,but also
to create those conditions which together with these experiences
give us overall stretches of consciousness which are happy.It does
not seem,however,that this is possible.Certain action leads to an
experience with a pleasurable quality,one which can be an element
within happiness,if,among other things,this experience is preceded
by others of an appropriate character and other succeeding
experiences of an appropriate character are
anticipated.However,what this appropriateness is. cannot be known
independently of or in advance of our having the particular
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pleasurable experience: if we are having a pleasant experience which
is part of an overall happy experience,ipso facto the other
surrounding experiences are appropriate;if we are trying to create
a pleasant experience we cannot know in advance of it,with our
limited knowledge of self and future possibilities,what conditions
will be necessary to give us an overall happy stretch of
consciousness (and even if we could,we have only limited control
over both preceding and successive stretches of our experience).
The strict,and seemingly impossible,requirement Sprigge's theory
makes on the utilitarian agent appears to be the result of
attempting to produce a utilitarianism in the classical mould which
yet does not reduce utility to mere pleasure maximising. 1 think his
account of pleasure within the model of the happy consciousness is
largely accurate,but happiness must be distinguished from the
experience of continuous pleasure which,at one level.it
is. Happiness is not correctly described as continuous pleasure but
something more like guaranteed or safe overall pleasure,and the
only way to ensure this, of course, is to invest and develop one's
experiences of pleasure within forms of activity and engagements
which can give not only a permanence to pleasant experience, as
Sprigge requires,but also security and easy recall:pleasure
functions frequently as a resource we can call upon.Happy lives
have value,then,not because of what it is like to experience
pleasure,but because they satisfactorily reconcile the need for the
sensation of pleasurableness with the requirement that the sources
of the individual's pleasure consist in activities and projects he
is able and willing to face a lifetime of pursuing.
This account,if adopted by Sprigge,would allow him to explain how
we can determine in advance of pleasurable experience the
conditions required for happiness:knowledge of a pattern and
regularity to those activities which give me pleasure is knowledge
of what I must do at any given time to make sure a particular
pleasure will fit into the structure of my life in a way which will
make it not transient but an actual contribution to my
happiness.Because Sprigge does not distinguish between happiness
and continuous pleasure,he has no ready answer to my objection.His
only move would be to return to the classical picture of pursuing
pleasure as a means to happiness.This,however,would return to the
difficulties which his account of the maximisation of happiness
because of what pleasure is like was intended to avoid.
Intuition and Basic Principles,
Having examined a sort of utilitarianism which has great concern
for the overall structure of experience,I will turn to the theory
which concerns itself most with the experience of the agent not as
goal of his moral reasoning,but as source of the basic principles
of his reasoning.Sidgwick'sThe Methods of Ethics (London;i962) is
the most sustained attempt to try to prove utilitai~ian theory from
the basis of common sense.Sidgwick believed an examination of
common sense views on morality would provide first,self-evident
principles.A principle was held to be self-evident only if a/its
terms were clear and precise,b/careful reflection had been employed
in formulating it,c/all alleged self-evident principles were
mutually consistent,and d/there was general assent to them. The
first examination of common sense,however,leads only to tautologies
or bare necessary conditions oi Tightness. These can, however, be seen
to be limited versions of principles known through 'philosophical
intuition' (3,13; to be truly self-evident ('we should expect that
the history of Moral Philosophy...wouId be a history of attempts to
enunciate in full breadth and clearness, those primary intuitions of
Reason by the scientific application of which the common moral
thought of mankind may be at once systematised and corrected').
These truly self-evident principles seem to be a/a version of the
Golden Rule: if it is right for y to be treated p it is right for x
if there are no relevant differences in x's circumstances
(p. 209); b/' one ought to have an impartial concern for all parts of
one's conscious life' (p.381);c/the good of any one individual is
ultimately of no more importance than that of any other(p. 382); d/we
ought to aim at the good generally.and not just at the good of
particular individuals (p.404).These principles are axiomatic
requirements upon the actions of a rational being.'They present
requirements which are intrinsically reasonable,or which possess
ultimate rational justification' (J.Schneewind.Sidgwick's Ethics
and Victorian Moral Philosophy. Oxford;1986,p.381).Consideration of
the circumstances of human beings in the world,then,according to
Sidgwick,reveals that rationality requires some measure of
justice,prudence and benevolvence.
These self-evident principles,conditions of practical
reasoning,arise because of the goal of rationality:the increase of
a certain good.Sidgwick believes this good is pleasure.The
elimination of virtue and perfection (3,13) by which he reaches
this conclusion is hardly rigorous,but the defence of pleasure
is.He believes,like Sprigge.that the intrinsic good must be some
form of consciousness.However,what has value is not the
consciousness itself,but its object.Pleasure for Sidgwick is a
definite and identifiable object of consciousness,and not,as
Sprigge sees it,the 'tone' oi certain conscious experiences.lt is
on the same level,then,as the non-hedonic goods of knowing truth
and appreciating beauty.These,however,(p.400/1) have value only
because of their 'conduciveness,in one way or another,to the
happiness of sentient beings.'When we appeal to common sense we see
that Knowledge,Beauty and Virtue form the categories of the
desirable only so far as people believe them to be means to or
constituents of the general happiness.Pleasure is the ultimate V
good.It is the attempt to pursue it,universal hedonism,as a
rational being and one 'in the world',possessing
intellect,understanding,sociability and so on,which leads us to a
determination of the principles we know confusedly in common sense
intuition,and clearly through philosophical intuition.The method of
intuitionism shows that ethics is the gradual unfolding of common
sense by the moral philosopher as a sort of universal
hedonism,utilitarianism.
If Sidgwick could have shown that the utilitarian conclusion
unambiguously followed from his methods much of the twentieth
century debate between egoism and altruism, particularly in
connection with utilitarian theory,and the self versus the other
within the structure of practical reasoning would have taken a more
fruitful form. Famously, however, Sidgwick sets egoism and altruism at
each others' throats,both rationally justified.lt might have been
thought that this hopeless result of his great labours would have
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caused other moral philosophers to accept that if the two are
rationally justified and incompatible,the rejection of the
Kantian/Benthamite picture of the relation of rationality to
morality would be the most reasonable course to follow.Sadly,a
debate which it now seems reasonable not to -have started is pursued
still,oiten it seems for no better reason than that the antagonists
have the ability to produce yet another argument.I include Sidgwick
not to expose his methodology but only to report his own
recognition of failure and to expose the pity of a whole century's
debate in English speaking moral philosa^phy in terms shown to be /
faulty,to the detriment of a widely acceptable philosophical
response to the problems of the swiftly changing pattern of
communities in our time.If debates stagnate,loyalty to them is not
continuance of a tradition but continuance of a personal
obsession;they ought to be abandoned and new theories of practical
rationality proposed.
The Sidgwickian issue which is still worth investigating is how far
utilitarianism is based on very strongly held and non-philosophical
intuitions.A formal demonstration of self-evidence in the sense of
Ross and Pritchard is now in disrepute.But how deeply is the belief
that right action maximises pleasure or happiness rooted in pre-
reflective intuition?
Hare (Moral Thinking,Oxford:1981J has taken seriously the grounding
of morality in the common-sense question 'but what if that were
happening to me?' He believes the practice of asking what I would
want if I were in another's situation is structured in our moral
language.The basic form of moral judgment is the prescription.To
prescribe is to make explicit one of one's preferences:'let x be
(done;'.Moral judgements are those prescriptions expressed by using
the term 'ought' in such a way that it is part of the
prescription's meaning that the prescription is universal,and that
it has precedence over any other prescriptions of other types
(p.55ff.).The point about universality is the important one:if I,or
another,ought to do a certain thing,then the prescription which
expressess this also prescribes that anyone similarly circumstanced
ought to do this thing.Hare holds this feature of
universalisability is basic to moral discourse,and is discovered in
our disposition to ask what we would want were we in another's
place.
Hare believes that I only succeed in knowing what I would want were
I in your place if I now actually form this preference.That is,I
cannot know that if I were in your position I would prefer y to
such and such a degree unless here and now I actually da prefer y
to this degree just in case I am in such a position.So
universality,the property of moral judgements,is the result of our
actually considering what 'anyone',whoever they are,would want in a
certain situation,and discovering this involves adopting as wants
and preferences of our own all the wants and preferences of all
those who might be affected by the prescribed action.This involves
a certain de-personalisation.My own personal wants,after
all,continue,and if there were no de-personalisation,these would
retain the privileged status of agents-own and not enter into the
consensus of total relevant wants.I must retain my wants.and the
CDinmpn Sense Utilitarianism,
rational structure within which these are realised and into which I
must also adopt the wants and preferences of others.These adopted
wants must be incorporated into the structure even though,unlike my
personal wants,they are not arrived at through the structure:they
are not the results- of the expression of any- commitments or
projects of my own.
Now,Hare holds that despite de-personalisation 1 am still a
rational human being,I can,therefore,employ the rational structure
of my mind in a straightforward way to this new accumulation of
wants and determine what in any situation is the rational thing to
do.In doing this the rational agent will be reasoning in accord
with that theory known as preference utilitarianism.Our ordinary
moral language,then,reveals our moral practices to be utilitarian.
Hare's agent adopts all preierences whose satisfaction is liable to
be affected by one of his choices as his own.He then must ascribe
value to the individual preferences by the application of his
rational capacities in the normal way.However,despite Hare,it is
not possible to separate the 'rational capacities' from the
particular personal preferences which an individual forms,and which
structure his outlook.When I enter upon a piece of reasoning
concerning what I ought to do this does not consist of a set of
formal manuoevres which can be applied to whatever preferences I
(happen to) have.My personal preferences and priorities are not
collected in isolation from my critical faculties:they are rather
the result of these faculties as I have exercised them in the
world.When I exercise my capacity for reasoning I reason as. a
universaiiser,or as a happiness-maximiser,as a subject of the
Natural Law and so on.I never reason as something called 'a
rational being',but exercise and understand my rational iaculties
after a particular sort of understanding of rationality,and not
simply as pure instrumentality. This means that my wants and
preferences are iormed not just by brute desire or the vicissitudes
of the world but as the result of the total,and particularly the
moral,view 1 take of the world and follow in my making of rational
decisions.
My preferences do not stand in the relation of subject matter to an
efficient process of reasoning which is 'applied' to them:they are
product of my understanding of rationality,and so of my
rationality,as well as subject of my practical reasoning.Reasoning
concerning what (of the things I want or hold preferences for
doing) I ought to do cannot be described as a process of scanning
unconnected preferences by rational structure:practical rationality
is not application of rationality to wants because rationality also
determines wants.We do not 'treat' our own preferences with
rational structure,and we certainly cannot thus aggregate the
preferences of others which Hare believes we can adopt. Thus my
criticism of Hare concerns not the details of his utility
aggregation,but the conception of preference as specifiable in
independence of the operations by which preferences are
judged.Preferences cannot be stripped from rationality and
transferred and cannot be considered by. the rationality of the
maximising agent for the same reason: any preference is
determined, at least minimally,by a rationality which answers to an
individual's understanding of rationality,and the conception of
it?
rationality of the person it is stripped from may be different from
that of the agent who adopts it.
The mistake which Hare has made is in one way or another the
confusion at the bottom of any utilitarian theory which places
weight on the appeal to common sense intuition concerning our
shared lot.'What if it were done to me?' is an effective question
only because it requires me to distance myself from the one to whom
it is. done and to consider the effect of it on someone whose make¬
up is not that of the individual now actually suffering.Its effect
is a feature of our being directed to consider not the facts of the
suffering,but the nature of the sufferer,the nature of other
hypothetical sufferers,and judging that the differences between
individuals is irrelevant in the case of moral action.In order to
show that differences between individuals do not matter but only
the facts and the relations of their situation the Golden Rule test
must go beyond these facts and invite us to compare the situations
of different individuals.It has to direct attention to the fact
that x might suffer,y might suffer... and that in all cases the
fact that the suffering is this individual's plays no part in the
judgement that the suffering is wrong.Ve,as agents,cannot
understand that the differences between individual agents are
irrelevant in moral action unless we actually consider the effect
of the differences between individual agents in the making of
certain, moral, judgements.
By requiring us to separate preferences from individuals and from
the individual rationalities through which these preferences were
formed Hare does not succeed in isolating some neutral core of
facts and relations we can judge in impartiality.Rather he loses in
his account of rationality the comparison between cases of
individual agents,the comparison which,in considering
preferences, allows us to say that certain preferences ought morally
to be acted upon just because their satisfaction does not depend
upon the make-up of the individuals they affeet.Common sense moral
belief,as found,for example,in the question 'what if it were to be
done to me?',does not support Hare's depersonalising model of
preference utilitarianism.
Preference Utilitarianism,
The increase in popularity of utilitarian theory owes much to
utilitarian writers turning from pleasure and other conceptions of
the good to the concepts of harm and benefit,welfare and need.Such
economic utilitarianisms generally centre around an understanding
of choice or preference.
Preference utilitarianism naturally reflects the liberal economic
politics of the societies of the writers.It also gives apparent
scientific precision to ethics through the contribution of
interdisciplinary research in choice formation and decision theory
to the understanding of rational moral action.Preference
utilitarians believe that it is false that there is one true form
of the good at which we all aim.Instead there is a plurality of
goods,increase of which is brought about through principles of
reasoning.These principles contain within themselves measures for
limiting the pursuit of any one good to the detriment of any other
or of society.Preference utilitarianism is pleased to locate a high
degree of autonomy in our individual choices,and to balance against
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this limits on efficient pursuit of personal satisfaction through
the checks within rational principles.
The case for preference utilitarianism begins not with the notion
of the good or goods to be pursued,but with that of the choosing
agent.It focuses on the situation of individuals making particular
choices in pursuit of particular goods.In this respect,it is more
in the Kantian than the Benthamite tradition,but differs from Kant
in locating ultimate value not in the autonomy of the person but in
the satisfation of her personal choices.The great difficulty of the
theory is to explain how the rational pursuit of personal utility
is compatible with the rationality of pursuing social or overall
utility.It must negotiate the claims that value is found uniquely
in personal satisfaction and that it is found in satisfaction of
those preferences whose objects are judged good by the criterion of
social or general utility,Such negotiations were not faced by
classical utilitarians who,with the touchstone of pleasure
considered after the analytical model of Bentham,could provide
straightforward answers to apparent conflicts between individual
and society.Preference utilitarianism,because it acknowledges as
many forms of the good as there are objects of preference and
because it finds value not in the goods but in their achievement,is
open to conflict when it comes to the determination of right
action.
The measures preference utilitarianism has evolved to guard against
these conflicts either take the form of principles prescribing
certain goods which utility maximisers must pursue if they are to
pursue any goods in their choices,or the form of principles
prohibiting certain choices involving the dissatisfaction of other
agents.The first sort of principle depends upon a settled
conception of the person as rational;the second upon a conception
of the person as primarily moral,sympathetic being.The tirst
conception will be specified in terms ol an understanding of human
nature spelled out in a theory of human needs and welfare,or a
theory of liberty,autonomy,or rights:a theory of lundamentais which
cannot rationally be sacriliced. The second conception is the result
either of a view of numan beings as essentially concerned with the
satislactions and dissatistactions ol others in virtue of the
social arrangements which have developed or been artificially
constructed between them,or ol a naturalist theory of virtue which
sees rational action as the action of beings disposed in various
respects towards contributing to the good life for others.
Preference utilitarian theories which demand such built-in
safeguards against the clash of personal with social utility are
generally wrong on at least three counts:in supposing there might
be a plurality of goods we may pursue as individuals requiring no
reference to the good of others;in holding preference satisfaction
is the locus of value;and in believing the conception of the person
either as rational or as moral being can be specified in
independence of the particular conceptions of rationality and
morality of individual communities.We can make these points by
considering Harsanyi's views.
Harsanyi claims ('Morality and the Theory of Rational Behaviour' in
A.Sen and B.Williams eds.The Limits of
no
Utilitarianism. Cambridge: 1983) that the concept oi rational
behaviour comes about from the observable fact that human behaviour
is in general goal directed.Rational behaviour is behaviour
pursuing in a consistent fashion well-defined goods in terms of
well-defined preferences.Rational behaviour is the foundation of
the normative disciplines of decision theory,game theory and
ethics.These disciplines function both to help people act more
rationally and to give them a better understanding of
rationality.They form a system of explanation of action which
allows us to give a rational account of an agent's behaviour in
pursuit of a personal goal under uncertainty or risk (decision
theory),as well as a rational account of the pursuit of an
altruistic goal by another identically circumstanced agent.The
possibility of both of these rational accounts - the rationality of
self-interest and the rationality of one in identical circumstances
turning her back on self-interest - is the possibility of conflict
in rationality.
The three normative disciplines give rational explanations of
action (game theory is rational interaction of individuals each
pursuing their own objectives) as the pursuit oi certain goods in
terms of a basic concept of rationality as goal-directed
behaviour.Consistent pursuit of certain goods explained by certain
of our preferences leads to ethical choices,but we could also
pursue certain other goods leading to choices directed to the
maximisation of personal utility.Explanation of rational action as
goal-directed contains,then,a non-rational aspect of choice between
satisfying ethical or personal preferences.Do we simply choose the
preferences we want to satisfy most,or is there some richer
though,according to Harsanyi,non-rational scheme of explanation of
why we actually choose to do what we do to maximise utility?
Personal utility may oppose social utility for Harsanyi because it
is possible to make rational choices in independence oi the good of
others.This is possible because he holds we are rational beings
prior to being moral beings:there is a basic concept of rationality
as goal-directedness.We then have the great difficulty of
explaining how the gap between private satisfaction and
moral/social satisfaction can be crossed.I suggest that this gap is
unbridgeable,and that this is no difficulty because the notion of
the solitary rational chooser,even as a conceptual notion,is
fictitious.Rationality is not an exercise even of the most
sophisticated agency,but is activity.Rational choice is choice
satisfying principles which themselves have no grounding other than
in the current orthodoxy of debate within the community,and this
explanation applies even to such apparently fundamental principles
as Harsanyi's of goal-directedness.A self-interested utility
maximiser may represent the paradigm of rationality but not because
of any features of the objects of his choices,but because his sort
of choosing has the sanction of the current standards of
explantion.
Since the understanding of all rational choosing involves the
understanding of orthodox ways oi explaining and justifying,the
notion of the solitary personal utility maximiser can be no part of
theory of rationality.For even if this stance is sanctioned by any
given orthodoxy,its rationality derives not from some basic
normativity of goal-directed satisfaction of personal
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preferences,but from the orthodoxy which sanctions it. This means
that the goods which we can pursue as individuals cannot be pursued
wholly in independence of the good of others: even if self-interest
is sanctioned,it will be so only because it forms the good of
others together with whom I have some form of social life.This does
not mean we are essentially moral/sympathetic beings,the sort of
beings who always sincerely ask 'what if it were me?', because the
understanding q1 good of the community may not be at all an
altruistic one.The relation between the good in the sense of the
rational action the community advocates and the moral good it
practices in its shared life and institutions is something shortly
to be examined,and the question of whether there is some good in
any sense more basic than the moral good embodied in everyday
social life one that must be answered.So far I have claimed only
that because of the dialectic of theoreticai activity I have
suggested as an account of rationality,the notion of an individual
rationally pursuing goods without reference to the good of others
is fictitious.
There is another way in which I believe the pursuit of goods must
make reference to others;not to their good,as we conceive this,but
to them,themselves,as an expression of,or an expression compatible
with,charity.Charity is the disposition to act in such a way that
one's behaviour is a communication with others as individuals:as I
shall be arguing,to act so that one's behaviour is an expression of
love.I shall claim that it is the relation of charity to moralities
that gives us the nation of ethics as criterion of evaluation of
moralities.My point in this section is simply to note that
individual pursuit of personal preferences is not pursuit of true
goods if their achievement or the pursuit of them is incompatible
with the disposition of charity.
However,the demands that love makes upon action are
inexhaustible:unlike moral principles whose ultimate
justification,I will claim,rests upon an appeal to accepted
mores,judgements of charity,expressions of love,have no
justification and so cannot be ignored or overridden except by
ignoring or overriding the felt experience and the normative
imperative of love itself.The question then is how can we ever
pursue personal goods,if faced with claims concerning others whose
scope is inexhaustible and cannot be rationally scrutinised?This is
possible because although there are no grounds lor overriding the
claims of charity,there are grounds lor holding that what I ought
to do is to pursue some other form of good either because it is a
means ultimately to a charitable disposition,or because it is
sanctioned by the practices of my community in the form of a moral
principle interpreting charity.
Harsanyi is also mistaken in the general claim that value is
located in the satisfaction of preferences.We can see the effect of
this in the structure of his own argument.He distinguishes true
preferences as 'preferences he would have if he had all the
relevant factual information,always reasoned with the greatest
possible care,and were in a state of mind most conducive to
rational choice' (!p. 55). Apart from the fact that this restricts us
to one highly selective conception of rationality,it fails because
of the paring down of the agent's desires from 'surplus' wanting to
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a genuine core of preferences while holding that it is in
preference satisfaction that value resides.
The notion of a core set of preferences unambiguously the agent's
own is a result of the picture of the agent as rational prior to
any facts about the involvement of himself in the indeterminate
events of life,and relationships with others.However,the notion of
an agent rational prior to social contact is illusory,Preferences
cannot be distinguished as true and false on the basis of those he
possesses qua rational (when in a mood conducive to consistent
pursuit, in possession of all relevant knowledge and so on) and
those he possesses qua non-rational desirer in the world because he
has no principles of rationality unti1,engaging his preferences
with those of others,he forms a conception of rationality through
formation, and reformation,of preferences.We develop principles of
rationality as a result of beliefs and preferences formed together
with others in particular social contexts.
By paring down preferences to a set formed in accord with some
ideal rationality Harsanyi is,in fact,moving from holding value
resides in satisfaction of preferences to holding it resides in
autonomous formation of preferences,with autonomy understood in
terms of pre-preferentiai rationality.If it resided purely in
preference satisfaction we would not need to strip the agent's
preferences of the uninlorraed or the locally conditioned.The paring
down suggests value actually does not rest in satisfaction,but in
succeeding in forming preferences in accord with pre-
preferentiai , pre-social rationality.The problem with a theory of
utilitarian rationality relying on a basic concept of reason
appealing to a conception of the individual prior to his social
identity is that this conception is not that of the individual as
preference satisfier but as autonomous person,and it is bound to
keep slipping through the utilitarian mask expressing itself in
compromise devices such as Harsanyi's true and false preferences.If
the appeal to the person as the ground of the concept of
rationality is an appeal to the autonomous chooser,and not to the
utilitarian satisfier,it is hard to see why value ought not to be
located there,in autonomy,rather than in preference satisfaction.
Contractariamsm.
The best of the recent work connected with preference
utilitarianism has involved the recovery of contractarianism.This
is almost always the best worked out alternative to those forms of
utilitarianism whose creators tend to favour the term
'consequentialism',although there are contractarian theories which
are compatible with utilitarianism (see B.Gert's Moral Rules.hew
York;1973,based upon his concept of the reasonable human being).The
most thorough contemporary contractarians are T.Scanlon (in Sen and
Williams eds.) and Gauthier (Morals by Agreement.Oxford:1988).but
they are so deeply within the tradition of Rawls that it would be
as well to discuss the theory in terms of A Theory of
Justice(Oxford:1972).
The classical social contract theories of Grotius,Hobbes,and Locke
depend on seeing the individual as a choosing agent
who,somehow,together with others,stands just before our history
begins and opts to give it the form it has.Thus Anscombe:they have
the idea 'of the universe not as a legislator but as the embodiment
oi a contract' (Hudson,p.189).As she says,the contract concerns
'the universe':it relies on the notion of being there before our
world is,and choosing it.Rawls's version of the contract supposes
that we are individual choosers with individual conceptions of the
good,and that we come to agreement on what is just within a society
in which many different conceptions of the good co-exist.This
conception of justice as fair means to mutual advantage is
convincing only if we conceive of persons as moral - moved by a/a
sense of justice and Tightness,and b/the capacity to form, revise
and rationally pursue a conception of the good.These two interests
constitute the intrinsic morality of persons,and explain their
desire to cooperate fairly to advance their good according to those
public principles of justice all can be reasonably expected to
accept.
Principles of justice themselves are discovered by assuming every
moral person is represented in an original,pre-social position.In
this position principles will be chosen depending upon how far they
provide us with that class of (primary) goods without which we, none
of us,can follow our moral interests.In order to pursue moral
interests we require basic liberties,ireedom of movement and
occupation,certain rules in effect concerning responsible public
offices,income and wealth,and various goods of self-respect.As
these are all-purpose means in any rational life plan,they together
with our moral interests allow us to claim a scheme of basic goods
expressed in our principles of justice which ensure that by
following the principles we are pursuing our mutual good in the
most advantageous way.The principles expressing these goods
are:1/each has an equal right to the most extensive scheme of
liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for
all;2/social and economic inequalities must a/be to the greatest
benefit of the least advantaged,and b/ be attached to offices and
positions open to ail under conditions of fair equality of
opportunity.In particular decisions the relevant primary goads are
considered in the light of the basic goods expressed in these
principles,and together these are supposed to give fair answer to
all questions concerning social resources.
The detail of Rawls's vast theory is irrelevant here.What matters
is whether by taking justice as fairness he avoids difficulties
utilitarianism cannot answer.He says rightly that the utilitarian
does not see the agent as having any antecedent moral structure but
simply as a bare maximiser, and that there seems little reason ior
holding that the pursuit of the utilitarian good need be limited by
any considerations of fairness.My complaint is that although Rawls
believes we cannot conceive of the agent except as having some
antecedent moral structure <.a conception oi the good, ana a
corresponding rational plan of life;,he believes we can attribute
this structure prior to the facts of shared social life,and that
what social life is. is the set of arrangements chosen so that we
can self-interestedly,though fairly,pursue our individual
goods.Rawls's liberalism,and all liberalisms I know,fails because
it posits an intelligible good or goods outside the community in
order to explain the possibility of pursuit of different forms of
hte good inside it,and this is not possible.
Rawls defines the good as 'the successful execution of a rational
plan of life'(T.J.p.433).Haksar (Liberty.Equality and
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Perfectionism. Oxford; 1979) has shown that Rawls repeatedly also
uses a richer and more precise concept of the good which makes
appeal not to a purely rational and neutral concept of the
person,but to a particular ideal involving 'perfectionist'
considerations. He thus shows the intrinsic moral character of the
person,which Rawls believes to stem from his nature as adopting his
own conception of the good to be rationally pursued,is actually to
be understood variously as a/having chosen a (any) conception of
the good,qh b/having a conception of the good involving the higher
and richer wider capacities.('Human beings enjoy the exercise of
their realised capacities. ... and this enjoyment increases the more
the capacity is realised,or the greater its complexity'
T.J. 426).This is sufficient to show that Rawls's theory,like any
other, is not actually describing the conditions of holding a (any)
conception of the good,but is simply appealing to the particular
conception of the good of a particular community:the liberal-
democratic view of the good as unhindered pursuit of whatever does
not interfere with the objects of pursuit of others,with the
proviso that the 'higher goads' are to be preserved. Things have not
improved much since Mill.
However,the greater failure is not perfectionism but the belief in
the intelligibility of a conception of the good which is pre-
social,and in a society which can be morally mature with many
competing and often conflicting conceptions of the good.To the
original position people can bring only desires for society,not
desires for fair social conditions to pursue personal goods because
'fair' as yet cannot have meaning.If it does have meaning, then the
moral structure of persons from which the pi~inciples of justice are
to be constructed already contains the property,fairness,which is
supposed to be wholly derived from the neutrality of the original
position.If,as I believe,'fair' in Rawls's original position would
have to be construed as having no meaning, and the social choosers
therefore have only desire for social life,it is impossible to see
how from any choice made by individuals in this position any
principle can result which will be one of justice rather than of
exploitation.'Fair',like 'just', 'lawful', 'compassionate',
'worthy' and all other moral meanings,arise from social consensus
concerning social life and understanding.In the imaginary position
of Rawls in which social life has not started there will be no
moral meanings, and so no possibility of creating specifically moral
meaning.The only way out of the dilemma is to say with Rawls that
moral structure,like rational structure,is inseparable from human
lite,but that such life exists only where there is human
community,and that consequently moral principles are not to be
explained from the position of pre-social life,but from social
standards of acceptance and coherence within individual
communities.
The second point is that society cannot be 'made' from a number of
atomic, competing goods or conceptions of the good,however flexible
the structures devised as a framework for their pursuit.This is so
because society does not exist for the purpose of giving the
individual whatever she wants:society does not exist as anything
other than the individual at all,for even the institutions and
practices which do give society objective existence have no purpose
extrinsic to the individual,but are merely the historical context
of the individual.Rawls's conception of society as fair pursuit ot
mutual advantage is a passible description of a predominant
conception of society,but it is no description of what society is.
in some essentialist sense:justice as lairness has no monopoly on
correct descriptions of society. 1 Community' captures the notion of
context better than 'society' because community is a form of
living,and not a description of life.I do not claim that the sign
of social life is pursuit of the homomeneous good, but that the
variety of goods pursued in a community are pursued in the form of
participation in actual practices and institutions and continuing
(theoretical) enquiries of different sorts.These are not structures
within which individual goods are pursued,but presently developing
and historically conditioned varieties of behaviour which are
pursuit of goods,and of heterogeneous goods,because of the
complexity of history and the possibilities of confrontation of
present standards of practice and enquiry with constantly changing
new conceptions.
Vhat is wrong with liberal contractarianism is not the notion of
more than one conception of the good,but,as with preference
utilitarianism,the misunderstanding of the nature of the individual
within society,and the misunderstanding of rationality and morality
as basic social concepts with which we explain and pursue our
conceptions of the good rather than as,literally,the very life ai
society by which all otherwise individual conceptions are
transformed into community ones.
Rights.
Something must be said about the utility/rights debate in this
context.It seems to me that the doctrine of natural rights is one
part of the theory of Natural Law,and of classical social contract
theory,and that when it is taken from this context it is
insufficiently grounded to be of any value unless it can be set in
a new ethics of the nature of the human being.This is precisely
what writers like Finnis,Vlastos,Vasserstrom,McDonald and Hart have
failed to do (see J,Valdron.Theories of Rights.Oxford:1990:and see
Sumner, ch.4 for a contemporary Benthamite argument against natural
rights,fatal outside the context of Natural Law theories),and it
means that natural rights theories at present enjoy no advantage
positivist or conventionalist theories of rights do not also share.
It is obvious that rights are an important form oi moral
relation.However,they have no special moral primacy.Positivist
theories of rights are plagued with uncertainties concerning
justification and extent.Recently J.Sumner has attempted to show
rights do have a primacy,and has managed to add great clarity to
Hohfeld's analysis.He,and T.Sprigge,both hold utilitarian theories
of rights.For Sprigge y has a right to x if,should he not have
x,there are grounds for complaint on y's behalf.Rights talk is a
useful device here for preserving those little stable packets of
utility we wish to preserve from unnecessary scrutiny,believing
their utility can be more or less taken for granted.For Sumner
consequentialism can be found to provide a moral justification tor
rights because imperfections in our moral strengths and character
and in our reasoning and decision making faculties imply that as
maximisers we cannot range freely over options,but must acknowledge
certain constraints for the sake of the greater good.And these
constraints are rights.
Both of these views seem to me not to encourage,perhaps even not to
allow,what is surely the central feature of rights,that they are
moral relations the terms of which are not violations of desert or
deprivations of utility but the needs of human beings,or,where
these are not fulf illed,human harms. The point is not that rights do
not concern violations of entitlement for which complaint can be
made,or constraints on instrumentally rational action given human
weaknesses,but that the feature of these situations rights focus
upon is the actual harm,direct or indirect,to human welfare which
results.This is not to claim that the normative weight of rights is
merely rhetorical,for a second essential feature of rights is that
they not only draw attention to the actual harm of wrong
actions,but that the entitlements right claims express cannot
normally be validly opposed except by other entitlements expressed
or expressible as rights claims.That is,except perhaps for certain
dangerous or emergency situations,no claim except another valid
rights claim can oppose this form of entitlement.Rights are not
merely rhetorical,because their indefeasible role in modern moral
discourse is one of the key relations which gives method to
prioritising and classifying moral judgements.
Neither Sprigge nor Sumner accept the flesh and blood nature of
rights or their invulnerability to everything except other right
claims or the contingencies of emergency.This emergency situation
must be clarified because I think it vital that rights claims
should not be allowed to overturn difficult and conscientious,or
caring efforts of judgement,or expert judgements,and because I
think the characterisation of those situations in which rights can
be overridden could not be accepted by a utilitarian.I suggest that
rights can only be overridden without consent if those involved
acknowledge that in doing so they are violating another's
rights,they accept rights give grounds of complaint which cannot
normally be overridden,and they believe that in this case not to
override them for this reason would be to act in a way which any
reasonable rights-holder would acknowledge as morally wrong.Very
few utilitarians could accept this characterisation of when rights
may be violated.Their theories would prohibit them from recognising
one or other of the three conditions:that infringing rights is
violation;in normal cases such violation is wrong;that it is only
right when any reasonable rights-holder would agree that not to
violate would be morally wrong. ('Reasonable' is not specified,so
that the criterion of reasonableness might even be utilitarian).Yet
it seems to me these three conditions are the minimum
characterisation of this situation,and that it must be acknowledged
within any rights theory.Because the utilitarian cannot accept the
criteria for overriding rights claims, he cannot accommodate rights
within his theory .
A Different Conception of Morality,
In general,the reasons lor rejecting utilitarianism concern the
conception of morality.The conception I prefer reflects a way of
thinking about morality or moralities and the relation between
morality and ethics which arises from ancient thought and medieval
practice.This way of thinking concerns the connection between
morality and charity,or,as 1 prefer to call it,love.Aristotle's
theory of the virtues and Aquinas's theory of Natural Law are,I
believe,particular ways of explaining this approach to morality.In
the 1950's the philosophy of language,inspired by
Wittgenstein,produced a climate in which a new theory taking this
approach ought to have appeared.This theory - a semantic theory
explaining moral norms as the import of ethics for particular
communities:morality is a particular set of linguistic rules by
following which we understand and experience love - has not been
written.Instead moral philosophers were diverted by arguments such
as Anscambe's,Geach's and Kenny's into the study of Wittgenstein's
psychological,particularly motivation,concepts.Having exposed the
reality behind foisting legalistic moral concepts onto moral
discourse of a non-theistic twentieth century community,Anscombe
went on to recommend the study of psychology in the hope of
providing moral philosophy with a scientific basis.Psychology
seemed,and to many seems,the correct foundation for constructing a
theory explaining for our age the relation of moralities to some
timeless ethics,or 'moral truth'.This trend accounts for the
revival of preference utilitarianism which puts its trust in the
harmony it finds between straightforward motivation and moral
motivation.Psychology takes up the role of virtue theory,natural
law or religious codes.It is the more basic level of a two level
theoretical analysis of morality which,therefore,justifies the
moral theory it supports.
However,language and not psychology ought to play the basic role in
contemporary moral theory. This is so because forms of psychological
explanation are explained by the particular conceptions of
rationality of different communities: there is no invariant human
psychology.However great cross-culture similarities of behaviour,it
is in terms of similarity of conceptions of rationality and moral
understandings that these are explicable.By examining connections
between the patterns of enquiry and the moral practices and
conceptions of different communities we could build up a map of
psychology,not just a picture of the relations between the
different concepts of explanation and motivation used,but a guide
to the actual behavioural regularities of human beings which is
purely local and in no way as it is because of human 'nature*.This
claim will be supported by the account of morality I am about to
give and its relation to rationality.
The implication of it is that the pressing task for moral
philosophy is examination of the way in which language,through
theoretical activity and the reflection of this in social
institutions and patterns,structures communities;how the form of
communication that is historically conditioned theoretical
discourse,enquiry,relates to the form of communication that is
participation in everyday social practices and interaction in
shared forms of life;and how communities engage through their
contingent means of enquiry and practice in that iorm oi
communication I have described as love and indicated to consist in
communication between individual members of a community as
individuals and not as role-bearers or place-keepers within various
of the community's institutions.
The critical role given to one particular set of psychological
concepts, and the conception of morality as a set of practical
rules or guidelines applied in decision making to issue with the
description of practically rational actions are the basis oi the
attempt by utilitarians to make moral philosophy a science.I have
criticised the psychological assumption and the various paradigms
oi decision making.Many other iorms oi this assumption and patterns
oi instrumental practical reasoning could be developed,so the
argument of this section is not conclusive.it could not be
conclusive;this is a feature of the argument of anyone who enters
the contemporary moral debate,particularly concerning
utilitarianism. Conclusive argument can come only from describing in
a better way than the utilitarian does what morality is.I will move
to this now.
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My first point is that we are not required to give a proof of
ethics,for ethics can only be pursued through our particular
morality:it can be known and sought only through the moral
understanding and practices of what I have called my community. Both
the understanding and the practice here must be understood as
linguistic.They are not different sorts of linguistic
behaviour:rather they form a unity of theory with practice and,in
combination,as morality,they form,together with the sort of
theoretical activity which is intellectual enquiry,a second unity
of theory with practice.The fluid nature of such unities,whose
bounds are not externally prescribed but are a function of their
own coherence,was my aim in deriving from Aquinas a concept of
rationality as theoretical activity which is both theory and
practice,yet which entails that all practice is theoretical,the
result and expression of dialectical enquiry.A second source for an
understanding of this unity is the later Wittgenstein whose
distaste for theorising as philosophy culminated in the union of
activity and theory in the concepts of language game,life-form and
rule following.This source will be made explicit shortly.
When I say that the unity in question is linguistic I mean that the
understanding and practice of morality take place in the context oi
complex networks of communication.Particularly moral understandings
and practices add to this complexity in a particular way:they are
expressed,and eventually developed and revised,in
individual,concrete situations in which a fixed small group of
individuals speak and are heard.An individual saves another from a
third's intemperateness;a court removes the liberty of a woman for
harming her child;a teacher explains to some children the
disobedience of Gjliand/i . The standards exercised, strengthened, or
revised here are those of the community, but they are expressed by
individuals within a situation which is both concrete (its
specification cannot be given purely in terms whose abstraction
makes them fit for the description of stretches of dialectical
activity) and particular (the individuality of the participants
means that although their perception of the situation accords with
the pattern of the community,its structure is never more than in
line with the general:it cannot be deduced or predicted from the
moral norms of the community by logic or rules).Specifically moral
forms of communication are not sophisticated or late social
developments,but communication of individuals in
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concrete,particular situations: communication concerning everyday
affairs.
In a stable community morality and rationality will not war. Forms
of rational explanation and justification will provide the norms
communicated in our practices and understandings of ourselves in
particular,concrete situations. However,the forms of social practice
may become divorced from the forms of practical rationality either
in a transition to a new set of rational standards,or as what is
seen as a deliberate break from theory and principle.The latter may
be anarchic or spiritual;the first revolutionary or apathetic.In
both cases rationality and morality will war for a time,and then
necessarily come back together if a community is to preserve its
identity (they may come together in so new a form that we wish to
claim the founding of a new community;or stay apart for a time as
an extended breakdown of community).The war,when it occurs,is
caused by the continuing and unstoppable dialectic which is the
development of rationality,and the moral impulse of individuals to
pull away from it or jump ahead of it.The chaos within reason which
results can never persist.
In this sense rationality is irresistible:it cannot be jettisoned
because the attempt to create new farms of explanation outside the
bounds of reason simply results in the re-creation of these bounds
through the process of revision which is the heart of
rationality,if the dialectical account is correct.Attempting to
give non-rational paradigms of explanation merely sets up a new
standard of rationality,and attempting theoretical revolution as a
moral priority merely pushes theoretical standards to breaking
point,breaks them,and settles for a theoretical standard which
surpasses the previous one in its explanatory potential and so
satisfies the revolutionary for a while.
The moral life and moral knowledge need not at this level of
analysis be at all 'moral' in the common sense.The communication
between individuals in particular,concrete situations is always
rationally explicable,but the canons of rationality of the
community in question need make no mention of
virtues,rightness,duties,laws or the like. They will set up
relations of obligation and entitlement among members of the
community,but these are not to be understood as sorts of moral
relations.To stand in these relations is not something members of a
community do. or strive for,but what it is to exist not just as
individuals but as. a particular community.If there is to be a
morality,the existence of a community through the interaction of
individuals in concrete,particular situations,then there must be
individuals standing in relations of entitlement and responsibility
prior to this:if not,these sort of situations would not occur.Moral
standards,then,arise as a response to the particularities and
social necessities of shared human life, and the form of this
sharing,a farm which morality comes to contribute towards,can be
distinguished in the first instance as rationality,shared standards
of explanation and understanding.As the standards 01 rationality
may embody ways of discourse we would not call 'moral',patterns oi
communication destructive of communication itself,the moral
response may also through its adjustment to these lack any
characteristics we would normally think definitive of a morality.My
theory, that is, allows for the existence of thoroughly un-moral
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moralities.The question is,is there any way of distinguishing these
from good moralities,and are there any grounds for making such a
distinction,rather than a simple distinction between our morality
and those of others,in the first place?
This distinction can only be coherently made if we accept that
there are true and false moralities.It is only by accepting this
that we can evaluate moralities at all rather than merely describe
some as 'ours' and some as different,and it is only by a realist
theory explaining what a true morality is that we can distinguish
within the class of moralities those which succeed and those which
fail in their communicative purpose.The difficulty is what a true
morality can mean. For our consideration we have only the facts of
particular moralities and the relations between moralities: human
life is community life,and community life cannot only take the form
of instinctual or general communication,but must also include
communication on an individual level and in particular
situations;human beings therefore take part in and enquire into
morality.Ve cannot stand free from (all> morality and evaluate
moralities because we cannot stand free from community, and within
community morality is inescapable.Yet we want to claim there are
true and false moralities:we want to proscribe whole communities
for outrages.Also,there is. such a phenomenon as moral growth and
advance.
To understand how,though necessarily bound by our own moralities,we
can come to an understanding of true morality we must recall that
morality is not simply moral practices and institutions,but is also
moral understanding:the holding of beliefs, attitudes, emotions and
opinions which reflect the forms of communication these practices
and institutions embody and constitute them as they are.Moral
understanding is a sort of knowledge.It is formed after collecting
evidence.it is open to empirical investigation, and it is true. Moral
understanding is true not only because it accurately represents our
moral practices,but because it constitutes them. That is, as we have
said, moral understanding has the dual role or cataloguing moral
practices and of creating,and sometimes revising them.Its
truth, then, is not merely a matter of correct reporting but of
advancing correct adjustments and revisions of standards of
behaviour in concrete and particular situations,
This correct development of moral standards which is a leature of
true moral understanding, moral knowledge,cannot be an application
of rational norms, because evaluation by these norms would represent
not creative advance,but mere reflection of current
standards.Morality and rationality are closely related.Morality is
part of the context of rationality:it develops together with
dialectical progress of theoretical activity,though it is
identifiable independently due to its connection with the
particular and concrete;morality can be a standpoint of evaluation
of conceptions of rationality:one source of dialectical progress is
incompatibility with moral practices we feel actually structure our
community,leading to revision of rational norms.However,evaluation
of morality by principles of rationality is not the source of moral
truth for it can only ever bring morality in line with rational
standards it has escaped.When rational evaluation of morality
occurs what is happening is evaluation by something else which just
happens to be compatible with current rational principles.
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The source of moral truth,then,is neither moral practices nor
rational conceptions,but it appears we have no other normative
footholds than these.There is no extra-moral source of ethical
truth or practice available to us,therefore there is no ethical
knowledge we can appeal to to evaluate the truth or falsity of the
behaviour in which our moralities consist outside these moralities
themselves.However,although there is no moral knowledge outside our
own moral practices and institutions,I want to claim that through
our morality we can have understanding of norms of behaviour which
impose requirements upon us independent of our morality,and that
through our morality we can participate in behaviour required by
something other than our morality.The conduct the moral
understanding imposes upon our moral practices can be an exercise
of true judgement,moral knowledge,because it can be a judgement of
what is required of behaviour by a standard which is truly
objective (independent of the existence of communities).The
vocabulary of the moral understanding is not only that of a
particular morality,but that of what I will call ethics,the source
of a moral undersanding of some greater than merely moral
truth.True moral understanding is farmed through morality by.
ethics;and true moralities are moralities informed by this
understanding - which is a component of the morality - and
constituted by participation in practices and institutions which
are required by it or permitted by its
requirements.Morality,then,is level two to a standard of
explanation which is ethics.Vithin this system ethics is level one
to the disposition to love - charity - which is basic.
Charity:the Disposition to Love.
Moral philosophers in our tradition have been reluctant to discuss
love, presumably because of the belief that it is conceptually
vague.This is incorrect;there are a number of problems philosophy
will not solve unless it recognises the role oi the disposition of
charity. From this point I will talk only of love,but Intend by this
'love or the disposition to love'.Love has two
constituents:understanding and experience.Both are acquired through
individual human encounters.The understanding of love is moral:it
occurs always within the context of a morality;but our experience
of love need not be experience of a moral encounter.1 will consider
first the experience of love.
It might be thought there is a difference between erotic and other
forms of love,however this is not the case.The distinction is
between different sorts of expressions of love.All love is
bodily,but all expressions of love are not.The difference between
erotic love and non-erotic is that erotic love always tends towards
bodily expression,and cannot be fully expressed without bodily
forms of expression.lt need not,of course,rage for bodily
expression,and it can also be expressed in many other
ways.However,if it is erotic love,its overall tendency will be to
bodily expression,and it can never be fully expressed except in
bodily ways.
Non-erotic love need not be expressed bodily,but it is bodily.Vhat
does this mean?It is bodily first in that it exists between
individuals,particular embodied individuals.This does not simply
mean that disembodied love is inconceivable (though I think it
is),but that the characteristics oi the particular body are
relevant to the particular love involved.Familiar bodily contact oi
family or childhood friends has caused our love of them to have a
quite different quality even to that of good friends or sexual
partners;bodily wounds or hurt draw forth an immediate love,even
for strangers;sudden meetings with old friends whose appearances
have greatly changed requires additional effort and adjustment for
the old love to appear.Non-erotic love is also bodily in that the
experience of love is a felt experience.Love is, must be, felt in and
through the body.As with other felt experiences such as grief or
depression, love involves understanding. The difference with love is
the particularly high degree of coherence there is between
experience and understanding. Our understanding in
grief,ecstasy,hate and the like is incomplete in the sense that it
does not fully cohere with the felt experience to make this
intelligible.Further understanding is required by these
experiences, and it generally has the effect of dissolving the
experience. However, the understanding ot love,unlike the
understanding oi hate,makes the experience
comprehensible, and, together with the experience,prolongs the
loving. The reason for this,as we shall see, is that the experience
unites in a totally communicative way individuals,and the
understanding oi this unity always gives reason for prolonging the
union and seeking it in other situations.
Non-erotic love can be expressed through means of the body or
expressed in non-bodily ways.The latter does not mean 'without
bodies being involved' but 'without the involvement of bodies being
the expression of love'.Bodily expression of non-erotic love might
be smiling at the loved one, talking to her,touching him
intentionally,play fighting,having a meal with him, or simply
relaxing together.Non-bodily expression might be playing
tennis,singing with her,decorating a roam,repairing a car,going on
holiday together.The love is expressed not through the bodily
contact,but in the playing of a game,performing of an
activity,doing of a service.Non-erotic love neither tends towards
bodily expression nor requires bodily expression to reach
fulfilment.This is not to say that it is in any way not bodily.
Because of its bodily nature and its bonding of particular
individuals the experience of love is one of our most basic human
experiences.By this I mean that anyone who asks what authority love
has or what justification one who pleads love as a reason for his
actions has is asking a question whose answer in normal
circumstances is either tautologous or embarrassingly irank.In this
sense,and only this sense,love can be said to go beyond or to
transcend questions of right and wrong, ought and ought not.This has
lead often to a doctrine of 'love beyond morality',in particular
this has been suggested as the doctrine of the New Testament. This
doctrine is held by those who hold it because of the fact that love
exists beyond the possibility of its own justification,and because
there are no reasons why love cannot hold between any two human
beings in the world.The latter follows because as love is open to
no form of external evaluation,no other sorts of reasons can ever
be produced for not loving someone. This leads to the belief that
true morality can only be the living out of the life of love,In a
sense this is true,but not in the sense meant by theorists of
love.They mistake the complex nature of the relation between love
and morality,holding that love overthrows all complexity and is.
morality;and they forget that love is also understanding.
What is the relation of morality to love?Morality is the standard
practices and forms of understanding of these practices in our
community.Morality concerns individuals in concrete and particular
situations.It,therefore,provides the context for experiences of
love (and,as we shall see later,for the understanding in love).The
situations in which love is experienced are all structured or
actually created by the community in its forms of moral practice
and understanding:it creates love directly through recognition and
encouragement,and indirectly through suppression of more complex
instincts.The love we experience may,but need not be,recognised by
the community within whose boundaries of social possibilities it
occurs.By a community's recognition of love I mean the community's
holding an experience and understanding of love either morally
permissible or morally required.A community such as ours recognises
such loves as love of family,friends and celebrity and media
figures,in fact virtually any non-erotic love,and does not
recognise such loves as homosexual love,and love between an adult
and a child,in fact,virtually any erotic love other than that
between heterosexual long-term partners.The loves a community
recognises are both a result of its moral outlook and a cause of
the standards of that outlook.They are cause of it not in the sense
that they stand before moral standards obtain and influence our
choice of these,but in the sense that from within our morality they
suggest creative revision and improvement.Love only can be
experienced in a shared environment,through a community and hence a
morality,and whether it encourages and recognises one's love,it is
responsible for it.
Love,which is wholly discovered in a moral context,is the inner
dynamic of morality.lt is not merely 'another moral conception'
because morality Is. that form of communication between individuals
in limited and concrete situations which will turn out to be
love.The situation is thus unlike that of rationality,theoretical
activity,whose inner dynamic is simply the activity of theory
itself:the potential of generated farms of explanation to replace
the current ones by being explanatory of these. Because it is
communication between individuals,morality has a purpose,a goal
extrinsic to its own best (moral) standards: that communication
between individuals is achieved.Rationality,however,has no goal
extrinsic to its own best standards. Love, then, is both morality's
dynamic and the,extra-moral,teleology of morality.
Moralities can be false,they can tail to embody in practice and
understanding communication of individuals in particular
situations. This does not, however, mean that a true morality can be
described simply as one in which love is pursued,one in which
individuals' communication becomes action arising solely from
mutual displays of charity.I am not advocating love as the sole
moral motive,a philosophical theory of love.The reason for this is
that if we dedicate ourselves fully and exclusively to the
experiencing of love and to creating the conditions so that others
might experience love, without participation in any other social
structure,except perhaps those which allow us to pursue love more
efficiently,we sacrifice the element of understanding in love.To
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chase the experience of love ior itself is to pursue love
basely, without understanding,and the experience which would result
from this would not be communication of individuals in
concrete, particular situations because it would simply be x having
an experience of a certain sort and,perhaps,y,too having this
experience.The theory which would advocate this would be one whose
goal is the doing of charitable action,and which requires the
experience of love merely as a catalyst ior such action.
The true union of individuals in communication,the union in which
something is said and something heard,is not formed by two
individuals having private and individual experiences:the
communication requires the unity of experience with
understanding.And this understanding,the understanding which makes
the experience intelligible,is given only by participation in those
practices and institutions society has evolved as the ways of
dealing with concrete relations between individuals and by the
understanding of these;that is,by morality. The understanding is
given by morality because love occurs only in the context of
morality,and this means both that the community is responsible for
the conditioning of the experience and that the moral structures of
the community are responsible for the understanding.
Morality,then,cannot be 'overthrown' for love because love involves
essentially forms of understanding,the faculties of juagement,and
these make essential reference to the moral practices and forms of
moral understanding of particular communities.If the intellectual
component of love refers to a particular morality and there can as
I have suggested be false moralities,moralities failing to effect
communication between individuals as individuals - a notion still
to be explained - then there is always the possibility of chaos
within love itself,a dislocation between love and morality which
manifests itself as a disharmony in love.And this disharmony,which
is experienced primarily as something hurtful,is precisely,I would
suggest,the common experience of those who find their loves at
variance with the norms of society.lt is not just a war between
love and morality, but a war between the actual components of an
individual's loving due to our inescapable conditioning in moral
practice and understanding - something more tragic than a conflict
of love and morality. The real implication of this analysis,then,is
the frightening truth that morality,that which we create never as
creator but only as participant,pervades right down into the depths
of our experiences,even love,the most private one,so that
structures outwith our control retain always the power to throw
into chaos even those experiences which appear to be our least
public ones.Far from overthrowing morality,as theorists ol love
sometimes claim,it is love that requires to armour itself against
the inclination of morality to overthrow it.
If the understanding component in love is necessarily moral - it
makes essential reference to forms of moral practice and
understanding - then a true morality, one in which the sort of
communication which is love f lourishes, must include every passible
experience of love in the sense that it makes an understanding of
every experience of love possible.This requires discussion.
I have already said that moralities can be evaluated by an extra-
moral standard even though there is no non-moral standard available
to us.I said the evaluation of morality was by ethics,and that this
could not be understood without first understanding love.We have
seen that neither our experience nor our understanding of love is
explicable except within the moral context.So the understanding of
(the experience of) love requires knowledge of morality;and the
evaluation of morality,knowledge of true morality,requires an
ethical'standard outside any morality but acquired through one's
own morality.How can a morality which may not be true,a set of
social practices,institutions and understandings which may be
ethically deiective,provide ethical knowledge (knowledge of true
morality)? How through our own morality can we achieve knowledge
which may invalidate that very morality?
The theories of Aristotle and Aquinas may help to explain this.They
look beyond morality as it is practiced to a Final End:although the
moralities they reflect and contribute to have this in view,once
eudaimonia is reached.it will be seen that the life of highest
virtue or Beatitude makes redundant the moralities which culminate
in it.Morality is. the human process of instantiating eudaimonia
as,and through the standards of,a community,but it is also the
postponing of eudaimonia until a stage at which human life has
surpassed the contingencies of morality and all social practices:as
I say,until morality is replaced by the reality of communication ot
individuals as. individuals,by love.This does not mean that the
moral beliefs of a life which achieves eudaimonia were false:they
succeeded;but at the level of eudaimonia,ethics,the possibility of
morality is fully exhausted,and moral belieis,though true,are
redundant.Such accounts of ethics,and to a lesser extent the
Kantian account (the Kingdom of Ends) and the utilitarian account
(the felicific summum bonum),help explain how through morality we
can acquire a form of knowledge which is not separate from our
moral farms of understanding,but which is other than them and
explanatorily superior to them since it is what they are intended
to achieve.
This knowledge might be fully available to us even when our
morality is quite imperfect as a means of realising the object of
the knowledge,whether the imperfection is due to weakness of
character or of intellect (Aquinas held the Matural Law is known to
all),and so the knowledge might be available as an evaluative
standard for moralities.This model,derived from eudaimonic
thought,is well and good if it can be shown that there is an end or
an object all moralities aim to achieve,and that it is the same for
all moralities,whatever they might hold.Vhat,in other words,might
ethical knowledge consist in ?
I said above that love can only be understood in relation to a
morality,or morally.! have also said that moralities are contingent
and dynamically developing sets of practices and institutions with
the forms of understanding which accompany these.lt follows that
the understanding of love of a particular community,or from within
that community,is also contingent.On the model of an indefinitely
postponed yet 'imperfectly' realised eudaimonia (Aquinas's
Imperfect and Perfect Beatitude) we can say that through
contingent, even false, morality it is possible to have (true)
ethical knowledge.The concepts in which we express this are very
much a feature of our own morality, and are inadequate to the task
of fully describing the 'life of ethics',the object of ethical
knowledge,but as an expression of that abject they may be
sufficient for ev both our morality and that of
others'.This understanding of ethics is contingent upon our
particular moral circumstances but is. knowledge of moral
truth; similarly, the understanding of love,as I have presented it,is
contingent upon particular moralitites,though love exists at a
level of experience whose reality is independent of the normative
standards of particular communities.Love and the sort of knowledge
I have been calling ethical knowledge, then, occupy structurally
similar positions with regard to morality.
Ethical knowledge is possible from within even false moralities
because it is knowledge which comes not from what we attempt to
communicate on an individual level within our moralities,but from
the human necessity of communicating on an individual level over
concrete particular situations at all.Whatever individuals
communicate in their moralities,we have the existence of shared
practices and understandings of morality as the sign of the need
wherever there is human life for communication at the individual
level.This necessity,which is not the necessity of living as a
community (this requires shared and developing theoretical activity
also,rationality,as well as morality) but the necessity of a
particular sort of individual communication,extends beyond the
restrictions of the particular morality in which we follow it
(moral practices and institutions are constantly altering),and
stretches the experience of communication between individuals into
future possibilities while allowing that it is,also,experienced now
as participation in morality. As a necessary,though necessarily
unconsummated,human experience which prompts morality,the 'life of
ethics',whatever this is,can be used to evaluate moralities: so far
as they promote communication between individuals on an individual
basis,they are true;so far as they do not,they are false.
I have deliberately,of course,built love and ethics up in similar
ways so as to make the formal claim that ethics,the term I have
chosen for the complex communication of individuals,is love.I am
not presenting a formal proof of this;something at first
worrying,but later reassuring.As I have said,we are not required to
give a proof of ethics,for our understanding of ethics is wholly
conditioned,as it must be,by the concepts and form of our own
morality,the set of ways by which our people communicate over
concrete details and the ways in which they understand this.But as
we cannot prove that ethics is,so we cannot prove what it is:what
it is is again wholly a function of the beliefs of such as
participate successfully within our practices and our ways of
understanding.I have no business,then,with proving that morality is
ethics is love:this may not be so for my, or any other, community. But
what,then,is the meaning of my claim to be presenting a realist
theory,the theory that moralities really are true,and are only
true,so far as they promote love?
The meaning of this claim is that,unlike conceptions of
rationality,interconnecting sets of moral practices and
understandings can be described by a standard other then their own
which gives normative grounds for changing them;they can be
evaluated:they have a goal,one they can realise,but only
imperfectly and partially,and from its perspective they can be
described as true or false.This feature is not a contingent one of
certain moralities;it remains in every morality,despite attempts to
eradicate it by making a morality seli-suificient.It is inseparable
from morality because the basic necessity of communicating at the
level of lndividual-to-individual contact,through the body whether
by means of the body or not,is seen even in attempts to set up
social practices and norms which are deliberately chosen to destroy
such communication.lt is this necessity,and not some particular
concept of love,which I mean by 'love'.The inescapability of such a
communicative necessity entails ethical truth,and the nature of the
object of this necessity when we make it transparent is
communication between individuals in a way which is unmediated by
social forms or social roles:it is the complex of experience and
understanding which consists in individuals communicating just as
individuals;that is,love.No more direct proof is possible without
violating the universality and contingency of the forms of
explaining of individual communities.The coherence of my account of
what love is must be judged by its role within the acount of
morality,and the defence of it against alternative notions of love.
Morality on this account is the call to leave separateness,and to
enter into individual-ta-individual contact through means found
acceptable to all likely to communicate on an individual basis,and
to respect these means in our daily lives.The call itself is love
which may be experienced outside these means and practices as
giving reason to revise them,but which cannot be understood except
in terms of these practices and our understanding of them. Through
them we have an knowledge of love,ethics,which may be used to
evaluate moralities and particular aspects of moralities.This
knowledge,when combined with the experiential component of love,is
the same felt need to break down the barriers ol solitariness and
make communication with other individuals which explains the growth
and development of moralities.Yet this knowledge,the understanding
in love,can be explained only in the context of present moral
understanding,understanding of the practices and forms of our
current morality.
The terms of this knowledge of moral truth will be those of the
present morality.This is not uncontroversial,for 'the present
morality' is the continuous object of debate and disagreement
between those who hold different views concerning the details
concerning individuals within social life.This debate
is,however,the reality of the dynamism of morality I have in
mind,and is not formless due to the posibility of the exercise of
good judgement in accordance with accepted canons ol
rationality,and the possibility of ethical knowledge.The fact that
there is. something within the debate which can be confidently
refered to as the present morality is itself a feature of the
possibility of ethical knowledge:all morality is either a good or
bad attempt at communication of individuals; from the standard of
this communication, ethics, it is possible to discriminate those
social structures which are dependent for their success on the
communication of individuals, and those which are not.Those which
are,whether they advance this communication or frustrate it
(whether they are features of true or false moralities) are parts
of moralities, and can be considered,together with all those social
structures compatible with their success,as g_ morality of the
present. 'The present morality' is simply a. morality of the present
to which the speaker belongs.
What are the obiects oi the knowledge of ethics, the moral
truths?What must moral practices include if the morality is to be
true?I will state these here,and explain them in chapter 7.They
must include respect for the individual and for the means of
communication at the individual level,that is,the moral practices
and institutions of any but a false morality;concern for family
life, the dignity of procreation,and certain limitations on sexual
activity;knowledge must be valued;privacy must be valued;there must
be a concern for the basic needs of individuals and communities.
This listing of the content of ethical knowledge must be crude,for
it must be possible for it to be formulated differently, according
to the understandings of any true morality.Different true
moralities may not be able to communicate with each other even
about the contents of ethical knowledge,but in their practices and
institutions,and in their own understandings of these,I believe
each would exhibit respect for the individual,for all true
moralities,for sex ordered primarily to birth,for the rearing and
education of children,value for knowledge,and also for privacy -
non-interference by individuals or state,and the serving of all
basic needs (which will be specified).This is ethics:these six
points constitute the understanding component in love.We can
experience love without having this understanding,but the
experience will not be intelligible.Knowing these paints is to love
intelligibly.They explain what morality is,and one who knows them
through her morality,which may not express but is dependent upon
them,may evaluate moralities.Moralities are understandings of
love,then,but love can only be known morally;however,as love
concerns the communication of individuals not as moral agents but
simply as individuals,love exceeds and can reform moralities, both
true ones and false ones.Whereas rationality is simply theoretical
activity as pursued in a community,morality is not just practical
standards of conduct pursued in communities.Neither,however, does
morality have the precision of science.Mather,it falls between the
two as contingently developing forms of communication between
individuals which,whether or not it is respected as part of their
end,has as its cause and its end the very formation of means of
communication of individuals as individuals.
Before going on to defend my conception of love against others,and
to consider the implications of this for the sort of moral theory
we should write,I will summarise the posiiton so far in the form of
levels of explanation (Appendix 1).
My claim is that ethics is not just the theory of (theoretical
study of) moralities,but the union of theory and practice (the
understanding component and the experience component in love) as
that communication between individuals which every true morality is
an attempt to bring about,and every false morality an
attempt,parasitically,to feed upon.The role of love in this
analysis occupies a similar role to the concepts of life-form and
language game in the later Wittgenstein (see the discussions of
Holiday pp.46-8,60-1),As these are not theoretical constructs of
social and behavioural phenomena,so love is not the explanation of
morality and the description of true morality:it is the union of
experience and understanding which is. true morality,and which false
morality is dependent upon.Ethics is not simply the theoretically
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deeper expression of true morality,but actually is. the truth of that
morality,and yet a truth which never could be more than imperfectly
realised,but is always also indefinitely postponed.The diagram of
levels of explanation is,then,always only part of the story,for love
is never just an explanation but, as it is knowledge and personal
experience, always also a candidate for explanation,which must be
given in terms of morality, the understanding within which can only
be furnished by the understanding of love.
Alternative Accounts of Love,
Aristophanes and Self-Sufiiciency.
Plato's Symposium (trans.V. Hamilton, London;1951) contains in the
speech of Aristophanes one of the most famous and influential views
of love. 'Love is simply the name for the desire and pursuit of the
whole' (192e).According to the speech we were once perfectly self-
sufficient beings,circular wholes which gave in to the 'overweening
pride' of our self-sufficient states,and were punished by the gods
with bisection.Our subsequent preoccupation with wholeness explains
our desire for love - union with the bisected half.This is a
myth,and we ought not to become involved with its detail,although to
the exegete this cannot ever again be treated as mere preamble to
the doctrine of Socrates since the startling analysis of the
dialogue by Nussbaum (.Fragility of Goodness, ch. 6). However. we can
profitably discuss the speech in terms of a theory concerning need
and sufficiency.
Ironically,Aristophanes' speech takes the sting out of the major
criticism of such theories,what can be called the requirement of
respect.The analysis of love for p as the satisfying of a need or
lack of q's.even if in the process a lack of similar or equal
importance of p's is addressed,sees certain characteristics of p as
relevant lor q's fulfilment,and in doing so treats p not as an
integrated individual but merely as the possessor of certain
relevant properties. Aristophanes,however,cannot be accused of
violating the respect condition,because he is describing love not as
the search for property-bearers,but for whole,integrated human
beings.In fact,not only are we searching for individuals,but for one
unique individual.The fact that once we find him or her we will
unite because of the urge to become the sort of individuals we once
were,does not imply what we are seeking is something less than a
whole individual.lt is,in fact,a particular individual that we seek.
Aristophanes speech is a myth,but we must consider that the need-
analysis can be taken literally:the lover is an individual in need
of what the beloved provides.This view of lover as consumer does not
allow individuals to be conceived of as wholes:the lover does not
see the other but only her characteristics,and he does not see
himself in his experience of love but only his lack;the beloved does
not see the other but only his need,and she does not see herseli in
her experience of love but only her capacity to satisfy the need.
Vhy does respect for individuality matter in love,which appears
precisely to weld individuals together? Primarily,because
love,however it is expressed,involves the body and the body is
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particular:the body's identity cannot be destroyed except by
destroying it.As the body,like the intellect or sexuality,is what
the individual is. (be can be individuated by it),whenever the body
is involved the individual is necessarily involved.As love involves
the body,and so necessarily the individual, then if love is valued,it
follows the individual must be respected.To see the loved one as
bearer of needed properties is to both receive the gift of his whole
self,bodily,and in other aspects,and to devalue and reject this gift
by only acknowledging some part of it which is less than the offered
whole.What is needed is taken,the remainder is discarded,and this is
to reject both the precise gift offered and to devalue the
giver;that is,not to respect the other's individuality.
To believe when an individual ofers himself that we have an option
of accepting either whole or part,to seeindividuals in terms of
wholes and parts,is to see them as objects.Objects are
divisible.Living human bodies,human beings, however,are not objects
precisely because they have the ability to communicate with other
individual human beings as individuals.when we see another as
(either) whole or part,we see him as object,and thereby deny what is
determinate of his humanity,what makes this sort of individual not
an object:his capacity to communicate- as an indivdual,and not merely
through social or species means.Respect,therefore,matters,and cannot
be accounted for in a need-analysis of love.
Aristotelian Vulnerability.
'Without philoi nobody would choose to live,even if he had all the
other goods' (N. E. 1155a5>. ' The eudaimon needs philoi'
(1169b).Aristotle is quite unequivocal concerning the role of love
within the good life.His carefully developed conditions for love may
be less convincing.The abject of love must be separate from me;he
must have a good;I wish him this good for his own sake,and he must
also wish ray good tor my own sake; we must also share what we
understand as living (,1171b32-3). Loving, then, is mutual affection
between two human beings who know each other,can wish each other's
good for their own sakes',and who can share their lives.
What is relevant is Aristotle's approach to the restrictions upon
love.We can love another only if we can share what we both see as
life or that for which we live;we can understand the other's good
and wish it - and not as one oi my goods,but because it is her
good;and if she is capable of all this regarding me and my good.What
the intellectualist Aristotelian tradition omits is what the
disposition of charity captures:that when the conditions tor
full,sharing love are not fulfilled or have broken down,love is
still possible in the farms of individual communicative activity
such as compassionate consideration for another's welfare and for
his good.
I have said before that a suddenly encountered and immediate demand
upon love can exceed any other claims,including moral ones,before
us,and have said this is so because it is not other than morality
but the object of (true) moralities.I have also suggested that the
compassionate action, referred to by us as 'charity',is not different
from love, but one form of expression of non-erotic love:the
providing of one or some of the ethical goods.Aristotle's
understanding of love,though it talks of the comprehensive good of
the other,perverts the relation of love and ethics.Love Is.
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eudaimania,not a part oi it:we cannot know another's good,and know
that part of this is to love him,to further his good.Rather,his
good,and mine, is the communication I have called love,and our
knowing this - the component of understanding in love - is what
makes the experience of love intelligible,an intelligibility which
will consist in the knowledge oi the 'ethical goods'.Aristotle is
superbly insightful:he explains love by eudaimonia,of which love
itself is an element. But he is ultimately wrong because his
exclusive reliance on theoretical explanjtion both of love and of the
good of another makes impossible the intelligibility of the
experience of love in such a case as that of compassionate
action.Because eudaimonia,'ethics' as I have called it,constitutes
through the six ethical goods an understanding of love,and no more
than an understanding of it,we can say that compassionate care oi
another and the experience of the inclination to this is entailed by
love.
A theory such as Aristotle's fails because it places overwhelming
weight upon a high degree of reciprocity of knowledge,lifestyle and
concern for each other's good between individuals,and because it
makes the knowledge - of another,of her view of life and her good -
criterial for love and not simply a component of love.Aristotle's
view is of a very genuine,if elevated,interplay between experience
and understanding of well-acquainted,well-balanced individuals who
are approximately equal in respect of their powers of understanding
and of sympathy.It neither exhausts the varieties of love due to its
restrictions,nor captures the essence of love due to its
misjudgement of the relation of love to ethics.
Hume and the Impression of Love,
''lis altogether impossible to give any definition of the passions
of love and hatred; and that because they produce merely a simple
impression, wihtout any mixture or composition';'The
virtue, knowledge,wit,good sense,good humour of any person produce
love and esteem';'The object of love and hatred is evidently some
thinking person;and...the sensation oi the former passion is always
agreeable'(Treatise.ed.L.A.Selbv Bigge,Oxford;1978,2,2,1).This is
the crux of Hume's discussion of the passion of love.Love is caused
by,for example, beauty; its object is the possessor of that beauty
which must always be a person or thinking being; and the cause of the
passion produces a particular pleasure.When I love someone,then, some
characteristics produce an agreeable effect upon me; this cause must
be related to a person other than myself with whom I have some
concern and it must produce an agreeable efect,a pleasure, from which
arises the passion of love.The relation of ideas by which I consider
this person an object of concern for me,and of impressions by which
a pleasant impression leads to the passion of love being felt
towards the person who is the source of the cause of this pleasure
is the celebrated double relation of impressions and ideas of Hume.
What is wrong with this and all sensation accounts of love is the
role given to agreeableness.I have said we cannot break a human
individual into a whole and its parts for the purpose of showing
that answering needs is the essence of love;we certainly cannot do
this for the purpose of explaining how the agreeable sensations
certain characteristics such as beauty arouse constitute love.Hume's
relation of ideas is,therefore,incorrect:the other in love is
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obviously an object of great concern to me,but as the individual I
love and not as the source of the cuase of certain of ray agreeable
sensations. But it is not just the part/whole approach which is wrong
with Hume's account.lt is the idea that love arises only from
agreeable sensations.Here we must distinguish love,of whatever
sort,from'the experience of falling in love, what Erich Froram has
called 'the sudden collapse of the barriers which existed until that
moment between two strangers' (The Art of
Loving.London:1988.p.48)■The exhilaration of this moment is, of
course, the consummation, or a consummation, of all lesser pleasant
sensations.And in all loving,sensations as pleasurable as this,or
reminiscent of this, will occur;not only in erotic love: this is
merely the archetype of the pleasure which is afforded by
communication of individuals as individuals,as bodily
creatures.However,an understanding of love must also explain love as
something which continues when there is no pleasure,even no
experiencing,left.It is only because love can continue beyond
agreeableness that we do not have to live our entire lives in fear
of a loss of heightened experiences.It is in this space beyond
immediate pleasurable feeling that the structures of
trust,faith,fidelity and personal growth can be developed.These ways
in which love outlives experience form what I have called the
understanding component of love.
If love is a sort of communication, part of what is involved is that
something is said.Sounds need not be uttered,but something is passed
by one individual and received by another.What is passed is what I
have said is studied by ethics and embodied within true
moralities,the goods of respect and privacy,knowledge and concern
for individual welfare. When the pleasurableness of love reduces,the
same things are 'said' - if we use the term carefully,the same
'goods' are offered - and respect,concern for needs and so on
survive within such commitments as fidelity,trust,gentleness - in
fact,the elements of the disposition of charity when this is not
being actually exercised in the experience of loving.Thus the
understanding of love which makes the experience of loving
intelligible can survive the finish of that experience,and,in
particular,the cessation of the pleasure of the experience.This
should not be surprising because,as Hume rightly saw,the pleasant
sensations within love are the consequence of a relation of
ideas:the pleasure is a function of the intelligibility of our
experience of love,which is conferred by the understanding;and the
pleasure is therefore,unsurprisingly,survived by the understanding.
Kant and Pathology.
At the extreme from Hume is Kantian practical,non-pathological
love.'Love,as an affection,cannot be commanded,but beneficence for
duty's sake may...This is practical love,and not pathological - a
love which is seated in the will,and not in the propensions of sense
- in principles of action and not of tender sympathy;and it is this
love alone which can be commanded'(Qr. 399).
Kantian love is a practical attitude of will.The good will
determines itself towards duty because it is dutiful,and only this
has moral worth.Ho inclination whatsoever enters into the
determination to action of the good will.Love is the determination
of this will not to action which helps others,but to action which
m
attempts to help others to the extent to which the formal properties
of reason show that such action can be the subject of a categorical
imperative. Kant is not so fierce in M.M, .as we have seen,but the
basic attitude to love remains that it is the state of the will when
determined to beneficent action by pure reason.
What can be said about love as practical reason? First,love is not
practical because in loving,although we do things, what we do has no
end other than itself.We communicate in loving,ana we express this
communication in different ways, but this is not part of the world of
ends and aims, attempts and achievements.Love is doing,but it is not
doing in order to..., or doing for. . . ; it is the activity which in
experiences of love,and,'imperfectly',in our moralities,succeeds in
realising its own end. Love takes us out of the field of the
practical,the area of morality,even if our morality is a true
one, for the understanding in love,in which ethics consists, is not
functioning to give us the knowledge for further (moral) action, but /
is simply interpreting and making coherent for us the love we are
experiencing. Love includes understanding as well as experience, and
this understanding is not merely the provision of new theoretical
information relevant for the performance of continued activity, but
actually is essential to coherent experiences of love.Therefore,love
is not practical.
Love involves reason in so far as it is understanding,but love is
also experience.The understanding in love is always ethical
understanding,and it is always reached through our morality.Moral
standards reflect the standards of rational explanation of action of
our community.Love,therefore,involves rationality.But it is also
experience,and experience may show the accepted moral standards are
defective,and that any supporting rational forms of explanation are
invalid.Therefore,the experience of love may give reason to
transcend or rather to develop the conception of rationality.
Love is not practical reason because practical reason,pursuit of
moral ends by rational means,may function instrumentally within a
false morality. Within a true morality love is the end of practical
reason,that which is promoted in our social practices and our
understandings of them. But,again, it is not identical to practical
reason because at its fullest the experience of love excludes reason
altogether:the component of understanding in love ceases to provide
knowledge (the ethical knowledge we acquire through action and
reflection in our (true) morality) , and simply functions to make the
individual's experience coherent as an expression of that
knowledge:the communication of individuals as. individuals,
Pleasure and Gert,
Bernard Gert writes,'To love someone is to take pleasure in his
pleasure... To be loved is to have someone take pleasure in your
pleasure... To love someone who loves you is one of hte most glorious
things that can happen,for pleasure builds on pleasure as is
possible in no other way.... It is a feeling - a feeling of pleasure
at the pleasure of another' (Moral Rules.p.144).
This,like all Gert's writing,is marked by a cocksuredness whose real
value is the challenge it throws down to overthrow his
proclamations.Pleasure is so important, he believes,because it is one
of the goods which no rational man could risk losing without
possessing further adequate reason so to act.Gert has definitions of
m
great exactitude of all these terms which prepare one for
discovering some truth which cannot be established inter-
definitionally.That truth, when it comes,has two components: the
concept of self-interest can be understood as not being killed,not
suffering pain,disablement,or loss of pleasure or freedom and
opportunity;to act contrary to self-interest for no reason is to act
irrationally (p.37).
I am not concerned here with the status of the basic goods,or the
lack of argument for them,but with the intrinsic goodness of
pleasure which qualifies it for its role in the analysis of love.It
is persuasive that to act contrary to self-interest with no further
reason,where self-interest is understood as Gert understands it,is
irrationality.This,however,involves a sleight of hand.The only
'further reason' there could be for inflicting such a harm upon
oneself is the avoidance in some way or another of a basic evil,and
Gert's list is of sufficient generality to accommodate all of
these.Thus,if I believe self-interest is protection against Gert's
five evils,to harm myself by inflicting one of these on myself and
not to do so for the reason of preventing myself suffering another
of them is irrational not just,as Gert says,because of the great
seriousness of the harm,but because collectively this set of 'evils'
exhausts the possibilities of coherence of action within one system
of explanation of action.
Gert's basic goods and evils are explanatorily useless because they
are not ends or conditions of action,but the limits of the
intelligibility of action within a particular conception of
rationality.Transgressing them for no further reason is necessarily
irrationality because collectively they set all the possibilities of
rational action within a particular understanding of
rationality.When Gert suggests there is something of basic rational
significance about not violating certain goods,he has actually
simply taken the most general bordering conditions of a particular
understanding of rationality;he has not located a set of absolute
'goods' and 'eviIs'.Because of this,none of his intrinsic goods can
be held to be intrinsic in an sense of 'intrinsic' which means it is
something more than the construct of a particular conception of
rationality.Pleasure,then,is not an intrinsic good.
Even though Gert is wrong and pleasure is not an intrinsic
good,could it not be that love is taking pleasure in another's
pleasure? It is certainly not sufficient.! may get pleasure from the
sight of the pleasure of the Royal princes at Balmoral,but I in no
way love them. I may actually detest them, and the activities which
are giving them pleasure,and even grudge them their pleasure,yet
suddenly discover the leeling of pleasure arise in me through
watching their pleasure. There is judgement in love as well as
feeling. Gert' s account omits the understanding in love. It is also
not a necessary component of love since I may fail to get pleasure
from her pleasure, or any other form of her good,yet still approve
it, know it is good for her and welcome it,and love her through all
of this.If someone loves a wrestler,hates wrestling,cannot
understand how he gets pleasure from wrestling,feels no pleasure
even at the thought of his great pleasure in wrestling because of
what this is pleasure in,but wants his happiness and approves his
wrestling because it leads to this,then I do not believe we can say
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she does not love him.Pleasure is neither well-grounded as an
intrinsic good,nor an intrinsic part of love.
Fromm,and The Art ol Loving,
Frornn is excellent on love,though despite what he says,I think his
book is more a practical guide than a theory of love.His theory of
human nature explains that man,arising from,transcending but not
escaping his nature,is 'life being aware of itself
(p.14).Awarenesss is reason,and shows our lack of control over past
and present:we are helpless,alone,and worse of
all,separate.Awareness of separation leads to anxiety,and this can
only be overcome by union.The only satisfying sort of union is
love,'union under the condition of preserving one's integrity,one's
individuality' (p.24).Love is giving - 'in giving he cannot help
bringing something to life in the other person,and this which is
brought to life reflects back to him;in truly giving,he cannot help
receiving that which is given back to him' (p. 27). Love always
implies care,responsibility,respect and knowledge.In love, however,we
know each other without any desire to
know.Care,responsibility,respect and knowledge are themselves
ultimately stilled by love which is inter-penetration of the
essences of each other. The four values do not, however, become
irrelevant because complete union with another is. knowing
him, respecting him as him, caring for him, and responding to him. There
are a number of forms of love,but the most basic is brotherly love
'which is based on the experience that we are all one'
(p. 44). Brotherly love begins with love of the poor and the
helpless:'Only in the love of those who do not serve a purpose love
begins to unfold' (p.45).
Fromm knows love is ultimately all that matters,but he believes the
understanding of love is psychological.Therefore he gives a
wonderful series of discussions of the lack of love.I have claimed
the understanding of love is linguistic,a matter of
communication.Thus we understand love by searching for its
meaning:this is the specific role of morality. Through our social
practices,institutions and our communal understanding of these we
approach the meaning of love.I believe it is only here and not
through the having and analysis of individual experiences of love
that we can come to an understanding of love.I also believe that not
even a true morality will have a perfect understanding of
love,because love is. also experience:the two are inseparable within
a relation of intelligibility which can be decried partially and
imperfectly by the practice and understanding of a morality which
promotes the ethical goods,and,possibly,perfectly within our
experiences of loving communication.Neither analysis of personal
experience,nor the fullest understanding of love in terms of the
ethical goods through particular true moralities gives real
knowledge of love:if this comes.it comes only from the complex
within personal loving experience.
What, then, is. 'real' knowledge ol love? I agree with F'romm that it is
the knowledge that stops all enquiry,the knowledge which ceases to
be part ol theoretical activity,rationality,at all.To enquire about
love will be an unsuccessful activity unless we are willing to
accept its conclusion will not be given solely in theoretical
terms,but in the union of those terms with experience. However, Fromm
would want to say this is a form of knowledge which puts an end to
all other, normal,knowing: knowledge become pure experience, whereas I
want to say it is experience in which understanding has transcended
its function of providing ethical knowledge and is simply
understanding the experience itself, making it intelligible.Not even
the deepest or the most mystical love can break from understanding
and become 'sheer' experience because we are individual and rational
creatures,creatures of awareness,and without
understanding,experience for us would revert to unintelligibility.So
in the fullest experience of love understanding does not cease, but
simply understands the experience itself,not as. anything,not in a
knowledge-giving way, but simply by making it coherent.
Since my understanding of love is linguistic,a matter of morality's
expression of the meaning of love, I can claim, unlike Fromm, that the
experience of love is not mysterious.Love is between individuals
communicating as individuals in the context of a morality which
might accept or require their love,or which can be broken to
accommodate it.Even the deepest,the least epistemic,experience of
love is a particular experience to be explained either by its moral
permissibility or obiigatoriness,or by its authority to alter and
revise current morality because of the ethical knowledge it
includes.Because morality is love's meaning,even an experience of
love which goes beyond understanding does not escape our conceptual
grasp:it either can be explained in terms of present morality or can
explain the inadequacy of present morality. If love could only be
understood psychologically,its deepest forms would exceed our
awareness,and therefore become separate from those forms of love
which involve care,respect,responsibility and knowledge,or on my
theory,the ethical goods.My explanation of morality as the meaning
of love,and true morality as not only dependent upon but promoting
the objects of ethical knowledge which constitute the understanding
in love,seems to provide a philosophical account of all forms of
love,including those in which the understanding ceases to provide
knowledge but merely makes the love intelligible.
My theory of morality will have eventually to be related to my
account of rationality,in particular my conception of ethics will
have to be related to my conception of theoretical activity.It is
first worth making clear that my moral theory means that certain
sorts of moral philosophy,whatever other comforts or interests they
offer,do not constitute moral theory.Moral theory has three
functions:to indicate what our morality is (how our social practices
and institutions relate;how these account for our standards of
behaviour in public and private relations;and what forms our
understanding of morality takes - the ways in which we explain and
justify our behaviour and that of others');to evaluate present
morality in terms of ethics (the application of the ethical
knowledge which forms the understanding component of love);to
evaluate morality in terms of the experience of love (the
experiential component).
Those analytic philosophers not writing such theories,and this is
most of them, present a problem to me because I cannot understand
just what it is they are doing.Those analysing moral vocabulary,for
example,provide a useful service,and work perhaps relevant to social
anthropology,linguistic theory, semantic theory and so on.The fact
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that the subject of their work is moral language,however,no more
qualifies it as moral theory than the study of gambling terminology
constitutes a theoretical study of gambling.It neither shows nor
relates anything within morality,evaluates moralities,or suggests
revisions of morality. Analysis of moral language is, of course, on the
decline, but the trend it leaves behind,the impression that not to
study moral vocabulary is not to theorise seriously,is a terrible
legacy which can be seen to hamper even the best work within the new
analytical fad of 'practical ethics'.
What sort of theories, then, ought we to have? First,those which show
what our morality is,including its ambiguities and its errors - the
fact it is not a coherent system of rules or principles,but an
attempt by individuals to make smooth their personal relations with
other individuals against the necessity of their living in
communities. I say 'show' because if we dethrone the methods of
analyticity,it may be sometime before alternative models appear and
this should not prevent us meantime from writing moral
theory. Tolstoy, most obviously in War and
Peace(trans. R. Edmonds.Penguin.1978).and Jane Austen,particularly in
Emma (ed.R.Blythe,Penguin;1966) and Mansfield Park
(ed.T.Tanner,Penguin;1966) show moralities consummately. Maclntyre
and Nussbaum have developed their own successful methods of showing
particular moralities,Amongst analytic philosophers most of the
credit for revealing the details of present morality must go to
those within jurisprudence and political philosophy:Hart's and
Devlin's debate on the nature of socially harmless
immoralities,Hart's Concept of Law(Qxford:1979).Dworkin's Matter oi
Principle(Oxford;1985).McCormick's Legal Reasoning hhd Legal
Theory(Oxford:1978).Sumner's The Moral Foundation Of Rights,Benn's A.
Theory of FreedomCCambridge: 1988). and The Authority of
La#(Oxford;1990),Raz's The Morality pf FreedogKQxford; 1986) indicate
the nature of our moral practices and legal institutions and our
understanding of these within our overall morality. Work in the
medical field is considerably less advanced,basically because it
lacks the written moral tradition.
Professional analytic philosophers prefer to select individual
practical 'concepts' (Kenny.The Logic of Nuclear
Deterrence,London,1985; 0'Neill,Faces qi Hunger;T.Regan,The case for
Animal Rights.London,1988;Radden,Reason and Madness:Tooley,Abortion
and Infanticide.Oxford.1983).The disappointment in this is that it
means that the wider questions of why abortion? when? how? and for
whom? become relegated to parts of a theory concerning
abortion,rather than being part of a description of our morality in
the context of which it is explained how abortions occur,and how we
explain and justify them.This fragmenting of the overall context of
a particular morality gives rise to the complaint that the writer
has not done the topic justice,he 'has not entered into the reality
of the situation of an abortion'.This is frustration that the writer
with his ability and resources has not succeeded in entering into
the fullness of the social arrangements in which this problem occurs
and must be addressed,but has simply applied the tools of his trade
to a 'concept'.Such failures are at least honourable,whereas the
worst moral theories are those which try to both express current
morality and to claim that their expression of it represents 'the
truth' about morality irrespective of context,Here the worst
m
offenders are preference utilitarianism of the market-place which
takes capitalist morality of exchange and builds this into pseudo-
scientific theory of rational and moral decision making, and theories
of justice and fairness which take the fact that modern industrial
society fails to promote charity as justification for constructing a
formal theory of cold logic to explain our formation of morality as
a self-protective compromise.
The second type of moral theory evaluates moralities by ethical
knowledge.The standard of ethical knowledge has been expressed in
many different ways;necessarily,because as we saw,it is known only
through particular moralities.A concept of human nature is
invoked;some faculty,conscience or consciousness,is appealed to;the
virtues are 1isted;Spinozistic essential preservation or Hobbesian
contractual preservation is introduced;God,or a basic faculty of
intuition is involved.However,the separation of the two layers of
morality and ethics,which ought to indicate the actual relation
between the two,comes to be seen as unnecessary proliferation,and
the ethical is brought, sometimes surreptitiously,within the domain
of morality.There are exceptions.Strawson ('Social Morality and
Individual Ideal' in Freedom and Resentment.London:1976) has the
basic distinction,and Hare has something like it in 'Ethical Theory
and Utilitarianism' (in H,D. Lewis,ed.Contemporary British
Phi Iosnphv.vol.4.1976).But the process of philosophising by
criticising the essays,occasionally the books,of other philosophers
tends to lose the opportunity of evaluating individual moralities by
constructing through the methods of understanding within these
moralities an expression of the ethical goods,an account of ethical
knowledge.
There are, however, some who succeed in this.Herbert McCabe's work in
social thought and the place of the church,Lovibond's and Holiday's
attempts to create a Wittgensteinian ethics, Rorty's pragmatic
liberalism,T.Sprigge's attempt to create an extra-moral dimension of
value in the idealist tradition, G. Thomson's (Needs.
London;1987),M. Ignatieff's (Needs of Strangers) and M.Midgkley's
(Beast and Man. London: 1980) attempts to revive the concept of human
nature in terms of needs succeed in creating accounts of ethical
knowledge from within particular moralities. In our age,uniquely it
seems, aq(8g|unts of ethical knowledge are rare, and this cannot be
something to be welcomed.
Finally, moral theory which evaluates morality from the standpoint of
the experience of love has the most difficult task.Love is always
experienced within the context of morality,either as morally
admirable or permissible,or as experience which requires the
transformation of morality in order to capture it.When love as
experience evaluates morality it is not experience without
understanding - the understanding component of love which consists
in knowledge of the ethical goods acquired through the iorras of our
moral understanding - but experience in which the understanding is
functioning to make the experience intelligible.Such experiences are
capable of evaluating morality because they force us to ask the
question:to what extent is morality succeeding in the task of
communicating the meaning of these experiences to our community?
Whether it requires or allows this experience,or whether it requires
to be revised to accommodate this experience,does the morality
succeed in expressing the meaning of the experience?
m
This area of moral theory is understandably the hardest to
furnish.The evaluation of morality here cannot be ultimately a
rational one because the conception of rationality is linked already
in complex relationship with the morality whose standards of
explanation and justification it reflects and
creates.Ultimately,then,derivation of morality from rationality
(Gauthier,Practical Reason.Oxford;1963,Morals by
Agreement; Gert: Harsanvi).from language (Hare;Kenny;Foot),from
primary political,legal and social justice considerations
(Rawls;Mozick;Feinberg;Benn;Dworkin;Finnis),from attitudes and
psychology (Pariit;Stevenson;Nagel;AnscombeJ should all defer before
evaluation of current morality by individual experiences of love.The
theories in which this is accomplished would have to turn from such
structural derivations,and discover in other areas models by which
we might relate the experience of love and contemporary morality so
as to be able to evaluate it and all other moralities and moral
attitudes.Such theories might turn to metaphysics to seek as Kant
did a conception which relates love and (true) morality,the
regulative ideas. Or they could look to the perspectives of
theology,existentialist thought, psychoanalysis,or poetic
literature. These have in common the ability to frame a language in
which the experience of love is made accessible to,and as,the
standard of morality.The 'morality of experience' is little heeded
because some,especially philosophers,increasingly question the
'reality' or 'objectivity' of the experience of love, and treat
it, when they do, as another 'concept' upon the canvas of human
experiences.il 1 am correct,the experience of love is not a part of
our experience,but the way in which understanding and experience can
unite to make our individual experiences open to the experiences of
others as the communicative union which moralities must depend
upon,and ought to promote.
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Chapter Six.
My claim has been that rationality is theoretical activity.The
theoretical activity which philosophy has engaged in recently has
very often had as its object conceptions of rationality
themselves.Two areas in particular in current theory of rationality
are pursued:temporary breakdowns or incompetencies in reasoning; more
permanent breakdowns,and dispositions of incompetence towards moral
and social evaluations.It is part of the current drift of
philosophers of mind and moral philosophers towards 'practical'
philosophy that rationality should be so often discussed with
relation to cases of irrationality,and cases of gross abnormality or
insanity.
Before considering this recent work we must be clear concerning the
status of theory of rationality and philosophical theory in
general.My claim is that theorising,intellectual activity of
whatever sort,is both the exercising of,and the creating of,norms of
rationality:exercising the rational capacities,but also determining
what are to be the rational capacities,what counts as rational
(behaviour).If inferential thought and consistency of
thought,when, and to what degree? If self-interest,unrestrictedly? If
neglect of personal interest for the sake of the general lot,should
this be followed even to the denial of personal ideals and the
neglect of the demands of friendship? The only restriction,on my
view,of what counts as rationality is social consensus.This is
revealed in the interaction of members of the community within and
towards the practices and institutions of enquiry,the practices and
institutions of their shared everyday lives - their morality -
and,to some extent,in the relation of their morality to the
situation of the community as an enquiring body.Intellectual
enquiry,then,of the kind which instantiates and frequently
transforms the canons of rationality of a community,can be
characterised as enquiry which has as its object something which can
be shared in,intelligibly or as received benefits,by the whale
social community.
This does not mean that the enquiries of the Druids or of crystal
ball gazers can play no part in determining rationality within our
twentieth century European communities,but it does mean that the
opinions of politicians,media,academics hired by the media,medical
experts and teachers play a much greater part.Their enquiries are
shareable by the whole community,and to a very great extent
determine the standards and the possibilities of sharing,because ox
the histories which can be written in which such enquiries play a
successful and increasing role.On this criterion philosophers
obviously play a very minor role in determining the rationality of
our communities. On the whole they have not managed to make their
enquiries shareable;it is not often we encounter a clear case of the
philosopher providing tangible beneiits in which the whole community
can share.
Despite this,it must be remembered that philosophers carry the
responsibility for one unique part of theoretical
enquiry.Philosophers,clearly since Plato,have had the task of
explaining the nature and role of theory of rationality itself.They
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must explain from age to age and community to community what theory
of rationality is.The only way in which they can do this is by
explaining the conception of rationality of the community which
forms their chosen object of study;the details of the relation of
the various components of this conception as they are determined by
philosophers,moral philosophers and others when engaged in
theoretical enquiries concerning or not concerning everyday shared
life to various specialised areas of intellectual enquiry within the
community,and to its morality;the relation of current rationality to
the rationality instantiated in this community previously,and to the
conceptions of rationality of other communities,particularly as
these are explained by other philosophers.Philosophy,then,has a
primary task and responsibility not of determining and exercising
rationality,but of theoretical study of rationality in all its
aspects.In doing this it will contribute to the determination and
exercise of rationality,but this wi11 be a contribution:it is not its
defining task or responsibility.
As with every form of theorising,philosophy has a particular purpose
- for philosophy the study of rationality itself - which is itself
determined by the traditional understanding of rationality of a
particular social community. Philosophers must, then,first have a
historical understanding,and must be aware of,and willing to
consider the relations of,a manifold of different study
disciplines.The same holds for moral philosophers who must possess
both this,and a knowledge of moralities - the shared lives of
particular communities, and the histories of any relations between
these.Even when philosophy does not have an
interactive,communicative role in a society,its function of
scrutinising conceptions of rationality,the methods and structures
of human communication themselves,makes it of value.
The problem with the contemporary functionalist school of analysis
of individual irrationalities is the failure to see particular
distortions of reasoning in the context of particular and specific
conceptions of rationality.The problem with studies of the social
and moral evaluations of gross abnormalities is the failure to see
particular evaluations in the context of particular moralities and
conceptions of rationality.
Donald Davidson.
The major functionalist interpretation is that being built up by
Davidson in a series of essays ('How is Weakness of the Will
Possible?' in Essays on Action and Events.Oxford:1980:'The Paradoxes
of Irrationality' in Freud;A Collection pi Philosophical
Essays.ed.R.Wolheim. Mew York;1974;'Deception and Division' in The
Multiple Self.ed.J.Elster,Cambridge;1987;'Incoherence and
Irrationality' in Dialectica Vol.39) owing much to the work of
D.Pears (Questions inPhilosophy Ol Mind,London;1975;'Motivated
Irrationality' in ed.R. Wolheim: Motivated
Irrationality.Oxford:1984).Davidson's problem begins with the
paradox in the explanation of irrationality.To successfully explain
it we must bring it within the orbit of standards of explanation
which confer intelligibility on the process of forming a deviant
desire,belief or intention,but to do this is to rationalise the
deviance and so to let the irrationality slip away as nothing mare
than the result of our slowness in explaining unusual mental
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phenomena.If we are to retain the phenomena and explain it 'we must
find a way to keep what is essential to the character of the mental
- which requires preserving a background of rationality - while
allowing forms of causality that depart from the norms of
rationality' (Dialectica Vol.39 p.347).We need,he says,'a mental
cause of an attitude,but where the cause is not a reason for the
attitude it explains',
Davidson develops the position that at least in the common
irrationalities of akrasia, self-deception,wishful thinking,and
'weakness of the warrant' irrationality of beliefs and other
'propositional attitudes' arises always because of some
inconsistency between the attitude and some element within the
overall pattern.One who farms a judgement or belief contrary to her
best evidence is in a state of inner inconsistency so far as she
also holds the general principles that one ought always to form
beliefs according to the best supported hypothesis,and judgements
according to the reason one acknowledges to be best.When we place
this alongside the point that irrationality is to be explained by
citing the cause of a mental event which yet is not a reason for
it,which lacks some logical relation to it,we have the problem of
explaining how propositional attitudes are caused in such a way that
there is 'inner inconsistency' in the agent who forms them.We must
explain how they are formed by him, but nonetheless how this
formation is the result of a non-rationalising causation,a causation
conceptually closer to physical causation than the normal formation
of beliefs.
Davidson is clear in 'Deception and Division' (p.91) that this
experience is a sequence and not an event,but he is also clear that
the causal analysis of inner inconsistency requires that at some one
point there is a definite mental cause which is not a reason.The
irrational agent does believe inconsistent propositions.He does this
- it must be possible for us to give some (rationalising)
explanation of it - yet it is the result of a mental causation which
cannot be rationalised - it is unintelligible given our norms of
rationality.Our concept of integrated and consistent agency cannot
rationalise the irrational;it cannot accommodate non-rational causes
of propositional attitudes - or at least it cannot while maintaining
that the break up of the unity of the mind is impossible. Faced with
the facts of irrationality,however,and the paradox in the
explanation of it,Davidson argues that we must look to the only
occasion we know of on which there is. non-rationalising mental
causation,that is,'when cause and effect occur in different minds'
(Wolheim p.300),and assert that in the case of at least some
irrationalities we just do have an instance of one individual
possessing different minds. ' If we are going to explain irrationality
at all,it seems we must assume that the mind can be partitioned into
quasi-independent structures that interact' (Wolheim,p.300). When a
part of the mind shows 'a larger degree of consistency or
rationality than is attributed to the whole' (p.300) mental
partitioning should be assumed.
However,Davidson also asks why such things as internal consistency
matter,why they constitute rational criteria.lt might,after all,be
claimed such criteria are no more objective than others,but merely a
philosopher's preference.His answer is that such principles as basic
logical ones,principles of decision theory,and the principles of
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continence and total evidence are held by any creature which forms
propositional attitudes or acts intentionally.Whenever anyone can be
said to have formed a belief,desire or intention there are certain
logical relations between these,and between them and the world which
make them the beliefs,desires and intentions that they are.They must
keep these relations:'Such relations are constitutive of the
propositional attitudes' (Dialectica p.352).And 'keeping these
relations' amongst one's beliefs is what we refer to as 'subscribing
to' these very basic principles of logic,evidence and
continence.These basic norms of rationality must be,largely, complied
with otherwise the individual cannot be said to have thoughts at
all.Rationality is constitutive of thought,and there is no true
decision about whether to subscribe to fundamental norms of
rationality or not,since to consider the matter is to demonstrate
the subscription.
As we cannot generally fail to conform to these principles,then
to,occasionally,fail to do so is clearly to violate our own
standards,and so to demonstrate inner inconsistency.This violation
is clearly possible,and it is clearly not violation of merely first
person or loosely subjective criteria.(Davidson's argument here is a
clearer version of that which appears at ed.Elster p.84).
This argument ought to be criticised at three points.First,the
paradox in explaining the irrational which requires the utilisation
of the separate vocabularies of reasons and causes;then,the claim
that irrationality is always inner inconsistency;and then the
argument for there being inescapable and universal rational norms
for any creature capable of forming propositional attitudes.
First,the paradox Davidson raises seems avoidable.There is only a
problem in retaining irrationalities once they have been
rationalised if the explanation given of them is not compatible with
the attempted explanation of them given by the normal process of
mental rationalisation.That is,if the normal,and in this case
unsuccessful,way of explaining the formation of beliefs and the
explanation to be given of the formation of this irrational belief
do not contradict each other,it is possible for a belief to be
rationalised in one vocabulary and for its irrationality to be
retained in the other,normal,one in which it resists analysis.lt
seems to me that in the case of irrational attitudes this is exactly
what happens:an expert (philosophical, clinical, theological)
vocabulary is introduced which is compatible with the
normal,everyday means of explaining the mental, but expands their
resources.The increase in conceptual resources which the vocabulary
of psychoanalysis or the Inquisition grants does not indicate new
though it may be with such s that the expert
draws attention to the conceptual richness of his scheme - but
simply makes it possible to describe previously worrying attitudes
in ways that are frightening from the point of view of the normal
vocabulary but no longer mysterious. Rot only need there be no
paradox,then,but there need be no appeal to a hitherto unknown sort
of mental cause,or to the sort of semi-independent structures within
an agent which non-rationalising causation implies.The possibility
of compatible yet independent rationalising vocabularies depends
upon the picture of rationality as open to constant change and as
much more of a 'game' concept than Davidsonian 'reason' ever appears
awareness of extra mental consciousness
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to be.Such a picture,of course,is the one I have been trying to
build up.
A second difference between my understanding of rationality and
Davidson's is the role given to consistency.By appealing to
principles of total basicness Davidson is able to describe all
irrationality as inconsistency: if you reach the most basic
principles of thought and action,these must be 'held' by every
agent,so irrationality is always describable as departure from
them,inconsistency with them.At Volheim p.305 he acknowledges that
the sort of inconsistency he has been suggesting is not sufficient
for rationality - non-rationalising mental causation does occur in
other cases.It certainly seems implausible to suggest that in all
irrationality some form of formal inconsistency,or inconsistency
expressible in formal terms,is not necessary. However■ some have
recently introduced peculiarities of policy or personality which are
not inconsistencies,and which do not depend upon pursuit of
unintelligible objects,but which do appear paradigmatically
irrational.Nagel asks (The Possibility ol Altruism,Oxford;1970,p.45)
whether it would be irrational to desire to plant parsley on the
Moon,and Parfit (Reasons and Persons.Oxford; 1984. p!24/5) considers
the cases of 'Within-A-Mile Altruism'' and the 'Future-Tuesday
Indifferent'.The standard line is that these represent merely
whims, obsessions or compulsions.But this merely strengthens the
question:such bizarre, though not harmful,projects and patterns of
behaviour are papular irrationalities,yet,since there is no formal
inconsistency,must we call them rational?
Davidson believes irrationality is inconsistency because in all
irrationality deep principles are held and violated.But the norms we
feel violated in the cases of compulsive hand-washers,examples of
sheer arbitrariness with regard to behaviour we hold to be
serious, the man who believes he is made of glass (Gert.Moral
Rules.p.21) appear to be in their own way as deeply held as
principles of logic and evidence,and in addition,consciously held
and reflected upon,and the point with them is they are not held by
the agent concerned.he. does not hold them,and is thereiore not
inconsistent in his violation of them,yet in his deviation from them
he is considered to be guilty of a non-conformity, an
irrationality,as deep as the internal inconsistencies of akrasia and
self-deception.This line cannot be fully pursued until we consider
issues connected with judgements of insanity,but the point is that
even if inner inconsistency is fundamental because of the basicness
of certain principles,it cannot be held it is fundamental to
irrationality unless my examples concerning the basicness of certain
norm violations are either answered or related to ' formal
inconsistency' irrationality in a system of decriptions of
unreasonablenesses.lt may turn out that inconsistency,even if it
always occurs in cases of irrationality,may not actually form part
of the irrationality itself.And this is a possibility Davidson does
not discuss.
The third point I wish to discuss is the argument that there are
basic principles without which a creature could not be said to have
prepositional attitudes,which principles ought then to be described
as bedrock of an account of rationality which is objective,and which
does not appeal,at least at its base,to standards of subjective
consensus.The heart of Davidson's argument is that without certain
fundamental norms, there is no thought, from which it follows that
without them, there is no rationality.At Dialecticap.352 he
writes:'Rationality,in this primitive sense,is a condition of having
thoughts at all.'The basic norms of rationality are indispensable to
the formation of prepositional attitudes,the having of thoughts,in
which case it is not even sensible to ask whether they are
dispensable or indispensable norms of rationality.
Now,my first point is simply that even if it is true that there are
certain norms without which there is no thought,and that this
implies that without these there is also no rationality,it does not
follow that adherence to these norms is sufficient for
rationality.This is obvious,of course:the necessary conditions for
thought may be necessary conditions for rationality,but even if they
are sufficient for thought,they are not sufficient for rationality
because irrational thoughts do occur.The norms necessary for thought
are the logical relations between propositional attitudes, and
between them and the world,and they are not sufficient for
rationality,Davidson would say, because logical distortions can
occur. However, such errors in logic as occur in irrationality are
different from errors in arithmetic or complex inference just
because the rationalising stories of
ignorance,forgetfulness,carelessness and so on cannot be told about
them,in addition to which they are usually motivated or related to
attitudes which are motivated.Davidson has,of course,his own
'compartmentalist' analysis of this form of logical distortion based
on the greater consistency of mental part than of mental whole. But
although this may allow us to describe certain irrationalities,it
cannot provide a sufficient explanation of irrationality any more
than 'adherence to constitutive principles' can provide a sufficient
explanation of rationality.
The problem is that since for Davidson holding these principles is
not a matter of choice,but consists in the capacity for forming
propositional attitudes,the capacity for thought itself,the
inconsistency in irrationality could only be described as having a
belief or intention which is inconsistent with the capacity to form
propositional attitudes,a failure 'within the House of Reason
itself'.This would not,of course,mean the capacity for reason has
gone,but that in some way the capacity for forming propositional
attitudes has been violated or abducted;within the rational
capacities themselves some disorder has occurred.However,it is clear
that the irrational attitude which has been farmed is a
propositional attitude,and,therefore,it is quite unclear in what way
the capacity for forming such attitudes can have been at all
seriously affected.To describe the inconsistency as centred upon an
independent structure in the mind which has succeeded in collecting
greater logical cohesion than the whole mind does not solve the
problem.lt is,as Davidson is relieved to agree,to rationalise the
irrationality,but it is not,as he wishes,to retain its
irrationality:an attitude has been lormed;there is therefore no
indication from this of how there might be incapacity of
thought;the partitioning model,therefore,though it captures the
notion of non-rationalising mental cause,does not capture the actual
centre of irrationality so far as this is considered to be an
inconsistency between a mental attitude and one of those principles
in which the capacity to form mental attitudes consists.
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My claim,then,is that Davidson's way oi describing irrationality -
as internal inconsistency - which requires the assumption of
principles constitutive of the rational nature of any agent makes
the actual moment of irrationality,the moment in which it
consists,impossible to discover.The claim of inconsistency and the
claim of constitutive principles must conflict:whenever a mental
attitude of whatever degree oi inconsistency is formed the
inconsistency cannot be with a principle so basic that its operation
consists in the capacity to form mental attitudes - the very
existence of the irrational attitude shows that.And the mental
compartmentalisation model cannot help because although it isolates
a definite moment of non-rationality,the moment is merely a
logically peculiar one,and not one which consists in a failure
within logic itself.
The clear message of the insufficiency of Davidson's mental disunity
analysis of irrationality is that if any inconsistency were
sufficient for irrationality it would be discovered not by looking
for models of the inconsistency within 'the description of
reason',but by looking to the objects of the irrational attitudes
and comparing these to the description of reason.Such a process
would exclude the whole Davidsonian account of the rational
capacities as the locus both of 'reason' and of 'unreason'.Once we
resist his account,we will see it is not in fact by formal internal
inconsistency or by incoherence with respect to 'the description of
reason' that the objects of irrational attitudes seem to be
characterised,but by a much more fluid and indeterminate lorm of
non-conformity whose resistance to determinate analysis may be seen
in our inability to define and describe once and tor ail
irrationality,however confident we feel we are about the nature oi
rationality.
It may be that pursuit of an object whose pursuit or achievement is
incompatible with possession of another object of higher value to
the agent will be held to be irrational behaviour;or it may be that
to turn from the object of burning desire for considerations of
prudence or self-interest will be held to be irrationality. But
whichever it is,the determinant will be neither logic nor the random
subjective desires of the agent,but standards and patterns of
rationality he will long since have made his own and in the
confirmation and revision of which his life will play a historical
part. My social consensus analysis does not argue that in all
rational behaviour there are no universal normative principles of
the Davidsonian kind presupposed and constituted.On the contrary,it
is pleased with the notion,and merely alters the scope of 'universal
principles' from the old notion of human nature or 'every rational
being' to the boundaries of communities determined by these and by
other - moral - principles.In doing this, it makes all the required
difference.
Davidson's analysis is only one oi many interpretations oi the
phenomena of temporary or small-scale irrationality.However,its
central features of concern with the 'paradox' of explaining
irrationality,emphasis on inconsistency,and the appeal to
fundamental rational norms are the bedrock of iunctionalist
interpretations of irrationality.Such accounts threaten my analysis
because they appear to look to a concept of rationality which is,in
the terms earlier used,absolutist,whether the absolutism consists in
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logical,or some other sorts,oi norms.1 have,however,given reason to
question such features as basis of an account of irrationality,and
therefore I need not feel the consequent threat of absolutist theory
of rationality.
I repeat again that the notion of explaining rationality,in the
sense oi explaining it away or explaining it totallv.which
philosophers such as Davidson have, is simply misconceived.What we
must engage in if we want to 'explain rationality' is the full-scale
critical project of constructing a theory which explains what we are
doing when we set ourselves to explain those phenomena which shared
standards of explanation have brought before our attention,and when
we defend our explanation of this against the explanations of
others'.Mo absolute rational norms enter this framework at this
level of defence,for one who denies another's judgement of
rationality or irrationality is simply placed in a dialogue with
that other in which the truth they seek is itself a feature of
dialogue and constructive argument.That is,disagreements,even over
fundamental norms, which are involved in constructing theory of
rationality do not involve for their resolution the claim that the
theorist's explanations are better in the sense of more
accurate,better at mirroring reality,than those of his
antagonist,but rather the claim that they satisfy conditions such
as:their criteria for relevance of information includes all that the
adversary's criteria do;their criteria for truth explain the truth
of all the adversary holds true,and more;they explain the
limitations of the adversary's explanations,and do not suffer from
these themselves;they are justified in ways the adversary can
accept,and so on.
It follows from this that theory is in an extraordinarily vulnerable
position.Particular theories can be nothing more than stages within
the activity of theorising, which is a non-completable process
between individual enquirers who share it within individual
communities which are, partially, determined by the variety and scope
of theoretical activities.Particular theories,then,have no self-
sufficiency from the historical process oi theoretical activity -
the obiect of a theory has no determining power over the theory's
objectivity - but can be altered in countless ways, totally revised
and eventually overthrown by the theorists in ways which cannot be
seen from the standpoint of present theory and which may even depend
upon the adherence to the theory.Particular judgements about whether
or not a certain piece of behaviour is rational are intensely
fragile,open to revision not only by others more intellectually
subtle,but by standards not yet known or even existing,and perhaps
by standards themselves disclosed by the very making of the
j udgement.
Irrationality and Insanity.
Of those who hold rationality to consist in some independently
specifiable principles,practices,or objects of reasoning some prefer
to study not small-scale and temporary lapses,but the general and
lasting irrationality typically found in some sorts of mental
illness.Such writers tend to give an account of the core concept of
mental illness in terms of deep or persistent unreasonableness, "lhe
implication of such a theory for rationality is that if such an
independently specifiable unreasonableness can be demonstrated,this
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must involve knowledge of the normative standards which can be used
to explain the concept of rationality,or at least the ideal of
periect reasonableness,in independence of the standards of any
particular community.
Such accounts (C.Culver and B.Gert.Philosophy in Medicine.Mew
York, 1982; J . Radden, Madness and Reason, London, 1985; M.Moore, haw and
Psychiatry:Rethinking the Relationship. Cambridge,1984 ;
J.Glover,Responsibility.London, 1972; J. Feinberg, Harm to
Self.Oxford,1986:Rights.JUstice ana the Bounds of
Liberty.Princeton.1980:A.Quinton. ' Madness' in Philosophy and
Practice.ed,Philips-Grifiths.Cambridge.1985) pose potential problems
for my thesis because if we judge and treat the insane as we do
because they are grossly and helplessly unreasonable,then it seems
there are considerations of justice involved which imply that
judgements of irrationality and rationality cannot be merely a
matter of theoretical commitment,however honestly pursued.If,for
example, we agree the insane ought to be excused their actions on the
grounds of the presence of exculpating irrationality,this is a
matter of justice which impliesanvone manifesting similar
behaviour,in whatever circumstances, is irrational and ought to be
excused.It seems unreasonableness here cannot be a matter simply of
consensus because anyone who behaves in the same way must be
excused,and if the suggested basis of excusing is irrationality,will
be being excused because irrational.whether the normative values of
their community imply this or not.
The rationale for such a conceptual link between rationality and
responsibility is the belief,held by many as fundamental, that deep
and obvious breaks with reality as judged by most intelligent adults
in their everyday lives can be recognised by all persons,of any
societies, and understood from within any conception of rationality
as conceptual chaos indicative of mental abnormality.I must show
that contrary to this belief,not even the greatest defects and
deviances in reasoning can be interpreted as failures as
such.without appeal to the particularities of a certain conception
of rationality.If 1 cannot show this,there is the threat oi the
introduction of a general or universal concept of reason,or at least
of a minimum content to rationality,irrespective of the theoretical
standards oi individual communities.
Jennifer Radden.
We should first ask whether insanity is always
irrationality.J.Radden has recently argued this.She argues an the
basis of Foucault1s Madness and Civilisation CLondon;1985) for a
return to an understanding of madness as 'unreason',a manifestation
of eccentricity of conduct demonstrating want oi reason which may be
occasional,or enduring and unavoidable.This conception of
unreason,she believes,can co-exist with causal - functional or
psychological - explanations of irrationality,but it does not depend
upon these.It is sufficient,then,to identify and to categorise the
madmen.We can understand the specific condition that is insanity as
lack of the capacity to avoid certain forms of unreason.
The paint of Radden's theory is to justify our practice of excusing
the insane.We excuse them because moral responsibility depends upon
the powers of agency.An agent is one who acts freely;this involves
both deliberation and choice,and it is precisely the capacity for
these which is missing in the insane.They are unable to demonstrate
these iarms of reason.She goes an to analyse a number of apparently
non-cognitive defects in various forms of insanity to demonstrate
that,contrary to appearances,it is with all,and not only with
some, of those we feel .justified in excusing that the justification
for the excuse arises from defect of reasoning and not
other,emotional or affective,defects.
What I want to expose in discussing Radden is the weakness of the
link that is often made between agency,reasoning and moral
responsibility.lt may be the case that a judgement of insanity
always is a judgement of irrationality of a certain
sort.However,Radden's case for this rests upon the practice of
excusing due to the absence of moral responsibility in those
incapable of avoiding certain deficiencies of reason.In return,I
suggest that no irrationality of itself entails absence of moral
responsibility.This is because the link between particular
conceptions of rationality and particular moralities is not
conceptual (except at one point,to be discussed in the final
chapter:there is a conceptual link between (any) true morality and
(any) rationality). The judgement that someone is even massively
irrational is not sufficient in itself to entail any weakening of
moral responsibility.But surely,it will be asked,if the
irrationality in question involves large-sclae incapacity to
deliberate and choose,it does?
First, the concept of agency implies not freedom but voluntariness of
choice. An agent is one whose intentional actions are voluntary: they
may not be truly his,he may not be sole or major cause of them (he
may not be 'free'),but he wills them:he desires them in an active
and effective way.Unfree intentional action does not imply lack
of,or failure of,agency,there is therefore no connection to be made
between the concepts of agency and responsibility by means of the
vehicle of freedom. Voluntariness of action,which is sufficient for
agency,implies the capacity not to act in this particular way, though
it does not entail the freedom actually to,now,act differently.A
failure of agency,then,would be located in the capacity for
voluntary action - a failure of will,a lack of will,weakness of
will,intractable willing,behaving contrary to one's will and so on -
and the link between failures of will and diminution of moral
responsibility does not possess the apparent plausibility of the
link between freedom and diminution of moral responsibility.It may
of course be that failure of agency is irrationality,but this,I
hold,is a contingent matter of the nature of the failure and its
relation to a set of rational requirements.
When the criterion of agency,the capacity for voluntary action,is
met,it does not follow that the agent is morally responsible.What
follows is that the agent qualifies for membership of the (a) moral
community:he or she is qualified to judge her actions and those of
others by the standards this community manifests in its members'
involvement with particular concrete situations,and to be judged by
these standards.This qualification arises from the simple fact that
she can act,and so is able to enter into the concrete particular
situations of everyday life and to interact with her neighbours.As a
further stage,it may well be that the moral beliefs of this
particular community imply that in so far as one is an agent,and no
further,one is morally responsible (as,very likely,a true morality
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requires).But the conceptual connection to be made here is not
between agency and moral responsibility,but between agency (capacity
for voluntary intentional action) and membership of a moral
community. Corresponding to this,one who is not an agent,whether his
actions are free or not,is not a member of any moral community (he
cannot have the will to communicate with others within concrete
particular situations),and cannot judge or,probably,be judged
morally.Incapacity for agency,however this is caused or
sustained,entails disqualification from moral community because one
who is not an agent cannot take part in the shared practices and
shared forms of moral understanding in which morality consists.A
true morality, one which respects individuality and not some
'elitist' or selective quality such as agency,will presumably excuse
those who cannot take their place in the moral community,and protect
and help such individuals to the degree to which they may enjoy,or
inspire any form of intelligible communication.
So we have a/a basic concept of agency,defined as capacity for
voluntary intentional actions;b/particular conceptions of
rationality (which will include different accounts of the role and
place of agency);c/a conceptual link between agency and membership
of a moral community; d/the particular moral beliefs of that
community (which will stand in various relations to the conception
of rationality of that community but which will always imply the
necessity of agency for membership of a moral community).The result
is that if insanity consists in irrationality,this cannot be shown
by appeal to defects in forms of reasoning and judgement required
for moral responsibility:it cannot be shown from the link between
moral responsibility and (rational) agency for this link is not
conceptual.There is,therefore,no universal concept of reason which
can be appealed to on the back of a universal concept of justice in
the context of the description of the condition of the insane.The
propositions 'we excuse the insane','the insane are irrational',and
'we always excuse the insane because they are irrational' cannot
form a case for demonstrating that insanity is irrationality because
the first proposition holds only for certain moralities;and the
third assumes a conceptual connection between morality and
rationality which is not the case.Only the second proposition
appears well-grounded, not because every conception of rationality
entails the insanity of those who depart massively from its
standards,but because there seems no possibility or point in a
concept of insanity,within any conception 01 rationality,which is
not connected to departures from standards of rationality.This does
not,however,imply either that all societies possess a concept of
insanity,or that the judgements of insanity of any one social
community will be mirrored by those of others.All that is implied is
that every true judgement of insanity will be a judgement of
irrationality.
Yet surely there are at least some profound breakdowns between
persons and reality which can be objectively judged as
irrationality? The degree of irrationality we feel impelled to
attribute to cases of massive paranoid schizophrenia or the most
fearful compulsions seems to be inadequately described as judgements
of mere social consensus.Generally,what suggests to us the objective
irrationality of such behaviour is not,contra Radden,any structural
failure implying a failure of agency,such as inability to act
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otherwise,which is relevant to us only when asking questions of
moral and legal responsibility and status,but rather the content,or
the objects of the behaviour.lt may be, as the concept of mental
illness implies,structural defects of agency,especially defects of
voluntariness,when they are deep-seated or permanent, do always
constitute insanity,however they happen to have been caused.But even
if this is so,the belief that there is abjective irrationality in
insanity arises not from judgements of irrationality we make because
of failures of voluntariness,but from the fantastic or florid
character of the behaviour of those with defective powers of
agency.This content is often specified by observers as pursuit of
what is fundamentally undesirable or unintelligible.The
specification of the behaviour,or the objects of the behaviour,will
usually,then,imply an account of what is intrinsically
desirable,which becomes understood as an account of the content of
rational behaviour.Once again,Gert in Moral Rules is a very clear
example of this.
His suggestion is that to desire death,disability,pain,loss of
pleasure or freedom,or what is likely to substantially increase the
risk of these,and to do so for no further justifying reason,is to
desire the intrinsically undesirable,to desire irrationally.He says
this is so just because it is so Cp.37),but also suggests it is so
because deliberate harm done to self-interest for no further reason
is irrationality.It certainly does seem that one who is held to be
accurately judged as mad will be describable as harming himself in
respect of one or other of these five goods.That is,any description
of insane behaviour can be,ultimately,replaced by a description of
behaviour which damages self-interest in terms of causing or
threatening one's death,disability,pain,loss of freedom or
diminution of pleasure,and doing this senselessly.Does this mean
that such self-harming action is irrational action,and that,as Gert
thinks,rational action is centrally action which is not self-harming
in these ways?
We can discuss this question outside the context of madness,because
deliberate pursuit of self-harm for no further reason is to be found
from time to time in all persons.Madness implies not only
unintelligible behaviour,but also a condition spelled out as
incapacity to alter this behaviour,or permanent disposition to this
behaviour,or an incapacity to appreciate this behaviour as what it
is - that is,as some sort of failure of agency,or will.But the
central threat posed to my account concerns not the nature of
insanity,but the core of irrationality in the behaviour of the
insane and profoundly disturbed,and this can be isolated from
problems concerning the cognitive and volitional defects of such
subjects.The core of irrationality in Gert's terms is located in the
desire to pursue intrinsically undesirable goods and the pursuit of
these.The question,therefore,is whether there are intrinsically
undesirable or desirable goods which are the determinants of
rational behaviour prior to the formation of particular social
conceptions of rationality.
The key here,as we noticed above (ch.4),is that it is, passible to
describe any piece of irrational behaviour as contrary the sort of
goods Gert mentions. It is passible because under one particular
conception of human life - as I have put it,one conception of
rationality - these goods are the very conditions of being human.the
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conditions of rationality.Any behaviour of any agent,whatever its
context,can be described ultimately in terms of these goods because
these goods are the ultimate goads,the grounds of all explanation,of
one conception of life,and any behaviour can be described in these
terms by one who has knowledge of the relevant vocabularies.Even if
a complete translation of behaviour into the descriptions of an
alien vocabulary is not possible,description in terms of ultimate
goods will be possible because the behaviour decribed here will be
extreme and identifiable with easily observable and well-known
patterns of physical harm and decline.
The reason it seems so convincing that acting against such goods
without further reason is irrational of itself is not that these
goods have some privileged status making them central to any
conception of rationality,but that they constitute the ultimate
goods of one conception,and one which,historically,is the
overarching conception of our Christian and humanist,democracy-
hungry and capitalist, societies,what is called our
'civi1isation'.As a set of ultimate goods,the only reason there
could be for acting against one or more of these would be to enable
oneself to pursue one other of the five fundamental goods.Acting
against them 'without further reason' would be acting so as to
damage one of the values which set the limit of intelligibility of
our actions without compensating for this by clarifying our action
as designed to preserve or share in another of these values.It
would,then,be literally unintelligible action,and we will see it as
'intrinsically irrational' or 'irrational in itself' so long as we
look no further than this conception of rationality,so long-as we
are not philosophers.Ve must insist that acting against any set of
basic values is irrational not because of some independent
desirability of the values or their objects,but because it threatens
the grounds of explanation of behaviour of a conception of
rationality which puts self-interest and avoidance of self-harm to
the fore.
But those who hold such theories will still insist that acting in
pursuit of death,pain and so on is not merely a way in which,with
suitable imaginative and translation skills,any irrational behaviour
can be described due to the fact that any (rational) behaviour can
be described in these terms,but that when we (anyone) so act we are
thereby irrational, and when we are correctly judged as irrational we
are acting in pursuit of these evils.They will trade on the thesis
that even if we do not value self-interest and are not aware of
either serving or transgressing it, it is what we reveal in our
actions to be of foremost importance and what we strive to
pursue. And they may be right when they speak of our western
communities. However,although they may also read the actions oi
members of communities outside our broad and economic tradition as
revealing this, this gift of translation gives no more,but exactly
the same, reason for saying a Greek warrior of thirty centuries ago
is pursuing self-interest than he and we have reason for saying we
pursue personal honour.
In the culture of Homer's Iliad time,honour,represented what we
might call rational value in a way in which
pleasure,freedom,security from death,pain and disablement did not
(see H.Lloyd-Jones,The Justice of Zeus.London;1983,ch.1,and
'Conclusion' espec. p.160).None of these would fundamentally have
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mattered to Achilles if undergoing them had meant winning
time.Vinning time was not important because it was in one's self-
interest (in fact, Homer seems to have no conception of the self
which would be acceptable to most of the philosophers who construct
such theories.See K.Wilkes.Real Persons.Oxford:1988.chs.4,7):it is
important because it is itself an ultimate standard of
intelligibility,a fundamental explanatory norm to those whose
communities form part of this society.So far as he is acting to
increase or restore his honour,the hero is acting rationally:however
substantial the risk of death and so on he incurs,Achilles' actions
after the taking of Briseis are rational,and paradigmatically
rational,without reference to self-interest in our sense,the sense
Gert among others tries to articulate.I could make this point
through many other comparisons: Buddhist ascetisism, life under
monastic vows,early Greek stoicism involve no notion of self-
interest . Actions within these life forms could be rationalised in
terms of avoiding the likelihood of death and so on,but so,and
equally well or badly, might a Homeric hero rationalise our self-
interest as standing guard aver time,or a Buddhist monk rationalise
it as senseless concentration on the fiction of the self,or an
Epicurean as pursuit of personal sensations.Ability to explain any
action in such terms as Gert's,then,does not indicate a privileged
norm of rationality,but the ultimacy of a particular way of
explaining within a particular community, within a particular form of
life.Without context,nothing is fundamental;and when a norm is
fundamental,it is so only within context,or to one concerned with
explanation within context.
Insanity was considered here only because it seemed to indicate a
break with reality which implied some standards of universal
irrationality which would imply a rationality whose norms might be
specified independently of the histories of particular human
communities.It was agreed that insanity might consist in failures of
agency.These failures,at the extreme,imply disqualification from
membership of moral communities - a fact which may well have
implications for the question of moral responsibility.However,there
is no universal notion of justice here - or anywhere else:that there
is is a perception of morality, perhaps of a true morality,but
certainly not the only true one,and the features which must qualify
a true morality do not specify that respect for individuality and
the possibility of human communication is passible only through
principles of fair distribution and desert.After all,'fair' and
'desert' are themselves terms the meaning of which is indeterminate
until we consider context: Imperial Rome,industrial Britain,South
Africa,post-war Germany.lt is not,however,in failures of agency that
that species of irrationality consists which tempts us to think that
insanity demonstrates a universal and objective irrationality and so
a standard basic norm of rationality,but in the content or abject of
the behaviour of the severely insane.Such irrationality can be
examined in isolation from questions of madness and the internal
defects of agency as it is found also,temporarily or slightly, in the
sane.Uo content or object of behaviour can, however,be held to be
irrational of itself,but only within the confines of particular
conceptions of rationality.There is,therefore,no threat of
absolutist rationality to my account of rationality as forms of
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I have claimed through my interpretative and conceptual analyses to
this point a/ that rationality is the creation, of standards of
explanation,the exercise of these in thought and action,the
continual development, and ultimate revision of these,and that these
forms of behaviour are a single process of activity described as
'theoretical activity';b/ that this occurs within and through
communities of which it is partially constitutive;c/ that those who
claim to hold a conception of rationality the validity of which
rests on grounds independent of the contingencies of forms of
explanation of particular communities are making claims which cannot
be true.I have claimed this understanding of rationality is present
within the theory of Aristotle,and in the thinking of Thomas
Aquinas.
Aristotle articulates this understanding by means of his use of,and
discussion of,dialectic,his conception of ethics,and his theory of
moral education.It is within the context of this understanding that
we must interpret his theory of rationality,the theory of the
virtues.Aquinas's theory of practical rationality,the theory of
Natural Law,has also tD be interpreted in the context of a similar
understanding.I have interpreted it as an explanation of how
community-based - for him, ecclesiatical-academic - enquiry into
conceptions of rationality,which Aristotle saw as dialectical - pre-
theoretical - can be theoretical activity;as a demonstration in the
writing of the great Summa that rationality is primarily
theoretical,even,perhaps especially,when it is enquiry into,and
explanation based upon,the concept of practical reason;and claimed
that this provides us with a new basis upon which we can understand
rationality,not in terms of rational faculties or capacities,but as
the very activity of ourselves that is theoretical,the defining
human attribute:that which proceeds from standards we have developed
together,and which is itself turned upon those standards in a
process of alteration and revision which is endless.Ve can read the
truth of this account of rationality in historical accounts not just
of societies,but of what I have called communities: interact!ve human
groups which are communicative not just incidentally,but
constitutively,in their purpose and formal constitution,
The tragedy of the school of thought which alligned itself with
Aquinas is that,in contradiction of this understanding of
rationality,it enforced a Natural Law absolutism of the fiercest
sort.The Thomist synthesis was not continued through the potential
fertility of the collision of the Church Fathers with the new
thirteenth and fourteenth century monastic and secular scholarship
and the scholarship of the post-medieval world in a way which might
have supported the primacy of rationality and the discrediting of
absolutism.Since we have never,even yet,managed to define 'human
being' as anything but rational and social - the foundational claims
of Natural Law theory - and since the Natural Law tradition has
upheld absolutism,its effect has been the belittling of the
individual human being, human rationality and individuality,and the
growth of conceptions of absolute authority.The final betrayal of
Natural Law comes when reason as it is found in man is itself
identified as the 'absolute norm',the 'law of nature'.At this paint
the human being through and because of his rationality becomes the
summit of achievement, the Final Good;there are no further normative
challenges for rational man,ana reason is finally inert.This is the
danger of mainstream contemporary Aristotelian thought and natural
law ethics.These take the great legacy to be the concept of the
practical which these traditions provide,but ail too soon this
concept leads to the introduction of absolute standards of action to
which 'rational conduct' must adhere,and to the diminution of the
theoretical aspect of reason in Aristotelian and Thomistic
thought.This leads easily to the conception of reason as only
requiring to be 'exercised' 'in practice', and not employed in
dynamic penetration of al1,including its own,standards.
I take the legacy of Aristotle-Aquinas for theory of rationality to
be the drawing attention to the fact that in explaining rationality
(what it is,and what things are rational) we reflect,in a way which
may be revisionary and recreative,upon shared theoretical
standards,our various conventional forms of explanation,and
acknowledge the contingency of these;and that in assessing the
rationality of any particular behaviour or form of explanation, from
the most abstract to the most banal practicality,we have nothing but
these shared and contingent standards upon which to reflect.This is
the conception I have been defending and trying to relate to a
satisfactory theory of morality without encouraging the spectres
either of moral relativism or of moral absolutism. 1 have defended
this idea against,and supported it by, criticism of,jurisprudential
natural law,the Kantian view at practical reason as pure and
universal rather than as activity,the utilitarian conceptions ol
reason and the alternatives of certain anti-utilitarians,and the
threat posed by contemporary philosophy of mind on two particular
fronts.I have also suggested my own account of morality, and the
structure of ethics,depending again upon the supporting nations of
community and communication.
I now want to turn to what sort of positive characterisation we can
give of rationality.There are no philosophical statements to be made
about the details of particular conceptions of
rationality. However,it is true that in our actual judgement making
and our formation of beliefs we cannot help but believe there are
norms of rationality which are beyond question. Fundamentally this is
a misperception, but it is a necessary misperception given the
structure of thought and action and human nature.If thought and
action are related because of the common element of theoretical
activity which is the process of exercising,developing and revising
our conception of rationality,they will be conditioned by the
requirements ot activity;one of these,I will argue,is the presence
of an object, and for human beings,if this object is to be
intelligible, some norm of rationality must be presupposed,Thus
although no philosophical statements about particular conceptions of
rationality can be made,we can make statements about human beings
and about rational norms which help explain why some norms must be
considered as inalienable by rational human beings,though not as
inalienable rational norms. This project will help add some minimum
content to the requirements of a theory of rationality,and it will
also give an indication of the structure of particular rationality
judgements.
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The concepts of which I have made most use have been derived from
consideration of the work of others.They are
communication, community, activity,and the theoretical.Of
these,enough,I think,has been said of communication. We need here to
investigate the other three concepts,and to derive from them a more
precise understanding of what it is we are doing when we evaluate
something rationally,or evaluate it as rational.
Activity,
The main feature of the analysis of activity I understand as its
'directedness',or 'intentionality' as this has been classically
understood.Intentionality of thought,as classically formulated by
Aquinas,is summarised by E.Anscombe and P.Geach (Three
Philosophers.Oxford:1962.p.95):'what makes a sensation or thought of
an x to be of an x is that it is an individual occurrence of that
very form or nature which occurs in an x - xness here occurs in the
speciual way called esse intentionale and not in the ordinary way
called esse naturale.This solution shows how being of an x is not a
relation in which the thought or sensation of an x stands,but is
simply what the thought or sensation of an x is' .This piece of
classical theorising was developed by Brentano into a theory of
mental content in Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint
(ed.L.McAlister,London;1973):mental phenomena are characterised by
the 'intentional inexistence of an object' (p.88/9).He expressess
this as 'reference towards a content','direction towards an
object';'every mental phenomena includes something as an object
within itself'(p.89).Brentano applies this theory solely to mental
phenomena. However, Roderick Chisholm (Perceiving.ch.11) develops an
account of intentionality in which physical phenomena take
objects,and differ from mental phenomena in that their objects must
exist.This does not accord with Brentano (see Linda McAlister in
Philosophy Ol Brehtano ed. McAlister),but it is the suggestion that
intentionality or directedness characterises mental and physical
phenomena that I want to pursue.
At p.109 of Perceiving;A Philosophical Study(New York;1968) Roderick
Chisholm writes,'physical - or non-psychological -
phenomena,according to Brentano's thesis,cannot thus intentionally
contain objects within themselves.In order for Diogenes to sit in
his tub,for example,there must be a tub for him to sit in'.For
Chisholm the hallmark of intentional inexistence is that those
phenomena in which it is found contain an object intentionally,that
is,in themselves. This is why mental phenomena,such as thoughts,can
have objects which do not exist.A thought may be of something which
does not exist,in which case it intentionally contains within itself
an abject which does not exist.The objects which physical phenomena
refer to,however,must exist.'The objects of our physical activities
are restricted to what does exist' (ed. Chisholm. Real ism and the
Background of Phenomenology.Illinois:1960, p.4),This is once again
far from Brentano whose own examples of physical phenomena are
sensible qualities.However,we can expand it into a distinct
understanding of activity.
Activity has directedness,takes an abject,even if its object does
not exist,This is the basis of my concept of activity.Physical
activities are those activities in which the body is explicitly
involved:the character and state of the body influences the
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character of the activity.Physical activity contains an object in
the sense that it is behaviour not merely referring to a part of the
world,but behaviour projected onto the world,directed towards
imposing upon or changing the world.Physical activity is practical
in one particular sense of the term:it initiates changes in the way
things are in the world.('In theory,the world-calls the turn,the
mind must conform to the facts;in practice,the mind calls the
turn.G.Grisez,'First Principle of Practical Reason',in
ed.Kenny.Aquinas).That which is practical is not only within the
world and referring to it,but directed towards bringing about some
sort of change in the way things are in the world,towards having an
ef fect.It must, therefore,have an object.In this it differs from
behaviour which is physical but is not activity:such physical
behaviour is not directed towards having an effect;it need
not,therefore,take or contain an object,though it will be influenced
by the condition of the body,and perhaps other objects.
Mental activity also has directedness towards an object (unlike
other sorts of mental phenomena),yet this object need not
exist.There are two cases in which the abject does not exist:in the
first our mental activity is directed towards an object which does
not exist and which we believe does not exist,though we may succeed
in 'blocking' this belief or its import (as in self-deceit, wishful
thinking and day-dreaming); in the second case we believe there is an
object but one which our minds have not yet fully grasped.This
second case is the case of theoretical activity.This is mental
activity directed towards an object which we believe exists though
we do not yet know it - and though it may always turn out that this
object does not exist. Mental activity directed towards an unknown
object in whose existence we believe but which may turn out not to
exist at all is,then,theoretical activity.Even when we enquire into
the possibility of the existence and character of some object in
which we are hugely disinclined to believe, there must be a minimum
belief in its possibility to ground the mental activity upon an
object.
Theoretical activity, then,requires beliefs about possible,though as
yet unknown, objects. The absence of knowledge may refer to knowledge
of the object's existence or of its character - whichever of these
forms the particular object of this stretch of mental activity.To
believe in what we do not yet know and to seek to know it takes
time,energy and trust.It is not a commitment made lightly,or
haphazardly.This is usually expressed by saying we make such a
commitment only for beliefs we hold to be well-grounded.Well-
grounded beliefs exclude that inherited stock of knowledge of our
community which we are taught and perceive after the static manner
of 'certain facts'.They include those unsolved questions,problems
and enquiries into whose pursuit we are born,and whose objects are
sufficiently believed in to suggest there are answers,solutions and
goals to be achieved.To the extent to which we share the beliefs of
those around us,we join with them in enquiries whose results are not
yet known.As individuals,we also have ourselves the capacity to hold
well-grounded beliefs which fall short of knowledge and which
therefore provide us with objects of theoretical activity.And if our
beliefs are important enough,or in relevant ways concern,objects of
public or general interest,others too may come to share them,in
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which case we will have initiated new avenues of theoretical
enquiry.
We do not,however,hold well-grounded beliefs in a vacuum,or approach
the world as an antecedently existing frame containing a set number
of things to be discovered.Our standards of what is well-grounded
are determined by those among whom we are reared and live,and the
starting points of our debates are not served up to us as gateways
to fresh and individualistic paths but are points within continuing
processes at which we happen to be born.When we join the on-going
debate we accept its current well-grounded beliefs,its standards of
evidence,and the stated goals of its present theoretical enquiries
into its beliefs.The greatest passible originality in theoretical
activity,then,would consist in so revising the beliefs and standards
of evidence of one's social communities that all contemporary
problems would have to be re-cast in terms which acknowledge one's
achievement (unarguably,Socrates, Augustine,Aquinas,Kant,Freud).This
would not abandon present beliefs,which would be useless,thus a full
account of rationality would require a philosophical account of
translation and coramensurability of terms.
Because it is an implication of theoretical activity that the
activity takes an object,and because the object refers to shared
standards of explanation and evidence,rationality always involves
the misperception that there are some beliefs or norms whose
validity is independent of the contingent enquirires of particular
communities:those into which we are born and trained are perceived
as objective,and given that the structure of theoretical activity
requires that an object of belief must always exist,something is
always perceived as objective.In this sense,again,rationality is the
fundamental human attribute:it is built into earliest childhood
experience and continues with exactly the same structure.Current
shared beliefs give us the presuppositions which are one of the
clues to the individuation of particular communities. The objects of
certain of those beliefs,the objects specifiable as the
institutions,practices and forms of understanding of
morality,provide us with the other determinant of the individuation
of communities. Our capacity for theoretical activity (together with
our capacity to live together in all the details,arrangements and
institutions of everyday life - our capacity for morality) is our
qualification for coming out of that isolation philosophers have
often imagined (but only imagined) into membership of a
community.Theoretical activity,as we will see,is not to be opposed
to practical/moral life,but forms this as much as it does the life
of the intellect.It can also provide us with materials for an
understanding of what community is.
Coumwnity.
Communities are partly constituted by the shared presuppositions and
aims of theoretical enquiries.They are also constituted by
practices,institutions and patterns in which people try to realise
these and other aims, and to lead their lives peaceably,without being
troubled by questions of aims and enquiries,but merely going about
everyday preparations and habits,and by the forms of understanding
of these practices,institutions and practices which those who
participate in them develop to explain,guide and evaluate their
conduct. By practices I understand simply what people &Q. in the
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unpuzzling sense in which even in the mast complicated social and
personal situations there is an answer available in the experience
and consciousness of the community as to what is to be done,Patterns
and rules I understand as beliefs generally held (held by a clear
majority) to the effect that in this type of situation we ought to
do x.Institutions are even more general than beliefs shared by
most:they are patterns which have taken on an independent existence
from the beliefs of those who hold x ought to be done,and now
instantiate or promulgate x in objective,independently existing
forms in the community. Institutions range from such things as legal
systems to queueing to marriage.
These 'non-theoretical' elements of a community are its morality.I
do not mean this in the sense that morality explains these;rather
these are (this particular) morality.They are non-theoretical only
in that they have a definite end-point,a standard of truth;they do
however contain both emotional forms of understanding and more
cognitive forms which explain the norms of conduct.The elements of
morality judge,guide and form the conduct of individuals.They serve
to partly individuate a community. Particular moralities and
particular theoretical enquiries (conceptions of rationality) are
together sufficient for individuation.
The role of morality in individuation ensures that it is never
strict and lawlike.Morality,at least,and often rational structures
as well,is not clearly defined:an interacting set of practices,
institutions and forms of understanding is not,and need not be,quite
independent of the practices and understandings of other surrounding
moralities of which it is otherwise independent or of which it
expresses disapproval or disavowal.Because of this
indeterminateness,the individuation of communities rarely provides a
'sharp' result.It is most often the case that individuation depends
upon the 'core' rational and moral concepts of a social grouping,the
practices and explanatory forms well established and well defended
against opponents.That the 'edges' of a social group's morality and
rationality cannot be accurately differentiated does not imply that
the group cannot be individuated as a community.Vhat it implies is
that such questions as how many and which communities individuals
belong to cannot be always,even often,answered with accuracy because
the membership to which they refer is,except for core
qualification,ambiguous.The unity of rationality and morality which
is community resembles the unity of language and practice which is a
Vittgensteinian language-game,and as in the case of the language-
game (EL_L_,71;23;67),the blurred edges of the concept of community
and the phenomenon to which it refers allow it the flexibility to
encompass both small-scale social units,such as clubs and
lifestyles,and the wide-scale whole of social life itself.
Since in most social communities individuated by rationality and
morality the explanations,justifications and prescriptions which
constitute moral understanding will be the product not only of our
moral practices,but of our conception of rationality (which will
have helped form these practices),morality and rationality will be
found to overlap greatly,Indeed,the development of moral practices
will normally be a feature not only of previous social practices and
necessities,but also of rational criticism of these;and
rationality,theoretical activity,will be influenced by moral
practices not only as, but specifically as, theoretical enquiry
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concerning morality, moral theory.However,I hold the conceptual link
between morality and rationality is much more restricted than has
been normally held.We will see later there is only one respect in
which such a link is truly conceptual,In general,there is no
requirement that morality and rationality develop in tandem,and no
certain predictions to be made about this, except that where there
are no. clear relations between the two,some trauma must have
occurred or be occurring within or to the community.We can say this
because a community whose everyday life need not be judged by its
own members as rational, though not inconceivable,is one no
individuals sharing both the moral and the rational life of the
community would (could?) choose, and most members of a community
share to some extent in both of these.
This understanding of community places no conditions on the
magnitude or origin of communities. They are social units whose
indeterminacy makes them the accurate embodiments of rationality and
morality rather than the universal political and cultural grouping
referred to by the concept 'society1.They may be formally
constituted bodies or society-wide forms of agreement in explanation
and day to day life.There are no definite answers to the questions
'at what point does membership of this community cease and activity
within the norms of another community begin?' and 'how many
communities does my sociability enrol me within?'.The individuation
of communities is itself a rational task which will be conditioned
by explanatory norms of theoretical activity,and which will
admit, therefore,of no 'absolute' truth.Most of us will be enmeshed
within numerous complicated patterns of community within some of
which we will be deeply active,while others will now be little more
than meaningless or instinctual conventionality to
us.Community,however,is not inevitable,since rationality and
morality are not.It is parasitic upon social life which is the
condition of human life,but human associations do not entail forms
of human communication.Social life entails nothing more than the
possibility of community;allies who agree to tolerate each other can
maintain total isolation once the agreement is made.
Importance of Activity.Vhv is Theoretical Activity Rationality?
Theoretical activity,joining intellectual enquiry,is not
completable. It consists in activity directed towards knowledge of
certain goods which have their drawing power for us because of
presuppositions concerning them which we share with others.This
intellectual draw and the intellectual activity directed towards
knowledge does not restrict the reasons we seek to know these
goods,and the purposes to which we shall put them,to intellectual
ones,but it does mean that our primary purpose in theoretical
activity,the thing we must first achieve,is knowledge both of the
existence of objects and of their nature.As we achieve these
intellectual goals,in whatever field,we do not then have fewer and
fewer shared beliefs on which to pursue theoretical activity,but
different shared beliefs.Answering questions does not reduce the
supply of questions,and should not:it alters the perspective of
questioning by supplying new presuppositions to the questioner,and
so throwing up new questions.Over lengthy periods,and through
intellectual revolutions these perspectives change radically.The
questions we face may bear no relation except for the intellectual
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historian to those others formerly faced. It is fiction to suggest
that methodological requirements of intellectual enquiry will remain
constant through such changes.They will change also,and their change
will be one of the most significant events within particular
stretches of theoretical history.
It is for this reason I have claimed any account of rationality
which does not allow for this paradigm of rational progress is
defect!ve,whether based,in Kant's way,on a supposed faculty of moral
personality or universal reason,or an a supposed universal
psychology such as the utilitarian's claim, or, equally bad,on
supposed universal requirements of law or justice, An aq/dcjunt of
rationality must explain what I adduced from Aquinas:that proof is
theoretical activity,and that this is incompletable.The boundaries
of rationality cannot be once and for all drawn because there may
always yet appear from without us, and then from within us, those who
reject not only anything we claim as rational,but also our
boundaries.
I have,however,not only claimed that theoretical activity must be
accommodated within an understanding of rationality. I have claimed
theoretical activity Is. rationality,and that a concept of
rationality is merely the result of one particular piece of
theoretical activity,rationality,here directed in upon itself.I have
claimed to construct this understanding from explaining how
Aristotle shows us,explicitly in N.E..a community of enquiry,and how
Aquinas shows us how this community can be understood not
politically but as a community under first principles and definite
authority,and haw the dialectical enquiry oi the community can be
understood not as non-theoretical but as scientific,theoretical
forms of intellectual activity.First principles for Aquinas,which
became presuppositions and goals of theoretical activity on my
account (the presupposition is a belief that x exist;the goal is
knowledge of x/that x exists.cf.Aristotle's and Aquinas's account of
first principles as arche and telos,both starting point and end-
point), can be derived scientifically as a result of theory
encountering theory within a theoretical community oi teachers and
learners,rather than at Aristotle's pre-theoretical level of
dialectical intereaction within the polis,The conditions,pattern and
extent of Aquinas's researches indicate his result that
proof,arriving at true conclusions,is not absolute but is activity
which is incompletable. It is also his belief that rationality is
paradigmatically theoretical:practical reason is directed towards
pursuit of good and avoidance of evil,not to truth,but it does not
follow it is not theoretical.Aquinas's own theory of rationality
does follow Aristotle in distinguishing theoretical and practical
reason as the dual operations of a single faculty.However,his
achievement for us is not his own synthesis oi Aristotle with sacra
doctrina.but his demonstration that theory,if pursued after the
manner of dialectical construction among the various available and
opposing alternatives within the shared presuppositions of a
community, can produce an account both of what it is rational to
think and what it is rational to judge and to do.
Vhat the tradition of Natural Law at its best teaches us is that
theory can solve the problems of what actions are rational - not
(merely) by helping us to discover this,but by allowing us to create
the conception of rationality according to which actions for us are
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rational or irrational as an intellectual achievement fallowing upon
the theoretical presuppositions and beliefs we hold and encounter.I
have not yet said much about practical reason.We can say here that
itis not a different kind of activity from that I have described as
theoretical,but that it does differ in one special way from other
theoretical activity.The goal of practical theoretical activity is
not knowledge,but beiief:belief that x is to be done,or belief
concerning how x is to be done.I therefore deny the Aristotelian
contention that there is any reasoning which actually concludes in
action rather than in beliefs or intentions about what is to be
done.1 do,however,ally myself with Aristotle against Aquinas and
against Kant that the end and meaning of human life rests with
intellectual and not with moral/practical activity (see
C. P. R.A840/B868:C.Pr.R.87ff. :C.J.453-6).
My claims,particularly concerning Aquinas,that when we engage in
theoretical activity we not only apply rationality,but also
determine it are interpretations.As such they rest not only upon
philosophical argument,but upon historical,biographical,and literary
judgements and upon reilection over these.This admission does not
disturb me.If the thesis is correct,if those beliefs which are our
presuppositions and that knowledge of objects which we desire
structure what for us are the norms of rationality,and if what these
beliefs and objects are depends upon the state of enquiry of a
particular community,then only interpretation can definitively
demonstrate this.That is,if no standard of explanation or
justification has any authority independent of the contingent
standards of contingently strcuctured communities,any attempt to
explain this will itself be limited by the explanatory norms of
writer and audience.lt seems reasonable to me,therefore,to throw the
matter open to non-argumentative interpretation as well as to
philosophical argument.
The argumentative force of the account is supposed to came from
these interpretations,the negative force of the,much more
analytical,critical interpretations of others, and from the coherence
of the account of rationality and morality.Furthermore,if one agrees
with me that theoretical activity is pursued in this non-completable
dynamic form through communities which are partially constituted by
the details of this enquiry,and that standards of rational
explanation and evaluation are theoretical in this sense,this will
lead to further agreement which serves to confirm my account.For it
follows that standards of rationality will change (a) along with and
also (b) as part of other theoretical developments. Despite the fact
they will normally change,at least for the whole community, only
gradually and in a piecemeal way,norms of rationality will change;as
the existing norms allow us to make fresh discoveries in all
fields, this new knowledge will supplant earlier beliefs and
enquiries,and with this,always,although gradually,the conception of
rationality will undergo change in an indirect way (a),and sometimes
(in the work of certain theorists;in an explicit way (b).
This change will be such that the members of the community will be
able,at least while it is occurring,to explain it as merely an
extension of clarification of the old standards;but suitably able
theorists will be able to explain the old standards,bit by bit,in
terms of the new evolving standards.This does not show either that
the old standards were inadequate or in need of improvement, or that
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the old standards were the only standards ana have now been
definitively developed,but only that all standards are simply the
standards of the here and now,and will and must be succeeded by
others as circumstances change,a change which is partly a result of
the success of the old and now passing standards.
So,theoretical activity provides standards of rational explanation
and takes these away not as rational watchdog,but simply qua
rationality.There is no need to posit some mysterious second
process,1 reason' ,criticising our conceptions of
rationality:theoretical activity and 'our1 rationality are
identicalOur' rationality determines the flow of theoretical
activity,and theoretical activity determines our standards of
rationality.None of this precludes us from constructing a theory of
rationality,but it does mean that theory of rationality is theory of
a (particular community's) rationality,and it is that standard by
which it must be judged.
The particular case of theory ol_ rationality,and not merely
'rational theory',or'theory determining rationality',also emphasises
that rationality is determined by and exercised in theory:the
rationality of a profoundly pragmatic and non-meditative people is
still applied in what I have called theoretical activity,and its
norms are reached through theoretical activity.Our task in what
follows is not to suggest a particular (late twentieth century, west
European) conception of rationality,but to enquire into whether
there are any general conditions we can lay down for rationality;to
make clearer the relation between rationality and morality; and to
discuss any general features of practical reasoning - reasoning
towards beliefs concerning what ought to be done,and how.
Theoretical activity is an extremely basic human attribute.It is
not,however,an inevitable consequence of being human. There are those
who cannot,for whatever reason,pursue the sort of mental activity,in
extreme cases at all.There are certain conditions which any human
being must satisfy before he or she can take part in theoretical
activity;there are requirements if a human being is to engage in
mental activity devoted to achieving knowledge of those things
belief in which distinguishes him as a member of his community. Some
of these are quite specific biological goods and practical
necessities.In all cases their provision is a matter of concern to
the whole community because if theoretical activity fails to
flourish in the distinctive form of this community,part of its
identity is threatened.However,these requirements are settled not at
the level of provision of certain goods to the community,but at the
level of individual needs.Needs which must be satisfied in order lor
us to be able to take part in rationality-exercising and
rationality-creating activity are extremely basic needs,for without
these that part of human existence which concerns enquiry of any
sort ceases,and an individual who suffers this must suffer
isolation.Inability to take part,with others,in the creation and
exercise of norms of rationality by which all our behaviour will be
judged is as serious a handicap as inability to take part in
communication with others as individuals,and morality,the everyday
life of a community in which this love,and all lesser personal
relationships are experienced.
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The Concept of Needs,
The most obvious way to approach the concept of needs is by
comparison with desires.At first it may seem the difference between
these is quite obvious:our needs are what we require;our desires are
what we yearn to acquire.However,the analysis is considerably more
difficult.Desires are only with the greatest difficulty further
analysable,and this itself indicates a difference between them and
needs.The modality of needing is necessity;the concept of needing
therefore invites us to look at the nature of the needy being and
the object of the need in order to discover the relation between
them.Desiring does not possess a similar modality:the requirement a
desire places upon us to act in the way appropriate to its
satisfaction depends not on the nature of the deslrer.but on his
continuing to have the desire - a wholly contingent matter.Even
where the desire is continuous or profound, the requirement that it
be satisfied appears still not to be necessary.Deciding whether a
persistent desire ought to be satisfied requires reference to
features other than the agent and the object of his desire,in
particular reference to his other desires and their objects, and in
these comparisons there is no necessity.Needs invite us to examine
the structure of the individual and the needed object;desires invite
us to examine the desired object,the importance of the abject to the
agent within the context of his other desires,and the strength of
the desire itself.The examination of needs reveals the meaning of
needing;the examination of desires,however,typically reveals not the
meaning of desiring,but contingent facts about the psychology and
life-plan of the particular agent.
Needs are needs for something.Our set of needs makes reference to
purposes,goals, aims and interests.lt gives a good indication,then,of
the sort of life we are concerned,or perhaps ought to be
concerned,to have.A need may be for something for the sake of
something else,or it may be simply for something.Desires also are
for something,which will be either a means to promoting some other
end or a way of realising in itself the desired goal. So I can desire
to eat a chocolate doughnut in order to achieve the aphrodisiac
effects of chocolate, or I can simply desire to eat a chocolate
doughnut in such a way that eating one will itself be the
realisation of my goal (rather than this being realised only by,for
example,the pleasure I receive from eating). Similarly if,as seems
likely,there is a universal human need for sexual expression,I may
need to express myself in this way either in order to achieve
something else - for example,procreation or the sensation of
satisfaction - or I may need to so express myself such that the
satisfying of the need is itself the way of realising my goal,In
this respect needs and desires are alike:both thread into our
network of purposes,aims and goals and respect the priority within
these.
In the case of our desiring or needing something as the means to the
achievement of some further end whether we actually desire or need
the means depends upon whether the further end is itself needed.If
it is merely desired and not needed,then,other things being
equal, one will desire to adopt the means to it which appear most
effective,least taxing and so on.It does not,however,follow from the
fact that we desire the end that we need here to take the
means;neither does it follow that even if we want to take the means
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to our desired end we need to take them.A desire for the company car
which brings about a desire for the job does not imply a need to
take the job.'I need the job' here is never more than shorthand for
'I need the job if I desire the car'.I suggest we read this as '(I
need the job if - ) (1 desire the car)',and not as '(I need the job!
(if I desire the car)'.That is,we should read'it not as a species of
needing which arises in relation to a conditional of desire,but as a
conditional dependent upon the presence of a desire whose
conditionally is expressed rhetorically by the terminology of
needing.
Only when the further end is itself needed,or perhaps unneeded but a
vastly important part of the interest of the agent,can we talk in a
non-rhetorical way - a way which claims action - about needing to
undertake the means to this end.And even in this case whether or not
the means are needed depends also upon surrounding circumstances.In
severe hunger 1 need to eat,but eating this pear (or a pear) as a
means to satisfying this need is something I need to do only if
there is no other available alternative,my digestive system copes
only with pears,and so on. So there is this difference between things
desired and needed for a further end:when the further end is
desired, the means to it will usually also be desired,but they will
never thereby be needed;only if the further end is needed (or vastly
important to the agent's interest) will the means also be needed,and
then only if they are only available/best available
means. Wants,however strong, are not sufficient to create needs.
We should also note here the agent's privilege of identification
operates only with desires.That is,if I need x and y is the best
means to it,I,you,or best of all an expert can tell with equal
authority that I need y.However,if I desire x and y is the best
means to x,I alone can say with authority whether I desire y.The
expert may rave about the irrationality of someone in this position
who does not desire y,but the agent is still free and able to ignore
y,and alone can accurately report on whether y is desired.This
reveals a further difference:experts and rational agents can say
someone ought to desire y;they cannot say he ought to need it.If he
ought to need it,then he does need it,for the normativity of needs
depends upon no contingent features of psychology.
The necessity involved in needing must be distinguished from what
often appears to be the necessity in desiring.As I said,analysis of
the situation of one who is desiring pulls us away from analysis of
desire itself to questions concerning the desirer,the desired object
and the importance of satisfaction 01 the desire.We dip into the
story of how desires come about and how they operate;we tell
Freudian or other psychological,sometimes physiological,stories of
why they arise and how they affact us.But what we cannot seem to do
is to say just what desires are,I think this is not so much a
limitation in us,but a reflection of just what desiring is, We can
limit or control the desires we are going to have,and we can prevent
or allow certain desires becoming operative in our behaviour,but we
cannot make ourselves have this particular desire now or stop
desiring this now,Desire,certainly within our culture,is the
ultimate explanatory ground of human behaviour.It is not an act of
will;it is what will controls.Its very ultimacy,not just in action
but in all behaviour,means that explanations of it can only be
either in the form of causal stories concerning how particular
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desires arise and operate or in imaginative form,such as Euripides'
Medea. We have no other terms with which to explain what desire Is..
It does not follow from this either that desires appear at random,or
that once in evidence,they rage.Self-control,or 'will power' , the
control of the forming,force and operation of desires,is after all
one of the capacities we are most acquainted with.It is also not
true that there is no logic or pattern to the occurrence of
desires.Desires are for things in themselves or for things as means
to ends.They have a certain interconnectedness.This can be compared
to the much stricter interconnectedness of beliefs.One who has a
certain set of beliefs must either reject a belief whose truth is
incompatible with that of a member of this set or alter the
set.However,one who desires to eat a banana but not to peel it even
though there is no reason for not peeling it may persist in this
behaviour without losing the desire to eat. In the case of belief,to
persist in the inconsistent belief is a puzzle;with desire it is
merely perverse or wilful conduct.The content of beliefs exercises
much greater restraint over their formation than the content of
desires influences the formation of desires.There is,nevertheless,a
weak connectedness between desires:that is,a connectedness between
the content of desires whose violation does not involve logical
error but does involve perceptual or calculative error.
It should be possible now to point to various differences between
desire and need which will indicate an analysis of the necessity in
needing.We do not have final control over when and what to desire,or
when to cease experiencing a particular desire.Desires,however,form
a network with our purposes and aims by reference to which we have
some understanding of how specific desires come about.Having an aim
is generally desiring to satisfy it (or,sometimes, simply to desire
to continue having it as an end),however the connectedness between
desires is not strong enough to produce 'rules of desiring',a logic
of desire.There are no desires all must share (crudely,the martyr
may not desire to eat,the lover to sleep,and the morbidly guilty to
die);and no one need have any one particular desire (perhaps,like
Schopenhauer's will-less individual, we can even extinguish all
desire).The necesity in desiring,then,is not the necessity of
holding,or satisfying any one desire,or the logical necessity of
desiring the means to desired ends. It must, there!"ore, be simply the
necessity between a desire felt and its satisfaction.But since it is
possible to fail to act upon any desire,what can this necessity
be?The necessity must be not the necessity of satisfying a felt
desire,but the felt necessity of satisfying a desire.That is,the
very experience of desire has built into it a felt tendency towards
satisfaction-related behaviour;it is never calm,and the object of
desire is never a matter of sheer indifference to us, (In
this,desiring differs from wanting or wishing that:we may want
something or wish that something were the case without iust now
feeling the draw and pull of this thing).Although this necessity is
a felt,or subjective necessity,there is no reason to question its
reality:it is a disturbance oi the organism at a fundamental level
which impels thought and action towards the object of the desire.
We can now look at the necessity involved in needing.First,could it
be the case that there are some needs which everyone must share;and
could it be that there is a human being who has not a single need?
Everyone must have some needs.This is clear if we remember that
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needs are always for something - either for the means to some other
needed or extremely important goal,or for a direct realisation of
some aspect of myself. Now,although one may conceivably desire
nothing,it cannot be that there is nothing for which one has a
need,for it cannot be that there is anyone for whom there is
nothing,whether already in his possession or outside it,which is of
any value,use or purpose.lt is simply part of being embodied that we
cannot be totally invulnerable before the world,and that
we,therefore,have needs.Even if we 'had everything that we need',we
would still be vulnerable and needy with respect to the preservation
of what we have.
Are there any needs common to all? Here we must again differentiate
needs for things 'in themselves* and needs for things which will
serve to fulfil other purposes,Let us call the former primary needs
and the latter secondary needs.I do not think it is necessary that
all should have,even any,secondary needs. Someone,perhaps of very
limited horizons,may have only a number of primary needs for the
basics of life.Or someone consumed by a solitary cause or ideal may
have need only for what directly realises this in her life.Such a
life in which only one cause mattered, and in which the requisite
conditions for living i'n accord with it were readily available so as
not to require the intervention of secondary needs to obtain
these,is,of course,unlikely,but conceivable.lt must,however, be said
that if circumstances brought it about that the holding and
achievement of other goals would effectively lead to the
satisfaction of this person's primary needs,he would be obliged to
adopt these goals and so to inherit corresponding secondary needs on
the way to the fulfilment of his primary needs.It can certainly be
claimed that there are no common secondary needs,because their
existence depends both upon the nature of someone's primary needs
and deep interest and upon the exact and particuloar circumstances
in which he finds himself.Even if there are common primary
needs,variation in individual experience and abilities means that
the secondary needs in which these will generally diversify
themselves are widely divergent and not shared by all possessors of
primary needs.
Are there common primary needs? Certainly not all primary needs must
be shared by all human beings.A man with lung disease may have
primary need for for attachment to a respirator;some have a primary
need to play music or to live in the country.These needs are primary
but peculiar to a small group of people. If primary needs are not
shared by all,what is the force of the implication that they refer
to things needed 'in themselves'? I suggest this definition of
'primary needs':x has a primary need for p if p is necessary for the
realisation of x's basic human capacities or for the exercise of
these in the particular ways x has freely determined,where 'basic
human capacities' is understood as 'capacities for (physical and
mental) activity'.There are primary needs both for whatever is
necessary it we are to participate in the full range of activities
of which we are capable and for what is necessary if we are to
exercise these capacities in the ways we freely choose.These two
constituents are supportive and regulative of one another:without
free choice direct realisation of capacities would involve so many
possible forms of flourishing that the varieties of need-
satisfaction required could not feasibly be met;without a theory of
basic human capacities someone who made few and limited choices
would be harmed in respect of goods indifference to which would not
continue as the needs for these goods were not met.The two
constituents are together sufficient for the definition of primary-
need, though since for same (autonomous and very well-balanced )
persons the first constituent will not be necessary and for some
(retarded or unbalanced) persons the second will not be possible to
fulfil, they are not singly necessary.On this definition most of us
will have primary needs concerning diet,exercise and shelter,while
some will have primary needs concerning specific food,location and
health care if they are to flourish both in ways they have chosen
and in the more basic, biological sense of directly realising
capacities.
The question of which choices we have a need rather than some lower
grade form of reason to promote is a question of self-
identification. Everyone needs to be supplied with what is necessary
for participating in the full range of possible activities of which
he is capable,but these needs will be foregone by us,perhaps
rightly,so long as we have what we need to participate in those
activities we have elected to concentrate on,for whatever reason.It
is in so far as we consent tacitly to the absence of many things
needed because we have the things needed to do what we want to do
that we reveal which of our desires refer to projects and objects
which structure our selves:we would not consent to give up what we
need,even if we do not want it,unless what we are supplied with is
sufficient not merely to satisfy desires,but to equip us for
projects which are deeply important to us.This may seem too
optimistic a belief in human reason:for many,if something is not
wanted,that it is needed,even if this is known, is
unimportant.However,for no one,I think,is what is needed,where this
is known but not desired,something which is positively not wanted:if
you know what you need,you cannot be indifferent to it.To know I
need something,though I do not want it,is to believe it is necessary
for me and that I am entitled to it,and the entitlement and
obligatoriness of this abject will not allow me to accept the
absence of it unless I am assured of being equipped for what is
lastingly important to me and of the same depth of necessity to me.
The capacity for free choice,then,(itself a capacity towards whose
realisation we bear primary needs) is not a way of losing or gaining
primary needs:we all have a primary need for everything necessary
for the realisation of all our basic capacities.Rather,in choosing
how to exercise our capacities we simply alter the pattern of
primary needs so that to the fore comes,for example,the need for
those things necessary for an athlete,while the other primary needs
- food,water,political liberty,companionship and so on - take on a
backseat status in which the individual is either content with low-
grade satisfaction or no satisfaction,or looks to their satisfaction
in the specific ways which serve the production of an athlete -
special diet,training,new lifestyle,freedom from certain social
obligations.What is general and unspecilied before in primary
needing becomes particular and specific,with the additional effect
that what is not required as means to the chosen activities can
became a matter 01 little or no importance to the
individual.However,primary needs cannot be 'lost'.Though from 'the
inside' the agent may see the new pattern as relegating many primary
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needs to a status at which they no longer exercise practical
necessity,iron 'the outside',the viewpoint of the spectator these
needs are as important as ever:the basic capacities we choose not to
use,while we still possess them,require, and entitle us to, the means
of exercising them because we are never restricted to a life of
activity only of our own choosing. The 'outside' view is. relevant in
the domain of needing just because in the case of needs,unlike
desires,there is no privileged identification.
The factors of entitlement and necessity or urgency in primary
needing reliect this absence of privileged status.There is no
privileged identification because there is no specific sensation or
tug of consciousness which is need.Weeds are purely formal relations
between agents and goods.The distinct status of primary needs arises
from their being a relation which appears to include no logical gap
between the '1' and the 'food' in the need-statement. The 'need'
which joins these,because it does not specify any purpose of mine
lor which food is required, seems merely to iterate with urgency and
with right 'I' 'food'.The relation between the terms of a primary
need-statement is logically as close as it can be in a practical
statement.lt is this which sometimes makes it seem as if we would be
better to understand needs dramatically rather than conceptually:as
a cry rather than a logical relation.
Ve should be able to understand now the meaning of the sort of
necessity which holds of primary needs.This will help us in the
general project of understanding those needs whose satisfaction is
required if there is to be rationality,theoretical
activity.Secondary needs derive the degree of necessity they possess
from the necessity of the objects of the primary needs towards which
the objects of secondary needs are means.That we are.that we are
constituted in a certain way,entails that we have certain primary
needs - whereas nothing about us entails that we experience certain
desires.Our basic capacities for participation in forms of activity
and the free choices of ways in which we will exercise these entail
that we have primary needs.The necessity involved in needing,then,is
a function of the individual human constitution and the capacity for
free choice in which we determine the particular sort of life we are
to lead,one in which basic capacities are realised in this
particular pattern.This contrasts with the necessity of desire which
is a felt necessity,partly constitutive of the desire itself but no
function of the desire's object.Heeds require to be satisfied
because of the connection between their objects and the nature of
the needy being both as an individual of a certain sort and as an
individual freely constituted.
The structure of needing implies a stronger interconnectedness than
that of desires.Human beings possess a number of primary needs;given
the rough equality of the capacities for physical (in particular;
and mental activity (at least at the upper limits) of human
beings, some of these are common to all humans who possess any
capacity for activity whatsoever (a relatively healthy
environment;exercise;physical space;education;free discussion and
equality of opportunities and so on);others are possessed because of
special physical and mental features of individuals and because of
those radical or unusual tree choices individuals make about how
they will exercise a certain capacity through a lifetime;humans also
possess a great number of specific purposes and aims the achievement
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□I which requires the satisfaction of a multitude of secondary
needs:needs which borrow their necessity only from the more ultimate
primary needs.The structure of needing,then,is much closer to
hierarchy,at least under ideal conditions.The ideal of a coherent
life is one in which a stable arrangement of exercise of basic
capacities is maintained by free choice,thus implying stable primary
needs;and aims and goals are formed substantially in accord with,and
rarely in violation of,these basic ways of flourishing,leading to a
stable and manageable structure of secondary needs.
Basic capacities are capacities for forms of physical and mental
activity:all mental and physical behaviour which implies
directedness towards objects.There are,of course other forms of
mental and physical behaviour which are not activities,and which are
the realisation of fundamental human capacities,but what I wish to
capture with the notion of 1 basic capacities' is the essential
connection between human nature and activity.The capacities realised
in behaviour,intentional and nonintentional,related to,for
example,personal and species biological survival,however
fundamental,are not capacities of human nature but capacities of an
organism to constitute and support a human life.A human being's
distinctive capacities concern his basic potential for various sorts
of activities,and these are what I mean by his basic capacities.The
simple propagation of life and survival are not the ends of primary
needing:these are those ends which structure a distinctively human
way of surviving and which extend also to the ways in which
individual humans choose to survive and live.
(Few writers believe unconditional needs are simply the biological
goods of survival,but those who do see the connection of basic needs
with natures rarely succeed in specifying the form of this
connection and the list of unconditional needs which follow from
it.Thus Mary Midgley (.Beast and Man.chapter 9) is criticised by
C.Battersby (Phiiosophy 1980) and fails to answer these paints in
'Human Ideals and Human Meeds' (Philosophy 1983);she is also
criticised by J.Cottingham ('Neo-Naturalisra and Its
Pitfalls',Philosophy 1983) for sliding from wants to needs without
spelling out the more difficult content of the latter;A.Maslow is
criticised by R.Fitzgerald ('A. Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs' in
ed. R, Fitzgerald,Human Needs and Politics, Australia;1977) for lack of
empirical evidence and analysis of the relevant concepts in his
hierarchical view of basic needs; M. Ignatieff (.Needs of Strangers)
sees human nature,and therefore human needs,as historical,and
so,different.In his 'Conclusion',however,he hints at a
'meta', primary, need of 'belonging' which is what puts us in touch
with the needs of 'our' time. However, he neither works out the
relation of this primary need to the historically conditioned basic
human needs,nor gives a method or account of the basic needs of we
moderns,who have ceased to 'belong', and so need to understand what
basic needs we must satisfy in order to recover the need of
belonging.He settles instead for an Augustinian pessimism that we
have gained in freedoms and possession of objects of need,but last
the liberty of knowing we exercise our freedoms correctly and the
joy of satisfying needs of the spirit since we have lost any context
of liberty.
G. Thomson (.Needs) does try to explain what 'natural' needs are, but
his analysis confuses,and it entails he cannot tell us what natural
needs there are.He claims some needs are inescapable for natural
beings;these are those the being would possess even if it had been
exposed to a completely different range of social and environmental
factors;these needs are understood in terms of harms,which requires
an account of what is of primary value to the being,which is
provided in terms of that being's interests (for Thomson,the
features of its make-up which structure its desires);because what is
a harm for an individual depends on what is worthwhile to it and
this is a contingent matter of its interests,two things follow:the
connection of needs with natures is transiormed into one between
needs and radical individuality - the individual characteristics
which would survive any alterations in the being's social history -
and such needs,though inescapable,are not fundamental,because their
normative necessity refers not to the type of being I am,but to my
most particular,least general,characteristics,and there is no reason
why I must not sacrifice these;secondly,because of the connection of
needs with radical individuality, Thomson cannot specify in advance
what the basic needs of anyone (except those he knows) are.What this
amounts to is that Thomson's total socialising and individualising
of the concept of human nature means he can have no strong account
of practical reason:he cannot deduce.a set of common practically
necessary first principles of reason based upon shared fundamental
needs,and so instead of a strong theory of moral reasoning he can
only have an individualistic and inward-looking sort of prudential
reasoning.By removing all trace of universality from basic human
needs and suggesting that our deepest interests are purely
contingent,Thomson takes both our needs and our interests out of the
context of rationality which - at least for a Thomist - explains the
latter and depends upon the former).
I am concerned,then,to return in an analysis of primary needing to
the pattern of St.Thomas's naturales inclinationes which concern
equally preservation of life,love of and care for the
species,rationality and depth and degree of understanding,and
awareness of the wider context of human life,rather than the
restriced field of survival of the organism and the species,This
analysis looks with St,Thomas to a ^ more complex,though /
determinate,conception of human nature than the biological or
economic conceptions held by those who have approached the topic of
basic needs through theory of fundamental human motivation or
rights,or political and economic commitment.
The forms of activity include theoretical activity,emotional or
aesthetic experiences,imaginative and illusory
experiences,intentional action,physical exercise,participation in
games and projects,physical and mental relaxation and so on.Since we
are finite and embodied creatures,conditioned by past experience and
choices,and by environment,performance of any of these activities
requires that certain needs be satisfied.Uniquely of these forms of
activity,the way in which we can choose to pursue theoretical
activity is outside our individual control.We can choose not to
participate in it at all,but if we do participate,participation is
restricted by the fact that we are born into a particular community
of enquiry whose intellectual debates provide us with a
framework.Even the genius and the revolutionary can only surpass the
given debates if they have lived through a great part of them and
learned their histories,and even then they do not abandon the old
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debates,but revise the terms in which they are understood.This
unique characteristic of theoretical activity means that not only
are the things for which we have primary needs if we are to realise
the capacity at all determined by factors outside our control (as
with ail forms of activity),but also our individual primary needs it
we are to participate in the activity in the particular ways we have
chosen are outside our control.This is because our iree choice to
pursue the debates we do,though genuinely free,can be exercised only
within the framework of those debates and that history in which we
have been reared and educated:we cannot rid ourselves of the
presuppositions we learned and now have;we can only
expand,revise,even revolutionise these.So,no one can freely choose
to realise their capacity for theoretical activity in a completely
free way.Therefore,the primary needs our iree intellectual choices
serve us with are a function also of the intellectual debates and
understanding of our community.
Now,because whenever we realise one of our basic human capacities
this consists in exercising it in a particular way,chosen or not,the
total specification of primary needs for realising that capacity
will always be what we need in order to be able to exercise it at
all + what we need to be able to exercise it in particular,chosen or
unchosen,ways.As I have suggested,these do not form two different
and non-interacting sets of primary needs,but a single pattern
flexible enough to take account of the first-person preferences and
priorities of the agent while not abandoning his deep requirements
if he is to maintain in readiness his capacities for activity
presently of low-grade or no importance to him. Whereas tor the other
basic human capacities we cannot specify in advance the primary
needs of particular chosen ways of exercising the capacity,in the
case oi theoretical activity,because free choices to pursue it in
this way are determined by pre-existing debates,we can specify for
any individual both the needs to be satisfied ii the capacity is to
be realisable at all,and the more specific needs,the more detailed
pattern,which must be achieved to exercise the capacity in
particular chosen ways.We can specify the general and the specific
pattern of primary needs because in both cases these are those
things required if a basic capacity whose every realisation depends
upon the limits of the understanding of a particular community is to
be realised.
We can express this by saying in the case of theoretical
activity,rationality,the capacity for free choice concerning how to
exercise this capacity is itself part of the capacity for
rationality. Freedom of choice concerning how tQ participate in
rationality is itself part of the inheritance of theoretical debate
and understanding which a community,often despite itself and its own
standards of rationality,passes on to its members simply in virtue
of being a social grouping which functions by operating,and not by
merely worshipping or paying lip service to,standards of explanation
and understanding.
We can,then,give a full specification of what primary needs we have
if there is to be theoretical activity,rationality:a specification
which is not practically useless,concerning only the general needs
for realisation of a capacity,but one which is flexible enough to be
applied to the reasoning of any individual agent and to provide
practical guidance as to what he needs if he is to act
rationally,and which is not linked to the conception of rationality
of any particular community.If we can assume the existence of the
goods necessary for the supporting physical and mental activities of
theoretical activity (food, oxygen, health,peace, information and so
on),we are left with the question 'what is necessary if a human
being is to adopt that form of mental activity in which belief
concerning an object not fully known is pursued as the means of
finally reaching knowledge? '.If we remember,as I said above,that
this is the question 'what is necessary if a human being is to adopt
that form of mental activity in which the shared beliefs of his own
community in objects not yet fully known are pursued as the means of
finally reaching knowledge?',the answer is not too difficult.The
full pattern of primary rationality-needs reveals itself in
reflection on the nature of individual human beings,community and
theoretical activity.
LI s
First,it is necessary that the agent's liie be preserved;not only
that she live,but that she be sure of herself as leading a life
continuing into the future in which the knowledge she now joins in
pursuing might be eventually reached.Rationality has the dual
purpose of being exercised now both in the making of particular
judgements of rationality and,through this,in the
creation,confirmation and revision of standards of rationality.lt
cannot be pursued in this dynamic fashion upon shared
presupposiitons if we are not certain of having a life that is
enduring.So self-preservation is a primary need which must be
satisfied if there is to be rationality.
Second,it is necessary for rationality that human beings live
together with others in accordance with common ties.This is
obvious:if rationality is found only within the context of
communities,without communities and the forms of social life which
lead to them there is no rationality.Basically,without a community
of enquiry there is no rationality,and without a stable community
life at a non-theoretical (that is,a moral) level there will be no
community of enquiry.We need to be part of a community if we are to
possess rationality,and we need to respect what holds our
communities together - both moral and explanatory norms - if we are
to exercise our capacity for theoretical activity,For even if the
moral norms are false and the intellectual norms weakly justified
and pursued,without allegiance to them there is no possibility of
revision and revolution of them.
There are,of course,other reasons why community is a basic human
requirement,reasons concerning solely morality: the attempt of human
individuals to create conditions in which in the shared details of
their daily lives they can communicate as individuals.Community
here is not really a requirement of morality,but a requirement for
morality,and for a certain sort of morality,for communication
according to standards which move towards the goal of love.That is
to say,it is a requirement of ethics - the understanding component
in love - the requirement not for morality,but for true
morality.However hard we may try to harmonise rationality and
morality,we will always run up against this difference:that
morality has a goal and therefore a truth independent of standards
internal to particular moralities.Moral theory is realist;theory of
rationality is context-dependent.Community is a primary need of
theoretical activity;it is not,however,a primary need of
morality,but a requirement of love the experience of which includes
the (ethical) understanding that true morality is required.It is a
requirement of ethics itself that there be true morality,and that
all true moralities be respected.Another way of saying this is that
love is not a basic human capacity in the sense intended here,it is
not realised as participation in activity;its requirements
are,therefore,not primary needs of human beings.
A third requirement for theoretical activity,or rationality,is one
of what might be called intellectuality.Human beings must engage in
some degree of reflective and intellectual thought if there is to
be rationality.This entails valuation of knowledge itself.Without
an increasing store of personal knowledge and a concern for
this,our capacity to engage in theory would be restricted and prone
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to avoidable errors.Also,our personal judgements of
rationality,whether strictly intellectual or moral,will be less a
fulfilment of our wills and more a matter of our moral slavery,our
loss of individuality in our immersion in the ways of our
community,if they da not proceed from a personal stock of
knowledge,and if this stock does not provide us with a wide
selection of alternative policies of thought and action.Moral
slavery of the will must be avoided if there is to be rationality
because theoretical activity is dynamic enquiry,not a mere
reflection of set norms,and one who cannot think for herself will
be unable to contribute to or understand the processes of critical
development and revision of rationality.
A final primary need of theoretical activity is the need for hope
or faith.If we are to persevere in activity upon shared assumptions
whose truth,or whose status as knowledge,is continually deferred,or
once realised replaced with new assumptions and a new search,we are
required to have the sort of interest in the result and progress of
theory which will withstand the collapse of desire for the goal,and
of all personal conscious involvement in or valuing of the
process.This sort of interest is only provided by a hope or faith
in a future in which things will be as they are now,and which will
also constitute a rational improvement upon the present as present
beliefs will have been abandoned for beliefs of greater explanatory
flexibility.This need also implies our need to see our particular
rationality judgements and contributions towards theoretical
activity as part of a larger context,an overall pattern of progress
and advancement. The primary need here,then,is to accept that
despite the ambiguity of theory as constantly deferring (or
creating) as well as exercising rationality, the process of creating
rationality is rational:it is progress and not blind,despite the
fact that there is no independent goal it is approaching.Perhaps
this is the blindness of faith which religious faith actually
postulates:trust in dynamism as progress despite the belief that
there is no ultimate goal of activity of which we can ever have
knowledge.
These seem to me to be the goods without which we cannot join in
theoretical activities based upon the shared beliefs of our
communities.They can be summarised as life,community,knowledge and
hope.Anything else we need in order to be theoretically active is
the object of a secondary need - something needed if the primary
needs are to be satisfied.One for whom these four primary needs and
relevant secondary needs are satisfied can realise his capacity for
rationality,and realise it after her own free choices.As these are
basic to rationality - needed by any human being if she is to be
theoretically active - they can be taken to ground certain
methodological requirements upon the particular conceptions of
rationality we form. We can claim there are structurally basic
principles of theory of rationality which any conception of
rationality will respect;which its first principles,no matter what
these are,will include or be compatible with,and some account of
which might be offered in terms of them. 1 If there is to be
rationality,life,community, knowledge and hope must be respected'
means 'any conception of rationality will include or be compatible
with the following principles:'individual lives are to be
preserved','nothing must be done to threaten the existence or the
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structure of our communities, the ones individuated by this
conception',1 knowledge is to be valued,and its pursuit
encouraged','the particular means and expressions of hope of
individuals should not be taken from them,and hope in the future
should be given to those who have none' '.These principles based
upon needs which must be satisfied if there is to be rationality at
all guarantee that even a conception of rationality not framed in
terms of principles at al1,but,perhaps,highly
subjective, sentimentalist or haphazard will contain buttressing its
limits requirements of the participation in rationality itself that
certain goods are necessary.
We must note that the necessity here is not moral, and not a
requirement of reason itself,but a requirement of the basic human
capacity for one particular sort of activity (cf.Onora O'Keill's
(Constructions of Reason.Cambridge: 1989.chs. 1. 2) views concerning
the 'politics of reason' aiid toleration of the 'public use of
reason' in Kant).It is a corollary of the view that reason is
activity;all activity requires antecedent structure of some
sort. The principles the primary needs entail,the result of their
necessity for any rationality,are methodological and not
practical.However,they have a practical application.Since any
action or project dependent upon reasons or grounds denying or
incompatible with these basic principles would be undertaken upon
grounds which could not be sanctioned by any theory of rationality
(for they would be projects destructive of the capacity for
rationality itself in any form), these principles do place a
limitation upon what we can da in the name of rationality.They do
not,however,give any practical guidance as to what we may
rationally do:there is no such guidance external to the standards
and criteria of particular conceptions of rationality
themselves.They simply form the boundaries within which we can ask
truly practical questions,questions to which we can receive a
rational answer as to what we ought to do.
It is in the character of these primary needs that none of them can
be satisfied once and for all,or even sufficiently satisfied at any
one time to allow us to turn from it completely to attend to other
concerns.In this lies the key to understanding the structure of
practical reasoning.Before we are in a position to do this we must
consider the relation of these primary needs to ethics and the
goods which are the requirements of ethics.
Morality and Rationality.
It is the basic requirement for community at an individual level,a
requirement of ethics,that entails morality.This requirement,as I
have said,is part of the understanding within love.It is correctly
understood as the requirement for true morality,and as such it is
expressed in terms of what I called the 'ethical goads'.These goods
are the goods intrinsic to any true morality,any morality which
realises in the experience of everyday life the experience of
communication of individuals as. individuals and not as any sort of
constructs of morality or society.Ethics must include the demand
for true morality because neither love nor human life are possible
without morality.There are also,however,false moralities,moralities
which are defective as attempts to live together in communities as
individuals,moralities inexpressive of love.The ethical knowledge
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in which the discrimination of true and false moralities consists
is possible only through our own moralities, for it is only ever
within the context of morality that we can experience love,the
fully communicative unity of experience and understanding.This
knowledge,in whatever terms it is expressed,will be simply the
knowledge either that the moral life of our community is succeeding
in making intelligible the experience of love,or the realisation
that our morality must be altered in order to bring our practice
into line with our experience of love which is presently lacking in
intelligibility due to the ways in which we are living.
The knowledge about our morality is possible even though love is
only understood through our morality because the understanding in
the experience of love is understanding not of love as morality,but
of love as ethics:love is made intelligible by knowledge of the
goods of ethics which we acquire through the complex of experience
of love within the context of our own moralities.The experience of
love,within our own moralities,then,is sufficient to provide us
with the knowledge of certain goods either as present or as
needed.The experience thereby allows us to see our moralities as
true or as false because it occurs within a morality which
conditions it,and not in spite of this.This ethical knowledge
consists in the awareness of certain goods:those objects which make
experiences of love intelligible,and which are known in experience
of love-within-the-context-of-morality,either as present or as
needed grounds of intelligibility.The experience of love thus
entails the knowledge which makes itself intelligible,and allows us
to evaluate our own morality as true or false so far as,and
because,this experience takes place within the context of the
morality.
The 'goods of ethics',I claimed,are: respect for individuals and for
true moralities;concern for family, procreation and certain sexual
1imitations;valuation of knowledge;valuation of privacy;and respect
for all primary needs.Any true morality is founded upon these;these
alone make experiences of love intelligible;experience of and
reflection upon love in our particular communities reveals these
goods to us.Different moralities may well produce different lists
of ethical goods,but,I hold,it is only these five which determine
the existence of a true morality.Any other 'basic goods' of a true
morality provide information about what is vital to it,but not
about its truth.These five goods have an 'objective' existence in
the sense that they make (all intelligible) experiences of love
intelligible;but they exist and are discovered only within
particular moralities (even,in a sense,false ones - experience of
love in a false morality involves knowing these goods which would
make it intelligible,and which are experienced here as needed.).
The goods I suggest I suggest because:all individuals and all true
moralities must be respected otherwise we are not encouraging and
supporting loving relationships and the social arrangements which
permit such relationships to flourish;we must respect sexual
relations, family and children because these concern the most
commonly encountered expressions of both erotic and non-erotic
love,and because they effect us in our capacity to produce and
prepare off-spring capable of laving relationships;we must value
knowledge so that there is constant awareness of the need to leave
low-level forms of communication which imply solitariness for the
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experience of communication of individuals as individuals;we must
value privacy in order to guard freedom from interference - by,for
example, the state or particular institutions,including moral ones -
otherwise there will be no possibility of,and security
in,individual relationships as individuals;we must respect and work
for the satisfaction of primary needs because if human beings
cannot realise their basic capacities,if they are incapable of
forms of activity,there will be no possibility of individual
communication (it does not follow there is a requirement to provide
what is needed for every particular exercise of a basic capacity:
the goal of ethics will place certain, moral, limits upon this).
Unlike primary needs which I described as requirements if a basic
human capacity is to be exercised,these goods are not requirements
if there is to be love,full human communication:a loveless morality
in which these goods are flouted will not be empty,but actually
particularly full of experiences and expressions of love.These
goods are requirements if love is to be intelligible;they are the
means by which we explain and understand the experience of
love.Love is. valuing individuals,true moralities, family, the
body,knowledge, privacy and human needs.When it is found in a
society where these are not valued,the loving individuals interpret
what is happening to them in terms of these goods,and know that
their community is deficient because it lacks them. The
understanding they have in love is an inherently social one,and
this is the heart of the experience:they understand not just that
they ought to respect these goods,but that these goods ought to be
respected by everyone,for everyone exists within the context of
social communities precisely in order to have the conditions to be
able to communicate with other individuals on an individual level.
So the goods are both the objective standards of true
moralities, and the understanding of individuals who experience
love.In virtue of the former they can be used to evaluate
moralities; in virtue of the latter individuals understand their
deepest communication with other individuals. But these two
functions are not independent:through our experience we know the
moral necessity of these goods,for if they are not valued in their
various ways our experience is meaningless;and it is because of the
meaningfulness of this experience that we live in communities in
which it can be repeatedly encountered, moral communities.
Now,the objects of primary needs form one element (the fifth
one, above) of the set of ethical goods upon which true moralities
must be founded, and which all true moralities will promote.True
moralities will have as one of their concerns the satisfaction of
primary needs.These include,as we have seen,those needs which must
be satisfied if there is to be theoretical activity,rationality.So
one of the ethical requirements is to provide what is necessary for
rationality,and a true morality will,therefore, do this.This moral
obligation to make rationality possible continues even if the
particular conception of rationality of our community supports or
condones a false morality, far first, rationality is the basic human
activity and must be allowed to flourish in any exercise,and
second,unless rationality,theoretical activity, Is. allowed to
continue it will not ever alter and reach moral maturity.This
result reverses the traditional view that morality is (the result
of) rationality: rather,there is an ethical requirement to aid the
development of rationality.
As there is an ethical requirement to make rationality possible,it
can be seen how likely it is that our particular conception of
rationality will reflect the particular morality within which this
requirement is respected.lt must be noted,however,that there is no
ethical requirement to form any particular sort of conception of
rationality: the requirement is only to aid the realisation of the
capacity which will develop autonomously,and where it presently
does not support morality, hopefully develop to support it.Morality
does not limit, conceptually, particular conceptions of
rationality,however much its own end leads a true morality to hope
for a rationality supportive of individual communication while it
tends to the satisfaction of rationality-
needs. Similarly, rationality does not limit,conceptually, particular
moralities.Neither,however,can survive far apart for long as any
sophisticated standard of moral explanation and evaluation will be
rational,and rationality judgements will be made within the
practices of social context,morality.The connection between
rationality and morality, then,is not a tight,logical one,but at the
level of content of norms of explanation and,in the case of
morality,morality's goal.
There is,however,a tighter,conceptual,connection between
rationality and ethics.Standards of explanation and evaluation in
morality can be altered by the knowledge of ethical goods which can
call for a reappraisal either of a false morality or of a morality
dangerously close to deficiency in respect of one or more of the
goods.To alter in this reflective and revolutionary way the
morality and thereby the standards of moral explanation and
evaluation,must be to change the conception of rationality,the
norms established by theoretical activity. Moral
revision,then,entails that rationality and ethics are conceptually
connected.
There is also a logical relation to be spelled out at the level of
practical reason.In practical reason we reason within the context
of the basic rationality principles grounded upon the primary needs
which must be satisfied in order for there to be theoretical
activity.We have seen the requirement to satisfy these is an
ethical one as well as a requirement of rationality itself.We will
see that these needs are satisfied not atomically but in the
structure of reasoning which never violates them.Therefore,it is in
practical reason based on principles which ensure it never violates
the rationality-needs that we discover the structure of the
rational life (though this makes no restriction upon what the
content of any particular conception of rationality may be),and it
is this which forms one object of the (fifth) ethical requirement
that primary needs be respected and satisfied.Of course,this is
only one aspect of one of five ethical requirements,but it does
serve to place practical reason,the rational life,within the moral
context,and this,we should note,no matter whether the content of
this reasoning is particularly 'moral' or not.
Both morality - the shared life of a community of individuals in
which they ought to aspire to communicate as individuals - and
rationality - participation in theoretical enquiry by individuals
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based upon their shared presuppositions - are fundamental to the
social vision of human life presented here.They are related not in
the logical manner of the Socratic tradition,and not in the vision
of reason as law,or as primarily practical,or as primarily
instrumental,but through the independent concepts of primary needs
and ethical knowledge,respectively the concepts which explain the
principles which ground reasoning and which supply understanding of
love ana evaluation oi of moralities.Ve come then by a new way to
the old conclusion of natural law theory:that since rationality and
morality are essentially human attributes,and are linked by the
facts of shared social life,human beings are naturally social and
it is this which ultimately provides the standards of rational
conduct.
Practiohl Reasoning,
Rational decision making concerning what to do in particular
situations requires the bringing to bear of general principles of
action upon very particular and changing ends and possibilities.Ve
must be faithful to our principles yet at the same time we must
involve ourselves in the difficult and chaotic world of people and
their actions,events and things.Practical reasoning is the
traditional name given to the way in which we bridge the gap
between principles and particular situations.
Practical reasoning is based ultimately upon principles.That is not
to say it does not also concern desires and wishes,but its
foundation consists in principles.This is so because every
conception of rationality requires the inclusion within its
principles,or the protection by its principles,of the primary needs
of theoretical activity.These needs are distinguished by their
necessity,and this is not a felt or conscious necessity,but a
feature of their connection to the way human beings are constituted
or choose to constitute themselves. Their representation within
practical reasoning,then,is not as desired or inclinationai at all
but as principles,and within practical reasoning these
principles,because they are foundational to rationality,are
ultimate.Other principles based on the agent's other primary needs
will also occupy an essential place in his reasoning,and will be
the subject of the fiith ethical requirement,but they will not be a
requirement of rationality itself:their satisfaction will not be a
condition but solely a result of practical reasoning.
Although we have great latitude concerning how to satisfy our
rationality-needs,we cannot choose to violate them in sound
practical reasoning.There is only one occasion upon which there
might be an ethical permit to violate the requirements of
rationality:in circumstances in which satisfaction of one of our
other primary needs,needs for the realisation of a basic human
capacity,requires this.This is a feature of the basicness of
primary needing to human life.The cost of sacrificing the capacity
far theoretical activity may be paid to enable us to pursue other
forms of activity.In all other circumstances violation of
rationality requirements in practical reasoning is unsound.Ethics
may on occasion require us to do or hold what is irrational,but it
will never require that the conditions of rationality itself be
overthrown,and will permit this only in the case of preserving or
developing our capacity for another form of activity.
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We do then have some starting point:practical reasoning is the
application oi principles which are ultimately based upon the
principles grounded upon the rationality-needs in order to
determine what ought to be done in particular situations;no
practical principles can prescribe the violation or frustration of
rationality-needs,except in circumstances where this is required
for the satisfaction of another primary need.
Let us begin by asking what we are actually confronted with when we
come across the kind of particular situation an appropriate
response to which is action.Vhat we do not see is simply states of
affairs,events to which we will 'apply' a piece of practical
reasoning in order to find out what ought to be done to or with
them.Rather,the situation we perceive as appropriate for acting we
perceive as such only because our perception is already structured
by a particular set of beliefs:those beliefs on the basis of which
we reason practically.My perception of my situation is shaped by
beliefs - far example,about what 1 or others have previously done
to cause this situation,about what harms may be done and what
duties owed in this situation - and by feelings - of
outrage,shame,admiration or bewilderment and so on at the situation
- which engage my interest because of their effects upon and
implications for my desires and needs and obligations.When we have
beliefs about our situation which involve possible effects upon the
most important parts of our interest,that situation is said to be
perceived by us as a practical one.
A practical situation will be seen not as possessing a necessary
structure, but, to the extent to which we, or anything else can
intervene to affect it, as possessing various possibilities for
development.This is another aspect of its practicality:a/ it is
contingent,and b/ our perception of it depends upon beliefs
concerning our interest and to such a perception we can never be
indifferent:we will always be anxious to join in action to protect
our interests.My perception of how my situation might develop will
affect how I view the chances of my inf luencing it, and will also be
affected by what chances I have of influencing it.The important
point about practical perceptions,then, is that they are not
perceptions of states oi affairs independent of the involvement of
ourselves and others in them to which we then come to apply our
hard-won rationality in order to clarify what our involvement is to
be.Rather,in practical perception elements of our practical
reasoning are already at work,not as conscious reasoning,but in
tying us down, practically speaking, to some part of the world, and in
shaping the ways in which our practical involvement can be
pursued.In action a sharp distinction between reason and conduct is
misleading: the reasoning we will undertake is a coordination of
elements of the practical intelligence already engaged,not a new
application of these elements to unstructured involvements.
Practical reasoning is the coordination and restructuring of the
elements of practical perceptions in accordance with some
generalising framework.This is why practical reasoning is often
considered as abstraction from our individual circumstances into
the sphere of common reason,or of morality.This is seen as leaving
the empirical domain of low-level instrumental rationality for the
high-level realm of reason and morality.Philosophers taking this
line must confront the problem of relating the efficient
rationality oi self-interest to the rationality of first or common
principles and the interests of others.The truth of the
matter,however, is that we do not experience such a clash of
rationalities at all in our practical lives.The generalising which
is the mark of sophisticated - not merely instrumental - practical
reasoning is not a move from egoism to altruism,but from the
unmediated engagement of practical reasoning in practical
perception to the full reflective engagement in which &£.
restructure our involvement by the application of principles to
which we have a commitment which predates our involvement in this
situation.These principles which allow us to place our involvement
in practical situations within our own control are principles of
our conception of rationality,including any moral principles which
are part of this conception.The generalisation of practical reason
might well be from self-interest to 'enlightened1 rationality and
altruism,but might equally well be from thoughtless benevolence to
rational self-interest,or from present to prudent future self-
interest . Practical reason is not of two kinds,the simple and
selfish and the complex and moral: its form is contextual,and the
content of its generalising is determined by the context at
situation and of rational principles.The egoistic-altruistic
dualism has hampered much modern moral philosophy.Practical
reasoning moves from the practical but unselfconscious and non-
responsible involvement of the agent to conscious and autonomous
structuring of perception through the generality of rational
principles.
To find oneself in a practical situation,of whatever sort,is to
find oneself with a problem.The reason it is a problem, and never
merely a pattern requiring a solution like a competition puzzle,is
because the beliefs which structure our perception show the
possibility of damage being done to our interest and of our action
having an effect upon this,and we can never be indifferent towards
such a situation.There is not a single 'correct' answer to the
practical situation because it is not a puzzle to solve,but a
complex perception of what may be straining,or even
conflicting,desires and interests over which we must come to some
sort of reflective autonomy.Furthermore,after proposing an answer
to the problem of a practical situation,we are likely to find this
new perception simply opening up further practical situations - not
a misf ortune, because with practical problems it is the number and
complexity of these,and not only our success in solving them,which
adds to the richness and value of our lives.One way of explaining
the structure oi practical situations is to say that practical
reasoning very often requires judgement.
Our reasoning Is. generalising and principled,but when principles
are to be applied,and which.and to what degree,and in the face of
how much opposition are questions to which often the only answers
available for one who wishes to act depend upon individual
judgements ol personal skill and experience which go beyond
rational principles.In the terminology developed,they are part of
moral understanding.Such a judgement is only ever more or less a
good one,and may be a bad one:may produce more and greater problems
than it solves.Hy. paint is that judgement is greatly assisted in
its work because,since any theory of rationality must be based upon
the satisfaction of primary rationality-needs,and since any
perception ol a practical situation will reflect the agent's
conception of rationality at least to the degree that it reflects
his interest part of which consists in his primary rationality-
needs, judgement has this to go an:good judgement must not ignore
but must try to make more specific in policies of action the
general structure of rationality-needs which it will find reflected
in the agent's practical involvements and to which it will find the
agent disposed in so far as he is rational,in so far as he adopts
the perspective of his own first principles of rationality.
The interplay of generalisation through bringing to bear one's
principles of rationality in an attempt to gain reflective control
over practical perceptions (control which reveals to us what we can
and ought to do),and particularisation through using judgement to
make specific and relevant the objects of primary rationality-needs
and the implications of principles of rationality,both of which are
already involved in our initial unreflective practical
perceptions,give practical reasoning its 'practical'
character.Practical reasoning moves from the particular to the
general at the level of rationality and principles,and from the
general to the particular at the level of making specific for
action objects of rationality-needs and 'goods' referred to in
rationality principles,both of which are already embedded within
practical perception.
Building up perceptions into' new arrangements,exercising individual
judgement and the constant interplay between generalising and
particularising the pattern of our involvements are all expressions
of our creativity in the field of teasing out value,of making our
contributions to the part of the world we can have an effect upon
as telling as passible.The tension between the way things are and
the way things ought to be within these fundamental features of
practical reasoning suggests the necessity of
conflict,disagreement, and disharmony if we are to sustain practical
reason.If there were only a single way in which a situation could
develop,and no place for the subtleties of judgement,increased
self-control and generalising interplay,the situation would not be
a practical one:it would not make its appeal to human beings in
their faculty of practical reasoning,their perceptual faculty,the
seat of their interests,but would only appeal to their intellectual
faculties and their understanding. Restructuring, judgement,
particularisatian and generalisation exist only because practical
perception is a problem,and one which has no final,or
true,solution.
Without internal conflict and the perpetual possibility of
this,practical reason could be replaced by a simple form of
theoretical inference,hierarchical deduction of means to ends.This
is quite conceivable,but not desirable,for with it would come the
lass of our practical and human perception of situations,to be
replaced by an instrumental and unadvancea form of perception.A11
perception would be reduced to the level of seeing:'in this
situation pursuit of rationality would be the getting of x or the
getting of y as an eventual means to the getting of x'.Without
practical reasoning action would become only a means of pursuing
rationalitv.and not of exercising rationality in pursuit of valued
and desired ends.
A substantive theory of practical reasoning can only be given
within the context of a particular conception of rationality,and I
am not presenting that here.However,because of the universality of
primary needs and ethical goods, it is possible to give some general
outline of practical reasoning.First,because practical reasoning
concerns particular situations and is undertaken by individuals,it
is inevitable that the agent will see those of his own interests
involved in the situation as requiring special
attention.Basically,we experience within our perception of
practical situations,as a subjective limitation upon our
actions,the felt necessity of doing what will lead to maximum
satisfaction of each and every one of our ends.This limitation is
spelt out by the agent who consciously constructs his own or
another's reasoning as principles of rational choice requiring that
we do not harm ourselves in respect of important ends, that we adopt
means which will satisfy several ends rather than one end,and so
on.Such a making conscious and rehearsing of practical reasoning is
not necessary,but when undertaken will make great use of such
principles derived from the subjective limitation upon action that
we look to our own ends first.
Further subjective demands which practical perception places upon
agency include consistency,which again the reasoner or spectator
may spell out as principle:we must be consistent in our conformity
with the basic principles of our own conception of rationality,or
indeed in our flouting of them. The demand for consistency arises
from the fact that we lead a continuing life - connected by
memories and by intentions and emotional states to past and future
- and the effect of knowing this upon the reasoning of one who has
practical perception.Another demand is that for
flexibility:practical reasoning is not deductive or determinate,but
a reconstruction of perception,therefore there is no final
guarantee that we have 'got it right'.We should be ready to alter
our practical judgements, however unwilling,and should thus have a
certain detachment from them.The subjective requirement for
flexibility arises from the subjective experience of
reconstruction,the generalising rather than inferential pattern of
practical reasoning,which shows that we are solving a particular
problem merely by changing our persepctive and not by apprehending
some truth.Another requirement is equal concern among our basic
rational principles.Ii the 'goods' to which these point,and also
the objects of primary rationality-needs,are plural as well as
truly basic,they will be incommensurable.Respect,then,far the
principles which ground our generalising strategy in practical
reasoning is as necessary as prior respect for the parts of our
self-interest involved in practical perception,and this respect
will be equal among basic principles.
Many more requirements of reason could be listed,but as these
became more specific.it becomes obvious that they are to large
degree the consequence of adoption of particular conceptions of
rationality.There is,thereiore,no point in producing here a fuller
list.It should be remembered, however,that in practical reasoning it
is generally mostly through consideration of such principles as
consistency,self-satisfaction,pursuit of pleasure,flexibility and
so on that we solve problems by restructuring practical
perceptions.It is rare for us to actually become consciously
involved with the objects of needs and the goods of basic
principles of rationality which are the objective features involved
in practical perception which we are trying to articulate in our
particular solution to the practical problem.Subjective
requirements oi practical reasoning are as deep as most of us
generally need to go:the principles and details of our own
conception of rationality are rarely transparent to consciousness
in prfrdtical reasoning.
These informal subjective principles are the means by which our
unreflective involvement becomes full and reflective engagement
with the problem.The solving of a practical problem is actually the
conscious movement to the generalising stance of principle and the
particularising stance of objects of principles and needs
(together,the stance of autonomy), from the not fully conscious
stance of initial involvement in a practical situation
(experiencing a sort of practical perception not fully within our
own control>.This conscious movement of thought in practical
reasoning,is not usually the effect of applying basic rationality
principles and striving for objects of primary needs and of
principles themselves,but rather is the activity of applying the
informal principles we raise on the head of subjective requirements
of reasoning,the limitations upon our passible actions whose
necessity we encounter in our practical perceptions.Basic
rationality principles, needs and goods, then, are usually the result
of practical reasoning, from informal principles of practical
reason,and do not themselves constitute the operation of practical
reason:they constitute the stance of one who has performed sound
practical reasoning.This is not to say that their role in practical
reasoning is never conscious and active,In moral reasoning,for
example,needs,goods and principles are often explicitly at
work. However,in most practical reasoning what is conscious is the
restructuring oi perception in terms of principles and needs, but by.
informal and subjectively grounded principles.
My theory is not 'another' theory of rationality.However.it does
contain a theory of one part of the structure of human nature which
constrains any possible conception of rationality.Human beings have
basic capacities for activity,including theoretical
activity,rationality,which confront us with the necessity of
satisfying certain needs.These needs are not - though they can be -
the objects of theory of rationality.To speak of satisfying them is
to speak of leading a life in which 1 ife,community,knowledge and
hope are the boundaries of rational choices.A rationality which
preaches them (cf.Midglev.Beast and Man) is empty because it
preaches only the conditions of its own existence,and this is to
make the object of rationality rationality itself and the
preservation of rationality.These primary needs are never satisfied
once and for all (cf.A.Maslow.Motivation and Personality.Hew
York;1954,p.58),but they must in their own way be satisfied because
there is an ethical requirement to this effect.This special sort of
satisfaction can be understood from the experience of practical
reasoning in which the very general and unself-conscious pattern of
these needs,and of others,involved in our perception of a practical
situation is made more specific,usually not through a making
conscious of these needs themselves, when we reflect on our
practical involvement in context of the principles of our
conception of rationality.This autonomous determination of
practical involvements is the heart of practical reasoning.It
suggests that satisfying rationality-needs is not something which
can be accomplished.but is the leading of a life in the practical
situations of which these needs are constantly brought to
reflective and specific prominence through the various ways of
restructuring perception by principle or by judgement.
It cannot be too highly emphasised that we can produce no stable or
universal calculus for practical reasoning.This is first because of
its creative operation as the re-structurer of perception,It
achieves its results as creative solutions to problematic
perceptions.This often involves personal and skilled judgement for
which no fixed or universal algorithms can be given.And second
because of the fact that the basic principles through which we
pursue practical reasoning depend upon particular conceptions of
rationality.Restructuring perception is not only specific to
individual human beings,but also,in important ways,to different
communities. Since basic rationality principles differ with
conceptions of rationality,and these differ with
communities,initial perception of practical situations cannot be
specified independent of particular rational frameworks,and
therefore no fixed practical calculus can be advanced.
This is as much as we can say about practical reasoning without
committing ourselves to a particular conception of rationality.At
the most, we might say that what has been said here is a 'pre-
theory' of reasoning:it concerns nothing substantive,but the nature
of practical reason given the structural relation of rationality
and needing.There is much which could still be said about the
operations of reason concerning exactly which means we ought to
take to do what we have decided ought to be done.This topic,which
forms the largest contribution of modern analytic philosophy to the
question of practical rationality,is less interesting,and much less
a manifestation of a particularly human rationality than a sort of
simple theoretical efficiency calculation which could be reproduced
by agents not at all like ourselves.Questions of success and
failure in such reasoning would form a supplement to my
work.However,these questions concern a different set of problems
from those which I have been discussing.
Z.<h1
AppgrxliK^L.




U^ <j( irs fax n <4a/k
A
ETHICS
CummuM Lo^fi «>\ of











Arrarw/i Ik\ OCA c-A f"<L fkft. ditnLcTi av\ of <^Xpl«/*,a f(V* ,
Appendix a.
The Problem of Abortion
It will help to clarify my account of morality by illustrating
it,in the only way in which it can be illustrated, with discussion
of a problem for agents within our, my, particular morality and
discussion of how within this morality we can go about solving the
problem.
There is a moral problem of abortion.It is a problem because people
concerned with abortion,personally or professionally,regularly ask
'what should I do?' where this is not simply an appeal for a
statement of what is usually done concerning abortions,but an
appeal to existing standards for guidance.That is,this appeal is
not for an answer to be handed down,but tor a principle to be
advanced upon which the agent may rely and which gives her a basis
for making a decision of her own concerning what to do. The
appeal,for anyone aspiring not just to know an answer but to answer
a problem for herself,is not solely either a rational on a moral
appeal.However,when the problem is a personal one,the appeal is
usually and primarily a rational one - 'what do 1 (really; want to
do/what would it be best for me to do?' - and secondarily,often
only after the initial decision is taken,a moral one - 'what ought
one,and especially I,to do here?'.Appeal to morality is generally
secondary when we have a personal problem not because morality is
'too theoretical' in the first instance,but precisely because
morality is not primarily theoretical,and the first human
involvement is always theoretical.The appeal to rationality is
first to the 'dominant conception',the norms of rationality we
share;this is inevitable.The moral appeal is to the practices and
forms of understanding in which we share in everyday life.and which
we recognise as our morality. Even moral problems,then, are first
problems which appeal to rationality,and only secondarily to
morality when we recognise consciously the claim of morality to be
the correct branch of discourse to provide a solution.
The more savage and intractable moral problems owe their difficulty
to the falseness of an agent's morality,or the intervention of
rational norms in her moral practices and understandings,or the
tumultuous interaction of elements of one morality with elements of
another.To all moral problems there is a solution:there is never
not something which is an ethical answer.Serious problems result
from rationality/morality or morality/morality conflicts which
obscure our understanding of how conduct in accordance with a true
morality is an expression of the laving experiences it promotes.
An appeal to our rationality about abortion,where the specification
of 'our' is something like western,capitalist democracies, is an
appeal to a conception of rationality which in the area of choices
affecting others has as a fundamental norm the principle of persons
and what is due to them.That is,we have a concept of the person
which functions as a rational norm in cases of action affecting the
fate of others,and this norm places a limitation upon our rational
actions.Other fundamental norms of our conception of rationality -
principles of self-advancement and economic independence,oi
righting severe injustices to disadvantaged individuals and
\
groups, of duties to the developing world - seem to exist along-side
this norm and to be fairly comfortably made consistent with it by
informal theorists and social leaders as well as by philosophical
theorists.This concept of the person is historically a Christian
understanding of human 1iie:wherever human life is,and whatever
form and character it has,that is a human being,and human beings
function as fundamental norms in practical reasoning.
This is the concept which the Catholic Church maintains and makes
quite fundamental to so much of the practical reasoning concerning
others which it promotes.Where there is human life,that is,from
conception onwards.be it in the womb,or in the form of baby or
adult,or suffering mental and physical defects,or perfectly
healthy,there is a complete human being because,'any discrimination
based on the various stages of life is no more justified than any
other discrimination.' (references to Let Me Live.Declaration on
Procured Abortion,confirmed Paul Sixth,1974).The very first fruit
of conception is a human being lacking nothing because the level of
life that is its humanity is 'a level of life that is more profound
(than temporal life) and cannot end.' Quite simply,'it would never
be made human if it were not human already.' The Church argues that
since a human being is present from the moment of conception,and
'the child itself,when grown up,will never have the right to choose
suicide',then "no more may his parents choose death for the child
while it is not of an age to choose for itself.' This
existence,beyond appearances,of a human being at conception means
that the traditional prohibition 01 unjust killings is extended to
al1 human life,and that instead of upholding a fundamental norm
forbidding the unjust taking of human lite,a norm of injustice,the
Church tends to uphold a fundamental norm of persons:of respecc for
human life,for human beings as such.This is the thinking upon which
the Church proclaims abortion and inianticide to be 'abominable
crimes' (Gauaium et Spes.Pastoral Constitution,51).
This conception of a person,though now not commonly with its
Catholic justification,is a fundamental norm of our ratianaiity.lt
is clear to me that whatever other basic principles we possess,we
do possess the principle of absolute respect far human beings,even
at a level 'beneath' their temporal lives and psychological
individuality,though many of us have lost the theological
vocabulary for making this level intelligible.It - ana here we have
to remember it is itself a highly moral conception for us - exists
along with another conception of the person which for many is
embedded in our specifically moral practices and iorms of
understanding and explanation.This is the post-Cartesian,empiricist
concept of personhood as an attribute of a human being;a
personality,a developing character for whose present stage of
development the individual has certain
responsibilities.Paradoxically,though I believe this is the concept
of the person currently embodied in practices and habits of
treating individuals and in the structures oi political,legal and
welfare institutions of much contemporary morality,it is much less
'moral',at least less likely to excite moral emotions,than
the,above,rational, conception.
We must recall here that morality is very much a game-concept; a
concept whose vagueness is its virtue.Morality is equally a
particular tight system of formal social patterns and institutions
W
( what we might call an etiquette,or a bureaucratic morality ),and
a broad cultural range of habits and lorms of explanation which
ignores social,national and denominational boundaries.When I speak
of the concept of the person embodied in contemporary morality,I
mean that it so happens that it is enshrined in the practices and
used in the explanations of a number of moral'ities, of different
sorts and extent of membership,which agree,or which merge in at
least this respect.These range from the broad morality which is the
culture of the economically developed democracies to the morality
which is the formal dogma of the Catholic Church to the morality
which is the responses and customs of the United States'
fundamentalist to the morality which is the 'lifestyle' of the
English 1980's money-professional.
The particular complexities of the problem of abortion arise
because the rational appeal obviously cannot be only to the
rational norms which in our case include the norm of personhood
(person l),but also must be to the moral conception,person
2,insofar as this aspect of morality is functioning as a factor
within present day theoretical enquiry concerning action likely to
aifect others.To the degree to which our moral understanding is a
matter of concern and enquiry to us,it enters our rationality,the
exercise of our capacity for theoretical activity.It is certain
that person 1 has been for a long time on the way to being replaced
with something like person 2.This is partly due to the demise of
the churches,decrease in religious habits,the fragmentation and
decreasing membership of particular moralities,and sustained,un-
policed technological advance.We have not yet,however,reached the
stage where it is a principle of our rational beliefs about conduct
that humanity alone is not sufficient to entail inviolability but
requires an additional attribute of personhood which human beings
may not possess.The two conceptions of the person,then,frequently
clash in our rational appeals depending on the extent to which our
morality is an object of rational concern to us.
There are also difficulties with the moral appeal lodged in the
question of one trying to solve the abortion problem.A morality
which awards an important position to person 2 may be affected by
the influence of other surrounding moralities which do not do
this,or which attach importance to concepts incompatible with
person 2.This is a consequence of morality's game-nature,the porous
character of its boundaries.Also,the morality will be conditioned
by the effect of the ethical requirement that we be rational - that
we adhere to the norms oi rationality.Where the rational norms do
not cohere with the principles oi our moral habits,we will feel the
obligation to play our part in developing harmony. The more mixed
and complex our community in respect of its rational and moral
roots - the richer the assortment of moralities and the more
intense the theoretical involvement oi its members - the greater
will be the difficulties of one suffering from the abortion
problem.Our membership of different communities,and the claims of
communities to have us as a member, will certainly torment unless we
live at a time of progressive moral and moral/rational harmony or
unless we make this a central aim of much of our personal decision
making.
If we accept that our society is a complex structure of
communities,and that a decision in the problem of abortion is
tt\
difficult because of the incompatible concepts of the person and
the other moral and rational complexities I have
described,how,typically,would we go about making such a decision?
The key to this is that moralities can be evaluated by some
standard external to themselves,but rationality cannot be.The
response,or responses,we find ourselves or others making to our
moral appeals can be judged a/ rationally,by appeal to elements of
our conception of rationality,and b/ by ethical assessment of our
morality through our knowledge of ethical goods and the standard of
the communication of individuals as individuals.Bow.it is a
consequence of my thesis that rational criticism of morality
entails of itself no necessary alteration of the morality: it is
always possible to ignore rationality and pursue morality. How could
it not be possible? So,the value of rational criticism here cannot
alone be relied upon.However,ethical criticism cannot be ignored
because it is criticism of a morality as deficient with respect to
what a morality is.
We must note that the object of such criticism is not a moral
judgement,but a morality. We do not assess an individual judgement
because what concerns us are the reasons behind the judgement, the
basis on which it has been made.The moral judgement does not
typically contain within its form its own justification,and it is
the principles of this justification that we must assess in order
to assess a judgement. Evaluation of a moral judgement,then, is
actually evaluation of the practices and explanations which justify
it in order to discover if this justification is one which makes
the judgement sound.If the morality which justifies a moral
judgement implies or sanctions a loss of,or diminution in,the
respect of others for individuality and true moralities,the
existence of family life,value of procreation and sexual
discernment, the values of knowledge and privacy,consideration for
the primary needs of others,then the morality is false,and the
judgement unsound to the extent to which its justification is based
on false principles.
There is a great deal of vagueness here:in the way in which the
morality implies violation of ethical goods;the nature and degree
of relevant harms;the form and consequences of respect;the
specification of the extent to which true moralities must promote
each of these goods.This vagueness is essential if we remember a/
that the ethical level cannot be specified except through the terms
of a particular morality, and b/ we cannot specify in advance of,or
outwith,membership of a particular morality what the form and
features of that morality are.The way in which the goods are
morally interpreted,the extent to which they must be pursued,the
ways in which action fails to show respect can only be specified
inside the limitations of a particular moral context.lt is worth
making clear that even in the context of a particular morality what
we ask is not 'does this practice respect this good?',but 'does it
fail to respect it? Is the achievement of such and such a good
incompatible with,or judged incompatible with,the pursuit of this
practice?' We seek to show departures from respect and not to
detail requirements of respect because ot the impossibility of
providing moral specifications outside of the morality in
question.In the case of our morality,if it justifies the judgement
that the woman ought to have an abortion,we must ask whether the
reasons for this are,or are judged,incompatible with respect for
individuality and the other goods as these are interpreted in our
morality.This evaluation we will perform,depending on our own
characters,either more at the level of our experiences of love,or
more at the level of our ethical understanding.
If the area of morality which we examine fails in its expression of
respect for any of these goods,and it is the justification of the
moral judgement,then the judgement is unsound because based on
false principles (If the moral practices in question have affected
the formation of the judgement.it is thereby unsound;if they have
not.it is unsound because it lacks,so far, moral justification).
I certainly believe that there are presently,and have been in the
past, circumstances in which person 2 plus other fundamental
principles justify the abortion decision and the morality of which
these are part does not entail relevant violation of the ethical
goods.There are also situations in which the circumstances of the
woman means that this morality cannot justify the decision to have
an abortion not because the practices and principles are in
themselves objectionable with respect to the ethical goods, but.
because they are objectionable with respect to the goods in that
they make no provision for adjustments in the face of particular
circumstances.That is,where the morality justifies the abortion
decision,as it has done,in later pregnancies,in cases of medical
interference or interference by the state through the financial and
other constraint of womens' choices,in cases where relevant parties
suffer from ignorance or serious family difficulties,or in which
the basic needs of some individual are not considered,then,even ii
it has previously appeared true and,in different
circumstances, capable of implying sound judgements in the abortion
problem,the morality shows itself to be false in its principles
regarding abortion.It implies lack of respect for
individuality, family life,privacy, knowledge and needs.
What this means is not that a morality requires prescience with
respect to all possible human contingencies in order to be true and
capable of justifying moral judgements,but that any morality, even
if apparently true,must constantly be the abject of ethical
evaluation in order that it can adjust and alter itself to the
changing concrete,particular situations of its members.Moralities
not only have fuzzy boundaries,but their boundaries are 'set'
reflectively by their members in response to constant ethical
evaluation.
The major complications begin when we remember most people will not
want this decision to be issued automatically from impersonal
calculation of current morality ana their circumstances,bur will
want to themselves make it,to make it rationally.They wiil do this
either by forming a decision concerning the abortion in question
based upon rational norms and then comparing this with their,quite
autonomously farmed,moral judgement for consistency,or by applying
practical reasoning to the moral principles embedded in their moral
practices and understandings in order to discover whether these are
not only ethically acceptable (true),but also rationally
justified.If they are rationally justified,they not only justify
the moral judgement concerning abortion,but justify this to the
reasoner•
v
It is ior this reason that the rational appeal is typically merged
with the moral appeal.The agent wants herseli to make the moral
response:she wants it not only to be a sound judgement,and Iron a
true morality,but she wants that morality to be hers and the
judgement made by her.If she wants the judgement not only to issue
through her but to be her own, she must herself" be in control of its
formation. She must propose and believe the premises, collect the
relevant evidence, form the judgement using relevant skills,and
believe in it.That is,she must perform the appropriate piece of
practical reasoning in the context of this situation in which her
action will affect others.
We should remember that not all the cases in which we make a moral
judgement have the character Df practical reasoning.We need not
believe the premises,collect information of relevance to us or
believe the conclusion.We can merely report the judgement, having
formed it more or less unthinkingly in accordance with the
practices which we,more or less unthinkingly,adhere to.Personally,I
have until recently so formed my moral judgement on the subject of
contraception, based upon Catholic morality,and filtered
unthinkingly through practical reason.
However,interest,personal or professional,in the abortion problem
is unlikely not to be also an appeal to rationality, and to
rationality first,or an embedded appeal to rationality through
moral practical reasoning.Whether the appeal is directly to
rational norms or to moral norms requiring practical reasoning,the
same question of the conduct which rational norms imply is what is
at issue. Their implication,unlike the moral judgement,cannot be
something I can unthinkingly accept,because the rational norms have
validity and intelligibility to me only so far as I have
involvement with them as standards and methods of enquiry and
explanation.Part of the problem of joining relevant theoretical
activity is that beginning with my accepted norms,I am not required
to take these as indubitable starting points but am encouraged to
suitably explore,even alter,these in connection with perceived
facts of ray situation. What I am required to do in bringing conduct
into accord with rational norms is to consider the ways in which
forms of conduct which suggest themselves will be reinforcing and
confirming the requirements of the dominant conception and the
pattern of satisfaction of conditions-for-rationality (the
'rationality-needs') associated with it. I must then ask whether
this reinforcement and conf irmation, and in particular the ratio of
satisfying rationality's requirements to its conditions (the
needs),appears to accord with the perceived character of ray
situation as I perceive this in the light of present rational
norms.Depending on the answer to this,I may in my conduct confirm
the rational norms, or initiate revision of them.
In contemporary thought about abortion one of the starting points
we have is the principle based upon person 1 that the unborn
child,as we refer to it in the light of this principle,be not
killed.Person 1 is now always in process of more or less radical
reinterpretation due to technological and medical developments,and
may not survive for much longer,but so far it is still a norm in
that part of our rationality concerning conduct that will affect
others that abortion should be avoided,and that where it is
performed the conditions should be perceived as 'special' or
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1extraordinary',like excusing conditions at law,rather than as
normal and foreseeable,It may be that our circumstances - moral
worries about population,lack of income, heavy demand on
housing,emotional disturbance - the perception of which may have
person 2 as a contributory factor,imply that fallowing person 1
here is prejudicing principled action over important perceived
facts of need,desire and emotion.Then the rational principles
involved should and will be altered by me to accommodate the
demands of my situation.Such alterations when they are common and
have support will lose the accompaniments of guilt and shame and
issue as revisions in the conception of rationality.The important
point is that the rational response cannot be merely 'read off':if
we are to make a rational decision,our 'use' of rational norms is
an actual involvement with them in which we may well find ourselves
reconstructing them.
When the appeal is made not in practical reasoning but directly to
rational norms, there need be no moral involvement - just as there
can be a straightforward moral appeal and moral response returned
without rational involvement. Even when our perceptions require that
we revise rational norms this is passible without appeal to moral
norms:the perceptions need not involve any perception of facts
about human communicative relationships.In this case the rational
response and the moral response which has been returned may
clash.This happens frequently in the abortion debate,where it is
intelligible as the clash of person 1 with person 2,and there is no
reason here why we ought to ignore either the rational response or
the response of a true morality.As things stand,this is an example
of irresoluble conflict;there is no neutral criterion of personhood
which might solve the issue for the alternatives at issue are two
different concepts of person and are instantiated and understood in
different sorts of ways.The only course is to consider whether the
rational response violates any of the ethical goods - there are
many circumstances where preserving the life of person 1 might do
this - and if so to reject it.However,this moral solution is
obviously not rationally required,and we are open here to rational
self-criticism.This raises the question of how important this
is,which I do not want to consider here.If,however,no ethical goods
are violated,this strongly suggests the existence of
another,background morality exerting strong influence through my
rationality,and one incompatible with my own morality. There is a
moral conflict.
My approach to moral conflict is that it is a conflicting case of
membership of two or more moral communities.It then becomes a
straightforward matter of self-identification.This,I think,must be
the case since morality is a game concept.There can be no strict
demarcation between moralities,and therefore no sharp resolutions
of moral conflicts,but only acts of self-identification - itself a
moral concept.
When the appeal to rationality is in the form of a moral appeal
which we are attempting to make a piece of our practical
reasoning,the appeal always entails ethical commitment a/ because
we must evaluate,ethically,the morality as true,and b/ because our
practical reasoning depends upon principles of rationality which
entail a certain pattern of satisfaction of rationality-needs which
is an ethical requirement (practical reasoning here is not
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sufficient for revising rational norms;the pattern of need-
satisfaction these embody is therefore not in question here,but
rather relied upon;.In this case,we are not merely assessing the
impact of our moral judgement upon rationality,but considering
whether and how it satisfies the principles of rationality; whether
it is compatible with the satisfaction of rationality-needs which
our conception of rationality embodies; and whether as well as its
ethical acceptability it is part of a system of morality which
implies a rational (by our rationality's terms; coordination of
responses to particular,concrete situations with our theoretical
involvements.
In practical reasoning concerning the problem of abortion we must
a/ bring into reflective prominence the particular structure of
satisfaction of primary rationality-needs our conception of
rationality upholds;b/ bring into reflective prominence the
requirements and implications of our rational norms;c/ compare the
suggested moral judgement to rationality-need satisfaction and the
satisfaction of the requirements of the norms;d/ if the two
elements in c/ are compatible, consider whether the particular
understanding of the ethical goods in question,the morality, is a
rational solution to the problem of balancing our theoretical
involvements,our rationality, with our moral life (d/ is necessary
for otherwise we are merely rationalising an isolated decision:if
we are actually to make the judgement in the course of our
practical reasoning,irrespective of whether we have made the same
judgement before on different grounds,we must consider the grounds
of its justification in relation to our rationality).Having done
this successfully,we will have a moral judgement which is
rationally acceptable,and which is representative of a morality
compatible with our rationality.Ve may then as a conclusion form
this moral judgement - perhaps for the first time; perhaps for the
first time rationally.
However,we may not.Even if the reasoning is successful - and it is
notoriously difficult to bring off either in philosophy or in
practical life - we may fail to form the judgement.External fears
and factors may intervene - passion,apathy,moral weakness in the
face of decision,ignorance of the rationalising of the judgement
being sufficiently complete.Or we might simply feel that though
compatible,our rationality and morality are just too far apart for
us to make a rational commitment to the judgement without suffering
symptoms of rational betrayal,or 'intellectual weakness' in
resorting primarily to morality in questions of conduct affecting
others.Of course our reading of certain over-intellectualist
philosophers may help to fuel these prejudices.When the reasoning
is successful,however,we have reasoning proceeding from a true
morality by means of the principles of the rationality the agent
professes and participates in,and the possibility of this outcome
is enough to inspire the personal,if not the professional,search
for moral practical reasoning.
I will give an imaginary sample of such reasoning concerning
abortion,which,I hope,is the reasoning I would have myself to take
given involvement in such circumstances.
A/The theoretical enquiries in which I participate,the norms of
rationality from which I reason,entail as the form of their
satisfaction of rationality-needs that reflection and enquiry ought
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to be pursued tirelessly but not as mere means to knowledge-
accumulation, but as the best way to an understanding of all the
human life-processes,in particular,the reflective capacities;that
is,they ought to be pursued as the best expression of,and
reinforcer of,hope in our own future;they also entail that life
should be valued very highly,but that where life is
secure, individualism ought not therefore to be encouraged,but
rather we should turn to the quality of life of the whole community
and surrounding communities.
B/the particular requirements and implications of rationality for
me are that my life should go forward,particularly in its
intellectual and creative aspects;that no harm should be done to
any human beings,where harm is determined by western professionals
whose job this is;that all conditions,especially chronic
loneliness,from which human beings suffer should be tackled by
governments who give this equal priority with economic
prosperity;that intellectuals engage in the task of demonstrating
the compatibility of material prosperity with the values in terms
of which we understand ourselves and others;that scientists be paid
and equipped to expose and replace all pseudo-science within our
technological world.
B/ is no list of 'objective goods' but simply the contingently
determined list of basic norms of rationality as I represent them
to myself.A/ is how I understand the conditions which must be
satisfied if there is to be rationality.A/ is inevitably determined
by the content of B/:it is the set of self-reflective norms of
rationality.In my imaginary reasoning I would have to compare to A/
for compatibility and to B/ for satisfaction a certain proposed
moral judgement(s) to the effect that in these her/my circumstances
the woman concerned ought/not to have an abortion.Having found a
straightforward compatibility of abortion in these circumstances
with the ends which A/ and B/ express,I would go on to consider
whether,by the terms of A/ and B/,the (true) morality which
justifies the moral judgement is a rational solution to the problem
of balancing rationality,theoretical involvement with the norms of
B/,with morality,the understanding of communication of individuals
as individuals in particular,concrete situations which the morality
articulates.If the morality does indicate by the terms of the
principles of rationality a form of community life in which
rationality and morality are balanced,I/she may form the moral
judgement as the conclusion of our practical reasoning.I would
certainly then have as high a degree of the rationalising of a
moral judgement as is possible.For completeness I will indicate
outlines of morality which I would use in this imaginary reasoning.
C/The understanding of the ethical goods that my morality gives me
is that a/individuals and customs ought to be personalised and
localised as far as possible,and alternative true moralities ought
to be learned from,and where more successful than ours,their
principles adopted;b/the nature of the family ought to be studied
and suggestions made concerning how those who do not or cannot lead
a family life in our present context might be enabled to share in
the benefits of this irreplaceable framework and foundation;also
such studies should examine the best ways and numbers,lor all
concerned,of having,rearing and educating children;c/the state
ought to define privacy over property as the pre-eminent legal
norm;d/society ought to allow knowledge to be pursued even,and
especially,where it is not clear what this is for.and should
encourage this;e/the primary needs of individuals should be
satisfied not as one item within the political agenda,but,as the
concept of such needs requires,by a constant vigilance against
their violation in the processes of decision making.
Assuming a moral judgement that an abortion ought to be procured is
discovered by me to be compatible with A/ and B/, I have the task of
determining whether C/ is compatible with A/ and B/ by their
terms. I must ask whether the understanding C/ provides is both a
particularisatlon of the principles of theoretical activity and the
satisfaction of rationality-needs as these determine the relation
of rationality to morality within my life,and a generalisation of
these to the level not just of one aspect of life and community,but
of determinants of harmony of rationality with morality. If it
is,the judgement in favour of an abortion is not only morally
justified,but a rational decision,in virtue of my practical
reasoning.If it is not,the moral judgement is not one I am
rationally required to make.
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